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






# DISHONOURLED LEGACY

The Lessons of the Somalia Affair



Report of the  
Commission of Inquiry into the  
Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia

Volume 3





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Commission of Inquiry into the  
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## NOTE TO READERS

### Military Ranks and Titles

In recounting events and reporting on testimony received, this report refers to many members of the Canadian Forces by name, rank and, sometimes, title or position held. Generally, we have used the rank and title in place at the time of the Somalia deployment or at the time an individual testified before this Commission of Inquiry, as appropriate. Thus, for example, the ranks mentioned in text recounting the events of 1992–93 are those held by individuals just before and during the deployment to Somalia, while ranks mentioned in endnotes are those held by individuals at the time of their testimony before the Inquiry.

Since then, many of these individuals will have changed rank or retired or left the Canadian Forces for other reasons. We have made every effort to check the accuracy of ranks and titles, but we recognize the possibility of inadvertent errors, and we apologize to the individuals involved for any inaccuracies that might remain.

### Source Material

This report is documented in endnotes presented at the conclusion of each chapter. Among the sources referred to, readers will find mention of testimony given at the Inquiry's policy and evidentiary hearings; documents filed with the Inquiry by government departments as a result of orders for the production of documents; briefs and submissions to the Inquiry; research studies conducted under the Inquiry's commissioned research program; and documents issued by the Inquiry over the course of its work.

**Testimony:** Testimony before the Commission of Inquiry is cited by reference to transcripts of the Inquiry's policy and evidentiary hearings, which are contained in 193 volumes and will also be preserved on CD-ROM after the Inquiry completes its work. For example: Testimony of LCol Nordick, Transcripts vol. 2, pp. 269–270. Evidence given at the policy hearings is denoted by the letter 'P'. For example: Testimony of MGen Dallaire, Policy hearings transcripts vol. 3P, p. 477P.

Transcripts of testimony are available in the language in which testimony was given; in some cases, therefore, testimony quoted in the report has been translated from the language in which it was given.

**Documents and Exhibits:** Quotations from some documents and other material (charts, maps) filed with the Inquiry are cited with a document book number and a tab number or an exhibit number. These refer to binders of documents assembled for Commissioners' use at the Inquiry's hearings. See Volume 5, Chapter 40 for a description of how we managed and catalogued the tens of thousands of documents we received in evidence.

Some of the references contain DND (Department of National Defence) identification numbers in lieu of or in addition to page numbers. These were numbers assigned at DND and stamped on each page as documents were being scanned for transmission to the Inquiry in electronic format. Many other references are to DND publications, manuals, policies and guidelines. Also quoted extensively are the *National Defence Act* (NDA), Canadian Forces Organization Orders (CFOO), Canadian Forces Administrative Orders (CFAO), and the *Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces* (which we refer to as the *Queen's Regulations and Orders*, or QR&O). Our general practice was to provide the full name of documents on first mention in the notes to a chapter, with shortened titles or abbreviations after that.

**Research Studies:** The Commission of Inquiry commissioned 10 research studies, which were published at various points during the life of the Inquiry. Endnotes citing studies not yet published during final preparation of this report may contain references to or quotations from unedited manuscripts.

Published research and the Inquiry's report will be available in Canada through local booksellers and by mail from Canadian Government Publishing, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0S9. All other material pertaining to the Inquiry's work will be housed in the National Archives of Canada at the conclusion of our work.

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

This report contains many acronyms and abbreviations for government departments and programs and Canadian Forces elements, systems, equipment, and other terms. Generally, these names and terms are spelled out in full with their abbreviation or acronym at their first occurrence in each chapter; the abbreviation or acronym is used after that. For ranks and titles, we adopted the abbreviations in use in the Canadian Forces and at the Department of National Defence. A list of the acronyms and abbreviations used most often, including abbreviations for military ranks, is presented in Appendix 7, at the end of Volume 5.



## INTRODUCTION

Our examination of the manner in which Canada's participation in operations in Somalia was planned is central to our report. In our mandate we were asked to inquire into and report on the "operations, actions and decisions of the Canadian Forces and the actions and decisions of the Department of National Defence in respect of the Canadian Forces deployment to Somalia" and, in relation to the pre-deployment phase, to examine "the mission and tasks assigned to the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG)" and the "effectiveness of the decisions and actions taken by Canadian Forces leadership at all levels to ensure that the CARBG was operationally ready, trained, manned and equipped for its mission and tasks in Somalia".<sup>1</sup> To meet this objective we began from the earliest indications that Canada might become involved in United Nations activities in Somalia and followed the political, diplomatic, and military planning that led eventually to the arrival of members of the Canadian Forces in Somalia.

Tracing this story comprehensively was a complex aspect of our Inquiry. The process is technical and demands first a basic understanding of how Canada responds to requests for assistance from the international community, principally from the United Nations (UN). Then we were required to study the policies and guidelines that direct public servants and military officers who prepare advice in such matters for governments. Finally, we were required to delve into the process by which Canadian Forces officers consider, assess, organize, plan, and mount military operations.

What we might have considered an appropriate response was not an issue at this stage of our deliberations. Rather, we began by placing laws and regulations, government policies, departmental norms and standards, and military doctrine, principles, and orders beside the actual actions and decisions of officers and officials. Thus we were able to assess whether these actions



conformed to the norms set for officers and officials by governments and professional practice. From this point, it was possible to draw conclusions, about what occurred relative to what was required.

However, we were not restricted in our deliberations to this pattern of investigation alone. Where we discovered that no norms, policies, concepts, or doctrine guided actions, we remarked on this and drew conclusions. Moreover, where decisions and actions by senior officers and officials charged with planning Canada's activities in international affairs were found wanting, we also drew appropriate conclusions.

The result, therefore, is a well-documented explanation of how Canada plans and commits the Canadian Forces to international operations. It is mainly a report of how this activity was conducted by officers and officials in relation to the commitment to Somalia between late 1991 and 1993. The conclusions are significant, however, not only for Canadians' understanding of the planning of that mission and its impact on subsequent events, but also for how Canada might plan peace support operations for the Canadian Forces in the future. ('Peace support operations' is the generic term used in this report to describe the full range of mechanisms for conflict resolution and management, from preventative diplomacy to peace enforcement.)

## MISSION PLANNING: THE POLITICAL ASPECTS

Political decisions lead military activities. Governments decide when and under what circumstances the Canadian Forces (CF) will be employed. Normally decision making involves two closely related planning stages: a political process to assess the national interest and a military feasibility process. The government decides the political objective, allocates resources, arranges foreign aspects of the deployment where necessary, and assesses and assumes any risk to Canada. The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), as the military adviser to the government and head of the armed forces, assesses, in conjunction with the Deputy Minister of the Department of National Defence, the proposed operation in light of defence policy; assesses the resources needed; determines whether the operation is within the capability of the CF; develops a concept of the operation and plan within the government's guidelines or direction; then advises whether the CF can accomplish the mission.

Aspects of military planning can be undertaken concurrently with political decision making, but they must not pre-empt it. Nevertheless, the CDS is the government's sole military adviser, the principal professional expert who directly controls the military planning process and occupies a position of trust in the machinery of government. Governments can act without the advice

of the CDS if they choose, but they open themselves to criticism if they do, especially if the mission fails. Any decision to employ the CF is in practice a responsibility shared between the government of the day and the CDS and for which the government is accountable.

CF deployments on international missions usually pass through independent, though concurrent, stages. First comes international diplomatic recognition of a problem demanding the use of armed forces. Interested or involved states attempt to define the problem, to develop consensus concerning how it might be addressed, and to build a coalition that will bring political and, if necessary, military force to bear. Interested parties may negotiate the resources and the resolve to confront the problem, and through multilateral or international organizational auspices, states can indicate how and where they will contribute to an international mission or operation.

Second and concurrently, Canadian political leaders, officials, and military officers may assist and join the diplomatic initiative to advise diplomats and the government, clarify issues, and assess situations before Canada makes any firm commitments. Officers and officials brief the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Defence about the risks involved, the cost of the mission in resources and people, its duration, the terms of troop employment, and other technical information and may offer recommendations. Advice would be framed by policy established by governments before a crisis develops or a request for use of the CF is made.

Parliament usually debates questions of war and peace and may pass resolutions supporting the government's actions. Recently, governments have followed this practice whenever the CF have been deployed abroad on peace support operations.

Third and finally, the government instructs supporting departments and agencies and orders the Chief of the Defence Staff to deploy the Canadian Forces.

## MISSION PLANNING: THE MILITARY ASPECTS

Typically, the CDS anticipates a government's order to employ the CF and orders officers to plan, draft orders, concentrate units and resources, and train personnel at the same time as diplomats and governments prepare their part of the deployment. The CF has doctrine to guide officers through this process, and although officers need not follow the doctrine slavishly, each step in the process must be considered carefully. Where lack of time or other unavoidable circumstances preclude an adequate and prudent application of doctrine to a situation, other compensating measures must be adopted.

Effective staff work and supervision by senior officers ensure that the right unit, with proper orders, sufficiently supported, will arrive at the right place in time to complete the mission. However, if staff work is incomplete and commanders careless, missions are at risk and soldiers are put in danger. The final stage is the deployment itself, which can be complex and expensive.

## THE INQUIRY'S APPROACH

The question we consider is whether the Canadian Forces were deployed with due consideration for all aspects of the mission to Somalia, and whether soldiers and officers in units were given a fair chance to do their duty within the norms of military doctrine and practice.

This chapter reports comprehensively on all aspects of mission planning in relation to Canada's commitment to Somalia. It begins with a detailed review of the government structure for advising on international commitments and for preparing plans in the diplomatic and the military field. This is followed by an investigation of the decision to participate in the first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), and later in the UN-authorized but U.S.-led mission known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). In this opening section the focus is on the key factors that encouraged the government to accept a mission for the Canadian Forces and that ultimately shaped the military plan.

We then go on to review and explain the CF system, process, and procedures for planning operations. The CF has an established doctrine for operational planning, developed from warfare. This doctrine provides the basis for training, especially in staff colleges, and for staff organizations, and is applicable at all levels of command. A fundamental concept underpinning the planning system is the notion that commanders are responsible for establishing the mission for operations and for every facet of planning. In other words, according to doctrine and custom, the military plan for any operation is the commander's plan.

Then we examine the development of the operational plan for the Somalia deployment. This review begins with plans and orders issued in 1991 for Operation Python, the Canadian contribution to the UN mission for the referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and follows the changes in that plan to create plans for Operation Cordon and then Operation Deliverance. This history is important, because the final plan resulted from an unsteady manipulation of operational concepts and partly prepared plans for earlier operations.



The military planning process and the actions and decisions of leaders are then traced through National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), to Land Force Command (LFC), Land Force Central Area (LFCFA), the Special Service Force (SSF), and finally to the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR). Here we can see plainly the confusion of aims and concepts, the misapplied or outdated doctrine, the professional compromises, and the command inattention that led to a wholly inadequate operational plan for the deployment and employment of the Canadian Forces in Somalia.

Military planning should identify the most appropriate units for the mission at hand. It should also reveal where units need to be reinforced with troops, weapons, and other resources. In the section on force structure we examine the critical decisions made by the CDS and commanders relating to the strength of the force that would be deployed. Here we concentrate on the issue of the so-called manning ceiling, an arbitrarily imposed limit on the commitment. In the remaining sections we review and analyze planning decisions concerning military intelligence and logistical support. Finally we consider one aspect of the early deployment of the CARBG in Somalia, the decision respecting the layout of the camp.

## KEY FINDINGS

Findings are presented throughout the text in this volume, while recommendations are located at the end of each chapter. Significant key findings are outlined here as a guide to readers as they consider the text.

We reviewed the decision-making process in effect in 1992 and were dismayed by the lack of explicit doctrine articulating the process at NDHQ for responding to requests for Canadian Forces involvement in peace support operations. While defence policy required that certain criteria be taken into account in decisions, no formal process was in place to give effect to such policy. Thus when we traced the negotiations about and preparations for UNOSOM, the proposed United Nations-led deployment, we found that the planning process (with one exception) — though conducted in accordance with loosely acknowledged ad hoc procedures, including a review of the mission to determine CF capability — was concluded without adequate reference to government policy. The exception pertains to the initial decision not to accede to the UN request in April 1992, which we find was taken credibly and on reasonable grounds — that the situation and arrangements were insufficiently safe and secure to risk Canadian participation until at least that aspect of the criteria for a traditional peacekeeping operation could be met. We found further that the issue of security remained a key factor throughout the process leading to the decision to join UNOSOM.

However, with respect to Canadian participation in the Unified Task Force Somalia, the U.S.-led peace enforcement operation, we found a marked deterioration in the integrity of Canada's decision-making processes. UNITAF represented a radical escalation of the deployment in terms of mandate, mission, size, structure, authority, rules of engagement, and cost. Yet the decision to commit the CF was taken in a few days, on minimal analysis that paid no attention to even the doctrine and processes that had characterized the initial decision.

The documents we examined and witnesses we heard indicated that the decision to join hinged on the supposed readiness of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR)/Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG) and the fact that a Canadian ship was already en route to Somalia. The analysis had little to say about the fact that UNITAF involved our troops in potentially greater risks, under a more war-like UN Chapter VII mandate, with correspondingly enhanced rules of engagement, at costs borne by Canada rather than the UN.

Instead, we heard testimony about a focus on the readiness of the troops and a concern for how the decision would be received by the public. We believe that an attitude enunciated by the Chief of the Defence Staff, at the time, Gen John de Chastelain, was widespread during the decision-making process: "a role that was seen to be secondary would not sit well with the troops, with me, with the Government or with Canadians."<sup>2</sup>

We saw reckless haste and enthusiasm for high-risk, high-profile action undermining due process and rational decision making at the most senior levels. Doctrine, proven military processes, guidelines, and even policy were disregarded. What guidelines and checklists existed were treated with little respect. The deployment of the CF, therefore, began with an uncertain mission, unknown tasks, ad hoc command arrangements, an unconsolidated relationship to U.S. command, and unclear rules of engagement. An international commitment conceived originally in the Canadian tradition of peacekeeping was hastily reshaped into an ill-considered military operation for which the CAR/CARBG had little preparation.

## NOTES

1. Commission of Inquiry, Terms of Reference, P. C. 1995-442.
2. CDS Note to file, December 7, 1992, Document book 32A, tab 9.

## CANADA'S MISSION IN SOMALIA

The terms of reference for this Inquiry directed us to investigate the mission and tasks assigned to the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG), to assess the suitability of the unit for the mission, and required analysis of the operational readiness of the CARBG, the appropriateness of the training for deployment, and the leadership in preparation for the mission. Hence, a clear understanding of the mission is necessary.

In this chapter we review the decision-making process leading to Canada's agreement to participate first in the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), then in the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). In both instances, we focus on the role of the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF) and evaluate the decisions in light of the policies and procedures in effect at the time. Finally we examine the mission and tasks assigned to the Canadian contingent, first in relation to Operation Cordon and then in relation to Operation Deliverance.

We begin, however, with an overview of the policies and procedures in place at National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) and in the Department of External Affairs (DEA).<sup>1</sup>

### CANADA'S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

During the Somalia operation, there was no comprehensive doctrine for the process of examining a request from the UN. To determine NDHQ procedures at the time, we referred to a review of peacekeeping operations by NDHQ's Chief of Review Services, conducted around the time of the Somalia



operation.<sup>2</sup> The study confirmed our findings that there was no overall NDHQ policy instruction covering all aspects of peacekeeping operations. The study did find some relevant instructions, governing some aspects of peacekeeping, but they were considered outdated and poorly co-ordinated. This review and witnesses' testimony are the basis for the following discussion of decision making before and during the Somalia operation.

Cabinet determines the participation and scope of Canada's presence in UN peacekeeping operations, on the basis of advice and recommendations from DEA and DND.<sup>3</sup> The departments share the responsibility of advising Cabinet on the decision to participate, but DEA is responsible for relations with the UN as part of Canada's foreign policy and assumes the lead role in the decision-making process. In 1992, the senior DEA official immediately responsible for handling the UN request was the Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM), Political and International Security Affairs Branch. Within this Branch, the Director of International Security and Defence Relations Division, reporting through a director general, first analyzed the UN request from the perspective of Canada's foreign policy and then co-ordinated the government response.

Within NDHQ, the lead group principal for peacekeeping before a formal commitment was made was the ADM (Policy and Communications),<sup>4</sup> who reported jointly to the Deputy Minister and the CDS<sup>5</sup> and was primarily responsible for any decision taken by NDHQ. Once a commitment was accepted, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) assumed the lead and bore overall responsibility for the "coordination of planning, structuring, mounting, deployment, command and control, sustainment and redeployment of the force".<sup>6</sup>

## The UN Request

Daniel Dhavernas, who was Director of DEA's International Security and Defence Relations division in 1992, testified that once the UN accepts a request for action from a member state and is considering involvement in an operation, informal discussions with member states begin — particularly those with special expertise in the region or area or known to have appropriate military capabilities.<sup>7</sup> These informal initiatives are undertaken by the UN Secretariat, specifically the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Once the troop-contributing countries confirm their acceptance, a resolution is finalized for Security Council approval.

As division Director, Mr. Dhavernas would receive initial notification of a UN request for participation in a peacekeeping operation from Canada's permanent representative to the UN mission in New York. Thereafter, he

was responsible for co-ordinating Canada's response through discussions within DEA and with the Privy Council Office (PCO) and the UN. He would also act as liaison with DND through the Director International Policy (DI Pol), who reported to the ADM (Policy and Communications).<sup>8</sup> Thus in considering a commitment, the formal avenue of communication began with Canada's representative at the UN and went through the Political and International Security Affairs Branch (IFB) at External Affairs, to the group headed by the ADM (Policy and Communications) at DND (see Figure 24.1).

## Role of the Department of External Affairs

Mr. Dhavernas testified that on a request for commitment from the UN, the lead person at DEA would begin by notifying superiors and communicating with DI Pol at NDHQ, who was responsible for examining the request in terms of its "logistic and personnel capacities"<sup>9</sup> and co-ordinating NDHQ's mission analysis. At the same time, divisions of DEA — such as the one dealing with the geographic area in question — discussed the issue. The Privy Council Office was kept informed of negotiations and discussions but was not involved formally in the process until a decision was required. Then PCO called a meeting of DEA and DND.<sup>10</sup>


In considering a request, the foremost concern for DEA was that a commitment was in keeping with Canada's foreign policy, which supports the UN in conflict resolution by multilateral means. Other factors considered included Canada's policy toward, and influence in, the country or region; refugee and aid questions; and issues pertaining to the mandate of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).<sup>11</sup>

## Role of National Defence Headquarters

NDHQ analyzed the mission from both a policy and an operational perspective to respond to the informal UN request. In 1992, when plans were under way for UN involvement in Somalia, Canada had no single document outlining the policy and procedures for planning and conducting either traditional peacekeeping or other peace support operations. Each operation was considered unique, requiring one-time policy considerations.<sup>12</sup>

Col John Bremner, Director International Policy at NDHQ, during planning for the Somalia operation, testified on NDHQ's procedures with reference to the Somalia request.<sup>13</sup> DI Pol was central to the planning of all peacekeeping operations and had two roles: first, the mission was analyzed

Figure 24.1  
Lines of Communication for Decision-Making Process  
for Canadian Commitment in Somalia, Fall/Winter 1992





for consistency with Canada's defence policy; second, DI Pol co-ordinated the information and estimates prepared by the operations staff at NDHQ, who analyzed the mission from an operational perspective. Then DI Pol prepared the response, which would go up the chain of command, through the Director General Policy and Operations, the ADM (Policy and Communications), the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Deputy Minister to the Minister of National Defence. A letter to the Minister set out options and recommendations which, when approved, went to the DEA, which would then seek Cabinet approval of the response (see Figure 24.1).

According to military doctrine, there are four levels of peacekeeping planning in the process of developing a response to a UN request: Normal Phase, Indication Phase, Negotiation Phase, and Decision Phase.<sup>14</sup> The Negotiation Phase is most important. Frequent meetings are held at NDHQ to plan and co-ordinate departmental estimates and reports, prepare military options, and assess CF resources. A decision comes at the fourth phase. Thereafter, formal planning for the mission begins, with NDHQ responsible for the initial planning and pre-deployment. The primary agency for planning, organizing, and controlling the operation once the commitment has been made is the designated command, supported by joint staff at NDHQ for operational guidance.

## NDHQ Policy Analysis

Col Bremner testified that the policy analysis had three parts. First, the mission would be examined to ensure its consistency with Canada's defence policy objectives and to ascertain the likelihood that it would meet determinants of success necessary for UN operations.<sup>15</sup> Second, the operation would be assessed to determine whether it was logistically supportable. Finally, the mission would be examined to ensure proper funding and availability of troops.

NDHQ was guided by two main policy documents: the 1987 White Paper on Defence,<sup>16</sup> and the CDS Guidance to Commanders — the Red Book.<sup>17</sup> According to the 1987 White Paper on Defence, DND was required to consider seven criteria before participating in a peacekeeping mission:

- there must be a clear and enforceable mandate;
- the principal antagonists must agree to a cease-fire and agree to Canada's participation;
- the mandate should serve the cause of peace and have a good chance of leading to a political settlement in the long term;

- the size and composition of the force are appropriate to the mandate;
- Canadian participation will not jeopardize other commitments;
- there should be a single identifiable authority overseeing the operation; and
- participation in the mission must be equitably and logistically funded.<sup>18</sup>

DI Pol began the policy analysis by first consulting DEA, the UN (particularly the military adviser), and staff at NDHQ, members of the Crisis Action Team, including the DCDS group (who were mainly staff attached to the Directorate of Peacekeeping Operations), the personnel and logistics group, and the Judge Advocate General (JAG).<sup>19</sup> The aim of the consultations was to develop a co-ordinated response on the nature and extent of the proposed commitment.<sup>20</sup>

Theoretically, all proposed missions were to be weighed against the criteria, but the effectiveness of the process before the Somalia commitment is not clear. An evaluation by the Chief of Review Services, released in April 1992, noted a lack of clear division of responsibility between NDHQ and DEA in the application of the criteria and expressed pointed criticism about the lack of explicit policy direction and procedures.<sup>21</sup> This confusion was reflected in testimony before us.

Col Bremner testified that the policy analysis clearly included a consideration of the peacekeeping guidelines, the likelihood of success being the overriding consideration.<sup>22</sup> The testimony of both Gen (ret) de Chastelain, and Robert Fowler, the Deputy Minister of National Defence at the time, suggested a somewhat less rigorous approach.

When asked whether he would have assessed the Somalia operation against the guidelines, Gen de Chastelain stated that it was not the policy of the Department to go down the list of criteria like a checklist, but rather to consider them in a general way. He noted that he and his staff would know what the concerns were and would discuss the operation bearing them in mind. Furthermore, he considered that the guidelines were primarily within DEA's jurisdiction, while NDHQ simply ascertained whether a particular operation was "doable".<sup>23</sup>

Mr. Fowler also downplayed the significance of the guidelines in the decision-making process. In his view, the guidelines were taken into account only "somewhat, not in any particular detail". In fact, like Gen de Chastelain, he maintained that no one applied them like a checklist; by way of example, he noted that very few of them would have made sense if applied to Somalia,<sup>24</sup> since they were designed for traditional peacekeeping operations.<sup>25</sup> The former Deputy Minister maintained that the overarching concern in deciding whether to participate was that "1,000 to 3,000 people were dying a day and

it was going to get worse". The pressing situation required the guidelines to be "significantly" flexible.<sup>26</sup> However, we observe that some of the guidelines — for example, the requirement of a clear and enforceable mandate, equitable funding, the likelihood of success of the mission, and the relationship between this and Canada's other commitments — would still have had significant relevance in analyzing any potential commitment. Moreover, according to a 1992 defence policy paper, at NDHQ these guidelines ought to have been considered.<sup>27</sup>

Although UNITAF was the first peace enforcement operation in the post-Cold War era (the Gulf War being described more precisely as an enforcement action under current terminology<sup>28</sup>), the UN and Canada had been involved in more complex, multifunctional operations since 1988. The question that arises is why no new guidelines were produced until 1994. It appears that very little analysis of the changing nature of peacekeeping had been done up to this point. Yet the lack of attention within the CF to the doctrinal developments in peacekeeping was noted as early as 1983. A 1983 DND program evaluation noted that since the 1956–1966 period, Canada had done little with respect to study and development of peacekeeping. It suggested that "if the CF are to continue to participate, there would appear to be a need for active involvement in the study of activities and developments in the field...there is no identifiable professional focus or responsible OPI for doctrine development with respect to how these operations are and should be carried out, the application of new technology, the place of peacekeeping in arms control".<sup>29</sup>

Col Bremner also acknowledged in testimony that the guidelines were not meant to be etched in stone as formal criteria. He nonetheless stated that they were clearly factors to be considered in arriving at a reasoned decision in response to a request from the UN for a commitment to a planned peacekeeping operation.<sup>30</sup>

In any event, the revised criteria, set out in the 1994 Defence White Paper, did go some way toward reflecting the need to adapt to the changing nature of conflict and conflict resolution:

- there must be a clear and enforceable mandate;
- there must be an identifiable and commonly accepted reporting authority;
- the national composition of the force must be appropriate to the mission and there must be an effective process of consultation among mission partners;
- in missions that involve both military and civilian resources, there must be a recognized focus of authority, a clear and efficient division of responsibilities, and agreed operating procedures;



- with the exception of enforcement actions and operations to defend NATO member states, in missions that involve Canadian personnel, Canada's participation must be accepted by all parties to the conflict;
- the size, training and equipment of the force must be appropriate to the purpose at hand and remain so over the life of the mission; and
- there must be a defined concept of operations, an effective command and control structure, and clear rules of engagement.<sup>31</sup>

The application of the guidelines to Canada's commitment to UNOSOM and UNITAF is discussed later in this part.

## NDHQ Operational Analysis

The role of J3 staff was to examine the mission from an operational perspective.<sup>32</sup> DI Pol consulted with J3 staff, in particular J3 Peacekeeping,<sup>33</sup> to assess the mandate, size, and composition of the commitment, the CF's capability to provide the requested services, and the risk analysis. These elements gave ADM (Pol & Comm) operational data to formulate NDHQ's input to the joint Cabinet submission. Operational issues were normally assessed in written estimates or analyses, the components of which were not rigidly established, but as explained elsewhere in this chapter, were intended as a guide to rational analysis of the situation. Estimates identified the aim, assessed relevant factors, considered options, and outlined a course of action.

Along the way, DI Pol also prepared aides-mémoire — memoranda keeping senior personnel abreast of the situation and providing options for consideration by the CDS or DM before the final Cabinet submission.<sup>34</sup> DI Pol co-ordinated preparation of both the estimates and aides-mémoire, as well as any response to senior management.

Although DEA takes the lead in the decision-making process, both DEA and DND are inextricably linked throughout the process, and both departments consulted constantly with each other, as well as with the permanent representative of Canada for the United Nations and the UN military adviser in New York. Staff at NDHQ were responsible for preparing the estimates and analyses of the situation, but senior officials were actively involved in the issue and bore the ultimate responsibility for advice and recommendations. Thus, the views of the ADM (Pol & Comm), the DCDS, the CDS and the DM all played an important role in the final briefing presented to the Minister.

This was the framework for decision making that applied to NDHQ's decision-making process for Operation Cordon and Operation Deliverance. In the next section we describe that process and discuss the factors that influenced it.

## THE DECISION TO PARTICIPATE

The formal Canadian commitment to UNOSOM, designated Operation Cordon, did not occur until late August 1992, following extensive negotiations between UN and Canadian representatives in the preceding months. The formal commitment to participate in UNITAF was made on December 4, 1992. This section examines Canada's decisions to join UNOSOM, then UNITAF, primarily from the perspective and involvement of NDHQ. We conclude the section by analyzing the effectiveness and appropriateness of the decision-making process, with respect to changes in the mission and Canada's decision to participate.

### How Canada's Decision to Participate in UNOSOM was Made

Although UN involvement in Somalia began in early 1992, and a formal UN mission was established in April 1992, Canada's commitment to the mission was not made definitively until August. In April 1992, despite public pressure, Canada was reluctant to commit personnel to the operation without UN confirmation of adequate security for the military personnel. Since this confirmation was not originally forthcoming, Canada declined to participate. Canada agreed to participate only after the Security Council explicitly authorized the deployment of security personnel in addition to the original observer force. This section considers the decisions taken by NDHQ in the period leading to the final version of UNOSOM and examines the factors considered by NDHQ in arriving at those decisions.

### Establishment of UNOSOM

During the early months of 1992, officials at DEA and NDHQ monitored the tragedy unfolding in Somalia. Following the usual practice, Canada was approached to contribute military observers to the proposed UN operation in Somalia before the UN resolution was adopted. The UN plan was to send 50 unarmed observers to monitor the cease-fire agreement signed by the rival factions in Mogadishu, supported by a security battalion. However, the factions had not agreed to the deployment of the security battalion.

According to Col Bremner, after officials considered the criteria, NDHQ recommended that Canada not participate because of significant security, safety, and support concerns. Col Bremner testified that there were significant concerns about the viability of sending 50 unarmed observers into a place like Mogadishu.<sup>35</sup>

On the basis of reports received, particularly the report of the UN technical team, prepared after a visit to Somalia in March and April 1992, DI Pol submitted a briefing note for consideration by the CDS and the DM.<sup>36</sup> After considering the note, the CDS and the DM recommended to the Minister that he advise the Secretary of State for External Affairs to decline the UN's informal request.<sup>37</sup> The Minister accepted the advice. The mission failed to meet the criteria on three fronts: the mandate for UNOSOM was uncertain; the agreements obtained from the chief antagonists in Somalia were doubtful (given that one of them, General Aidid, had not formally accepted the security battalion); and, most important from NDHQ's perspective, serious safety concerns had already been acknowledged by senior personnel at the UN.<sup>38</sup>

On receiving the advice from DEA and DND, the Clerk of the Privy Council, Paul Tellier, outlined the situation in a memorandum for the Prime Minister and included the reservations of DEA and DND about inadequate security arrangements.<sup>39</sup> Mr. Tellier noted that since the operation failed to meet the established criteria, and Canada's concerns had been made known to the UN, it was unlikely that Canada would be approached formally to participate in the mission.

Planning for the deployment of the military observers continued at the UN, with a target date of May 15, 1992. Though not a participant in UNOSOM, Canada continued to monitor the situation.

## UNOSOM Revised

From May through early July 1992, UNOSOM was unable to establish itself effectively in Mogadishu.<sup>40</sup> Faced with serious humanitarian imperatives, the UN was considering authorizing a much expanded operation, outside Mogadishu, within four proposed operational zones.<sup>41</sup> In response to a specific request from the Privy Council Office to determine whether something could be done to support humanitarian assistance operations in Somalia,<sup>42</sup> Gen de Chastelain directed the joint staff at NDHQ to conduct a feasibility study on July 28, 1992, to determine CF capability to provide a battalion to Somalia, should one be required.<sup>43</sup> Before he issued the direction, there was considerable discussion following the NDHQ daily executive meeting (DEM) about whether the CF should be involved at all, even at this stage. The CDS offered his reassurance by confirming that Canada would not send observers without a security battalion.<sup>44</sup>

Members of the joint staff were directed to investigate specific issues within certain parameters and to report within 24 hours.<sup>45</sup> The staff provided the information the following day, and in their view, subject to certain qualifications, the CF had the capability to provide assistance to Somalia. Other than the security issue, there was no indication that peacekeeping



criteria were considered at this point. Planning remained at the contingency level, since Canada had not yet made a decision and no request had been received from the UN. The following estimates and analyses were prepared:

- Aide-Mémoire on Somalia (July 28, 1992),<sup>46</sup> in which the ADM (Pol & Comm) recommended that DND could provide support by way of a security battalion; airlift and ground transport; or medical/surgical teams.
- Options Analysis Somalia — Probable Tasks and Forces Available (July 29, 1992).<sup>47</sup> One of the documents produced by J3 Plans identified the nature of the probable tasks for the mission and assessed available forces for a security battalion to undertake them, naming three units that might be available, including the Canadian Airborne Regiment.
- Somalia Threat Assessment (July 29, 1992).<sup>48</sup> This document was an intelligence briefing memorandum on Somalia prepared by the intelligence group, J2 Ops.
- Option Analysis for a Security Battalion in support of UN Humanitarian Assistance Operations in Somalia (July 30, 1992).<sup>49</sup> Prepared by the planning staff, this analysis assessed the capability of the CF to provide a security force for UN humanitarian assistance operations in Somalia from the operational perspective. It concluded initially that the CF could provide the battalion within 60 days. The document was revised and re-submitted a day later, as it was determined that if the Government were to commit to Somalia, the CF would be unable to meet the prior commitment in Western Sahara.<sup>50</sup>
- Report from J2 Security<sup>51</sup> recommended additional security personnel after assessing the security situation in Somalia.
- National Chief Command Information System (CCIS) Input to the Estimate<sup>52</sup> assessed the CF capability with respect to communications systems and determined that Force Mobile Command could provide in-theatre communications from within its own resources.
- Feasibility report respecting support base and logistics.<sup>53</sup>
- Option Analysis Humanitarian Medical Support to displaced persons in Somalia.<sup>54</sup>

While NDHQ was doing contingency planning, the Government agreed to participate in a humanitarian food airlift, following reports from the UN special representative for Somalia, Mohammed Sahnoun, that there was a “total disintegration of state and society with almost all the country in the hands of heavily armed mobs”.<sup>55</sup>

Following the various assessments conducted in response to the CDS directive, and anticipating that a new Security Council resolution would be adopted shortly authorizing the deployment of the security battalion, NDHQ and DEA officials met in early August to collaborate on a memorandum advising their respective ministers, and ultimately the Prime Minister, on options for a Canadian response to the crisis in Somalia.<sup>56</sup> Three options were presented to the ministers:

- Canada could respond incrementally to needs in Somalia as they arose, beginning with the provision of airlift support to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.
- Canada could consider a request for combat troops for up to six months, in addition to the airlift support, once the technical team report was completed.
- Canada could take a more active leadership role in the issue by pledging support for the UN plan; providing military support by way of a combat unit; and lobbying other members on the issue of assessed contributions.

Interestingly, both DEA and DND opted for a cautious approach and recommended the first option, believing that the risks (assessed as medium to high at the time) were still too uncertain and that the issue needed further exploration and assessment.<sup>57</sup> However, PCO recommended option three.<sup>58</sup> On August 13, 1992, Prime Minister Mulroney wrote to the Secretary-General of the United Nations confirming Canada's support for UN efforts to bring humanitarian assistance and peace to Somalia, offered to provide a military transport aircraft for the delivery of humanitarian relief, and reiterated Canada's pledge to participate in a sanctioned operation involving the deployment of a larger security force to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid.<sup>59</sup>

Once the Prime Minister made the decision regarding the airlift, planning began in earnest at DEA and NDHQ. As plans for the airlift were being finalized, Canada was preparing for the anticipated military operation in Somalia.<sup>60</sup>

## UNOSOM — The Final Version

By late August, there was significant pressure for Canada to become further involved in the UN action in Somalia. According to Col Bremner, most of the policy analyses and estimates had already been completed in anticipation of the formal UN request. Additional analysis completed at that time was only to supplement previous assessments. By that time, the focus of NDHQ planning was primarily the north-east sector, around Bossasso, the area of operation being seriously considered for Canadian troops.<sup>61</sup>

At a meeting at the Privy Council Office in late August, officials from NDHQ, DEA, and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) reviewed options for Canadian involvement in an expanded operation.<sup>62</sup> NDHQ officials and the CDS assured those present that the CF could respond to a UN call for troops, including engineering and logistics personnel, within weeks of the request.<sup>63</sup> As the decision to participate had effectively been made (it being more a question of working out the details of the mission once the mandate had been authorized), officials from all departments were now awaiting news of Security Council approval for the expanded operation.

Shortly thereafter, and before adoption of the final enabling resolution for UNOSOM, advance information on UNOSOM plans was forwarded to planning staff at NDHQ. Apart from the proposed concept of operations set out in the latest technical team report,<sup>64</sup> this was the first examination of the UN operational plan.<sup>65</sup> The plan was understandably tentative, since the Security Council had yet to consider the Secretary-General's report.

In response to a request from the CDS for an update on the contingency planning, LCol Froh, of J3 Plans, prepared a briefing note for the daily executive meeting of August 25, 1992. The note included a short synopsis of the operational plan.<sup>66</sup> LCol Froh confirmed the original estimate of available forces if the commitment to Western Sahara was withdrawn.<sup>67</sup> The CDS directed accelerated contingency planning for Somalia.<sup>68</sup>

On August 25th, NDHQ received an informal request for troops from the UN that set out a general outline of the battalion that would later be requested formally. The outline included a request for up to 750 infantry (all ranks), specific weapons, and vehicles.<sup>69</sup> Canada's UN representative informed NDHQ that the proposed UN plan at the time was to deploy one battalion in the south-west, near Mandera, along the border with Kenya, and one in Bossasso, as originally planned. At that time, Bossasso was perceived to be the most difficult area outside Mogadishu.<sup>70</sup> Plans for the other two operational zones were on hold pending negotiated consent from ruling factions in the areas.

Although there were no clear deployment dates, there were general indications of when deployment was expected. The UN was considering a three-phase operation: Phase One, deployment of a Pakistani battalion to Mogadishu in early September; Phase Two, deployment of two battalions to Bossasso and Mandera in mid-October; and Phase Three, deployment of two battalions in the south and north-west, once agreements had been secured with the local clans.<sup>71</sup>

After receiving the request, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, MGen Addy, on the direction of the CDS, ordered Force Mobile Command (FMC) to prepare draft contingency plans to support possible relief operations in northeastern Somalia by September 3, 1992, for a briefing on



September 4, 1992.<sup>72</sup> At that time, the UN plan for the military component of the mission, the precise area of operations, and the location and activities of the non-governmental organizations (NGO) operating in the area were unknown.<sup>73</sup>

## The Decision to Join UNOSOM

By the time the official request was received, plans for a formal response to the UN request for troops were well on their way. The green light had already been given by the Prime Minister on August 21, 1992 in his letter pledging troops for an expanded UNOSOM. The CDS and the DM recommended, in a letter to the Minister of National Defence dated August 26, 1992, that the CF should undertake relief operations in Somalia as requested, subject to certain conditions. While the CF would be able to provide the battalion requested, the commitment should not exceed one year, and if the need resurfaced for the battalion previously committed for Western Sahara, Canada would have to be relieved of the latter commitment.<sup>74</sup> The Minister agreed and advised the Secretary of State for External Affairs.<sup>75</sup>

Untypically, the UN's formal request for an infantry battalion was forwarded to Canada's UN representative in New York before Canada acceded to the informal request, although it was apparent that a positive response from Canada would indeed be forthcoming.<sup>76</sup> According to representatives at Canada's UN mission, the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Kofi Annan, was under pressure to ensure that the UN was seen to be responsive; and it appeared to them that matters were being dealt with in a hasty, unorthodox manner. In the official request (which was not received until September 15, 1992), Canada was informed that deployment of its battalion was expected within two or three weeks.

Canadian officials in New York acknowledged the impossibility of deploying within that time and asked NDHQ to give the UN realistic time lines that would demonstrate Canada's short-reaction capability.<sup>77</sup> As commitments from other contributing states for the deployment of troops to other regions and to Mogadishu were tentative,<sup>78</sup> the permanent representative indicated that, if Canada were able to respond quickly and decisively, it would be seen as a significant accomplishment.<sup>79</sup>

On September 2, 1992, the CDS was briefed by FMC on plans for an operation in Somalia. The CDS conditionally approved the proposed contingency plan and organizational structure.<sup>80</sup> On the basis of the contingency plan, a warning order for Operation Cordon was to have been issued that day, but it was delayed until September 4, 1992.<sup>81</sup> In the meantime, discussions continued on the timing and arrangements for the deployment, anticipated to occur within the next few weeks.<sup>82</sup> The Commander of FMC decided that

the Canadian Airborne Regiment would be the unit sent to Somalia, and on September 2, 1992, the Government finally issued a press release about the mission and the selection of the CAR.<sup>83</sup> On September 8th, the order in council was issued; it was tabled in the House of Commons shortly thereafter in accordance with usual practice.

The formal request from the UN was finally received on September 15, 1992.<sup>84</sup> An informal response from Canada acknowledged agreement with the request, subject to two conditions: the commitment was for one year only and was conditional on Canada being relieved of its commitment to the UN operation in Western Sahara.<sup>85</sup>

The commitment was finally formalized on September 23, 1992, by a diplomatic *note verbale* in response to the formal request. This completed the agreement between Canada and the United Nations, and included Canada's agreement to provide the requested headquarters personnel.<sup>86</sup>

## Key Factors in the Decision-Making Process

Unlike Canada's decision to participate in UNITAF, which occurred within days of the UN decision to authorize a U.S.-led enforcement action under Chapter VII, the decision to participate in UNOSOM was taken after several months of negotiations with UN officials and reports from two UN technical missions, one of which included Canadian officers. During this time, officials were also receiving numerous reports from NDHQ and DEA staff concerning the deteriorating situation in Somalia. Finally, time had elapsed between the initial staff check ordered by the CDS in late July 1992 and September 23, 1992, when the formal commitment to join UNOSOM was made. This allowed for the consideration of many options before a decision was reached.

Note that when an expanded mandate for the Somalia operation was being considered in July 1992, DND recommended *against* significant participation in a security battalion. Note also that this recommendation, with which the DEA agreed, was ignored by PCO. Instead, PCO suggested that the Government should provide a battalion and play a more active role in dealing with the conflict. We do not know what factors the Government considered in coming to this decision. The following discussion therefore focuses on the significant factors relating to participation that were raised consistently by DND.

Although evidence heard on the decision-making process for Operation Cordon was far from complete, it appears from testimony and documents that the key issue was security — not only security of the military observers required for the initial mission (the risk factor), but also security required for the overall operation, including protecting the delivery and distribution of

humanitarian assistance. Other factors included international imperatives, specifically the desire to be seen to be responding to an urgent humanitarian situation in Somalia, and the sustainability of the operation.

## Security

The issue of security first surfaced when the UN made its informal request for Canada to provide five observers for UNOSOM. Reports from NDHQ clearly indicated the importance of the security issue at the time. In a briefing note to senior officials, the ADM (Pol & Comm) recommended against accepting the UN request, primarily on the grounds of inadequate security for the military observers.<sup>87</sup>

To reject such a request was unusual, because Canada had participated in almost every UN peacekeeping mission in the previous five decades. It was clear, however, that this refusal was not final, but only a rejection of the mandate as initially framed. A memorandum to the Minister from the DM and the CDS alluded to the fact that Canada continued to support the secure and effective distribution of aid in Somalia and would thus in all likelihood review the decision once the concerns were addressed.<sup>88</sup>

Security concerned NDHQ officials in the early stages of the decision making process and reappeared once the decision had been taken to join UNOSOM.<sup>89</sup> At the daily executive meeting of August 31, 1992, the CDS noted that in light of the situation in Somalia, the earlier decision not to send observers seemed justified.<sup>90</sup>

The security issue remained the determining factor in the decision to join UNOSOM throughout the process. It was the only real consideration for Canada when the first UN request was declined and, in the final decision, the security factor played a critical role, as the decision to join was conditional on the deployment of appropriate security forces.

## Humanitarian Imperatives

According to the testimony of Robert Fowler, the Deputy Minister of DND at the time, the humanitarian situation and the desire to be seen to be responding quickly were the key factors in Canada's decision to join UNOSOM.<sup>91</sup> The humanitarian concerns and the desired public response to the situation were conveyed explicitly to the Prime Minister in a memorandum prepared by the Clerk of the Privy Council and dated August 18, 1992: "Press attention and public interest is growing day by day. A Government statement on Canada's response to security and humanitarian needs in Somalia would be timely and well-received."<sup>92</sup> Three days later Canada's commitment to the UN operation in Somalia was announced publicly.



## Sustainability

Early in the planning, before any decision, concerns were raised about possible resource problems as a result of the number of CF troops engaged in UN peacekeeping operations.<sup>93</sup> Gen de Chastelain testified that he had been concerned about the ability of the CF to respond to either of the two missions being considered during the summer of 1992, Somalia and Bosnia. He had specifically asked the Commander of FMC to determine CF capability. The response was positive; the CF had the ability to maintain four operations (Croatia and Cyprus were already in place) until the fall of 1993.<sup>94</sup>

This estimate was later revised. In a briefing to the CDS in early September,<sup>95</sup> Col Kennedy maintained that in light of anticipated force reductions in 1993, the CF would not be able to maintain the four missions, rotate troops to them, and still give troops sufficient time at home.<sup>96</sup> In addition, at the time the request for troops for UNOSOM was pending, a commitment to provide the standby battalion for the possible UN mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was also outstanding. The CDS accordingly received advice from LCol Froh on August 25, 1992 that a positive response to the UN request in August 1992 was possible only if the commitment to MINURSO was dropped. Based on this advice, the CDS told the Minister of this condition for accepting the request. While the issue of sustainability was not foremost in the decision-making process, it was considered, and concerns raised in connection with the CF capability were addressed.

## The Decision to Participate in UNITAF

### Events Leading to the Change in Mandate

In October and November 1992, while the UN proceeded with its plan for UNOSOM and the CF continued preparations for Operation Cordon, the security situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate.<sup>97</sup> Thus, while food remained available for delivery, as many as 3,000 people were said to be dying of starvation each day.

The UNOSOM mandate was to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance by deploying troops in four zones.<sup>98</sup> But the mandate proved impossible to achieve. Since UNOSOM was authorized under a traditional peacekeeping mandate, troops could be deployed to the zones only if they had the consent of the *de facto* authorities. By the end of November, agreement had been obtained only for the Canadian deployment to the north-east zone.<sup>99</sup> And while Canada continued preparations for deployment in early December, the balance of the mission was effectively put on hold.

On November 24, 1992, in light of the worsening situation and the inability to carry out the mission as originally conceived, the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, warned the Security Council that it might become necessary "to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia".<sup>100</sup> This reference was a clear invitation to the Security Council to consider moving toward some kind of peace enforcement action, which would allow troops to be deployed without the consent of authorities and would allow the use of force to secure the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

On November 25, 1992, as options were being developed at the UN, the Acting Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, met with the Secretary-General to tell him that the United States was willing to lead a peace enforcement operation in Somalia, the sole object being to stabilize the situation throughout Somalia, using force if necessary, so that UNOSOM could resume and continue with its mission.<sup>101</sup> The offer raised difficult questions about the role of the UN in the new operation and the relationship between the U.S.-led operation and UNOSOM.<sup>102</sup>

Following the offer, the Secretary-General presented five options to the Security Council to address the immediate problem of creating conditions for the uninterrupted delivery of relief supplies.<sup>103</sup> The first two, to continue with UNOSOM and to withdraw the military elements of UNOSOM, were modelled on Chapter VI missions (that is, traditional peacekeeping under Chapter VI of the UN Charter which provides for progressively interventionist action to resolve a dispute by peaceful means). The other three options envisaged action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (that is, peace enforcement missions which require a determination that non-military measures are not capable of achieving a resolution of the dispute) and included a show of force in Mogadishu; a country-wide peace enforcement operation authorized by the UN but under command of member state(s);<sup>104</sup> and a country-wide peace enforcement operation under the command of the UN.<sup>105</sup>

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali preferred option five, but he had doubts about its feasibility.<sup>106</sup> The most promising course therefore appeared to be option four, a country-wide peace enforcement operation led by the United States. It was widely supported, even by countries in Africa and the non-aligned movement, and provided the most viable option for an immediate response to a situation in which, as Canada's UN representative described it, Pakistan's battalion remained *de facto* hostages, aid agencies were afraid to operate, and the port of Mogadishu remained closed despite recent assurances of co-operation from leaders of the combatants.<sup>107</sup>

On December 3, 1992, the Security Council endorsed option four, thereby authorizing the first peace enforcement mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter since the end of the Cold War.<sup>108</sup> The operation was to be

commanded by the United States and funded completely by member states, not by the UN.<sup>109</sup> The mandate of the operation was set out as follows: "...to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."<sup>110</sup>

On December 4, 1992, U.S. President George Bush directed the execution of Operation Restore Hope, to be carried out by a multi-national coalition known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). On the same day, the Government of Canada announced its contribution to the U.S.-led operation. It would send one infantry battalion of 900 troops, replacing Canada's earlier commitment to UNOSOM of 750 personnel.<sup>111</sup>

In the following sections, we examine Canada's role and interests in the changing mandate, the events leading to the Canadian commitment, and NDHQ's contribution to the decision-making process. Finally we consider the extent to which that process followed the standard decision-making process, its effectiveness, and the appropriateness of the factors considered most important.

### **Canada's Interest and Involvement in the Changing Mandate**

While discussions on the changing mandate were taking place at the UN, Canada's UN representative had two principal concerns. First, Canada wanted to assure its involvement in any discussions about changing the UN mandate. Second, a clarification was needed on the relationship between the U.S.-led operation and UNOSOM.

On learning of possible change in the mandate at the end of November, DEA immediately began a campaign to ensure that Canada, as a contributor to UNOSOM, would be consulted before the Security Council made any decision about a new mandate. Louise Fréchette, Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN (and now Deputy Minister of DND), contacted members of the Security Council and Mr. Boutros-Ghali, while Canadian diplomatic staff in Washington, London, and Paris contacted their counterparts in those capitals.<sup>112</sup> These informal discussions were followed by a letter from Ambassador Fréchette to the President of the Security Council on November 27, 1992 reiterating the request.<sup>113</sup> Canada's efforts to ensure its views were heard sparked lobbying efforts by other troop-contributing countries and in the end led to the formal consultation that had been requested.<sup>114</sup>

There appears to have been immediate agreement at DEA that the deteriorating situation in Somalia demanded some form of forceful external intervention. However, officials identified several fundamental questions that had to be addressed before firm recommendations on Canada's position could be made to Cabinet. Officials in Ottawa seemed particularly concerned that



this operation should serve the ultimate goal of political stability and reconstruction in Somalia, while at the same time meeting immediate security and humanitarian needs. They asked Ambassador Fréchette:

Will outside intervention reinforce this psychosis of invasion created by warlords and if so, how would this be dealt with? Would it require racial etc. balance in composition of enforcement troops? Who would be involved, troops already committed or others with due consideration given to "geographical" balance? What is the purpose of the intervention? to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance or restore some kind of authority/government? How long would UN force be engaged in Somalia? What kind of civil and military actions are being contemplated? More specifically, what structures could be put in place in order to allow Somalia to govern itself once operation is terminated? What would be conditions for UN military withdrawal from Somalia? and who would pay for overall operation?<sup>115</sup>

Although DEA raised similar issues about how to accomplish the long-term goals of the operation a couple of days later,<sup>116</sup> the issues were never resolved and continued to be a source of significant disagreement between the United Nations and the United States throughout the operation.<sup>117</sup> At this time the attention of Canadian officials focused more and more on the relationship between UNOSOM and the contemplated U.S.-led intervention.

Initially, when resolving the impasse in Mogadishu was the only thing at stake, it appeared that Canada retained the option of continuing under the existing UNOSOM mandate in the Bossasso region.<sup>118</sup> However, with the U.S. offer on November 25th to launch an operation covering more than just Mogadishu,<sup>119</sup> the wisdom of carrying out both operations simultaneously was debated.

Canadian officials took the position, supported by the U.S. State Department, that the Canadian deployment to Bossasso could continue,<sup>120</sup> even though the details of the arrangement were still to be decided.<sup>121</sup> They maintained that since UNOSOM had not been excluded explicitly by the Secretary-General in his report of November 29th, planning could continue on the current basis. This position, which became known as the 'Canadian option', was also passed on to the President of the Security Council.<sup>122</sup>

Although Security Council members supported the Canadian option, Mr. Boutros-Ghali did not. He believed that an operation like UNOSOM based on a traditional peacekeeping mandate and a peace enforcement action should not take place concurrently. His fear was that the peaceful situation in Bossasso might change as a result of the peace enforcement action, rendering the traditional peacekeeping mandate inadequate and thereby jeopardizing both the troops and UN credibility.<sup>123</sup> Instead, he wanted Canada to remain

available to play a role in the revived UNOSOM operation and asked that Canada not participate in the peace enforcement operation.<sup>124</sup> On December 2nd, at the request of the Secretary-General, the Canadian deployment to Bossasso was suspended.

Until this time, NDHQ did not appear to play a significant role in the developing situation. Although Gen de Chastelain requested, as early as November 27th, that communication be established with the Pentagon to determine U.S. intentions with respect to Somalia,<sup>125</sup> no serious consideration was devoted to the issue until December 1, 1992.<sup>126</sup> At the daily executive meeting that morning, the ADM (Pol & Comm) noted that Canada should continue to plan for the Bossasso deployment until the U.S. policy was confirmed and plans were proposed.<sup>127</sup>

Then, on December 2nd, perhaps because UNOSOM had been suspended and the Bossasso deployment appeared increasingly unlikely, Gen de Chastelain became personally involved in the mission planning. He telephoned Gen Colin Powell, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, to ask about the U.S. position and to relate his own views. Gen de Chastelain told Gen Powell that he would shortly be presenting two options to the Government:

1. to take part in the peace enforcement operation if the UN wished Canada to do so; or
2. to continue with the original plan for deployment to Bossasso when the UN ordered it to continue.

The CDS indicated that his personal preference (not the Government's) was to continue with the deployment to Bossasso, but only if it were going to take place immediately. He emphasized the capabilities and readiness of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, and suggested that if there was going to be an open-ended delay, his preference was to join the peace enforcement operation. Gen Powell responded that he would welcome Canadian participation in the peace enforcement action in southern Somalia, but he also saw some value in having a contingent operating from a firm base in the north.<sup>128</sup>

Shortly after Gen de Chastelain's call to Gen Powell, President Bush contacted Prime Minister Mulroney to encourage Canadian participation in the mission.<sup>129</sup> On learning of this communication, Gen de Chastelain called Gen Powell again to advise him that he would initiate staff contact between NDHQ and the Pentagon to discuss the possibility of Canadian involvement in the peace enforcement operation.<sup>130</sup>

Meanwhile, the possibility of a partial UNOSOM deployment — the Canadian option — was considered by the Security Council. The Secretary-General presented three options: integrate UNOSOM into the coalition; the

Canadian option, with a mini-UNOSOM in the north-east and Mogadishu incorporated into the peace enforcement operation; or to freeze the UNOSOM deployment until after the peace enforcement action was terminated. Mr. Boutros-Ghali expressed his preference for the third choice.<sup>131</sup>

Canadian officials at the UN sought direction from Ottawa about whether they should seek to change the Secretary-General's mind.<sup>132</sup> We have no evidence of any guidance they received in response to this query. However, a document entitled "Initial Planning Considerations" appears to be an NDHQ assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of each option.<sup>133</sup>

The document provided no recommendation about which was the best option, and there is no evidence of the use, if any, to which this document was put. In any case, there do not appear to have been further efforts by Canadian officials in New York to push the Canadian option after December 2nd. There is no reference to it in written materials or the testimony.

### **Canada's Decision to Participate in UNITAF**

Having apparently abandoned the Canadian option, in light of Mr. Boutros-Ghali's resistance to the idea, NDHQ began to analyze the remaining options in preparation for a Cabinet briefing on December 4th.<sup>134</sup> Over December 2nd and 3rd, three analyses were prepared.

It is interesting to note that all the witnesses who were asked testified that they favoured participation in the peace enforcement operation, yet no recommendation one way or the other was offered to Cabinet. Instead, Gen de Chastelain and Mr. Fowler presented two options to the Cabinet committee: (1) immediate participation with an augmented force in a peace enforcement operation expected to last eight months, or (2) participation 9 to 12 months later in a resurrected UNOSOM for a period of one year. They projected that the incremental costs to DND would be the same for both operations and told the Cabinet committee that the Canadian Forces was equally capable of carrying out either.<sup>135</sup>

Normally, a recommendation would have been provided to Cabinet, but in a situation like this involving two missions, either of which the CF could undertake, the CDS and the DM felt it was best to present the options to Cabinet and let it decide.<sup>136</sup> Furthermore, as DEA, not DND, had been designated the lead department on the issue they took the position that the only appropriate role for NDHQ was to say whether it was capable of carrying out either option and to present the pros and cons of each operation.<sup>137</sup>

On December 4, 1992, an Ad Hoc Committee of Ministers on Somalia<sup>138</sup> met. After considering the advice of DEA and the information from NDHQ



that it could participate in either mission at equal cost, the committee agreed that Canada should

participate, for the duration of the UN military enforcement operation (an estimated nine months) with a properly supported battalion sized force of up to 900 troops. Canada therefore would not participate in any subsequent peacekeeping operation in Somalia.<sup>139</sup>

The announcement of Canada's participation in the peace enforcement operation was made in a special broadcast by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Hon. Barbara McDougall, and the Minister of National Defence, the Hon. Marcel Masse, at noon on December 4th. The order in council placing members of the Canadian Forces on active service for the multi-national effort in Somalia was tabled in the House of Commons on December 7th. It was followed by debate and passage of a resolution affirming support for UN resolutions dealing with Somalia and for Canadian participation in the multi-national effort to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.<sup>140</sup>

As the actions and decisions of DND and CF leadership are relevant to our Inquiry, their contribution to the decision-making process is outlined and analyzed in more detail in the next section.

## NDHQ's Contribution to the Decision-Making Process

### *Written Analyses*

According to Gen de Chastelain, NDHQ began to analyze the possibility of participating in the U.S.-led mission in earnest after December 1, 1992.<sup>141</sup> Analyses were based on the U.S. mission and concept of operations as gathered from a conversation the next day between officers of the J3 Plans staff and the U.S. Joint Staff.<sup>142</sup> The mission of the multi-national coalition was recorded as the following:

- to secure seaports, airports, ground routes, and major relief centres;
- to protect and assist the operations of non-governmental relief organizations;
- to provide a secure environment; and
- to disarm, as necessary, forces interfering with humanitarian relief operations.<sup>143</sup>

It was assumed that the mission would take place in a 'non-permissive environment' — meaning that the use of force might be required to accomplish the mission — and would be carried out in four phases, beginning with

securing the seaport and airport at Mogadishu, then securing two major outlying centres, first Baidoa, then Kismayu, and finally handing the operation back to UNOSOM.

Only three very cursory written assessments were done by NDHQ before Cabinet was briefed. LCol Clark, the desk officer responsible for Somalia in DI Pol, produced an aide-mémoire dated December 2, 1992 (as he had done for Operation Cordon).<sup>144</sup> The desk officer in J3 Plans, Cdr R.K. Taylor, wrote a briefing note.<sup>145</sup> One other undated, anonymous document, entitled "Comparison of Options for Canadian Participation in Somalia", was prepared.<sup>146</sup> The contents of these three documents are described briefly below.

### *Aide-mémoire of December 2, 1992*

In his aide-mémoire, a two-page document dated December 2, 1992, LCol Clark recommended that, given the time constraints, the possible options for Canadian participation should be based on the force configuration and support structure already developed for UNOSOM. He assumed, without analyzing the nature of the mission, that this structure might require some modification, but that it had the basic capabilities and characteristics to participate in either an "enforcement action" or "in the protection of humanitarian aid distribution". In the last two paragraphs LCol Clark considered the advantages and disadvantages of each option:

8. Option A [enforcement action]. The major advantage of this option is that the Contingent could be committed at the outset and performing a task of fairly short duration. Early In - Early Out. Integration under a US command structure and interoperability would not present a significant operational problem since we have trained frequently with US forces. However, there are a number of concerns:

- a. There is some serious doubt that the UN would fund the operation.
- b. The degree of risk to Canadian troops is assessed as higher than Option B or even the current task.
- c. It runs counter to the SG's expressed plan for Canadian participation.

9. Option B [protection of humanitarian aid distribution]. This option conforms to the original Government direction but simply delays the execution of the current operational plan. This will mean that some elements of the current plan would have to be reversed and then re-started. This will involve considerable additional cost, but since the commitment will be UN-funded it should not impose any significant additional burden on Canada.

The aide-mémoire contained no final recommendation about which option should be pursued.

### **Briefing Note of December 3, 1992**

The briefing note by J3 Plans, a four-page document, was slightly more detailed. As in the aide-mémoire, the advantage of participating in an “early in-early out” operation and the ease of operating under U.S. command were noted. In addition, Cdr Taylor pointed to the advantages flowing from the fact that the forces were already “packed and ready to go”. There would be minimum disruption of the deployment plans and no change in the sealift or airlift allocation. HMCS *Preserver* was already en route with equipment for the Canadian Airborne Regiment and, once alongside Mogadishu, could be used for other activities in support of the operation. Finally, the airlift could be rerouted direct to Mogadishu, thereby decreasing the amount of time required to airlift the main body of the force.

The disadvantages or considerations mitigating against participation in the peace enforcement action were that the existing force structure, weapons, ammunition, and stores were all configured for peacekeeping, not peace enforcement, and might not be conducive to deployment by air landing or air assault, should that be necessary. The effects of these disadvantages would require some adjustments to plans. Certain capabilities, such as indirect fire support, medical services, and logistical support, would have to be provided by coalition forces, and Canada would have to add an in-theatre command and control element. As well, Cdr Taylor suggested that a new airlift plan would have to be developed, new deployment times might be required to fit into U.S. plans, and close liaison between Canadian and coalition movement and logistics personnel would be required.

Other considerations noted were that Operation Relief airlift resources might be put at risk as a result of being associated with “offensive operations” and that HMCS *Preserver* might not be required as long as originally planned and might therefore be available for other tasks.

The advantages and disadvantages of participating in a resurrected UNOSOM were listed as follows:

#### *Advantages*

- a. little or no change to role and equipment requirements;
- b. no change to airlift plan (other than timings);
- c. high degree of readiness of CAR can be maintained;
- d. less risk (more benign environment) for peacekeeping mission; and
- e. UN will pay for the mission.



*Disadvantages*

- a. equipment and personnel unavailable for other tasks;
- b. equipment and personnel requirements may change depending on outcome of enforcement operations;
- c. equipment has to be moved and/or stored at a financial cost;
- d. sealift contracts will have to be re-negotiated; and
- e. AOR [HMCS *Preserver*] is already en route.

Again, the note contained no recommendation about which mission Canada should participate in.

**Comparison of Options**

The last document, a two-page document entitled “Comparison of Options for Canadian Participation in Somalia” was simply a short comparison of the pros and cons of each mission. It appears to have been written for Mr. Fowler (it has the notation “DM” in the corner). It includes factors such as the potential impact on Canada-U.S. relations and on public opinion. These factors would be more likely to be considered by the Deputy Minister, in his role as adviser to a minister, than by the NDHQ military staff.

The perceived advantages of participating in the peace enforcement operation were said to include some of the same factors identified in the other two notes: “early in-early out”; the Canadian contingent was “ready to go”, with only minor adjustments required, and could be in Somalia in 30 days; they could draw on U.S. support such as logistics, medical, and fire support; shipping was available for transport of equipment; and HMCS *Preserver* was available for initial sustainment. In addition, the author noted that the peace enforcement operation might be shorter than the subsequent peace-keeping operation; that participation would reflect “immediate and vigorous action”; and that it would have a positive effect on Canada-U.S. relations.

Under the heading “cons”, the author identified eight disadvantages of participating in the mission. Two of these — the potential cost of the mission and the greater danger it posed to the troops — had also been identified in the other briefing notes. Four were not true disadvantages, but reflected unknown aspects of the mission that might turn advantages into disadvantages: the risk that it would be difficult to get out of Somalia and therefore that the mission would not be “early out”; the need to restructure mission requirements if U.S. support was restricted; the need for independent command, control, and communications if the Canadians were not under U.S. operational command; and the need for a national line of communication support if U.S. assistance was restricted.

The last two disadvantages referred to public perceptions of the mission. The author noted that participation might be seen as inconsistent with traditional Canadian foreign policy and that public support might erode if there were casualties.

The advantages of the peacekeeping operation were listed as lower cost, lower risk to soldiers, no change to planning required, and maintenance of the Canadian peacekeeping profile. The disadvantages included both operational and policy concerns. The operational concerns were that keeping the troops on hold at a high state of readiness might have a negative impact on other CF commitments; that HMCS *Preserver* might need to return and then be redeployed; and that the operation might extend beyond 1993 and therefore pose a sustainability problem. The policy concerns were that the "post-enforcement phase" might be "unmanageable" and that Canada could be seen as doing nothing while others sorted out the situation in Somalia.

As with the other two written assessments, the author did not provide recommendations.

In addition to these three written assessments, Land Force Command (LFC) was also asked to contribute to the analysis. Maj McLeod, G3 Plans staff, produced a brief to the Commander LFC on December 2, 1992, entitled "Capability and Options". The aim of this brief was not to consider which operation was more feasible from LFC's perspective, but to outline the options for reconfiguring the CAR to enable it to participate in UNITAF.<sup>147</sup>

These assessments were not the only basis on which the briefing to Cabinet was developed. Since time was short (they had two days, December 2nd and 3rd), and because it was assumed, incorrectly in our view, that much of the analysis for Operation Cordon applied to this operation (particularly, the background of the situation in Somalia, the tasks, whether it was in Canada's interests to participate), the standard process of analyzing a mission was not followed, and much of the work was done orally.<sup>148</sup>

In the next section, the factors that figured in discussions at NDHQ between the joint staff, DI Pol staff, and senior officers (Chief of the Defence Staff, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, and group principals) are considered. While LFC was consulted about its capacity to participate in the peace enforcement operation, it appears that no senior officer outside NDHQ, including the Commander LFC, had any significant input into or influence on the analysis of options.<sup>149</sup>

## Key Factors in the Decision-Making Process

Senior officials and officers in NDHQ saw their role in the decision-making process as making a presentation to Cabinet on options for possible CF deployment to Somalia. They did not believe they had any legitimate role in

recommending one option over the other. Yet despite this professed neutrality, all the witnesses testified that their preference was to participate in the U.S.-led peace enforcement operation. Moreover, Mr. Fowler acknowledged in testimony that the Minister of National Defence was aware of the Department's bias.<sup>150</sup>

Some witnesses identified what they believed were the most important factors taken into account in developing the briefing to Cabinet and, in many cases, favouring participation in the U.S.-led peace enforcement mission. They included the fact that the unit was ready and anxious to go on an operation; that senior officers and officials desired a prominent military role in the mission; that some planners felt that the decision to participate in the U.S.-led mission had already been made, reducing their function to justifying the decision; that the peace enforcement mission was more sustainable given other CF commitments; and that media attention to the situation in Somalia required immediate action. As well, some raised cost and a desire to foster good relations with the United Nations and the United States as factors in the decision about whether to participate.

### **Alleged Readiness of the Unit**

The fact that the unit was allegedly ready and anxious to go appears to have been one of the most important factors favouring participation in the U.S.-led peace enforcement operation. Every witness on this topic mentioned it, and it appeared in all the assessments. As Gen de Chastelain explained:

...we had a unit ready to go, we had ships waiting in the port of Montreal to load their vehicles and equipment, we had a supply of vessels that already I think by that time was through the Suez canal and closing in on Djibouti. We had the troops on 48 hours' notice to mount up and, therefore...I preferred to go ahead with the operation that we had planned, that we had done a reconnaissance for and we were ready to conduct.<sup>151</sup>

Although Col Bremner asserted in testimony that the fact that HMCS *Preserver* was en route to Bossasso would have had no impact on the decision to participate in the peace enforcement operation, Cmdre Cogdon, who was responsible for co-ordinating operational planning activity, and Gen de Chastelain both agreed that this was a prime factor.<sup>152</sup> Certainly from the written assessments, the alleged readiness of the troops and deployment of HMCS *Preserver* appear to have been important factors in the decision.

### **Desire for a Prominent Military Role**

The desire for a prominent military role also appears to have been a significant factor favouring participation in the U.S.-led mission. As early as mid-November, LGen Addy, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence, Security and Operations), and MGen Gervais, the Commander Land Force Command, began to question the usefulness of a Canadian contingent in



Bossasso. As confirmed by the reconnaissance mission to Bossasso in October 1992, the region was relatively calm and had sufficient food. In fact, the region was exporting beef to Yemen.<sup>153</sup> Col Bremner and Col Houghton both said that they were satisfied that although there would not be much to do in terms of protecting food aid, there would still be an important national reconciliation role to play in Bossasso.<sup>154</sup> However, LGen Addy was definitely dissatisfied with that role.<sup>155</sup>

Gen de Chastelain also attached considerable importance to this and made personal efforts, even calling Gen Powell, to secure a prominent or visible role for Canada. After one conversation with Gen Powell, he explicitly noted the importance of securing a high-profile role. A "role that was seen to be secondary", he wrote, "would not sit well with the troops, with me, with the Government or with Canadians."<sup>156</sup> In his testimony he suggested that one of the reasons Canada had to secure a prominent role was to satisfy the media, which were portraying Canada as having been left out of the real action during the Gulf War in 1990–91.<sup>157</sup>

The importance of securing a prominent role was impressed upon RAdm Murray (the Associate Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and Communications), who led the liaison visit to the United States, Col Michael O'Brien (J3 Operations), the key NDHQ staff contact for Operation Deliverance, and Col Serge Labbé, Commander of the Canadian contingent.<sup>158</sup> Col Labbé testified that he wanted a meaningful role for the Canadian contingent "so that we would be able to accomplish something significant in Somalia and actually reverse the famine and contribute to putting the country on its feet again."<sup>159</sup>

## Analysis Geared to a Decision Already Taken

It appears that the pressure to secure a high-profile mission played a significant role in the decision-making process, for a number of witnesses suggested that the decision to participate was small-p 'political' in the sense that there was a bias toward participating in the peace enforcement operation.<sup>160</sup> This meant that planners were asked to determine not whether one operation or the other made more sense from a policy and operational point of view, but whether participation in the U.S.-led peace enforcement operation was possible and how quickly the CF could get to Somalia. As Cmdre Cogdon explained, he received direction from the Chief of the Defence Staff, through the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (ISO), to make it happen and jump on the U.S. bandwagon as quickly as possible. Although this was unusual, he asserted that it was logical given the alleged readiness of the Airborne and its support. Things had to move quickly to make sure Canada became a part of the U.S. plans as early on as possible. Doing a full estimate and examining all the options would have prevented the CF from getting involved right from the beginning of the peace enforcement action.<sup>161</sup>

In our view, this review of the decision-making process suggests that there was pressure to focus on determining how Canada could participate in a prominent way in the U.S.-led mission, at the expense of the normal process of analyzing the merits and drawbacks, from a policy and an operational perspective, of participating in an operation. This approach deviated from standard practice. Regardless of whether senior decision makers thought the unit was ready to go, Operation Deliverance was a fundamentally different operation from Operation Cordon and, as DND and CF practice requires, it should have been assessed against the (modified) peacekeeping criteria.

## Media Attention Prompting Immediate Action

The Deputy Minister suggested that the major motivating factor favouring participation in the U.S.-led peace enforcement mission was the desperate situation of people in Somalia. He said that even though the United States wanted Canada to wait and participate in UNOSOM II, the situation as portrayed on television suggested that waiting did not make much sense.<sup>162</sup> This interpretation of the decision-making process is not wholly supported by the facts. It is true that intense media coverage of the situation in Somalia made action there a priority for the Government.<sup>163</sup> However, consideration of how Canada could best contribute to improving the situation was not the principal motivation for decisions. Rather, securing a high-profile mission was the top priority and, as Gen de Chastelain and Col O'Brien noted, that could be achieved only by getting in at the beginning of the U.S.-led operation.

## Sustainability

In the fall of 1992, Canada had 2,279 personnel deployed abroad, with another 1,200 promised for the former Yugoslavia.<sup>164</sup> By January 1993, Canada's commitment to peace support operations overseas amounted to 4,700 CF personnel.<sup>165</sup> At the same time, planning was geared to maintaining only 3,000 people internationally.<sup>166</sup> With the second deployment to the former Yugoslavia, that number would be exceeded. When asked whether participation in the U.S.-led Somalia operation was possible, Land Force Command responded that it could be accepted but sustained for only one year without rotation.<sup>167</sup> Conducting an operation with no allowance for rotations was something that had not been done since World War II.<sup>168</sup>

Moreover, at the beginning of December 1992, the CF was, by LGen Addy's own admission in testimony before us, already above the limit of sustainability, and it was consequently having to augment with reserves.<sup>169</sup>

It was assumed that Canada's international commitments would remain the same the following year and therefore that there was no particular advantage in waiting a year to participate in a resurrected UNOSOM. If anything,

it was suggested that participation in the peace enforcement mission made more sense from a sustainability perspective. Military planners thought the peace enforcement mission would be quick — a maximum of nine months. They were less certain that they could guarantee a 12-month peacekeeping operation later.

However, the evidence before us suggests that decision makers did not really examine this issue very closely. For example, within weeks after the decision was made to participate in the U.S.-led mission, Canada announced its intention to withdraw from Cyprus. It is difficult to believe that decision makers did not know of this contingency, which would have made participation in a resurrected UNOSOM more sustainable. Second, in his briefing to Cabinet, the Chief of the Defence Staff suggested that if Cabinet decided not to participate in the peace enforcement operation, its option was to consider participation in the resurrected UNOSOM operation. In other words, Canada might not participate in any Somalia operation at all. From a sustainability perspective, given the overstretch being experienced by the military in the fall of 1992, this would have been the optimal option. Yet exactly the opposite conclusion was reached.

As suggested by Cmdre Cogdon, the options were not given genuine consideration. No effort was made to determine whether no participation at all, or participation in a resurrected UNOSOM operation, would make more sense. On the basis of the evidence before us, we can only conclude that sustainability was considered from the perspective of whether participation in the U.S.-led mission was possible, not in terms of which mission could be better sustained.

## Cost

The cost of the mission was mentioned by only one witness, LGen Addy, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (ISO) at the time, who raised the issue not to alert us to its importance in the decision-making process but only to acknowledge that it would probably have been one of the issues presented to Cabinet.<sup>170</sup>

LGen Addy's portrayal of the importance of cost appears to be accurate. As noted in the three written analyses and confirmed at the daily executive meeting of December 8, 1992 by the Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance),<sup>171</sup> participation in the peace enforcement mission was going to cost Canada more, because the mission would be nationally funded. Despite this, cost does not appear to have been a decisive factor at all.

In DND's briefing to Cabinet,<sup>172</sup> cost was presented (at least graphically) as a neutral factor. A chart included in the briefing listed three options: the peace enforcement operation for eight months; a resurrected peacekeeping operation for 12 months beginning in August 1993; and a resurrected peacekeeping operation for 12 months beginning in November 1993. Although



notes accompanying the chart included an important caveat to the effect that the estimates did not take into account either Canada's assessed contribution or revenues (estimated to be about \$40 million<sup>173</sup>) that would be received from the UN for participation in peacekeeping, the chart showed that over a three-year period, any one of the options would cost DND \$65 million.<sup>174</sup>

Four days after the briefing to Cabinet, the Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance) advised the daily executive meeting that with the change from a UN-funded operation to national funding (a fact that was confirmed on December 3, 1992), the cost for the Somalia effort had increased from \$65 million for a 12-month period as part of UNOSOM to \$75 million for an eight-month period as part of UNITAF.<sup>175</sup>

It is significant that cost was presented as a neutral factor in the December 4th briefing, even though the peace enforcement operation was clearly going to be more expensive. There may not have been a conscious attempt to mislead Cabinet, but cost was not a key consideration in DND analyses and may have been downplayed because of the bias toward participating in the peace enforcement mission.

## UN and U.S. Positions

The Secretary-General wanted Canada to participate in the resurrected peacekeeping mission, not the U.S.-led peace enforcement mission. Although this was acknowledged in the first briefing note prepared by LCol Clark, it does not appear to have been a significant factor in the minds of DND decision makers. Both Col Bremner, the Director of International Policy, and Col Houghton, J3 Peacekeeping, testified that they were not aware of the Secretary-General's preference, although they must have seen the messages from New York and read LCol Clark's briefing note — especially Col Bremner, who was LCol Clark's immediate superior and must have approved the note. By contrast, Gen de Chastelain testified that he was aware that participation in the peace enforcement mission was contrary to the wishes of Mr. Boutros-Ghali. However, he saw it as a consideration that the Government had to weigh in deciding whether to participate in the peace enforcement mission. It was not a matter of concern to the CDS or his staff.<sup>176</sup> Mr. Fowler agreed with Gen de Chastelain that the UN's wishes were not significant as far as DND was concerned. Like the CDS, he emphasized that the decision about whether to participate was left up to the Government and made on the basis of a recommendation from DEA, not DND. As he said in his testimony before the Inquiry, "There were no defence considerations for Canadian [national] security here at all. These were foreign policy...strictly foreign policy."<sup>177</sup>

It is interesting to note that in her public announcement, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Hon. Barbara McDougall, suggested that

Canadian participation was at the request of both the United Nations and the United States.<sup>178</sup> This view is not supported by the facts.

It appears that Mr. Fowler, or his staff,<sup>179</sup> was of the view that participation in the peace enforcement mission would have a positive effect on Canada's relations with the United States. Presumably, this view was based on the assumption that Washington was anxious to have Canada participate. President Bush personally asked Prime Minister Mulroney to support U.S. efforts and to join the coalition, and one can imagine that the Government's desire to assist our most important ally would figure prominently in the decision-making process.

The White House may have been eager for Canada to participate, but the Pentagon appears to have been indifferent. In both conversations between Gen de Chastelain and Gen Powell, on December 2 and 4, 1992, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed surprise that Canada was not going to continue with the UNOSOM mission in Bossaso. In fact, it was as a result of Gen Powell's indifference that Gen de Chastelain ordered his staff to make contact with U.S. planners in MacDill, Florida and Pendleton, California during the early planning stages of the mission.<sup>180</sup>

The popular myth that Canada was pressured by the United Nations and the United States to participate in this mission misses the subtleties of the situation. In fact, Canada made the commitment with encouragement from the President of the United States but in the face of opposition from the UN and indifference on the part of the Pentagon.

The actual process of decision making and discussion of the factors witnesses identified as important in the process raise fundamental questions about its appropriateness and adequacy. These questions are discussed in the following section. Important deviations from the normal process and the reasons for them are examined and their impact evaluated. As well, the appropriateness of the factors considered in the process are examined.

### *Issues Arising from the Decision-Making Process*

Perhaps the most important deviation from the usual decision-making process was the starting point of analyses. The decision was not approached neutrally. Rather, there was a bias on the part of the most senior officers in favour of participating in the U.S.-led operation and pushing for speedy involvement to ensure that a high-profile role was secured. This is evident from the testimony of NDHQ staff and from the approach in the estimates, especially that of Land Force Command, which considers only options for participation in the U.S.-led mission.

As well, the bias in favour of participation appears to have been based on two erroneous but interrelated assumptions: that the unit was "packed and

ready to go", and that there were only minor differences between UNOSOM and the U.S.-led mission and therefore that the unit chosen for the previous mission was still the right unit. As Gen de Chastelain explained:

But to be accurate...I don't know that they [the guidelines] were considered, per se. I think the fact that we had accepted that the UN Chapter VI mission was doable and Canada should be involved was simply applied to this one too, once the operational assessment had been made that we could take part in it.<sup>181</sup>

As is apparent from the estimates, it was thought that the only real difference between the two operations was that some believed the Canadian contingent might have to neutralize armed opposition and would therefore need direct fire power and greater flexibility and mobility.

Another important deviation from the standard process is found in the approach and quality of the analysis. Given that planning did not start in earnest until December 1, 1992 and the briefing to Cabinet was delivered three days later, it is understandable that few written estimates would have been done. But the lack of time does not justify the poor quality of the estimates. They read like the authors' 'first thoughts' on the advantages and disadvantages of the missions, and none of those prepared at NDHQ identifies the aim of the estimate. Nor do they provide courses of action or indicate the preferred course open, as is standard practice in an estimate.

As described earlier, the Director of International Policy is supposed to analyze a mission from a policy perspective, considering all the relevant criteria for participation in peacekeeping operations set out in the Defence White Paper. These do not appear to have been considered systematically in the aide-mémoire provided by DI Pol on December 2nd. The likelihood of success of the mission and the requirement for a clear and enforceable mandate were not discussed at all despite the fact that at the time the note was written, there was already an awareness (evidenced in telexes from New York) of disagreements between the United States and the United Nations about the scope of the mandate. As well, while cost and sustainability, two key guidelines, were touched on in the note, they were not analyzed seriously.

According to the standard process, the estimate from J3 Plans is supposed to assess the capability of the CF to meet the needs of a mission as determined by J3 Peacekeeping. In this case, no initial analysis of the mission to be accomplished appears to have been done by anyone. If this step had not been missed, the lack of mission and its implications would have come to light. As it was, everyone assumed that Canada's role in the U.S.-led mission would be basically what it had been before, with a few minor adjustments to personnel and equipment. The analysis therefore focused primarily on determining whether Canada could meet troop and equipment requirements. But



how those planning knew what the requirements would be without analyzing the mandate, without knowing what Canada's mission would be, and without knowing what the United States would be able to supply is a mystery.

The approach of staff and senior officers to the change in mandate and their relative lack of concern about the fact that Canada had no mission are especially surprising in light of their dissatisfaction with the failure of the United Nations to provide details about the specific mission and tasks of Canada in UNOSOM.

It is evident that if the standard guidelines for writing these estimates had been followed, the lack of a Canadian mission would probably have come to light. There would have been less emphasis on departmental or governmental concerns and greater consideration of military matters, such as a clear statement of military purpose or mission and an analysis of the steps to be taken to accomplish that mission or, in military parlance, an "assessment of tasks". From that would flow a confirmation of force capability, size, composition, and organization needed to do the job; an assessment of the nature of the mission leading to the realization that specific, and new, rules of engagement (ROE) would be needed before troops were committed; the requirement to ensure all ranks had the opportunity to understand and train on the ROE; an overall and critical appreciation of the time factor, including time to address the ROE question, time for training, time for a force headquarters to be prepared, and time for the commander-designate to take command; and finally, reconfirmation of the state of readiness of the Canadian contingent before it was deployed.

It is acknowledged that the mission was defined only generally in the Security Council resolutions and that its nature, as well as the conditions likely to be confronted in Somalia, were necessarily vague at this early stage. However, these considerations ought to have led the planners to realize the critical importance of thorough military planning and to conclude that the most certain factor in the forthcoming mission was uncertainty. In turn, that conclusion should have pointed to the need for, among other things, a more balanced force with extra logistics and support capabilities and unfettered by an arbitrary limit on the number of personnel. This is not to say that these considerations would have, or should have, stopped Canadian participation, but they might have made the top decision makers aware of the need to emphasize this uncertainty in their briefing to Cabinet and to think through more carefully how they would deal with it.

The absence of an indication of a preferred course in the written estimates and the failure to alert Cabinet to the uncertainties of participating in the U.S.-led operation are also noteworthy. Both Gen de Chastelain and Mr. Fowler asserted that they presented the options neutrally, because the DEA was the lead department. Furthermore, they suggested that because

there were two competing operations, it was a decision that ought to be made by the Government, not by DND. However, neither explanation addresses satisfactorily the uncertainties facing the CF in participating in a substantially changed operation for which the military mission was unknown and for which they had only a matter of days to prepare.

When Canada was asked to participate in other operations in Somalia — one in the spring of 1992 and one in the spring of 1993 — the CDS and DM had no difficulty advising the Government against participation.<sup>182</sup> While it is obvious that the ultimate decision must be made by government, it is surely the responsibility of the CDS and the DM to advise the government, from their specific perspectives (which are admittedly blurred by the diarchy structure), about which mission, if any, Canada should participate in.

In the minutes of the special departmental executive meeting of December 4, 1992, there is a deliberate but impenetrable statement rationalizing the limit of DND's advice to Cabinet. It states explicitly that DND would not offer a recommendation, since it had not formally been asked for its opinion.<sup>183</sup> This explanation was not mentioned by any of the witnesses, raising this question: If they had not been asked for their advice, why did Gen de Chastelain and Mr. Fowler provide a briefing to Cabinet? This question is especially pertinent considering that DND briefings to Cabinet on peacekeeping issues are uncommon. Usually, it is DEA that briefs Cabinet after having received the advice of DND.

For both the estimates and the final briefing to Cabinet, it appears to us that if DND had presented the issue in terms of courses open and a preferred course of action, this would have forced the analysts to articulate their rationale. This in turn might have brought to light the weaknesses in the major assumptions — for example, that the unit was “packed and ready to go” — and the gaps in the analysis, such as uncertainties arising from the lack of a clear mission.

The analysis of options for participation in the Somalia mission was undertaken in an extremely short time. Recall that the Secretary-General's letter was written November 24, 1992, and analysis was begun in earnest only after the daily executive meeting of December 1, 1992. The estimates produced did not follow the standard form, were cursory, and made significant, erroneous assumptions about potential Canadian participation in the U.S.-led mission. This is not to say that the overriding inclination to participate in the peace enforcement mission was wrong, or that participation in UNOSOM II would have been more successful.<sup>184</sup> The point is that the actual decision-making process produced less than satisfactory analysis even if allowance is made for the short time period.

## THE MISSION AND TASKS ASSIGNED TO THE CARBG

### Mission and Tasks of Canadian Forces in UNOSOM

Although Operation Deliverance is the main focus of this Inquiry, it cannot be understood fully without reference to the planning that preceded it.

While planning for UNOSOM developed over several months, the mandate of the expanded mission, as described in the final enabling resolution adopted in late August 1992, was remarkably inexplicit.<sup>185</sup> One might reasonably have assumed that the mandate of the operation would have been clear by that time, since unlike its successor UNITAF, which was mounted effectively within days of the decision, the resolution authorizing the final version of UNOSOM (including the establishment of the four operational zones or humanitarian relief sectors and an augmented security force to secure each of the new zones), evolved over several months, as the surrounding circumstances became increasingly chaotic. Moreover, the resolution followed the recommendations in the Secretary-General's report, which was based largely on information obtained during the two technical missions to Somalia in March 1992 and August 1992.

The absence of a clear statement of mission in the UN mandate and the failure to specify explicit tasks for contributing contingents is not surprising. The UN has received frequent and directed criticism about its inability to task military operations effectively and responsibly. Many critics have recommended that the UN maintain a permanent military structure to assess probable missions from a military perspective.

However, the fact that Somalia was the first humanitarian mission undertaken by the UN was an important limitation. From this perspective, the ambiguous mandate was at least somewhat understandable. Nonetheless, from Canada's perspective, the mandate of UNOSOM and the tasks assigned to the CAR battalion group were never clarified acceptably, even though Canada had asked specifically for clarification in late October. The point became moot, however, when the peacekeeping mandate was suspended in favour of the peace enforcement mission, under the leadership of the United States.



## Mission and Concept of Operations: The UN Perspective

The first articulation of the expanded mission is found in the Secretary-General's report released in late August. The ensuing UN resolution,<sup>186</sup> established four additional security units, each with a strength of 750 in all ranks. One would be deployed to each operational zone. (See Figure 24.2, showing the operational zones under UNOSOM.) The main purpose of the mission was to secure the delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance throughout the country, using a multifaceted and comprehensive approach, covering humanitarian relief and recovery, cessation of hostilities, security and national reconciliation. These activities represent the general premise of UNOSOM as of August 1992, from which roles and tasks for the various member states were later identified.

The security forces were to provide protection and security to UN personnel, equipment and supplies (initially only at Mogadishu but later in the four operational zones), including at airports, and to escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies to distribution centres. In essence, their main goal was to give UN convoys a sufficiently strong military escort to deter attack. They were authorized to fire effectively in self-defence if deterrence should not prove effective.<sup>187</sup>

The preliminary statement of mission and tasks for participating contingents took the form of guidelines prepared for use by governments contributing troops to UNOSOM.<sup>188</sup> While the tasks were identified generally — for example, securing the port and airport, securing the distribution places, patrolling — they lacked sufficient detail. UNOSOM was the first humanitarian operation undertaken by the UN, involving numerous aid agencies in a number of areas throughout the country. There was no information on the agencies and no plan for how the escort and distribution of humanitarian assistance should be carried out.

## Development of the Canadian View of the Mission and Tasks

Once the long-awaited Resolution 775 was adopted by the Security Council on August 27, 1992, plans for the mission began to evolve. However, while estimates were being developed for the contingency plan in Canada, Force Mobile Command (FMC) raised concerns about estimates set out in the UN's original request for troops.<sup>189</sup> FMC was critical of the plans forwarded by the UN, emphasizing that they were driven not by operational considerations but by financial ones. Of particular concern was the plan for the organization of the force, which failed to recognize standard cohesive fighting units.<sup>190</sup> Equally important to FMC, however, was the stipulation that only small arms be taken. Noting that the mission was one of protection, not observation, FMC stressed the importance of ensuring that Canadian soldiers had

the necessary resources to undertake the mission without exposure to undue risk and recommended that the initial review should indicate that at least automatic weapons and medium anti-armour weapons would be necessary.<sup>191</sup>

FMC completed the contingency plan for Operation Cordon in early September. The plan was developed primarily on the basis of information in the UN request for troops. In the plan, however, FMC aggressively promoted a force structure radically different from the one proposed by the UN. The mission identified in the plan and on which planning was broadly based was "an expanded UN mission to ensure that relief supplies can be distributed within Somalia". Probable tasks for the Canadian battalion included "port security, airfield, convoy escort duties, distribution centre security, and base camp security."<sup>192</sup>

In a briefing in early September, the Chief of the Defence Staff was made aware of the weakness in the UN request with respect to the organizational structure. In fact, in a covering letter forwarded with the plan and sent to DEA and the DCDS (ISO) on September 3, 1992, BGen Vernon recommended that a commitment not be made at a lesser capability than that proposed, in view of the operational risks involved in the mission.

During the briefing, the CDS was advised of the "probable" mission of the CAR and the difficulties encountered in developing the plan. Specific problems noted included insufficient direction regarding the concept of operations and inadequate information about the needs of the population — for example, the number of refugees in the north-east, or the number and extent of involvement of aid agencies and other non-governmental organizations. Moreover, while it was generally accepted that the region was relatively safe and secure, there were still concerns about the potential for violence once troops began to arrive. Many issues were outstanding as of the briefing date, including the UN plan for the military component of the force, and the need for more information about the tasks, boundaries, military structure of operations, and the deployment timetable.<sup>193</sup>

Following the briefing, the CDS approved the Operation Cordon plan and outline, including the proposed organizational structure, subject to the results of the forthcoming reconnaissance.<sup>194</sup> A warning order for Operation Cordon was issued September 4, 1992, reflecting the statement of mission and tasks known at the time.<sup>195</sup>

### ***Troop Contributors' Meeting***

It was not until the first troop contributors' meeting on September 24 and 25, 1992, in New York, hosted by the UN Secretariat, that any further clarification was received about mission and tasks. The plan and structure of the

mission were highlighted by LCol Morneault, who attended the meeting, as follows:

Somalia would be divided into five sectors, with each sector under the purview of a senior diplomat reporting directly to the ambassador and assuming responsibility for all operations within the sector. Each sector will have a Humanitarian coordinator and staff of 10, along with the 750 man battalion and possibly military observers. The mission and tasks were as before; the security of humanitarian assistance in all forms, although there was mention of possible future tasks for the battalions, including observer roles, disarmament and participation in a food for arms exchange.<sup>196</sup>

Another participant, Col Cox, Commander of the Canadian contingent for UNOSOM, was far less impressed with the state of organization of the UN operation and expressed concern that the mission was far from firm, pointing to the absence of commitments from member states who were contributing troops and/or support services.<sup>197</sup> He also remarked that the operations were not at all stabilized to the point of being standing operating procedures and concluded that the “developmental phase” would exist for a while yet.<sup>198</sup> Col Cox went to Somalia with the UN after returning from New York. He continued to be unimpressed with the UNOSOM organization in theatre but believed that the situation might be remedied, despite strong evidence of poor co-ordination between the political, humanitarian and security aspects of UNOSOM both in Mogadishu and in New York.<sup>199</sup>

### *Formal Request for Clarification of the Mission*

Concerns were expressed by Canadian representatives very early in negotiations about the lack of clarity in the mission statement for UNOSOM. Moreover, specific concerns related to Canada’s designated operational zone, which was believed to be stable and flourishing, without need of humanitarian assistance. Canada’s proposed role in the operation was perceived by some as superfluous.

It was not until the second troop contributors’ meeting, in mid-October, that Canada’s representative made a formal request for clarification of Canada’s mission and tasks, including a list of the tasks to be performed and the UN concept of operations for the Canadian zone.<sup>200</sup> No response was forthcoming at the meeting. Following up on the issue, Canada’s representative at the United Nations wrote to the Under Secretary-General requesting a formal response to the questions raised.<sup>201</sup> Two days later a response from Marrack Goulding, the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, included what was described as a more refined statement of the mission for the Canadian battalion, together with a description of the tasks assigned.<sup>202</sup> The response also included a statement of the UN concept of operations.



While the response contained additional information about the general tasks, regrettably, it failed to address adequately the questions set out in the original request. The mission statement was simply a reiteration of previous statements: monitoring the cease-fire in Mogadishu; securing humanitarian aid and ensuring its safe delivery to distribution centres; and protection of UN personnel. And although possible additional tasks related to local humanitarian projects were mentioned, there was insufficient detail to assist in planning the mission.

The response was deemed unsatisfactory by Canadian officials, and the Ambassador to the UN once again requested further clarification on a number of points.<sup>203</sup> No further clarification was received. Shortly thereafter, events led to the cancellation of UNOSOM and the establishment of UNITAF in its stead.

## Issues Arising from the Development of Missions and Tasks

### *The Reconnaissance*

Although NDHQ's initial plans contemplated an early reconnaissance in Somalia, delays at the UN prevented the departure of the reconnaissance party before October, despite continuing efforts by Canadian officials to obtain permission to proceed.<sup>204</sup> The delay created serious problems, as it was difficult to clarify Canada's mission and identify tasks until the reconnaissance was completed. Typically, a mission and tasks are fine-tuned by the commanding officer during a reconnaissance. Other aspects of planning also depend on the clarification of mission and tasks. Canada considered the initial reconnaissance critical to ensure that the replenishment ship would be in position early and to give planning staff the information they urgently required to finalize plans for deployment.

Another issue arose in connection with the reconnaissance. The UN proposed that the reconnaissance be conducted as part of the advance party, thus avoiding the cost of an additional reconnaissance. The UN's refusal to finance a reconnaissance was uncharacteristic and detrimental to Canada. Canadian officials refused to waive the reconnaissance, opting for a separate excursion and appealing for the expeditious deployment of the reconnaissance party.

After considerable delay, a Pakistani advance team arrived in Somalia on September 21, 1992; deployment of other UN security forces was scheduled for mid-October.<sup>205</sup> Notwithstanding this apparent breakthrough, no date was set for the Canadian reconnaissance. As of late September, no further agreements with ruling factions had been secured, and other national troop commitments were far from firm. Moreover, since no national sponsor had yet been found for the logistics or field ambulance services, the challenge for the UN — to sort out the strategic deployment — continued.<sup>206</sup>

Canada finally received the message with the news of the authorization for the reconnaissance on October 6, 1992, when the Canadian Ambassador to the UN informed External Affairs that Ambassador Sahnoun had given the UN authority for Canada to proceed.<sup>207</sup> On October 12, 1992, the reconnaissance party left for Somalia, where it worked from October 13th to October 18th, with the aim of confirming the details of Canada's contribution.<sup>208</sup> LCol Morneault's report suggested that the reconnaissance was an overwhelming success.<sup>209</sup>

Although it came late in the planning process, the October reconnaissance was critical in many respects. Foremost, it clarified the mission and tasks assigned to the CAR for its deployment to Bossasso. The evidence before us reveals that the reconnaissance indicated, for the first time, a change in the nature of the implied tasks. While the UN mandate and strategy remained the same, including the three-phase approach, the tasks were somewhat altered as a result of conditions in Bossasso at the time.<sup>210</sup>

The concept of operations included three phases: Phase I — provision of humanitarian aid to those in need; Phase II — fostering reconciliation through diplomacy, security, and humanitarian assistance; and Phase III — fostering long-term rehabilitation through diplomacy, security, and humanitarian assistance. According to the Commander of UNOSOM, Gen Shaheen, north-east Somalia was already into Phase II of the mission, as the sector was considered stable and widespread famine had not been reported there. The reconnaissance report thus described the revised implied tasks for the CAR as follows:

**Base Camp Security** was still considered necessary, but fewer assets would be required.

**Distribution Centres.** There were no distribution centres or refugee centres and no apparent need to deliver food or other aid to specific areas.

**Convoys.** Few security convoys were needed. Reconnaissance convoys were seen as a high priority for purposes of showing the flag.

**Port and Airfield Security.** Although the CAR could assume these tasks after consultation with local factions, at that time, the Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia was handling security at both places.

While the tasks seemed minimal, the report noted the possibility of a further evolution of tasks, which might include observer tasks and/or humanitarian assistance.<sup>211</sup>

The changes in the tasks assigned to Canada in the north-east sector were of major concern, as both NDHQ and DEA wanted the Canadian Forces security battalion to be assured a major role in the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies in Somalia.<sup>212</sup> The concern triggered a diplomatic exchange between DEA and the UN that became moot before it was resolved.

## *The Bossasso Issue*

A second issue that surfaced during preparations for UNOSOM related to the proposed area of operations. Canadian officials were concerned that the designated area was sufficiently stable and healthy that there was no need for UN forces. In a meeting between Ambassador Sahnoun and Ambassador Fréchette in New York in mid-October, Ambassador Fréchette expressed Canada's desire that the CF role contribute noticeably to famine relief.<sup>213</sup> Ambassador Sahnoun saw Canada's role in Bossasso as extending far beyond the escort and distribution of food, to include the establishment of stability and security as a first step toward rehabilitation. It was his view that potential tasks for the battalion could include restoration of water, sanitation, and health care, all of which were as important as the delivery of food. While admitting that such revised tasks might not require full battalion strength, he nonetheless emphasized that Canada's role was seen as establishing a model region in the north-east that would serve as an example for the more troubled areas in the south.

Anxious to have more details on the proposals for humanitarian aid in the area, Ambassador Fréchette sought specifics on the anticipated presence of non-governmental relief organizations in the area, as well as World Food Program plans for the region and the UN co-ordination plan for the region. Ambassador Sahnoun promised a "blueprint" of the plan within days.<sup>214</sup>

Reports from the October reconnaissance failed to alleviate the concerns of Canadian officials about the role for Canada's security battalion in Bossasso. In a special briefing at the daily executive meeting of October 21, 1992, Col Houghton, LCol Morneau, and LCol Clark confirmed that current tasks for the CF would focus more on providing a stabilizing influence in the area than on the security and escort duties originally proposed. While concluding that the revised tasks were well within UNOSOM's mandate, LCol Clark emphasized that the situation would have to be monitored as it progressed. The concept of operations for the Canadian battalion allowed for mounted patrols to secure aid, but with the CF presence established principally for showing the flag. Any additional personnel would be used to provide humanitarian assistance.<sup>215</sup>

During the meeting, officials nonetheless concluded that the mission could be accomplished. They also recommended that the concept of operations proposed by the CAR be approved, despite continuing concerns about the uncertainty of the security battalion's role. During the discussion, the Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy and Communications) maintained that he was comfortable with the mandate, notwithstanding the perceived lesser role. The Deputy Minister observed, however, that if Canada's role would be merely to establish a presence, they would need to consider other options.



The Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (ISO) supported Mr. Fowler's position and advised that further clarification of the guidelines for Canada's operation would be required before accepting the task.<sup>216</sup>

Evidence before us indicates that following the meeting, Col Bremner conveyed DND's concerns to DEA and Canada's Ambassador to the UN, with specific reference to the proposed "hearts and minds" mission for Canadian troops. While acknowledging that the nation-building role was well within the broad mandate of UNOSOM, Col Bremner observed that it might not be a particularly appropriate role for the CAR, which up to that point was preparing to provide security for the delivery of humanitarian supplies. Col Bremner suggested that a smaller reconnaissance unit might be preferable.<sup>217</sup> A cautionary note was included in the memorandum expressing concern about the possibility that the deployment of the CAR might be cancelled yet again.<sup>218</sup> Col Bremner indicated that further mission analysis would be sought from Col Cox.

In a situation report received from Col Cox on October 28, 1992, the situation in Bossasso was described as "no more acute than we have already been briefed".<sup>219</sup> Col Cox outlined the proposed role for the battalion as once again including humanitarian relief activity, which he interpreted to mean doing more than simply escorting food convoys. Col Cox suggested that there was considerable meaningful work within the mandate, including protection of UN agency and NGO relief work, and possibly securing an evacuation operation from Bossasso airport or port.

While the information was more encouraging, there is little evidence to indicate whether officials were persuaded that the role for Canadian troops in Bossasso, as evolved, would be suited to the CAR and/or the proposed organizational structure. Canadian officials continued to seek further clarification of the mandate from the UN, but there is no evidence that an acceptable clarification was ever received.

## Issues Relating to the United Nations

From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that many of the problems associated with the development of the mission and tasks for Canada's UNOSOM contingent related to the nature and quality of UN peacekeeping missions during that period. Problems encountered in formulating the mission plan were largely the result of shortcomings at UN headquarters. Control of plans for UNOSOM was in the hands of UN Secretariat officials, who assumed responsibility for overall co-ordination of the mission until it was suspended in favour of the U.S.-led coalition, UNITAF.

Canadian experience with the mandate for UNOSOM reflects the conclusions of a compilation of lessons learned from the UN operation in Somalia, prepared for the UN and drawn from several evaluations of the mission.<sup>220</sup>

Evidence before us reveals that the lack of clarity in the overall mission for UNOSOM and the lack of specificity in the tasks assigned to the Canadian contingent were never remedied satisfactorily. Canada made repeated efforts to have the mandate clarified by the UN and to have the assigned tasks delineated appropriately. When a formal response to these requests was finally received, it contained little new information to assist in planning the mission.<sup>221</sup>

From the start, there were serious problems with the mandate that had profound implications for the Canadian contingent. The primary goal of the mission for UNOSOM adopted in August 1992 — the provision of security for the delivery of humanitarian assistance — was vague and consequently open to a variety of interpretations.<sup>222</sup> Moreover, consultations with troop-contributing countries during the mandate formulation stage were determined to be inadequate, as were overall assessments of the social, political, and military situations. The result was a mandate insufficient to deal with the seriousness of the humanitarian crisis unfolding in Somalia.<sup>223</sup>

For DND officials, such deficiencies were apparent in the original request for troops, which recommended a force operational structure that was considered risky and inappropriate by officers of the Canadian Forces. While these officers proposed an operational structure considered more appropriate, they were unable to secure UN agreement to the changes in a timely manner, notwithstanding repeated requests.<sup>224</sup>

In addition to uncertainty surrounding the mandate, UN planning for the mission was seriously flawed; this too had profound implications for troop-contributing countries. Early plans for the deployment of a security battalion to Mogadishu suffered significant delays, resulting in further delays in Canada's much needed reconnaissance. Despite repeated requests for a date for the reconnaissance, which was urgently required to assist in finalizing operational planning back in Canada, none was forthcoming until early October. Many aspects of the operational plans were dependent on the results of the reconnaissance, yet the UN refused to allow it to occur until the Pakistani battalion had arrived in Mogadishu.

Another of the lessons learned concerned the need for a co-ordinated overall plan, including "clear mission statements, command relations, rules of engagement, coordination procedures, standard operating procedures, intelligence management, and administrative and logistics policy and procedures", before the deployment of any operation.<sup>225</sup> Clearly this was not done for UNOSOM. Officials at NDHQ received inadequate information about their tasks and the overall UN concept of operations, and were forced to request more and better information from UN officials. Moreover, although Canada was aware early on that its assignment would be at Bossaso, conflicting reports were received about the need for humanitarian aid in that region.<sup>226</sup> Officials at NDHQ, DEA, and Canada's UN mission were reassured of the

continuing need for battalion-strength troops for the north-east, to secure humanitarian aid. Yet when the reconnaissance team went to Somalia in October, they were advised by the force Commander that the security role for the Canadian battalion was much diminished, and that the expectation was rather that Canada would assume a lead role in fostering political stability in the north, to act as an example for other regions of Somalia. These mixed messages hindered NDHQ's planning process.

## Mission and Tasks of the Canadian Forces in UNITAF

The mission and tasks for the combined coalition operation were defined only vaguely in the Security Council resolutions. The United States agreed to lead the operation on the understanding that its purpose would be limited to neutralizing armed elements that were preventing distribution of food supplies and that it would be a quick operation. As noted by Canadian officials in Washington, at no time did the United States entertain larger political aims.<sup>227</sup>

At the time Canada agreed to participate in the mission, the role of the Canadian contingent had not even been contemplated by U.S. planners, let alone defined. Canadian decision makers were aware only of the general types of tasks they might be asked to do, for example, securing seaports and airports and protecting food convoys.<sup>228</sup> They did not know the extent to which the Canadian contingent would be involved in systematic disarmament. Nor did they know where the contingent would be deployed or what specific tasks and challenges it would face on arrival. It was not until December 6, 1992 that they established, through liaison officers at the U.S. Central Command in Florida, that the Canadian contingent would be responsible initially for maintaining security at Baledogle airport.<sup>229</sup> It was not until December 19, 1992, four days after Col Labbé, Commander of Canadian Joint Force Somalia, arrived in theatre, that the Canadian contingent knew they would be responsible for securing and maintaining security in the Belet Huen Humanitarian Relief Sector, one of eight humanitarian relief sectors established under UNITAF. (See Figure 24.3.)

Defining the mission was left solely in the hands of Col Labbé. The CDS and NDHQ staff provided no guidance about what type of mission the CF would accept, except to urge Col Labbé to move as quickly as possible to secure a high-profile mission.<sup>230</sup>

We begin by tracing the development of the mission during the first three weeks of December. Then we consider the implications of the fact that the mission and operation were developed and mounted in such a short period of time.



## The Mission and Concept of Operations for UNITAF

The overall aim of UNITAF was set out in Security Council Resolution 794 as follows: "to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."<sup>231</sup>

This political statement of the mission was translated immediately into the following military mission statement by the Commander of U.S. Central Command:

- to secure seaports, airports, ground routes, and major relief centres;
- to protect and assist NGO operations;
- to provide a secure environment; and
- to disarm, as necessary, forces interfering with humanitarian relief operations.<sup>232</sup>

It was assumed that the mission would take place in a "non-permissive environment" (allowing the use of force) and would be carried out in the following four phases:<sup>233</sup>

Phase One (Mogadishu): Seaport and airport of Mogadishu to be secured (to be completed by D + 24 days).<sup>234</sup>

Phase Two (Baidoa): Baidoa airport to be secured and secure lines of communication back to Mogadishu to be established. Once established, responsibility to be turned over to "Third World" nations (to be completed by D + 90 days).

Phase Three (Kismayu): Kismayu airport and seaport to be secured and secure lines of communication back to Mogadishu to be established. Once established, responsibility to be turned over to "Third World" nations (to be completed by D + 180 days).


Phase Four: Transfer back to UNOSOM (to be complete by D + 240 days).<sup>235</sup>

This plan, developed rapidly during November 1992, represented the initial U.S. military concept of operations for Operation Restore Hope.<sup>236</sup> Several issues remained unsettled, however. First, although the operations plan, presumably developed at the Pentagon, was projecting a 240-day (eight-month) timetable, shorter timetables — between six weeks and three months — were still being discussed.<sup>237</sup>

Second, there was still uncertainty about the extent to which disarmament was part of the mission. Although disarmament appeared as part of the operations plan just described, it did not appear at all in the U.S. Central Command's statement of the mission, and in a December 9, 1992 briefing of defence attachés by the Pentagon, U.S. officials clearly stated their position



- BELGIUM
- CANADA
- EGYPT
- PAKISTAN



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## Camp Pendleton

At Camp Pendleton, it was not possible to confirm a precise Canadian role because U.S. plans were still evolving.<sup>242</sup> The main efforts of the Canadian envoys at Camp Pendleton therefore focused on determining what roles Canadians could play and how they would fit into the troop flow into the theatre. This appeared to be crucial, since LGen Johnston would not assign a specific mission until he was certain that troops would be in theatre ready to do the job.

When the CJFS advance party left on December 13, 1992, all they knew was that the CARBG would arrive at and maintain security at the Baledogle airfield. The deployment to Baledogle was not considered a mission in itself but merely a staging area from which to negotiate the eventual tasks of the CJFS.<sup>243</sup> One can only conclude that when orders for Operation Deliverance were written and support plans were prepared at NDHQ, they were drawn up without a defined military mission.

## NDHQ and CJFS Orders

Neither the initial warning order nor the initial operations order set out the mission or the concept of operations for the CF in Somalia.<sup>244</sup> In the warning order, issued by the CDS on December 5, 1992, the mission is stated as follows:

To provide a Canadian joint force consisting of HQ, Battalion group based on the Canadian Airborne Regiment and HMCS *Preserver* to participate in enforcement operations in Somalia under auspices of UNSCR [United Nations Security Council Resolution] 794.<sup>245</sup>

The probable tasks are described under a section entitled Execution. They include, along the lines of the U.S. concept of operations, "security of seaports/airports, protection of food convoys, security of food distribution centres and disarming of factions interfering with humanitarian relief effort."<sup>246</sup>

Similarly, the Chief of the Defence Staff's original operations order, dated December 9, 1992, described the mission as follows:

To provide a Cdn joint force consisting of a HQ, an inf battle gp based on the Cdn AB Regt, and HMCS *Preserver* to participate in enforcement operations in Somalia under the auspices of UNSCR 794.<sup>247</sup>

According to Canadian Forces staff procedures, the mission statement in an operations order should be "a precise, firm statement of the task given to the [command] issuing the order and which will be implemented by the plan embodied in the order. The verb used is always in [the] infinitive. This paragraph shall not contain [subparagraphs]."<sup>248</sup> Yet in both the warning order and the operations order, the objective stated describes a deployment objective, or as Col Labbé described it in his testimony, "a force generation kind of statement",<sup>249</sup> not the task of the force once deployed.



On December 11, 1992, Col Labbé issued his first operation order for Canadian Joint Force Somalia. On the same day, the mission statement in the operations order from NDHQ was amended. Both orders provided that the mission was to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in accordance with Security Council Resolution 794.<sup>250</sup> Although this mission statement comes closer to defining the task to be undertaken in theatre, it lacks the detail that a commander would expect and require to carry out a mission. It is true, as Col Labbé emphasized in his testimony, that the mission was not a traditional military one and that it was to be conducted as a joint operation, with the United States taking the lead. That being said, the mission statement, which was designed solely to get the troops into a secure staging area in Somalia from where the actual mission could be negotiated,<sup>251</sup> was clearly inadequate.

It appears that initially Col Labbé was also of this opinion. In a seminar he gave in June 1996, he said he had been given no mission statement, and he appeared mystified that he had never been approached or given the opportunity to talk to the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff or the Commander of Land Force Command before he left. However, in testimony before us, Col Labbé was of the opinion that the mission statement in the initial orders was appropriate in the circumstances.<sup>252</sup>

### *In Mogadishu*

On December 14, 1992, Col Labbé arrived in Mogadishu. The next day he met with LGen Johnston to find out more about U.S. plans and to try to define the Canadian role more precisely. Col Labbé had been directed by Gen de Chastelain to seek a worthwhile and high-profile mission<sup>253</sup> and was anxious himself to raise the profile of Canadian participation.<sup>254</sup> In trying to insert themselves into the U.S. decision-making process, therefore, the Canadians emphasized, at both the commander and staff levels, the capabilities of the CARBG as a highly mobile, mechanized infantry battle group.<sup>255</sup>

The operation advanced much more quickly than planned because UNITAF met less resistance than it had anticipated. An atmosphere of urgency was created by the fact that the media were constantly looking for advances in the operation. According to Col Labbé, had the Canadians not become involved immediately they would probably have ended up guarding the perimeter of an airfield — an apparently unheroic and unimportant task.

To avoid this outcome, Col Labbé let it be known, in his first meeting with LGen Johnston on December 15, 1992 in Mogadishu, that the Canadians were willing and able to secure the Belet Huen Humanitarian Relief Sector. Ideally, Col Labbé wanted to have that task assigned solely to the Canadian Joint Force; however, the U.S. Army had not yet been assigned a task and

were also looking for a significant mission.<sup>256</sup> After the meeting, it appeared that the Canadians would be assigned, along with elements of 10 Mountain Division, a U.S. unit, to secure either Bardera, Baidoa or Belet Huen.<sup>257</sup>

On December 19, 1992, Canada's role in securing the Belet Huen Humanitarian Relief Sector was confirmed, with D-Day set for between the end of December and January 2, 1993.<sup>258</sup> By December 22nd, planning for the Belet Huen operation had begun in earnest,<sup>259</sup> and D-day was set for December 28th. Although planning was just beginning, the troops were already arriving. By December 23rd, slightly behind the schedule worked out at Camp MacDill, the entire advance party had arrived in Baledogle. By January 1, 1993, the entire CARBG would be in Belet Huen.<sup>260</sup>

The Canadian mission within the overall operation was thus identified within five days of Col Labbé's arrival in theatre. Only nine days later, execution of the mission began. This tight schedule meant that troops were arriving in theatre before they knew where they would be going or what they would be doing. There was no time to train the troops for the specific mission, to reconsider decisions that had been made about supplies, or to wait to make decisions until full information was available.<sup>261</sup>

Once the Belet Huen Humanitarian Relief Sector was secured, the Canadian mission was the same as that given to all coalition commanders: to secure major air and seaport facilities, key installations and major relief distribution sites; to provide open and free passage for humanitarian relief supplies; and to provide security for relief convoys and relief organizations and assist in providing humanitarian relief under UN Security Council Resolution 794.

## Issues Arising from Development of Mission

From this description of the development of the mission, several facts and issues emerge. To begin with, it is clear that at the time the Government decided to participate in the UN-authorized, U.S.-led peace enforcement operation in Somalia, no role for the Canadian Forces had been established. In fact, U.S. military planners were not even aware that Canada had been invited to participate and were more or less indifferent to the news of Canada's intentions. If there was any notable reaction on the part of the U.S. military, it came from Gen Powell, who thought that Canada should continue to play a role in a peacekeeping operation in northern Somalia. Despite this uncertainty at the time troops were committed, neither the Chief of the Defence Staff nor any member of his staff played any role in determining, guiding, or adjusting the mission of the CF in theatre. In fact, the mission developed by Col Labbé was never directly confirmed by the CDS or anyone else at NDHQ.

Second, a mission was not identified until after the Canadian Commander, Col Labbé, arrived in theatre, and it was not confirmed until after a substantial number of troops had arrived. Third, it was only as a result of significant lobbying and negotiation on the part of Col Labbé and others that the Canadians obtained the high-profile mission of securing a humanitarian relief sector. In other words, the pressure to move quickly was the result of internal concerns, namely to obtain a high-profile mission.

Gen de Chastelain and Mr. Fowler would likely argue that the military was merely following the orders of Cabinet, which had made the decision to participate in UNITAF. However, that decision was made based on advice from the DM and the CDS that either mission (participation in UNITAF or participation in UNOSOM II) was equally possible. In turn, their advice was based on three main questionable assumptions:

1. As Gen de Chastelain stated in his testimony before us, he believed that the differences between a peacekeeping and a peace-enforcement operation would be negligible and that any differences that did exist could easily be compensated for by using a flexible, mobile force and by adopting less restrictive rules on the use of force. For this reason, he did not see the need to redo estimates.
2. It was assumed that any regiment that was suitable for a peacekeeping mission would also be suitable for a peace enforcement mission.
3. It was assumed that the Canadian Airborne Regiment was operationally ready.

The validity of the assumptions about operational readiness and suitability are discussed in detail elsewhere in this report (see Volume 2, Chapter 23) and so are not discussed here. From the perspective of planners, however, changing Canada's participation from UNOSOM to UNITAF should have been recognized as having significant implications because of the differences between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and differences in the planning and organization of the two operations.

Under UNITAF, the overseer of the operation was the United States, not the United Nations. The area of operations was different (the United States had plans to operate only in the south, not the north of Somalia), and the mission was different, because under a Chapter VII mandate, force was authorized to achieve the mandate. The threat would also be different, since foreign forces were now arriving in Somalia without the consent of the parties. All these factors would have had an impact on the appropriate composition and structure of the force and on the support, weapons, and training required.

Aside from generic differences between the operations, planners faced the particular problem that no mission had been defined for Canada.



That proper planning is impossible without a mission was a point made repeatedly to the UN by Canadian planners and diplomats between August and October 1992. In the absence of a precise mission, Canada insisted that a reconnaissance be undertaken before troops were deployed. Canada also repeatedly requested clarification of the mission, and right up to the cancellation of UNOSOM was never satisfied with the response received from the UN, although there was much more detail for that operation than for UNITAF. For Operation Cordon, Canadian Forces knew where they would be going and had done a reconnaissance there. They had been able to outline the expected tasks in some detail. They knew where their support base would be (HMCS *Preserver* within sight), and although they were not satisfied that it was appropriate, they knew and understood the implications of operating under a Chapter VI mandate. Still, the uncertainties of the mission in UNOSOM also made planners anxious that there was not enough time to prepare.

By contrast, for UNITAF, the only information Canada had at the time the decision was taken was the two-line statement of the mission in the Security Council resolution. Canada had no idea what its role would be in the operation, where its troops would be going, or what kind of situation they would face. The decision to participate was made December 4, 1992. Col Labbé was appointed Commander on that day and arrived in Ottawa December 5th. He was to organize his headquarters and deploy with an advance team on December 10th, five days later. The first of the troops were to arrive in theatre two weeks later, and the entire CARBG a week after that. This schedule was much tighter than what was thought reasonable for any deployment of a UN standby unit.<sup>262</sup>

Given the history of concern about the adequacy of the mission statement and time limits, as well as the significance of the change in mandate, Cabinet should have been made aware of the uncertainties flowing from an unknown mandate, and the chain of command should have made sure that there was adequate time to deal with them. This was not done, of course, because the overriding concern of senior officers was to secure a high-profile role, and that required them to move very quickly.

### **Concern About a High-Profile Role**

Although Operation Cordon was generally better planned and evaluated more rationally, securing a high-profile role in that mission was also a concern. After the October reconnaissance to Bossasso, when it became apparent that the area was free of famine and relatively calm, concerns were raised at the daily executive meeting, because both NDHQ and DEA wanted the CF security battalion to be assured a major role in the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies.

In and of itself, the objective of securing a high-profile mission might have been reasonable if it were appropriate to the capabilities of the forces involved. One would have expected that the head of an organization would try to negotiate the most positive and appropriate contribution possible. However, it appears that the pursuit of this goal, and the unfounded belief that the Canadian Airborne Regiment was ready to go, blinded decision makers to the need to go through the standard planning process to ensure that the Canadian commitment was appropriate from a policy perspective and that the force was operationally ready.

### *Lack of Consideration of Peacekeeping Guidelines*

The relative importance attached to securing a high-profile mission is indicative of the lack of attention paid to the peacekeeping guidelines, which are supposed to be considered in any decision to participate in a peacekeeping operation.

While the guidelines appear to have been considered in rejecting the original request for participation in April 1992, they played a progressively less significant role in the decisions to participate in Operation Cordon and later Operation Deliverance. In the estimates and assessments made in July 1992 with respect to participation in an expanded UNOSOM, the only criterion considered was the security of the troops, and that issue arose not out of systematic analysis of the criteria but because it was an obvious problem. Recall that the July analyses were part of a feasibility study to determine CF capability to provide a battalion. As in December, these were not done with a view to deciding whether Canada should participate. If the criteria had been examined systematically, however, would problems with the mandate that came to the fore in late August have been identified at this point?

With respect to the December 1992 analysis concerning participation in UNITAF, the criteria were essentially ignored. The factors that were significant in the decision-making process were the alleged readiness of the unit, the desire for a prominent role, the fact that a decision to participate had already been taken, the perception that media attention required a response, sustainability, and cost. Only two peacekeeping criteria, sustainability and cost, were considered, and in both cases they were analyzed with the object of supporting or justifying participation in UNITAF. It is clear from this evidence that, as Gen de Chastelain and Mr. Fowler testified, at best the criteria were considered merely guidelines and moreover, in the context of a Somalia operation, unsuitable. Had they been updated to reflect the changing nature of peacekeeping and accorded a more important role in decision making, analysis might have turned decision making away from irrelevant factors, such as securing a high-profile mission and ensuring a role for the CAR, but in the end it was these factors that dominated the decision.

In discussing the peacekeeping guidelines, it is important to note that criticism for failing to give the guidelines adequate consideration has been generally levelled at the Government. The Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs criticized the Government for putting too much emphasis on participation in peacekeeping operations for the sake of Canada's record and reputation.<sup>263</sup> It may well have been such concerns that prompted the Privy Council Office in August 1992 to recommend a more active role in an expanded UNOSOM (i.e., provision of a security battalion), contrary to the advice of DND and DEA. This only reinforces the need for suitable guidelines and for measures to ensure they are followed.

### *Reactive Planning*

It appears from the decision-making process that planning and analysis took place mostly on a reactive basis, and often planners were not given enough time to do an adequate job.

Although DEA was first notified of possible UN action in January 1992, and CF personnel played prominent roles in the technical team visit to the area in March and April 1992, no serious analysis of a potential Canadian role in the area or further monitoring of the situation was done (at least in writing) until July 28, 1992. It is true that in April 1992 Canada had refused to participate in the proposed operation to maintain a cease-fire in Mogadishu, so the CF had less reason to focus its efforts on the area. However, it was clear that the shape of the UN operation there was still evolving and that Canada might yet have a role to play. On July 15, 1992, Canada received an appeal to all member states from the Secretary-General for humanitarian assistance. One week later, the Secretary-General proposed an immediate airlift, which was confirmed in a resolution on July 27, 1992.

Yet it was not until July 28, 1992 — after having been requested specifically by the Privy Council Office to determine whether something significant could be done to support humanitarian assistance operations in Somalia — that Gen de Chastelain directed the joint staff at NDHQ to conduct a feasibility study to determine the CF capability to provide a battalion should one be required. Then, staff were given only 24 hours to produce their reports. Surely more advance work should have been done in what NDHQ terms the “negotiation” phase.

Again, with respect to the change in mission and the decision to participate in UNITAF, analysis was reactive and requested under very tight time-lines. Although the Secretary-General alerted member states to the need to “review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia”, serious analysis in NDHQ of the implications for Canada did not begin until December 1, 1992, and staff were given only 48 hours to produce their analyses.



It is surprising that between January and December 1992, written analyses and estimates were undertaken only twice, both times under severe time pressures in reaction to events. In both cases, the fundamental question of whether Canada should participate was removed from their purview, in the first case because staff were to conduct feasibility studies only, and in the second case, because staff were under the impression that the decision to participate in UNITAF had already been made.

It could well be that NDHQ, suffering from cutbacks and being asked to do more with less, was unable to do more than react to the situation, but there is a contradiction in seeking prominent roles internationally and at the same time being unable to plan effectively.

### *Problems of Joint Operations*

The question of Canada's participation in an operation without a specific military mission raises an important question about the functioning of joint operations. The essential question is whether Canada should offer to participate and allow the leaders of the operation to assign a role, or wait for a request to perform a particular mission before deciding whether to participate.

For example, at the time Canada decided to join UNITAF, the U.S. plans were still evolving, and they did not know what specific missions and tasks would be assigned to particular forces. The Government of Canada was well aware of this situation when it made its decision. It is clear that the Government wanted Canada to play a part in the international effort, even though no specific mission had been established and a newly formed element would have to deploy within a month. Was this a reasonable course for the military to support and for the Government to take?

Once Canada had committed to UNITAF, Col Labbé responded to the task of promptly deploying the troops and having a mission defined. As soon as Col Labbé was appointed, he visited the U.S. command centre to ensure that Canadians were not forgotten in the planning. He also made immediate contact with the U.S. Commander, LGen Johnston, as soon as he arrived in Mogadishu. Once he knew what the mission would be, he had his team work long hours to plan for it in a compressed time period. Under the circumstances, considering the limited planning carried out at NDHQ for the mission, Col Labbé acted quickly to pin down and organize a completely new mission within three weeks of his appointment. Whether the Chief of the Defence Staff should have played a more prominent role in the development of the mission is another question. He never met with Col Labbé before the latter left for Somalia and never gave him any instructions on what kind of mission to accept, except that it should be a high-profile one.

The fact that Col Labbé was able to identify a mission and organize troops to carry it out in this instance does not overrule the need to examine the issue of participation and co-ordination of joint operations more closely. Fortunately for Canada, the adequacy of planning and organization was never truly tested, as conditions at Belet Huen were not nearly as volatile or violent as anticipated. The issue should be analyzed further in the context of the changing nature of peacekeeping and development of joint planning doctrine.<sup>254</sup>

## FINDINGS

### The Decision-Making Process at DND in 1992

- *In 1992, apart from the 1987 White Paper on Defence and the CDS Red Book, there was no single document outlining Canadian Forces policies or procedures for planning and conducting peacekeeping operations. Each operation was considered unique, requiring specific one-time policy considerations.*

The lack of a comprehensive policy document, including an outline of factors to be considered in deciding whether to join a peacekeeping operation and procedures for determining who makes that decision, was evident in the inconsistent testimony on the issue of the applicability of criteria elicited during the Inquiry's Hearings.

- *The 1987 White Paper articulated a policy requiring DND to consider certain criteria before making a decision to participate in a traditional peacekeeping mission. During the initial phases of peacekeeping planning, a possible peacekeeping operation should be weighed against the criteria. The effectiveness of the process for applying the criteria at the time of the Somalia commitment was problematic.*
- *There was a lack of clear direction regarding the applicability of the criteria and the manner in which they should receive consideration from DND and the CF. No clear lines of responsibility existed between DND, the CF and DEA as regards assessment of the proposed operation against the criteria.*

An internal military review noted a split in responsibility between DEA and NDHQ with respect to the criteria. In the review, however, the ADM (Policy and Communications) saw no split in responsibility. The evidence at the hearings revealed ambiguity surrounding consideration and application of the guidelines. Col Bremner testified that the criteria were considered by officials at NDHQ during their initial estimates of the

mission. Gen de Chastelain, however, described the treatment of criteria in different terms. Although he acknowledged the existence of the criteria or guidelines, he was vague about their applicability and NDHQ's role in assessing them. In essence, he saw the role of defence officials as primarily to assess the capability of the CF to mount an operation. Assessing a mission mandate to determine whether it was clear and enforceable, or whether it was likely to serve the cause of peace and lead to a settlement, was DEA's responsibility.

- *No procedure was in place for examining the criteria and formally documenting the results of the review and the basis for any acceptance or rejection of specific criteria.*

There was no testimony describing the process or who was involved. Testimony was limited to assertions that the criteria were considered as part of the policy analysis, that the criteria were considered in a general way, that is, that the operation would have been discussed bearing in mind those concerns and that criteria were taken into account only "somewhat".

The most recent Auditor General's report (May 1996) noted that NDHQ staff meet to assess a mission in terms of the guidelines. The assessments are not written, however, and there is accordingly no record of the factors considered and the manner in which those factors affect the outcome of the review.

- *New peacekeeping guidelines, updated to reflect the changing nature of peacekeeping, had not been developed or were not in use at the time of planning for the Somalia deployment.*

In his testimony, Mr. Fowler asserted that the guidelines then in place were not applicable to Somalia. On the other hand, the CDS believed that the issue of the guidelines was primarily within the jurisdiction of the DEA. Moreover it was generally evident from the testimony that the approach of NDHQ officials to the guidelines was ad hoc and inconsistent, notwithstanding the fact that the direction in the White Paper was that use of the guidelines was imperative.

The criteria set out in the 1987 White Paper were undoubtedly inappropriate for assessing a peace enforcement operation, and it is puzzling that a military that prides itself on its record in peacekeeping had done nothing to update the guidelines since 1988 to reflect the type of operations then being undertaken.



- *At the time of planning for the Somalia deployment, there was no written doctrine or checklist relating to planning for traditional peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations, despite previous recommendations that such documents should be produced.*

The evidence revealed that, in 1992, although a generally accepted process was in place for examining a request from the UN to participate in a multi-national operation, it had not been tailored to deal with the specific challenges of traditional peacekeeping operations, let alone peace enforcement operations. Nor was the process formalized in any document.

These same problems had been noted previously in an internal military review of peacekeeping operations conducted in 1991–92. The review criticized the fragmented and unco-ordinated approach to peacekeeping operations and noted an absence of written procedures and/or checklists with respect to the handling of UN requests. It found that in determining practices and procedures, staff at NDHQ relied almost exclusively on the ‘corporate memory’ of the staff working under the director of International Policy.

The review found that this approach perpetuated an ad hoc staff procedure and accordingly recommended the establishment of formal directions regarding responsibilities, method of work, and procedures for peacekeeping activities. It further recommended that the ADM (Policy and Communications) establish or formalize clear and concise direction regarding responsibilities, method of work, and procedures for peacekeeping activities within the ADM (Policy and Communications) group and with respect to involvement of other group principals. ADM (Policy and Communications) did not respond to this recommendation in the review.

## The Decision-Making Process in Relation to the Somalia Deployment and the Mission and Tasks

### The Decision

- *Notwithstanding defence policy requiring peacekeeping guidelines to be considered in any decision about whether to participate in a peacekeeping operation, the guidelines played a negligible role at the various stages of decision making after April 1992. Instead, other irrelevant considerations dominated the decision-making process.*
- (a) *The first response to a request in April 1992 for a commitment of military observers to participate in UNOSOM was negative. The decision was made after consideration of the peacekeeping guidelines and was formally noted in documentation within DND.*

- (b) In July 1992, serious participation with a security battalion was again rejected by DND and DEA because of uncertainties in the security situation and in the mission. However, this recommendation was ignored by Privy Council Office and effectively overtaken by the Prime Minister's commitment to participate in an operation in a letter dated August 13, 1992.
- (c) While assessments were conducted in July and August 1992, there was little, if any, evidence of a formal consideration of the peacekeeping criteria. There was no evidence that the mandate of the operation had been reviewed extensively. Nor was there adequate review of problems associated with the failure to obtain consent from the warring factions. Although the governing factions in Bossaso were apparently in agreement with Canada's presence in the north-east, General Aidid was not even made aware of the expanded operation before it was authorized by the Security Council. There was also no evidence that the likelihood of success of the mission was evaluated. The only criterion apparently considered was the impact of the commitment on other CF operations.
- (d) In December 1992, when Canada was asked to join UNITAF, there was no serious consideration of the guidelines. As Gen de Chastelain and Mr. Fowler explained, the guidelines were not designed to apply to this type of mission. They were apparently considered in a general way but never discussed one by one.
- (e) Instead, the following factors, the most important of which were the desire for a prominent role and the fact that the unit was thought to be ready to go, played the key role in the decision-making process:
  - (i) The fact that the unit was ready and anxious to go, including the fact that the HMCS Preserver was en route, appears to have been one of the most important factors favouring participation in the U.S.-led peace enforcement mission.
  - (ii) The desire for a prominent military role also appears to have been a significant factor favouring participation in the U.S.-led peace enforcement mission. Gen de Chastelain attached considerable importance to this and made personal efforts, even calling Gen Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to secure a prominent or visible role for Canada. After one of his conversations with Gen Powell, he explicitly noted the importance of securing a high-profile role. He wrote "A role that was seen to be secondary would not sit well with the troops, with me, with the Government or with Canadians."

- (iii) *A number of witnesses suggested that the decision to participate was small-p political in the sense that there was a bias toward participating in the peace enforcement mission. In our view, there does appear to have been some pressure from Gen de Chastelain and Mr. Fowler to focus on determining how Canada could participate in the U.S.-led mission, at the expense of the normal process of analyzing the merits and drawbacks of participation in each mission, from a policy and operational viewpoint.*
- (iv) *We conclude that sustainability was viewed only from the perspective of whether participation in the U.S.-led mission was possible, rather than which mission could be better sustained.*
- (v) *Canada made the commitment to participate in the face of opposition from the United Nations and indifference on the part of the Pentagon, but with some encouragement from the President of the United States.*

The 1987 Defence White Paper and the 1992 Defence Policy Statement set out the guidelines against which participation in a peacekeeping operation is to be judged. Although the published guidelines were written to apply to traditional peacekeeping operations, the principle that participation in an operation should be measured against objective criteria of likely success is a solid approach. The guidelines could have been and should have been updated to reflect the changing nature of peacekeeping.

Had an approach to dealing with peacekeeping operations been thought through and set out clearly in a doctrinal statement, decision making might have been guided by more relevant factors.

- *The uncertainties, contingencies and challenges of participating in UNITAF were not adequately highlighted in the staff analyses done or the briefing to Cabinet. This was the result, in part, of the bias of senior officers and officials at NDHQ toward participation in UNITAF and of the lack of appreciation for the difference between UNOSOM and UNITAF.*

Staff were given only two days to prepare estimates and analysis, even though it was known as early as November 24, 1992 that the operation could become a peace enforcement operation. The estimates produced did not follow the standard form, were cursory, and made significant, erroneous assumptions about potential Canadian participation in the U.S.-led mission. In particular, the estimate from J3 Plans contained no initial analysis of the mission to be accomplished.



- (a) *The analysis done and briefing given failed to emphasize the implications of the change in mandate from a Chapter VI to a Chapter VII operation, the change in location, and the lack of mission or to account for how these issues might be dealt with. For example, the need for different equipment, new rules of engagement, another reconnaissance, different force composition and structure, different support arrangements, additional training, and, above all, more time to deal with all these changes were not adequately taken into account. If standard and thorough estimates and assessments had been prepared, these issues and potential approaches to dealing with them may have come to light.*
- (b) *At the same time, it should be noted that Cabinet approved Canada's participation knowing full well that no mission had been defined and therefore that there was considerable uncertainty about Canada's role in the operation.*

## Mission and Tasks

### UNOSOM

- *Canada's mission within UNOSOM was unclear. Problems encountered by the Canadian Forces in formulating a mission plan were largely the result of shortcomings at UN headquarters. Control of plans for UNOSOM was in the hands of UN Secretariat officials, who assumed responsibility for overall co-ordination of the mission until it was suspended in favour of the U.S.-led coalition, UNITAF.*

By August 1992, there was still no clear UN statement of the mission for the expanded version of UNOSOM, either in the Secretary-General's report of August 24, 1992, or the Security Council resolution adopted August 27, 1992.

The main purpose of UNOSOM after August 1992, was stated to be to secure the delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance throughout Somalia. Tasks for the security battalions deployed to the four operational zones included providing security at ports of entry and escorting convoys of food and supplies to distribution sites and providing security there.

At the UN, plans for the deployment of security personnel were constantly in flux. The UN had difficulty obtaining commitments from troop-contributing countries, both for resources or for the deployment of troops. UN negotiations with factions in other areas were not progressing, and in Mogadishu, General Aidid was having second thoughts

about allowing the deployment of security personnel to Mogadishu. Canada's assignment to Bossasso appeared to be the most stable of the arrangements made to that point.

NDHQ received formal notification of the mission and tasks on September 2, 1992, when Canada received the general guidelines for troop-contributing countries. The tasks were insufficiently articulated — there was no indication of how the humanitarian assistance would be distributed or what agencies would be working in the different sectors.

A contingency plan was prepared by Force Mobile Command, and the Chief of the Defence Staff was briefed on September 4, 1992. During the briefing, it was noted that the UN mission was still problematic, as there was still no clear concept of operations, information on the needs of the population was inadequate, and information on the possible threat in Bossasso was lacking. Outstanding issues included the UN plan for the military component of the force and insufficient information on tasks, boundaries, structure of operations, and the deployment timetable.

- *The lack of clarity in the overall mission for UNOSOM and the lack of specificity in the tasks assigned to the Canadian contingent were never remedied satisfactorily. Canada made repeated efforts to have the mandate clarified by the UN and to have the assigned tasks delineated appropriately. When Canada finally received a formal response to its request, it contained little new information that could assist in the planning of the mission.*

Concerns were expressed by Canadian representatives very early in the negotiations about the lack of clarity in the mission statement for UNOSOM. Moreover, there was growing concern that Canada's role in the operation would be superfluous because the area chosen for its deployment was relatively calm. Learning of the general lack of need for humanitarian assistance in the Bossasso region, Canadian officials expressed continuing concern about Canada's role in the expanded operation.

Canada's representative at the United Nations made a formal request for clarification of the mission, a list of the tasks to be performed, and the UN concept of operations for the Canadian zone.

Two days later, the response from Marrack Goulding, Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, included what was described as a more refined statement of the mission for the Canadian battalion, together with a description of the tasks assigned. The response also included a statement of the UN concept of operations. Although the response contained additional information about general tasks, it failed to address adequately the questions set out in the original request for clarification.

- In addition to uncertainty about mandate, UN planning for the mission was seriously flawed. This had profound implications for troop-contributing countries.
- Although initial NDHQ plans contemplated early deployment of a reconnaissance team, delays at the UN prevented the departure of the reconnaissance party before October, despite continuing efforts on the part of Canadian officials to obtain permission to proceed.
- Delay and uncertainty in providing authorization and arrangements for a reconnaissance, which was a priority for Canada, had a significant impact on planning for Operation Cordon. The UN proposal was to have the reconnaissance done by the advance party, but this was not acceptable to Canada. Ultimately Canada refused to move any resources to Somalia until the reconnaissance was complete and plans subsequently finalized.

Despite repeated requests for a date for the reconnaissance, which was urgently required to assist in finalizing operational planning back in Canada, none was forthcoming until early October. Canada finally received news of the authorization for a reconnaissance on October 6, 1992. On October 12th, the reconnaissance party left for Somalia and conducted the reconnaissance from October 12th to October 18th, with the aim of confirming details about Canada's contribution.

- Although it took place late in the planning process, the October reconnaissance was critical to Canada in many respects. Foremost, it clarified the mission and tasks assigned to the Canadian Airborne Regiment for its deployment to Bossasso. The results of the reconnaissance indicated, for the first time, a change in the nature of the implied tasks. While the UN mandate and strategy remained the same, the tasks were somewhat altered as a result of conditions in Bossasso at the time. The reconnaissance report described the revised and implied tasks for the CAR. The changes were of major concern to Canada, as both DND and DEA wanted to ensure that the CF security battalion played a major role.
- NDHQ also decided to plan and propose its own force structure for the mission, as it was dissatisfied with the recommended force structure for battalions in the various sectors, which failed to recognize standard cohesive fighting units. There was additional concern about the UN stipulation that only small arms be taken, since the mission was one of protection, not observation.
- Although the deployment of the CAR to the Bossasso area was known early on in the planning process, it was not until October 15, 1992 that concerns were raised formally by Canadian officials about the appropriateness of the



deployment. The specific concern noted at the daily executive meeting that day was that Bossasso was considered a stable region in relation to the other humanitarian relief sectors, so that Canada might have only a diminished role to play in that area. It was not clear whether there was even a need for relief distribution in the area, or whether relief activities were sufficient to warrant a security battalion.

Reports from the October reconnaissance failed to alleviate the concerns of Canadian officials about the role for Canada's security battalion in Bossasso. In a special briefing at the daily executive meeting of October 21st, Col Houghton, LCol Morneau, and LCol Clark presented a detailed account of events leading to the current situation in Somalia. The briefing confirmed the fact that current tasks for the CF would focus more on providing a stabilizing influence in the area than on the security and escort duties originally proposed. While concluding that the revised tasks were well within UNOSOM's mandate, LCol Clark emphasized that the situation would have to be monitored.

- *Canadian officials were not persuaded that the role for troops in Bossasso, as evolved, would be suited to the CAR and/or Canada's proposed organizational structure. Officials continued to seek further clarification of the mandate from the UN, but an acceptable clarification was never received.*

## UNITAF

- *At the time the Government of Canada decided to participate in the UN-authorized U.S.-led peace enforcement operation, no role for the Canadian Forces had been established. In fact, U.S. military planners were not even aware that Canada had been invited to participate and were more or less indifferent to the news of Canada's intentions.*

At the time Canada agreed to participate, a role for the Canadian contingent had not even been contemplated by U.S. planners, let alone defined. Canadian decision makers were aware only of the general types of tasks that they might be asked to do, for example, securing seaports and airports and protecting food convoys. They did not know the extent to which the Canadian contingent would be involved in systematic disarmament. Nor did they know where the contingent would be deployed, or what specific tasks and challenges it would face upon arrival.

- *Defining the mission was left solely in the hands of Col Labbé, Commander of Canadian Joint Force Somalia. The Chief of the Defence Staff and staff at NDHQ gave Col Labbé no guidance about what type of mission the CF would accept, except to urge him to move as quickly as possible to secure a high-profile mission.*
- *A Canadian mission was not identified until after Col Labbé arrived in theatre and was not confirmed until after a substantial portion of the troops had arrived in theatre.*

The Canadian mission in the overall operation was identified within five days of Col Labbé's arrival in theatre, and execution of the mission began just nine days later. This tight schedule meant that troops were arriving in theatre before they knew where they would be going or what they would be doing. There was no time to train the troops for the specific mission, to reconsider decisions that had been made about supplies, or to wait to make decisions until full information was available.

- *Once the Belet Huen Humanitarian Relief Sector was secured, the Canadian mission was the same as that given to all coalition commanders. Based on the U.S. Central Command's statement of the mission for the entire operation, it was as follows:*

*Mission: to secure major air and seaport facilities, key installation and major relief distribution sites, to provide open and free passage for humanitarian relief supplies and finally to provide security for relief convoys, relief organizations and assist in providing humanitarian relief under UN SCR 794.*

## Recommendations

**We recommend that:**

- 24.1 The Government of Canada issue new guidelines and compulsory criteria for decisions about whether to participate in a peace support operation.**
- 24.2 The Government of Canada define clearly the respective roles and responsibilities of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Department of National Defence (DND) in the decision-making process for peace support operations.**

**24.3 In briefings or advice to the Government relating to participation in a peace support operation, the Government of Canada require a comprehensive statement of how the peace support operations guidelines and criteria apply to the proposed operation.**

Despite the fact that both major defence policy documents — the 1987 White Paper and the 1992 Defence Statement — referred to criteria to be applied when considering a UN request for participation in a peace operation, there is no indication that the criteria were applied in any reasonable or consistent manner to Canada's proposed participation in either UNOSOM or UNITAF. As is apparent in our findings, the lack of clarity in the application of the criteria was problematic, making accountability and responsibility more difficult to assess. The Inquiry accordingly calls for a more co-ordinated and comprehensive approach to decision making to clarify and identify areas of responsibility with a view to establishing greater accountability, efficiency, and clarity.

To begin with, the process should apply to deployment of Canadian Forces personnel outside Canada in all peace support operations, including traditional peacekeeping, peace enforcement and any other missions initiated by the UN or other international agency. The criteria will no doubt differ in some respects, depending on the nature of the mission, and these differences should be set out carefully. There may also be a need to identify different criteria or an abbreviated process for emergency operations.

In this process, departmental responsibilities must be clear and unambiguous. An internal military review, conducted in 1992, found that there was a division of responsibilities between DFAIT and NDHQ, albeit unclear. DFAIT's responsibilities were identified as determining whether there was a clear and enforceable mandate; whether the principal antagonists agreed; whether arrangements were likely to serve the cause of peace; and whether the size of the force would damage Canada's relations with other states. NDHQ was responsible primarily for determining whether the size of the force was appropriate to the mandate, whether CF participation would jeopardize other commitments, whether there was a single authority to support the operation, and whether participation was adequately and equitably funded and logistically supported.



The review concluded, however, that the division of responsibility required clarification. The response from ADM (Policy and Communications) was that no split in responsibility existed.

The lack of certainty in this area was clearly problematic. At the hearings, senior officials expressed differing views, and no explicit policy document or doctrinal statement appeared to direct the manner in which the guidelines were to be applied. The Government of Canada must establish a clear demarcation between DFAIT and NDHQ and establish mechanisms to hear independently the advice offered by officials at DFAIT and NDHQ.

A recent Auditor General's report noted that NDHQ staff met to assess the mission in terms of the guidelines. However, the assessments are not written, leaving no record of the factors considered and the manner in which they affected the outcome of the review.

The issue of what policy guidelines/criteria should be considered is a significant determinant of accountability within the DND and the CF. While guidelines are set out in the new Peacekeeping Operations Doctrine, no formal process for their consideration is articulated. Moreover, the guidelines are now referred to as "key principles", not criteria, as they were in the 1987 White Paper.

- 24.4 The Chief of the Defence Staff develop Canadian Forces doctrine to guide the planning, participation, and conduct of peace support operations.**
- 24.5 The Government of Canada establish a new and permanent advisory body or secretariat to co-ordinate peace support operations policy and decision making.**

The Inquiry also calls for a separate body responsible for co-ordinating policy and decision making for peace support operations. Members could include representatives of the CF, DND, DFAIT, the Privy Council Office, the Prime Minister's Office, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and others and would be responsible for overseeing all aspects of policy and decision making for peace support operations. The changing nature of these operations underlies a need for broad-based consultation in the decision-making process. An Australian parliamentary committee recommended a similar permanent co-ordinating authority based on the same need.<sup>265</sup>

- 24.6 The Government of Canada adopt the policy that Canadian participation in United Nations peace support operations is contingent upon:**
- (a) completion of a detailed mission analysis by the Chief of the Defence Staff each time Canada is asked to participate in a peace support operation; and
  - (b) inclusion in the mission analysis of the following elements: a determination of troop strengths, unit configuration, resource requirements, and weapons and other capabilities.

Under the *National Defence Act*, when a province requests armed forces, the Chief of the Defence Staff must respond, but retains control in all respects of the nature of the force to be deployed.

The need for this control at the national level is apparent from a review of events leading to both Operation Cordon and Operation Deliverance. In both instances, the Canadian Forces was far too dependent on the United Nations and the United States for information and direction in the development of the mission assigned to the CF. Consequently, the CF had to deal with vague and undefined missions and inadequate force structures.

- 24.7 The Government of Canada, as part of its foreign and defence policy, advocate reform within the United Nations, particularly in the following areas:**
- (a) development of a process to ensure that the mandates of United Nations operations, as adopted by the United Nations Security Council, are clear, enforceable, and capable of achieving the goals of the mission; and
  - (b) development of a process to enhance the current planning structure at the United Nations to improve co-ordination of peace support operations through proper development of concepts of operations and strategic planning.

There are continuing complaints from UN member states that mandates for UN peacekeeping operations are vague and imprecise, and accordingly are not very useful for military commanders in the field. This lack of clarity was noted in a review of lessons learned from UNOSOM, conducted for the UN, and indeed this was a factor in the planning problems experienced by the Canadian Forces during the pre-deployment phase for Operation Cordon.

At the time of the Somalia operation, UN planning procedures were in need of improvement, to assist in providing early advice on force composition and other requirements to allow for effective preparation by troop contributors. The CF was awaiting permission to conduct a reconnaissance for weeks after the commitment to participate in UNOSOM was made. Despite numerous requests, it was unable to conduct it until mid-October, and this delay had a significant impact on the ability to plan. The delay arose mainly from poor co-ordination at UN headquarters.

## NOTES

1. Now the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
2. A report prepared by NDHQ's chief of review services, "Military Review 1/90, Peacekeeping Operations Final Report", April 15, 1992 (hereafter, "Military Review 1/90"), provides an in-depth look at the policies and procedures in place in NDHQ with respect to all peacekeeping operations in effect just before the deployment to Somalia. See p. iii of the report's executive summary.
3. "Military Review 1/90", p. 14. It appears that the report refers to DND in a loose sense, encompassing all of NDHQ. Note that although there is no requirement under the *National Defence Act* (NDA) or elsewhere to debate the issue in Parliament, there is a requirement under section 31(1) of the NDA to table the order in council once members of the CF are placed in active service, and a CF commitment to UN operations is considered active service under the NDA. *National Defence Act*, R.S.C. 1985, Chapter N-5, as amended.
4. "Military Review 1/90", p. iii.
5. Testimony of Col Bremner, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1467.
6. "Military Review 1/90", p. iii.
7. Testimony of Daniel Dhavernas, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1579 and following.
8. See "Military Review 1/90" for a description of the responsibilities assumed during the decision-making process. During the period in 1992 leading up to the decision to commit to the mission in Somalia, the ADM (Pol & Comm) was Dr. Kenneth Calder.
9. Testimony of Daniel Dhavernas, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1583.
10. Testimony of Daniel Dhavernas, Transcripts vol. 8, pp. 1587–1588.
11. These factors are identified in the most recent report of the Auditor General: Chapter 6, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and Chapter 7, National Defence, p. 6–15 and following. The report of May 1996 also suggests that the following considerations should be examined before deciding to undertake a UN commitment:
  - a clear statement of the nature and extent of participation and the potential for achieving Canadian foreign policy objectives;
  - analysis of the political, humanitarian and military situation in the country or region of conflict;



- an assessment of the physical risks to Canadian personnel and of the probable duration of involvement;
  - the financial cost and other implications for Canada;
  - an assessment of whether government guidelines for participation are being followed; and
  - the different ways in which Canada could participate, and an assessment of the lessons learned from participation in previous missions.
12. See "Military Review 1/90", p. 12.
  13. Testimony of Col Bremner, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1477 and following.
  14. The four phases are described in the "Military Review 1/90", p. 7, and are as follows:
    1. Normal Phase  
A group of NDHQ staff and representatives from commands meet every four to six weeks in periods of non-crisis to discuss potential areas for UN operations. Although not referred to specifically as the crisis action team (CAT) in the report, this is likely the same group whose responsibilities were outlined by Cmdre Cogdon in testimony (Transcripts vol. 9, p. 1658 and following). He describes the CAT as a collection of members at NDHQ, including representatives of all cells in the joint staff, who met regularly to stay in touch with all continuing activities and to inform their respective organizational groups. Cmdre Cogdon indicated that the team met weekly to review possible operations and activities, but could also meet at any time as required.
    2. Indication Phase  
When there is a preliminary indication that a commitment may be requested, discussions begin to determine what might be expected and what would be feasible, given the situation as noted.
    3. Negotiation Phase  
Although no formal request has been received yet, if discussions suggest a likelihood of participation, more in-depth planning begins, with a range of military options being developed. At the same time, the DEA co-ordinates the international and political aspects of participation for presentation to Cabinet. Meetings of the CAT occur more frequently, with key members from DI Pol, J5 (Policy), the Director General Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DGPO/DPKO), J3, Director of Logistics, Peacekeeping Operations, J4 (Log), the Director of Financial Services, J4 (Finance) and, when necessary, command staff. This phase ends with the Government of Canada accepting the request in principle.
    4. Decision Phase  
Once the UN has a clear indication that the participants are ready to make a commitment to participation, a resolution is submitted to the Security Council. Once the resolution is approved, the formal request for participation is made and accepted.
  15. Testimony of Col Bremner, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1479. The determinants of success refer to the criteria or guidelines for UN peacekeeping operations discussed here.
  16. DND, *Challenge and Commitment*, White Paper on Defence (1987), p. 24.
  17. "Military Review 1/90".
  18. *Challenge and Commitment*, p. 24. Although the white paper describes the considerations as "criteria" and provides that the government decision *will* be based on such criteria (our emphasis), during our hearings witnesses also referred to the criteria as "guidelines" or a "checklist". Moreover, the latest white paper, which sets out the revised criteria, no longer describes them as criteria. Instead, they are referred to as "key principles" that should be reflected in the design of all missions. See DND, 1994 *White Paper*, pp. 28–29.

19. The evaluation undertaken in "Military Review 1/90" describes the consultation process and criticizes the absence of written procedures or checklists to assist in the co-ordination functions undertaken by DI Pol: see p. 15 and following.
20. "Military Review 1/90", p. 15.
21. "Military Review 1/90", p. 18. Note that the ADM (Pol & Comm) response fails to see any split in responsibility in terms of the criteria and is silent on the issue of whether better and more explicit direction is needed.
22. Testimony of Col Bremner, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1480.
23. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, p. 9925.
24. Testimony of Mr. Robert Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10175.
25. This statement is certainly true for UNITAF, but it was not necessarily the case for UNOSOM. UNOSOM began as a traditional peacekeeping mission, with a military observer force authorized for Mogadishu. Security for the delivery of humanitarian aid did not become a formal part of the mission until mid-August 1992.
26. Testimony of Robert Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10176.
27. A defence policy paper published in April 1992 (DND, *Canadian Defence Policy*) acknowledged that the old guidelines did not reflect completely the changing nature of peacekeeping. It did provide, however, that "We will continue to participate in accordance with the Government's criteria, and provide troops and observers to the maximum extent possible given the structure and commitments of the Canadian Forces" (p. 34).
28. For an analysis of the distinction between an enforcement action and peace enforcement see Chapter 10.
29. Program Evaluation E1/81, "DND Policy/Capability in Support of Peacekeeping Operations" (July 1983), pp. iv, 29.
30. Testimony of Col Bremner, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1481.
31. 1994 *Defence White Paper*, pp. 28, 29.
32. For a description of role and function of the joint staff at NDHQ, see the testimony of Cmdre Cogdon, Transcripts vol. 9, p. 1658 and following; and Chapter 3 in Volume 1 of this report. Cmdre Cogdon described in general terms the process for operational assessments in place at the time. In his position as Chief of Staff of J3, Cmdre Cogdon usually became aware that something was about to happen through J5 (Policy) or a meeting of the CAT. Occasionally, he would receive an inquiry from his supervisor, the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence, Security and Operations) (DCDS ISO), or the Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy and Communications). An initial staff check would follow, and either J3 Peacekeeping or J3 Plans would complete the initial planning estimate. The information would be gathered from all participants in the CAT and would likely extend to the functional commands. The information would be assembled in briefing note format for the DCDS, the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff.
33. Testimony of Col Bremner, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1477 and following; Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 44, p. 8683. Within the J Staff, J3 Peacekeeping had primary responsibility for traditional peacekeeping operations, i.e., those with a mandate under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, whereas J3 Operations had primary responsibility for missions authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
34. Testimony of Col Bremner, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1494.
35. Testimony of Col Bremner, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1489.
36. See also Report on United Nations Technical Mission to Somalia, 21 March–3 April 1992, Document book 9, tab 11, paragraphs 39, 40.

37. Letter, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and Deputy Minister (DM) to Minister of National Defence (MND), May 1, 1992. The letter was based on a briefing note prepared for the CDS by the Associate ADM (Policy and Communications), April 29, 1992, Document book 9, tab 14, which outlined the basis for the concerns.
38. Letter, CDS and DM to MND, May 1, 1992, Document book 9, tab 14.
39. Memorandum, Clerk of the Privy Council (CPC) to Prime Minister (PM), May 7, 1992, Document book 2, tab 1.
40. On the various problems, see telex, Permanent Representative to the United Nations (PRMNY) to Department of External Affairs (EXTOTT), May 6, 1992, Document book 122, tab 7; telex, Canadian High Commission, Nairobi (Nairobi) to Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA/HULL), June 16, 1992, Document book 122, tab 8; and notes, Africa and Middle East Branch (GGB), DEA, July 23, 1992, Document book 122, tab 9.
41. Message, PRMNY to EXTOTT, July 24, 1992, Document book 9, tab 17, contained a summary of the proposed report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (SG); a copy of the report itself was attached (Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, S/24343, 22 July 1992).
42. Record of decisions of meeting of Crisis Action Team (CAT), Capt (N) McMillan (J3 Plans), July 28, 1992, Document book 9, tab 20. Reference to this was noted in the situation summary prepared for the meeting.
43. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, p. 9920.
44. Minutes, Post-daily executive meeting (DEM), July 28, 1992, Document book 32.1, tab 2. The CDS suggested that Canada consider providing a security battalion to protect the observers and the CAR. However, the observers had already departed for Mogadishu.
45. Record of decisions of CAT meeting, July 28, 1992, Document book 9, tab 20. The J staff were directed to consider such factors as risk assessment, possible tasks, policy, movement, sustainment, finance, available forces, available medical support, and Land Force impact assessment.
46. Document book 9, tab 19.
47. Document book 9, tab 22.
48. Somalia Threat Assessment, July 29, 1992, Document book 9, tab 24.
49. Option Analysis for a Security Battalion in Support of UN Humanitarian Assistance Operations in Somalia, LCol Froh (J3 Plans), July 30, 1992, Document book 9, tab 27.
50. Option Analysis, Document book 9, tab 27.
51. Document book 32C, tab 2.
52. Memorandum, J6 Operations and Plans, July 29, 1992, Document book 27, tab 12.
53. Briefing note, Feasibility of using CFB Lahr as a support base for Operation Cordon, Logistics Branch, July 29, 1992, Document book 27, tab 11.
54. Options note, DMO, August 4, 1992, Document book 11, tab 2. The report was prepared without knowledge of the nature and/or extent of the medical needs of the refugee community and was therefore intended only as a general report and conditional recommendation.
55. Telex, EXTOTT to Nairobi, August 5, 1992, Document book 27, tab 20.
56. Options note, Canadian Response to the Crisis in Somalia, August 5, 1992, Document book 27, tab 21.



57. Options note, Canadian Response to the Crisis in Somalia, August 5, 1992, Document book 27, tab 21, p. 5. The report noted that with anarchy prevailing, the UN forces could encounter small-arms fire from groups attempting to raid or otherwise interfere with relief supplies. Compliance with the UN humanitarian plan by armed factions was considered unlikely at that time, yet important to the level of risk to which the UN troops might be exposed.
58. The recommendation of the Privy Council Office (PCO) was set out in a memorandum, ADM (Pol & Comm) to DM, CDS and others, August 10, 1992, Document book 27, tab 23, outlining options that had been presented to the Prime Minister and the situation at the time. See Memorandum, CPC to PM, August 5, 1996, Document book 2, tab 3.
59. The contents of the letter were made public on August 21, 1992, the date often referred to as that of formal acceptance of the UN request for a commitment to UNOSOM.
60. Briefing note, LCol Turnbull (DI Pol), August 16, 1992, Document book 11, tab 5, p. 3, raises a concern about the potential delay in response by the Government, noting that the media were already reporting that the United States would begin emergency airlifts as soon as possible.
61. Testimony of Col Bremner, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1504.
62. There was no evidence of minutes from this meeting of officials, but reference to such a meeting was made in a memorandum, CPC to PM, August 18, 1992, Document book 2, tab 5.
63. Memorandum, CPC to PM, August 18, 1992, Document book 2, tab 5.
64. A second UN technical team was sent in August to complete plans for the expanded operations contemplated by the Security Council resolution in late July: see Document book 11, tab 6.
65. Facsimile, PRMNY to EXTOTT and National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ), August 24, 1992, with Peacekeeping Operational Plan for Somalia attached, Document book 11, tab 6.
66. Briefing note for the CDS, Document book 11, tab 14.
67. Briefing note for the CDS, Document book 11, tab 14, p. 2.
68. Minutes, DEM, August 25, 1992, Document book 32.1, tab 4.
69. Facsimile, BGen Baril, Military Adviser to the UN, New York, to PRMNY, August 25, 1992, with attachment, Aide-mémoire, Request for Troops to UNOSOM, Document book 27, tab 35.
70. Telex, Col Fraser, PRMNY, to EXTOTT, August 25, 1992, Document book 10, tab 5.
71. Telex, Col Fraser, PRMNY, to EXTOTT, August 25, 1992, Document book 10, tab 5. At the same time, DEA received a message from PRMNY, Document book 22, tab 35, advising of a possible request (unofficial) for the provision of a communications unit on an interim basis, notwithstanding the fact that Canada initially declined to provide one. There was also speculation that Canada could be asked to provide the security battalion in Mogadishu, since there had been a delay in Pakistan's deployment of troops to Mogadishu, which was of particular concern to the United States.

72. Tasking Order, NDHQ to MARCOMHQ, FMCHQ, AIRCOM, CFCCHQ, NDHQ Ottawa, ADM(MAT)/ADM(PER)/DCDS ISO, August 27, 1992, Document book 10, tab 12. (Translation: National Defence Headquarters to Maritime Command Headquarters, Force Mobile Command Headquarters, Air Command, NDHQ (Ottawa), the assistant deputy ministers responsible for materiel and personnel, and the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence, Security and Operations).)
73. Briefing note, Force Mobile Command (FMC) to CDS, September 2, 1992, Document book 32B, tab 2.
74. Letter, CDS and DM to Minister of National Defence (MND), August 26, 1992, Document book 27, tab 38.
75. Letter, MND to Secretary of State of External Affairs (SSEA), September 1, 1992, Document book 12, tab 4.
76. Telex, PRMNY to NDHQ and EXTOTT, August 31, 1992, Document book 27, tab 43.
77. Document book 27, tab 43.
78. Document book 27, tab 43. There was already the delay by Pakistan, and the Secretariat feared slow reaction time from Nigeria, whose troops were to deploy during phase two of the plan. Concern about the Nigerian delay was of sufficient importance that the Secretariat was considering moving the Egyptian battalion into Mandera instead of the Nigerian battalion.
79. Document book 27, tab 43.
80. Briefing notes, FMC to CDS, Operation Cordon and Operation Dagger, September 2, 1992, Document book 28, tab 6.
81. Telex, NDHQ, situation report — UN Operations Planning, September 2, 1992, Document book 28, tab 1.
82. Letter, DM and CDS to MND, September 2, 1992, Document book 28, tab 8, advising that the formal request had been received and that the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) had been chosen by Force Mobile Command for the operation.
83. DND, press release, September 2, 1992, advising of Canada's commitment to UNOSOM, Document book 123, tab 13.
84. Facsimile, PRMNY to EXTOTT, September 15, 1992, Document book 3, tab 1.
85. Telex, DEA to PRMNY, September 18, 1992, Document book 122, tab 13.
86. *Note verbale*, Ambassador Fréchette, on behalf of the Government of Canada, to the Secretary-General of the UN, September 23, 1992, Document book 3, tab 2.
87. Briefing note, ADM (Pol & Comm) to CDS and DM, April 28, 1992, Document book 60, tabs 15 and 16.
88. Memorandum to MND, May 1, 1992, p. 4, Document book 9, tab 14.
89. Aide-mémoire on Somalia, ADM (Pol & Comm) to CDS and DM, July 29, 1992, Document book 9, tab 19), stated that an effective relief program was not possible without adequate protection for relief workers: "A framework for the security of humanitarian relief operations is the *sine qua non* for effective action."
90. Minutes, DEM, August 31, 1992, paragraph 2, Document book 32.1, tab 6.
91. Testimony of Mr. Robert Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10176.
92. Memorandum, CPC to PM, August 18, 1992, Document book 2, tab 5.
93. At the post-DEM of July 28, 1992, Document book 32.1, tab 2, the Deputy Minister observed that an unachievable call on resources could result if additional troops were requested for the former Yugoslavia. In response to the observation, the Chief of the Defence Staff noted that the request could be turned down.

94. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, p. 9941 and following.
95. Briefing note, Operation Cordon and Operation Dagger, Document book 27, tab 6.
96. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, p. 9943.
97. Mogadishu remained divided between the militias of the two rival factions led by Ali Mahdi and Mohammed Farah Aidid. There was no functioning central government, and many of the *de facto* authorities were refusing to allow aid to be delivered. In-bound ships carrying relief supplies were kept from docking and were shelled on one occasion. In mid-November, Ali Mahdi threatened to shell ships unless certain demands, including a demand that UNOSOM take over the port, were met. On November 23, 1992, after extensive negotiations, he agreed to allow ships to enter port. Nevertheless, on November 24th, a World Food Program ship was shelled as it tried to dock. This brief outline of the situation in Somalia in late fall 1992 is from United Nations, Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and the Situation in Somalia* (Reference Paper, April 1995), p. 5. See also, letter, Secretary-General (SG) to President of the Security Council (PSC), November 24, 1992, SC S/24859.
98. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia, S/24343, 22 July 1992, paragraph 57. See map of zones attached as Appendix A.
99. Letter, SG to PSC, November 24, 1992, S/24859, p. 4. The Canadian advance party was expected to arrive between December 4th and 6th, with the main party following by the end of December.
100. Letter, SG to PSC, November 24, 1992, S/24859, p. 5.
101. Telex, Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C., to EXTOTT, Document book 122A, tab 1; and telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, November 28, 1992, Document book 32D, tab 6.
102. Telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, November 28, 1992, Document book 32D, tab 6. Questions raised about the respective roles of the United Nations and the United States included the issue of an appropriate mechanism to assure UN oversight as well as how the U.S.-led mission would achieve longer-term UN aims of national reconciliation in Somalia.
103. Letter, SG to PSC, November 29, 1992, S/24868.
104. Under this option, the Secretary-General noted that the United States was ready to take the lead if this was the choice of the Security Council.
105. To authorize an action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council would have to make a determination, as the Secretary-General noted, under article 39 of the Charter, "that a threat to the peace exists, as a result of the repercussions of the Somali conflict on the entire region". It would also have to determine that non-military measures were not capable of achieving the Security Council's goals and decide what measures should be taken to maintain international peace and security. Letter, SG to PSC, November 29, 1992, S/24868, p. 3.
106. Although it is not mentioned in the resolution, one of the greatest obstacles to carrying out option five was the reluctance of the United States to put its forces under UN command. Telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, December 1, 1992, Document book 122A, tab 2.
107. Telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, December 1, 1992, Document book 122A, tab 2.



108. Until the Somalia operation, the UN had authorized only three missions under Chapter VII: Korea, 1950 (more properly characterized as enforcement, in the sense of international collective action against a state aggressor); the United Nations Operation in the Congo, 1960–64 (an operation that could be characterized as peace enforcement); and the Iraq-Kuwait operation (the Gulf War, also characterized more accurately as enforcement). For further discussion of the various types of peacekeeping operations, see Chapter 10.
109. Telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, December 3, 1992, Document book 19, tab 16.
110. Security Council Resolution 794 (1992), December 3, 1992, paragraph 10. Although this was a clear political statement of the mission, there was a lack of agreement among member states about what this mission required in practice. For example, did it require disarmament? If so, to what extent? This and other issues remained contentious throughout the operation.
111. The Canadian decision to participate was made by the Ad Hoc Committee of Ministers on Somalia. For minutes of their decision, see Document book 21, tab 17.
112. Telex, EXTOTT to Canadian embassies, Washington and Paris, and Canadian High Commission, London, November 26, 1992, Document book 32, tab 3.
113. Letter, PRMNY to PSC, November 27, 1992, referred to in telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, December 1, 1992, Document book 29, tab 38.
114. Telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, December 2, 1992, Document book 19, tab 12.
115. Telex, EXTOTT to PRMNY, November 26, 1992, Document book 32D, tab 3.  
See also EXTOTT to PRMNY, November 26, 1992, Document book 122A, tab 4.
116. Telex, EXTOTT to embassies, Washington, Paris, Islamabad, Cairo, Riyadh, Rome and Brussels, and high commission, London, December 1, 1992, Document book 30, tab 1. The telex raises questions about how national reconciliation would be promoted in the aftermath of a peace enforcement operation, who UNOSOM would negotiate with after the peace enforcement operation, whether there might be a national backlash to a perceived “invasion”, whether UNOSOM would coexist with the peace enforcement operation, who had been approached to participate in the peace enforcement operation, and whether the necessary geographical balance could be achieved in troop composition. These questions demonstrate DEA officials’ concerns about the implications of the U.S.-led mission for long-term peace and stability in Somalia.
117. In his report of December 19, 1992, the Secretary-General explicitly acknowledged the difference of opinion between the United States and the UN about the mandate of the mission. The United States, anxious to transfer authority back to UNOSOM as quickly as possible, saw UNITAF’s role as limited to ensuring security in the zones they had established in the south of the country. The Secretary-General, on the other hand, tried to insist that UNITAF carry out widespread disarmament and gain control over all of Somalia before a transfer back to UNOSOM. (Report of the Secretary-General, S/24992, 19 December 1992, paragraph 23 and following). This was also apparently a source of disagreement between Canada and the United States. See Col Labbé, presentation to Operations Planning Seminar, Canadian Forces Command and Staff College (CFCSC), Toronto, March 11–15, 1996, Exhibit P-326, p. 5.
118. Telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, November 26, 1992, Document book 32D, tab 5.
119. In fact, Operation Restore Hope did not end up covering all of Somalia but only the southern part. See map of humanitarian relief sectors.

120. Telex, Embassy, Washington, D.C., to EXTOTT, November 27, 1992, Document book 122A, tab 1; and telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, November 28, 1992, Document book 122A, tab 1.
121. At this early stage, U.S. thinking posited a 'good cop, bad cop' scenario in which the U.S.-led operation would play the 'bad cop' role and then, once conditions were right, UNOSOM would take over as the 'good cop'. The details, such as how to avoid a vacuum of authority when the U.S.-led operation left and UNOSOM reassumed responsibility, still had to be worked out. Telex, Embassy, Washington, D.C., to EXTOTT, November 27, 1992, Document book 122A, tab 1.
122. Telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, December 1, 1992, Document book 29, tab 38.
123. Telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, December 2, 1992, Document book 19, tab 12.
124. It was actually the Under Secretary-General, Marrack Goulding, who asked that Canada not participate in the peace enforcement mission. Aide-mémoire, LCol Clark (DI Pol 4), December 2, 1992, tab 5. See also testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10053.
125. Minutes, DEM, November 27, 1992, Document book 18, tab 16, and Document book 32.1, tab 26.
126. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10028.
127. Minutes, DEM, December 1, 1992, Document book 32.1, tab 28.
128. CDS discussion with Gen Powell, December 2, 1992, Exhibit P-108.
129. CDS discussion with Gen Powell, Exhibit P-108. Canadian officials in New York were also reporting at the same time that Canada had been invited to participate. Telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, December 2, 1992, Document book 19, tab 12.
130. CDS discussion with Gen Powell, Exhibit P-108.
131. Telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, December 2, 1992, Document book 19, tab 12.
132. Telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, December 2, 1992, Document book 19, tab 12.
133. Document book 32D, tab 11. Perhaps it was written as follow-up to a J3 Operations note, December 2, 1992, which appears to summarize the contents of the telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, December 2, 1992, describing the three options the Secretary-General put forward.

According to the DND document, the concerns of officers and officials at DND about the first option — integrating the Canadian Forces into the peace enforcement operation — included issues about force composition for a higher combat role, command and control, sustainment if the operation lasted more than six months, the impact on Operation Relief, and the adjustment of plans already made for the UNOSOM deployment. The greatest concern about the second option, the Canadian option, was its impact on command and control. As well, there was some concern about the concept of operations and sustainment. With respect to the third option, it was feared that if UNOSOM were frozen and the deployment consequently postponed, the troops would be kept in limbo. On the other hand, it was noted that if the mission were cancelled altogether this could free up troops for other missions.

134. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10028 and following.
135. CDS briefing to Cabinet, Document book 24, tab 21. According to the briefing, both missions were expected to cost \$65 million over three years (1992–95). Only DND incremental costs were considered. Canada's assessed contributions for peacekeeping operations and UN revenues that would be received for participation in peacekeeping were not included. If the revenues had been included, as a number of the written analyses indicated, the peacekeeping option would have been the less costly option.

136. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10042. (Unfortunately, despite the importance of DEA's input on the decision, we have no evidence regarding DEA's recommendation to Cabinet.)
137. Minutes, DND special executive meeting, December 4, 1992, Document book 32.1, tab 29. The minutes of this meeting, held before the Cabinet briefing, record that "the DM and the CDS emphasized that the role of the Department was limited to proposing a concept of operations (including options) following the Government's decision. The DM pointed out that the Department had not officially offered advice on this issue and that it had not been asked either." See also testimony of Robert Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10183, and Gen de Chastelain, Transcripts, vol. 49, p. 9925. According to Mr. Fowler, the issue did not involve any defence issue, only foreign affairs issues.
138. Normally, this issue would have been considered by the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Defence Policy, but for some reason the decision was delegated to an ad hoc committee of ministers. Again, because of time constraints, we were not able to hear evidence to explain this unusual procedure. For details see minutes, Ad Hoc Committee of Ministers on Somalia, December 4, 1992, Document book 31, tab 17, and memorandum, CPC to PM, December 4, 1992, Document book 2, tab 8.
139. Document book 31, tab 17.
140. Order in Council P.C. 1992-2519; House of Commons, *Debates*, December 7, 1992, pp. 14736-14727. The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs also received a briefing on the Somalia situation from Maj Thorne and Col O'Brien on December 10, 1992.
141. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10028 and following.
142. The U.S. concept of operations was set out in a briefing note, LCdr Bambury (J3 Plans) to CDS, Document book 30, tab 9. Although this document is dated December 3, 1992, it is based on a conversation that took place on December 2, 1992. Therefore it is assumed that all analyses prepared on December 2nd and 3rd were based on this understanding of the U.S. mission and concept of operations.
143. By December 17, 1992, the U.S. mission had been changed to the following: "to secure major airports and seaports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief organizations and to assist United Nations and non-governmental organizations in providing humanitarian relief." Letter, Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the President of the Security Council, December 17, 1992, S/24976, Annex. The goal of disarmament is notably absent.
144. Document book 122A, tab 5.
145. Document book 30, tab 12. This briefing note also includes a summary of the analysis and recommendation of Land Force Command, the full text of which is in another briefing note for the CDS, Military Force Options in Somalia, December 2, 1992, Document book 19, tab 6.
146. Document book 25, tab 32. Only LGen Addy (DCDS ISO) and Gen (ret) de Chastelain were questioned about this document. Neither recognized it. See Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9541, and vol. 50, p. 10039. The document has a handwritten "DM" in one corner, but neither witness could say for sure what this meant.



147. Document book 19, tab 6. Land Force Command (LFC) identified three capability options: A — commit without significant change to force structure; B — commit with limited change; and C — commit with significant change. They recommended option B, with a direct role in the U.S. area of operations during Phase 2 or 3.
148. Testimony of Col Bremner, Transcripts vol. 8, pp. 1527–1528; and Cmdre Cogdon, vol. 9, p. 1706; and implied in testimony of Mr. Robert Fowler, vol. 50, p. 10178 and following, and Gen (ret) de Chastelain, vol. 50, p. 10045.
149. This is interesting in light of the program evaluation, “DND Policy/Capability in Support of Peacekeeping Operations” (DND, Chief Review Services, July 1983), which noted that the planning process did not envisage adequate consultation with commands or formations, which have the knowledge to assess capability (p. iii and p. 30 and following).
150. Testimony of Mr. Robert Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10183.
151. Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10032. Gen (ret) de Chastelain is referring here to participation in UNITAF, even though he talks about a reconnaissance having already been done for the operation. In fact, the only reconnaissance was for the UNOSOM mission to Bossaso.
152. Testimony of Col Bremner, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1530; Cmdre Cogdon, vol. 9, p. 1712; and Gen (ret) de Chastelain, vol. 50, pp. 10032, 10052. Although the Deputy Minister did not specifically mention HMCS *Preserver*, he did agree that the fact that troops and equipment were all set to go was a factor favouring immediate participation. Testimony of Mr. Robert Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10181 and following.
153. Testimony of LGen Addy, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9526.
154. Testimony of Col Bremner, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1519; and Col Houghton, vol. 44, p. 8730.
155. Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9526.
156. CDS note to file, December 7, 1992, Document book 32A, tab 9.
157. Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10131.
158. In a memo to Gen de Chastelain, written after the fact and at his request, RAdm Murray noted that he and the liaison team had been dispatched to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Headquarters to ensure that the military leadership at CENTCOM clearly understood “the requirement for an operationally meaningful, high profile, and early role for the Canadian Airborne Battalion (and *Preserver*).” Memorandum, RAdm Murray to CDS, December 11, 1992, Document book 122A, tab 6. Similarly, in testimony before this Inquiry, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32767, Col Labbé confirmed that the desire for a prominent role had been impressed upon him by Col O’Brien and Gen de Chastelain and necessitated a quick deployment. See also Col Labbé’s notes for a seminar presentation, CFCSC, Toronto, March 15, 1996, Exhibit P-326, p. 2, in which he wrote, “I am advised by NDHQ (Col Mike O’Brien J3 Operations) that there is a very great urgency to plant a Canadian flag in Somalia as soon as possible.... I sense that I have very little to say in what is going on — things are being driven by national defence headquarter[s] with a momentum of their own.” Col O’Brien confirmed the need to act quickly to secure a prominent role, Transcripts vol. 10, pp. 1907, 1951.
159. Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32782.

160. Testimony of Cmdre Cogdon, Transcripts vol. 9, p. 1716. See also brief, Maj McLeod to Commander, Land Force Command (LFC), December 2, 1992, Document book 19, tab 6, from which it is clear that LFC was asked not *which* mission LFC could contribute to but *how* LFC could contribute to the U.S.-led mission. Col Joly noted in testimony, Transcripts vol. 17, p. 3089, that as a staff person who was not directly involved in the decision making, it was his impression that a political decision had been made to participate in the mission, and it was up to the staff to make it happen.
161. Transcripts vol. 9, pp. 1712, 1714, 1732–1738, 1780.
162. Testimony of Mr. Robert Fowler, Transcripts vol. 51, p. 10181.
163. In his after-action report, Daniel Dhavernas, the key contact for DND at DEA, was critical of the fact that “priorities have been set as much by what is on the nightly news as by any empirical review of needs”. See Response to SSEA’s Inquiry on Lessons Learned from Yugoslavia and Somalia, September 14, 1993, Document book 62D, tab 4.
164. Allen Sens, *Somalia and the Changing Nature of Peacekeeping*, study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, 1997), p. 104 and following.
165. Briefing note for MND, responsible group principal: Kenneth J. Calder, October 20, 1993, Document book 122A, tab 7.
166. Testimony of Col Joly, Transcripts vol. 15, p. 2863 and following.
167. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, pp. 9942–9944.
168. Testimony of Col Joly, Transcripts vol. 15, p. 3085.
169. Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9585. On the issue of overstretch and sustainability, see the testimony of Col Joly and Gen (ret) de Chastelain. See also Sens, *Somalia and the Changing Nature of Peacekeeping*, p. 108 and following.
170. Testimony of LGen Addy, Transcripts vol. 48, pp. 9599 and 9617.
171. In the first briefing note (aide-mémoire, December 2, 1992), the author notes that stopping and restarting the peacekeeping mission might involve additional cost but that because the mission would be UN-funded, the burden would not fall on Canada. On the other hand, the author notes that the UN might not fund the peace enforcement mission, in which case it would be more expensive for Canada. By the time the other two briefing notes were written (Briefing note, J3 Plans, December 3, 1992, Document book 30, tab 12; and Comparison of Options for Canadian Participation in Somalia, Document book 25, tab 32), the fact that the UN would not cover the costs of the peace enforcement mission had been confirmed, and both notes therefore list the additional cost of the mission as a disadvantage of participating in it.
172. CDS briefing to Cabinet, December 4, 1992, Document book 24, tab 21.
173. Report on the cost implications of the proposed change of role, Document book 122A, tab 8.
174. The caveat is quite important, since the UN covers the incremental costs of UN peacekeeping operations. Therefore, if UN revenues had been included, the briefing would have shown, as several written analyses indicated, that the peacekeeping option was the less expensive option.
175. Minutes, DEM, Document book 32.1, tab 33.
176. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10053.
177. Testimony of Mr. Robert Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10184.

178. "Canadians set to help Somalia", *The Globe and Mail*, December 5, 1992, pp. A-1, A-15. The article states that "Mrs. McDougall said both UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Mr. Bush wanted Canada to participate."
179. Assuming that the analysis, "Comparison of Options for Canadian Participation in Somalia", Document book 25, tab 32, was written by Mr. Fowler's staff.
180. In his notes from a conversation with Gen Powell on December 4, 1992, Document book 32A, tab 9, Gen de Chastelain writes:

After I spoke to Colin Powell I was left with the uncomfortable feeling that the USA was very pre-occupied with their involvement in getting the Somali operation off the ground; that they did not really know what role Canada could play (Colin believed we would stay to peace-keep after the enforcement operation was over); and that we might be lumped in with a whole bunch of other nations for consideration in the enforcement phase plan "in due course" [quotation marks mine]. Such a situation would not be good for Canada, since we had put much planning into the Bossasso operation (*Preserver* was almost there, the advance party was ready to leave three days ago, the UN ships were moored off Montreal waiting to load etc.). Any further delay, or a role that was seen to be secondary would not sit well with the troops, with me, with the Government or with Canadians... we [Gen de Chastelain and Mr. Fowler] agreed that we should send a high level team immediately to either Washington or CENTCOM to make our troops availability, capability, and our wishes known.
181. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10045.
182. See also letter, CDS and DM to Jim Judd, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, no date (c. March 1993), Document book 122A, tab 9; and letter, CDS and DM to CPC, Document book 122A, tab 10. In both letters the CDS and the DM "strongly" advised against continued participation in UNOSOM II.
183. Minutes, DEM, December 4, 1992, Document book 32.1, tab 29. That section of the minutes reads:

The United Nations Security Council adopted UN Resolution 794 on 3 Dec 92 calling for enforcement action in Somalia under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This special DEM meeting was called in support of the DM and the CDS appearance in front of a Cabinet committee. The capability of the CF as well as the options open in support of an operation in Somalia were discussed. The DM and the CDS emphasized that the role of the Department was limited to proposing a concept of operations (including options) following the Government's decision. The DM pointed out that the Department had not officially offered advice on this issue and that it had not been asked to either.
184. Note that Col Cox, who was the lead Canadian at UNOSOM headquarters and in Somalia throughout the fall of 1992, wrote back often about problems with organization at the UN and heartily endorsed the decision to participate in the peace enforcement mission. See CCUNSOM Sitrep 11/92, December 8, 1992, Document book 122A, tab 11.



185. UN Security Council Resolution 775, August 28, 1992, S/24497. The resolution authorizes the expanded operation only by establishing four operational zones, as recommended by the Secretary-General, and by authorizing an increase in military strength for UNOSOM, also as recommended by the Secretary-General. To ascertain the mission of UNOSOM, it is necessary to review the Secretary-General's report on the situation in Somalia, August 24, 1992, in particular the paragraphs referred to in the resolution. Moreover, as the Secretary-General pointed out in paragraph 37 of that report, much of UNOSOM's mandate was already covered under existing Security Council resolutions. Reference must be made not only to previous resolutions, but to incorporated paragraphs from previous reports from the Secretary-General.
186. Telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, August 29, 1992, Document book 10, tab 15.
187. Resolution 775 outlined the mandate of security personnel by reference to the original concept of operations as outlined in the Secretary-General's report of April 21, 1992, paragraphs 27 to 30.
188. "Guidelines for Governments contributing troops to UNOSOM", September 2, 1992. Prepared by the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the guidelines were designed to provide basic information for military personnel before deployment. Under the heading "Tasks", the mission of UNOSOM was described as deploying UN observers to monitor the cease-fire; and deploying UN security personnel to protect its personnel and safeguard its activities in continuing to provide humanitarian and other relief assistance in and around Mogadishu. Note that in specifying only Mogadishu as the area of operations, the guidelines clearly predated Resolution 775, which called for a much enlarged security force. However, a later version of the guidelines included a specific reference to the additional role of military personnel in providing urgent humanitarian relief to the people of Somalia. The later version also included a reference to promoting the process of reconciliation and political settlement in Somalia.
189. Telex, Force Mobile Command Headquarters (FMC HQ) to NDHQ, August 31, 1992, Document book 27, tab 44.
190. FMC HQ to NDHQ, p. 2. Force Mobile Command emphasized that although the standard building blocks could be altered in size, the integral elements had to be protected.
191. FMC HQ to NDHQ, p. 2.
192. Force Mobile Command (FMC) Draft Contingency Plan, September 2, 1992, Document book 12, tab 16.
193. See briefing note, FMC to CDS, Operation Cordon and Operation Dagger, September 1992, Document book 32B, tab 2.
194. Telex, BGen Vernon, DCOS OPS, FMC, to LFCA, SQFT, LFWA, LFAA, 1 DIV. KINGSTON, 1 CBG Calgary, SSF Petawawa, 5 GBMC Valcartier, and CTC, September 4, 1992, Document book 28, tab 1. On September 8, 1992, at an FMC logistics co-ordination conference held to discuss logistical support for Operation Cordon, a three-phase deployment was proposed, beginning with a reconnaissance party of 20 personnel on September 11, 1992, an advance party of 200 personnel at W + 21, who would be responsible for building the main camp, and finally, the deployment of the main party, of approximately 550, no earlier than W + 30. The initial plans for the reconnaissance, which was to last seven days, included a meeting with UN officials in Bossaso to discuss all aspects of the deployment and operation of the battalion in the area. See memo, LCol Hache (J3 Peacekeeping), Somalia Reconnaissance, September 10, 1992, Document book 28, tab 18.

195. Warning order (WO) for Operation Cordon, NDHQ to FMCHQ, AIRCOM, MARCOM, and CFCC, September 4, 1992, Document book 28, tab 12.
196. See visit report prepared by LCol Morneault, with covering letter dated October 6, 1992, Document book 14, tab 17.
197. Memorandum, Col Cox to Commander Special Service Force (Comd SSF), September 26, 1992, Document book 14, tab 2.
198. Memorandum, Col Cox to Comd SSF, September 26, 1992, Document book 14, tab 2. The assessment of the troop contributors' meeting by officials at Canada's UN mission was less critical, although the inadequacy of the mission statement was still considered problematic.
199. Telex, PRMNY to NDHQ, October 6, 1992, Document book 122, tab 14.
200. See telex, PRMNY to NDHQ and EXTOTT, October 21, 1992, Document book 122, tab 15, summarizing the troop contributors' meeting of that date.
201. On October 21, 1992, Document book 3, tab 3, the Ambassador and Permanent Representative wrote to the Under Secretary-General, Marrack Goulding, requesting clarification.
202. Document book 3, tab 3.
203. Telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, October 26, 1992, Document book 122, tab 16.
204. The chief obstacle to deployment was the delay in deploying the Pakistani battalion and the UN's desire to settle it in Mogadishu before a show of any other force. As a result of these delays, Canada took the position that there would be no movement of Canadian resources until reconnaissance was complete and subsequent plans finalized. See telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, September 11, 1992, attributing delays to continuing negotiations with factions, problems with potential troop contributors, and bureaucratic problems at the UN.
205. Memorandum, CPC to PM, September 21, 1992, Document book 122, tab 17.
206. Memorandum, Col Cox to Comd SSF, September 26, 1992, Document book 14, tab 2.
207. Telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, October 6, 1992, Document book 122, tab 14.
208. Led by Col Houghton from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the team included LCol Morneault, Commanding Officer of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR), representatives from NDHQ, and eight other members of the CAR. According to Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 44, p. 8718, he led the reconnaissance on that occasion because personnel from several units were involved, requiring considerable co-ordination. Since Col Houghton had previous experience in Somalia, he was felt to be the best person to lead. He was quick to defer, however, to LCol Morneault as the command lead of the reconnaissance.
209. LCol Morneault, Reconnaissance Report, Somalia/Kenya/Djibouti, Canadian Airborne Regiment, October 27, 1992, Document book 16, tab 12, p. 1.
210. Reconnaissance Report, October 27, 1992.
211. Reconnaissance Report, October 27, 1992, p. 3.
212. Concern was expressed at the October 15, 1992 DEM in precisely those words, and action was directed to ADM (Pol & Comm) in respect of same. See Memorandum, ADM (Pol & Comm) to DM and CDS, with briefing note attached, October 16, 1992, Document book 15, tab 15.
213. Telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, October 16, 1992, Document book 122, tab 20, p. 5.

214. Telex, PRMNY to EXTOTT, October 16, 1992, p. 4. However, the Canadian High Commission in Nairobi disputed many of Ambassador Sahnoun's comments concerning the situation in Bossaso, particularly noting inaccuracies in the number and type of relief agencies there. See telex, Nairobi to EXTOTT, October 22, 1992, Document book 122, tab 21. Further discussion regarding Canada's role was strongly recommended.
215. Minutes, DEM, October 21, 1992, Document book 15, tab 26, p. 3.
216. Minutes, DEM, October 21, 1992, Document book 15, tab 26, pp. 6-7.
217. Note, Col Bremner (DI Pol), to ADM (Pol & Comm), October 21, 1992.
218. Col Bremner raised the issue of cancellation of the Airborne's previous mission (the Western Sahara) less than a year earlier.
219. Situation report, Col Cox, October 28, 1992, Document book 29, tab 13.
220. *Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from United Nations Operation in Somalia, April 1992–March 1995* (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Germany, Life and Peace Institute, Sweden, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, in co-operation with the Lessons Learned Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, December 1995). The lessons in the report are drawn from several evaluations of UN operations in Somalia, including the UN Commission of Inquiry, established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 885 (1993), an internal evaluation conducted by the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations, a seminar on lessons learned from UNOSOM organized by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs in June 1995, and the Comprehensive Seminar on Lessons Learned from UNOSOM, held September 13 to 15, 1992 and attended by countries that contributed troops for UNOSOM and by non-governmental organizations operating in Somalia at the time. (It is interesting to note that Canada's military was not represented at the conference.)
221. Note that the response from Marrack Goulding, October 23, 1992, Document book 3, tab 3, still refers to the principal mission of the Canadian battalion being to provide security coverage to the humanitarian relief convoys, whereas the reconnaissance report prepared by LCol Morneau, Document book 16, tab 12, p. 2, describes the UN mission for the Canadian battalion in the Bossaso humanitarian relief sector as one of winning "hearts and minds".
222. *Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned*, pp. 4–5, paragraphs 10–12, notes that every evaluation of UNOSOM concluded that the mandate was "vague, changed frequently during the process and was open to myriad interpretations". Moreover, the report notes that the mandate for the mission was often revised without consultation with member states, resulting in varying perceptions of the mission. The conclusion was that a mandate should be as clear as possible to allow it to be translated into an operational plan, leaving no room for ambiguity or differing perceptions about the roles and tasks of various elements.
223. *Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned*, p. 4, paragraph 11.
224. The proposed organizational structure was given informal approval by the Force Commander, BGen Shaheen, during the reconnaissance in October 1992. Document book 16, tab 12, Annex F, Briefing to the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, p. 6/8.
225. *Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned*, p. 7, paragraph 19.



226. A telex, Nairobi to EXTOTT, October 22, 1992, Document book 122, tab 21, stated that, contrary to Ambassador Sahnoun's assertion, there was a thriving market economy in food, and food deliveries appeared not to be threatened. There were apparently no reports of banditry in the area and, according to the High Commission's sources, the World Food Program never delivered food to the area, nor were there any food distribution centres that required security.
227. Telex, Embassy, Washington, D.C. (Washington) to EXTOTT (International Security and Defence Relations Division, IDS), "Somalia: UNOSOM", November 27, 1992, Document book 122A, tab 1. See also telex, Washington to EXTOTT IDS, "Somalia", November 28, 1992, Document book 32D, tab 6.
228. Note that these tasks were the same as those outlined for UNOSOM.
229. Facsimile, LCol Arbuckle, Document book 32, tab 21, no date, but from the context it must have been written on December 6, 1992. The contents of the fax, which describe the preliminary role at Baledogle, appear in a briefing given at NDHQ, December 7, 1992, Document book 30, tab 34.
230. Col Labbé, seminar presentation, CFCSC, Toronto, March 15, 1996, Exhibit P-326, p. 3.
231. UN Security Council Resolution 794, December 3, 1992, paragraph 10.
232. This description of the U.S. mission statement comes from a briefing note by J3 Plans, December 3, 1992, Document book 30, tab 9. The actual mission statement from U.S. Central Command did not mention disarmament. It read as follows:

When directed by the NCA, USCINCCENT will conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief organization operations, and assist UN/NGOs in providing humanitarian relief under U.N. auspices. Upon establishing a secure environment for uninterrupted relief operations, USCINCCENT terminates and transfers relief operations to U.N. peacekeeping forces. (Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, 1995), p. 16.)
233. This description of the U.S. concept of operations is, according to the J3 Operations briefing, based on a telephone conversation with the U.S. Joint Staff on December 2, 1992. However, the same description appears in a memo to the Prime Minister dated December 4, 1992, Document book 2, tab 8, citing the U.S. Operational Plan as its source. As with the statement of the mission, there are discrepancies between the Canadian description of the concept of operations and that proposed by the U.S. Central Command. There is more detail in the Central Command's proposed concept of operations; the CENTCOM document cites different objectives, e.g., in Phase III to secure Kismayu and Bardera; and there appear to be miscommunications, e.g., CENTCOM talks of transfer to "third countries" while Canadian documents mention transfer to "Third World" countries. Since the U.S. Joint Task Force Operations Order and the Joint Task Force Operations Plan could not be located in Canadian Forces files, this Inquiry was not able to follow the development of the mission precisely.
234. D-Day was the day the first troops arrived in Mogadishu, scheduled for five days after the Security Council passed the resolution authorizing the operation (December 9, 1992).

235. Briefing note, J3 Plans, December 2, 1992, Document book 30, tab 9.
236. An account of the development of the Pentagon's plan is found in John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), pp. 35–47.
237. President Bush had talked about leaving by January 20, 1993 (the date of Bill Clinton's inauguration), and Gen Powell had talked of an operation of two to three months. Memorandum, CPC to PM, December 4, 1992, Document book 2, tab 8, p. 2.
238. Report on Somalia Briefing to Defence Attachés, December 9, 1992, Document book 122A, tab 12, p. 2.
239. CDS discussion with Gen Powell, December 4, 1992, Document book 32A, tab 9, p. 1.
240. Testimony of Maj Moffat, Transcripts vol. 97, p. 18881.
241. Facsimile, LCol Arbuckle, December 6 or 7, 1992, Document book 32, tab 21. See also Operation Deliverance Briefing, Document book 30, tab 34, which restates the contents of the fax from of LCol Arbuckle. They were also able to establish preliminary command and control arrangements under which the CARBG would initially be under the operational control of the U.S. 10th Mountain Division. HMCS *Preserver* would be placed under operational command of the Commander, Canadian Joint Force Somalia as of December 13, 1992.
242. For example, the concept and location of the eight humanitarian relief sectors to be established under phases Two and Three were still being developed. See testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts, vol. 161, p. 32790 and following, in particular the brief exchange on the development of the humanitarian relief sectors, p. 32965.
243. Col Labbé, seminar presentation, CFCSC, Toronto, March 15, 1996, Exhibit P-326, p. 2.
244. Orders are the principal means by which a commander conveys intentions and plans to subordinates. Although orders serve a number of purposes, all orders must state what is to be done, when it is to be done, how it is to be done, by whom it is to be done, and with what resources.

A *warning order* gives notice to formations or units, at the earliest practicable time, of an impending task. The warning order must contain all available useful information required for preparations before receipt of the operations order. At a minimum it must state the nature of the task; the location and time for the presentation of oral orders or the time of distribution of a written order; and the degree of notice for movement of the main body of the formation or unit. (Operational Staff Procedures, vol. 2, Staff Duties in the Field, May 1991, B-GL-303-002/FP-002, in force until May/June 1993, pp. 9–1, 9–12.)

An *operations order* gives subordinate commanders, commanding officers and staff the direction and information essential to execute the commander's plan. It is arranged in five major parts: Situation, Mission, Execution, Service Support, and Command and Signal. (Operational Staff Procedures, vol. 2, Staff Duties in the Field, May 1991, B-GL-303-002/FP-002, in force until May/June 1993, pp. 9–13 to 9–14.)

245. NDHQ, Operation Deliverance, Warning Order (WNG) 01, December 5, 1992, Document book 20, tab 5.
246. In this section the order goes on to describe the tasks for each component; it reads more like a 'to do' list than an order (e.g., LFC to provide battalion of 900, plan sustainment of land force commitment).
247. Operation Deliverance, Operations order (OPO) 01, Document book 20, tab 29.
248. Operational Staff Procedures, vol. 2, *Staff Duties in the Field*, May 1991, B-GL-303-002/FP-002 (interim 1), May 1991, p. 9C-2.
249. Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32840. See also p. 32835.
250. The mission statement in NDHQ, Op Order — Amdt 1 (DND 037675, not filed) provides that the mission is "To assist in establishing, as soon as possible, a secure environment for humanitarian relief ops in Somalia under the auspices of UNSCR 794". The mission statement in Col Labbé's order, OPO 01 HQ CJFS, Document book 21, tab 14, reads as follows: "CJFS, as part of a US led coalition, will conduct enforcement operations in SOMALIA to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 794."
251. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32841. See also Col Labbé, seminar presentation, CFCSC, Toronto, March 15, 1996, Exhibit P-326, pp. 1–2.
252. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32842.
253. Testimony of Col Labbé at Board of Inquiry, Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group, vol. 11, p. 353 (Exhibit P-20.11).
254. Situation report (Sitrep) 001, December 15, 1992, Document book 41, tab 1; Sitrep 002, December 16, 1992, Document book 41, tab 2; Sitrep 003, December 17, 1992, Document book 41, tab 3. In Sitrep 002 Col Labbé suggests that there might be "benefits of Cdn diplomatic presence in Somalia as means of raising profile of Cdn participation in Op Restore Hope/Deliverance". See also Transcripts vol. 162, p. 32969.
255. Col Labbé was not alone in trying to negotiate a significant role for his troops. Elements of the U.S. forces were doing the same thing: testimony of Col Labbé, Board of Inquiry, vol. 11, pp. 342–343.
256. Testimony of Col Labbé, Board of Inquiry, vol. 11, pp. 342–343. In his situation report of December 20, 1992 (Sitrep 006), Document book 41, tab 6, Col Labbé described his efforts to secure a high-profile mission for Canadian Joint Force Somalia alone. He wrote:

Despite my attempts to make Belet Huen a singularly "Canadian" [operation] with some U.S. [support]...and personal intervention at the highest levels with LGen Johnston, interservice rivalry is driving the [requirement] for U.S. Army to be seen to be involved in a mission ASAP. I was told, candidly, by CTF HQ staff (mostly USMC) that most would be just as happy to have [the CARBG] take Belet Huen. However, we will be given high profile tasks within the [operation] to secure Belet Huen.
257. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, pp. 32964–32979.
258. Sitrep 006, December 20, 1992, Document book 41, tab 6.
259. CJFS Sitrep 009, December 23, 1992, Document book 41, tab 9.
260. CJFS Sitrep 019, January 2, 1993, Document book 41A, tab 4.



261. For further discussion of the lack of time to prepare properly for the mission, see Summary of Operational Readiness, later in this chapter. Recall that the troops were declared operationally ready on December 16, 1992, after the advance party had already left Canada.
262. The UN standby unit is to be able to deploy its headquarters in seven days and the follow-on unit in three weeks. Testimony of Robert Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10172.
263. Senate, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Meeting New Challenges: Canada's Response to a New Generation of Peacekeeping* (February 1993), p. 27.
264. In 1991, joint planning doctrine [CFP(J) 5(4)] existed and was being taught at the staff college. However, the final joint planning doctrine (Joint Doctrine for Canadian Forces Joint and Combined Operations, B-GG-005-004/AF-000, 1995-04-06) was not published until after Operation Deliverance.
265. See Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, *Australia's Participation in Peacekeeping* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, December 1994.)





## THE MILITARY PLANNING SYSTEM

### DOCTRINE

#### Operational Planning in the Canadian Forces

Officers in Canada are selected, trained, and paid to plan military operations and to command armed forces in operations. After commanding forces in action, planning military operations is an officer's most important duty. Although there are staff officers for both general and technical planning, the plan for any operation is always the commander's plan. Commanders confirm the mission or aim of the plan, give the staff their concept of operations, conduct the necessary reconnaissance, complete an 'estimate' of the situation or approve the estimate prepared by staff at their direction, prepare or approve orders, issue orders to subordinate commanders, supervise the deployment of units, and command their units in action.

During plan preparation, much depends on sound training, proven staffs, and a balanced combination of logic and experience. Without proper aids, randomness will dominate reason, and action will be haphazard. Throughout this process, however, command responsibility is never surrendered to staff. Always, it is the commanders who must provide purpose, direction, and unity for their staff officers and subordinate commanders. And it is always the commander alone who must account for the pertinence and efficacy of the plan.

The concepts of command responsibility, unity of command, the separation of command and staff authority, and completed staff work are the foundation of mission planning in the Canadian Forces (CF) and in the army in particular. Army officers are trained in battle procedure, that is, "the process by which a commander receives his orders, makes his reconnaissance and plan, prepares and issues his orders, and prepares and deploys his troops for battle."<sup>1</sup>



Battle procedure, developed from experience, is intended to ensure that officers (especially under the stress of combat operations) logically and methodically consider all the factors and circumstances influencing pending operations. The process is intended to allow commanders to arrive at a plan that places the most suitable unit, adequately supported, in the right place at the right time, and appropriate to the mission to be completed.<sup>2</sup> A planning process that misses any of these steps, or addresses them indifferently, risks the mission and the forces under command. In circumstances where dire operational necessity requires the abbreviation of battle procedure, other compensating decisions, such as the provision of larger quantities of resources, must be substituted in place of comprehensive planning.

Operations can fail for many reasons. Honest failures may be caused by accumulated minor errors in units — sub-units might get lost, for instance, or equipment might fail. Surprise, unanticipated conditions or enemy actions can defeat sound plans, as can the superior capabilities and skills of enemy troops and commanders. Few would blame a commander whose plan failed honestly. But a careless plan almost always leads to disaster. Commanders must therefore be held accountable for every operation, and especially for operations that fail because of inadequate, careless, or incomplete planning and poor command decisions in circumstances where, with due diligence, problems ought to have been anticipated and other decisions made.

## Criteria for Adequate Mission Planning

A critique of a military plan should include a review of the following factors to determine whether they were considered appropriately during the planning process:

*The Commander:* Commanders of military operations must be clearly identified. They should be trained and experienced in the type of mission they are expected to plan and conduct. They must be fully aware of the objective they are being asked to accomplish. They must be available and be given sufficient time to complete their own battle procedure.

*The Staff:* The staff must be suitably organized in relation to the mission and must include appropriate numbers and types of general, special and technical officers and support staff officers. Moreover, staff officers must be trained in their particular function, and the staff as a whole must be trained to respond to the needs of the commander in the circumstances of the mission. The staff ought to have proven, in exercises or on other missions, its ability to meet the needs of commanders and the units under their command.

*The Mission:* The mission must be defined and given to commanders by their superior commander. It must be clear and identify “**one** task which is indispensable to the fulfilment of all the others.... The selection of the **correct** aim is the crux of the [plan]. There can be a **single** aim only, and [the] mission analysis ensures that the correct **one** has been selected.”<sup>1</sup> Obviously, the mission should be within the capability of the unit and its commander. The mission, derived from the superior commander’s orders, must be spelled out clearly in the plan.

*The Limitations:* Commanders must receive from their superior commander a clear description of the superior’s purpose and concept of operations and the essential conditions and tasks that must be achieved to accomplish the mission successfully. Furthermore, commanders must understand the limits (if any) that have been set on the mission and what action they are to take if unforeseen and fundamental changes occur during planning for or execution of the mission. Finally, commanders must be aware of any limitations in resources, tactical ideas, rules of engagement, weapons, territory, or time, among other things, that the superior commander has imposed on the mission.

*The Resources:* The resources to be applied to a military mission are usually determined in one of two ways. The superior commander first makes an estimate of the situation, then allocates resources considered appropriate and sufficient for the subordinate commanders to accomplish the mission set out for them. Alternatively, the subordinate commanders, following their estimate of the situation, will indicate whether they have adequate and sufficient resources from within their own units (if they have any under command), and they might ask for additional resources if indicated by their estimates. No matter who prepares the estimate, it is finally always the responsibility of the superior commander to provide resources for the mission and the superior commander who is therefore accountable for any problems that occur if such resources are not available.

*The Operational and Logistics Balance:* An operational plan must always include a blend of tactical and logistical decisions and directions aimed at achieving the goals of the mission. Tactical factors and assessments must always govern the specific plan for the employment of forces, but decisions about logistics, because they provide the technical means to employ combat forces, may condition the scale and scope of combat operations. Therefore, an adequate mission plan must blend and balance the requirements of the operation’s aim, the concept of operations, and combat forces to be employed with the logistics resources available to deploy and sustain the force in combat. Whenever these parts of the plan are unbalanced or contradictory, the plan and the likelihood that the mission will be successful are suspect.

*Timeliness:* An experienced commander of a well-trained unit or formation who is assisted by a strong staff can usually plan and execute missions quickly and effectively. When time is limited, commanders depend on standing operating procedures, concurrent battle procedure, and the initiative of leaders at all levels of command. Even when there is not much time for planning, commanders are encouraged to complete the whole process by abbreviating each step rather than skipping steps entirely.<sup>4</sup> Operations planned haphazardly entail grave risks. Therefore, in a critique of a planning process, the time available for planning and how it is used must be carefully assessed.

*The Planning Factors:* In every operation there are common and particular factors that influence the achievement of the mission. Commanders are responsible to identify, consider and react to these factors. Usually, they must isolate key factors that will have an overriding influence on their mission. (These might include the enemy and the terrain.) They must then identify and consider other factors — such as the state of their support troops and the weather — that may have a secondary impact on the plan. The value of such assessments depends on the information and intelligence available to commanders and on their ability to understand the significance of these to the mission. The factors are considered to draw deductions about how the operation will be conducted and to identify issues and conditions that must be accommodated if commanders are to accomplish their mission. Whenever significant factors are missed or misinterpreted, the plan is weakened, sometimes fatally.

## The Reconnaissance

Officers commonly remark that time spent on reconnaissance is seldom wasted. The inference is that the more one knows about the opposing forces, terrain, climate, political situation, and other such factors affecting an operation, the more relevant and appropriate the plan for the intended mission will be.

Reconnaissance is therefore an inherent and necessary part of battle procedure at all levels of command. Ideally, just as the most senior commanders conduct a theatre-wide reconnaissance appropriate to their mission, the most junior leaders conduct a reconnaissance of the specific portion of the force objective that is their responsibility and then take their soldiers on a guided reconnaissance of that area.

The ideal procedure might not be achievable in every circumstance for many reasons; for instance, there might not be enough time to complete a detailed reconnaissance. When the lack of time or other circumstances prevents a comprehensive reconnaissance at all levels of command, alternative



techniques and methods are used routinely. Doctrine suggests that senior commanders should organize battle procedure so that junior commanders can complete their reconnaissance even when senior commanders cannot. Occasionally, commanders might divide the area to be surveyed and assign positions to staff officers, or they might rely on maps and photographs to provide some types of information. However, it would be dangerous for any commander to commit troops to an operation without any reconnaissance at all.

## The Estimate of the Situation

The estimate of the situation, sometimes called the 'appreciation', is at the heart of operational planning. It is defined in the CF as "a logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all of the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to the course of action to be taken in order to accomplish his mission."<sup>5</sup> It is a method of analysis intended to guide a commander's thinking and so avoid the dangers that follow from working from hunches and intuition. According to Col Labbé's testimony, it is "the manner in which we teach our officers...to think."<sup>6</sup>

The process is not a rigid formality, but experience shows that a worthwhile estimate includes an aim, assessment of relevant factors, consideration of 'courses open' or options from both friendly and enemy perspectives, and a general outline of the recommended course of action. The plan, at least in outline, is drawn from this process of analysis. Where no detailed estimate of the situation is evident for any major operation, commanders must be able to explain how they arrived at their decisions regarding the main elements of their plan.

Estimates vary with the complexity of the mission and the commander and staff for whom it is prepared. Written estimates are usually prepared for major operations and those involving units from several commands. Tactical estimates are produced for a combat operation. Other types of estimates are also common, including intelligence estimates of the enemy and administrative estimates made to prepare an administrative plan for an operation. A complex operation might be supported by a tactical and several technical estimates.

## Warning Orders

To assist subordinate commanders in planning operations and to save time through concurrent activity, commanders often issue warning orders for upcoming operations. Preliminary information is passed from each commander to subordinates to allow planning to commence. Warning orders may include, for example, information on the mission, grouping, preliminary

moves, logistics arrangements, time and place for the commanders' orders, and virtually any subject on which commanders wish to provide early warning to their subordinates. Information passed through warning orders is always confirmed during subsequent orders.

## Operation Orders

The plan "must be the logical outcome of the consideration of the relevant factors" exposed by the estimate of the situation or whatever other reasoning process was used to define the operation.<sup>7</sup> In the CF an operation order is the commander's direction to subordinates and explains precisely how, when, under what command arrangements, and with what resources the mission is to be accomplished. Operations orders are formal orders to subordinates whether they are delivered in writing or orally.

Operation orders follow a prescribed format, mainly to ensure that they address all important matters, but also to aid in the accurate communication of orders in stressful situations. Properly formatted orders include the following paragraphs:

- (a) Situation — a description of the situation of the enemy and friendly forces at the time and a notation on units or sub-units that may have been added to or detached from the formation.
- (b) Mission — a clear (usually) single sentence that specifies the task to be accomplished by the unit.
- (c) Execution — a paragraph describing the commander's concept of operations and allocating tasks to sub-units. It usually also includes co-ordinating instructions covering such things as timings, traffic routes, fire plans, and so on.
- (d) Service Support — a paragraph describing every aspect of the logistics plan for an operation that is not covered by standing operating procedures. It would include such things as medical support, transportation arrangements, and feeding.
- (e) Command and Signals — here respective commanders describe the command arrangements for the operation and detail where and how their headquarters will be deployed. This paragraph would also contain information about how communications networks would be deployed and operated.<sup>8</sup>

Obviously, the experience and training of members of the units and formation, and the nature of the operation greatly influence the amount and detail of information included in an operations order. When a unit or formation

is inexperienced and has few standing operating procedures, or when the operation is difficult or unusual, then one would expect to see very detailed operation orders at all levels. Moreover, commanders and commanding officers in the chain of command should be particularly diligent in overseeing the preparation of orders and in checking to ensure that orders are well understood by subordinate commanders and their troops.

## OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND ORDERS

The plan for Operation Deliverance evolved from two separate operations plans. Operation Python, planned in 1991 to support a UN peacekeeping mission to the Western Sahara (MINURSO), was still a possibility in 1992. Concurrently, beginning in the spring of 1992, Gen de Chastelain ordered his staff officers to begin planning for another United Nations (UN) operation in Somalia. Operation Cordon, a plan for CF operations in northeastern Somalia, incorporated many assumptions, factors, and estimates used to develop Operation Python. Both plans concluded that the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) would provide the base unit for the operation, even before the missions were fully analyzed. Eventually, the Operation Python plan was rolled into Operation Cordon, and when both operations were cancelled, their essential features were carried over to Operation Deliverance, an international peace enforcement mission. But again, no fundamental review was conducted.

The three operations had different objectives and tasks, and were to be conducted under different mandates and authorities, and in vastly different political contexts. Nevertheless, as the deployment to Somalia neared, commanders and senior staff officers changed estimates and assessments in an effort to save the existing plans and to justify the selection of the CAR as the principal operational unit. Finally, Operation Deliverance emerged as a plan forced to fit a situation, rather than as an objectively prepared plan honed to the realities of the situation the CF would confront in Somalia.

### Operation Python

National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) and Forces Mobile Command (FMC) Headquarters issued planning guidance, warning orders, and operations orders for Operation Python early in the summer of 1991. These orders stated in part that FMC was to assemble and prepare an infantry battalion group, a military police platoon, and other elements for employment with MINURSO to conduct security duties at selected sites and reception centres, and to provide basic mine clearance.<sup>9</sup> Although the CAR was not selected



at first by FMC planners as the principal unit for this mission, it was nonetheless chosen by LGen Foster, Commander of FMC. He and other officers were concerned that the continuing failure to employ the CAR on overseas missions would further erode sagging morale in the Regiment.

BGen Crabbe, Commander Special Service Force (SSF), issued planning guidance for Operation Python to the Commander of the CAR, Col Holmes, in July 1991. Officers then anticipated that the unit would be deployed in November 1991, but the schedule changed often. Ultimately, the mission was cancelled as Canada negotiated participation in the Somalia mission. Nevertheless, the framework of the Operation Python plan remained in the files at NDHQ and FMC Headquarters.

Several officers were critical of the process and the plan for Operation Python. Their remarks in after-action reports give an early indication that operational planning at NDHQ and in subordinate headquarters was clumsy. For example, Col Holmes remarked that the chain of command was too convoluted; too many officers at NDHQ were involved in vetting what should be routine demands; and senior staff officers at NDHQ were calling officers at every level in the CAR directly and vice versa. In his view, the procedures for obtaining information within the command system were “ludicrous by anyone’s standards. The information flow up and down the [chain of command] tended to be slow and was at times full of inaccuracies.”<sup>10</sup>

There was no reconnaissance of the intended deployment area in Western Sahara by the officers who would have led the mission. Col Holmes stated: “Had we deployed without a [reconnaissance] at worst we would have had a disaster on our hands, at best we would have taken much longer than necessary to become operational.”<sup>11</sup>

The Commander Land Force Central Area (LFCA) stated in his after-action report that, in effect, there was a failure to conduct an adequate reconnaissance. “Only one person, the Commander of the CAR, went to [UN headquarters] to be briefed on Operation Python.... Canada’s inability to send a subsequent [reconnaissance] party to the Western Sahara made the preparations [for the operation] that much more difficult.” LFCA recommended that in future the reconnaissance party should include “key participants from each headquarters level involved in the staff planning process.”<sup>12</sup>

Among other things, the Commander of LFCA noted serious failures in the planning process, a poor state of early logistics preparations, and a lack of official in-theatre information and intelligence. He thought that NDHQ should have pressed the UN for the release of information vital to the success of the mission, such as unit organizations and minefield data. Intelligence planning was unsure, and the Commander suggested that in future all G2 (Intelligence) staffs must be involved in the planning process from the start,

concurrent with the issuing of the warning order for an operation. Intelligence products must be made available from all relevant sources, and the intelligence staff procedure must be followed to streamline and expedite requests to avoid confusion.

The Commander of LFCA believed that the CF would have had difficulties mounting Operation Python on time. In his view, it was unlikely that the CAR would have met its loading schedule. Therefore, he recommended that all headquarters should review their procedures for establishing time lines to meet operational requirements. Planners need to identify delays that could cause major changes in the movement requirements and contingency plans during the initial planning stages for operations.

In his after-action report, Maj Desnoyers, a senior planning officer at LFCA Headquarters, remarked that "the whole question of our lack of logistic intelligence on possible areas of operation and the lack of truly qualified and dedicated experts in the utilization of local resources is a noticeable feature of all recent [operations]." He concluded that Operation Python "has been a costly and confused non-event...[exposing] as much by its ignorance of the facts as by its observations, the confusion which is generated by our current system of deploying contingents."<sup>13</sup>

There was little evidence that the lessons of Operation Python were incorporated into planning for later international deployments. Rather, missions continued to be addressed as discrete events, each demanding its own planning processes and solutions. Thus in late 1991 and early 1992, planning for Operation Python ceased, and these warnings were set aside as preparations for Operation Cordon began.

## UN Reconnaissance Missions to Somalia

There were two reconnaissance missions to Somalia related to Operation Cordon, although only one focused deliberately on pending CF operations. The first reconnaissance involving a CF officer was one of two technical missions, conducted under the auspices of the UN. Canada participated in March and April 1992 as part of a technical mission headed by a permanent member of the UN staff. NDHQ provided one officer, Col Michael Houghton, who headed the J3 (Peacekeeping) staff at NDHQ and acted as the Chief Operations Officer for the mission.<sup>14</sup> A detailed report was submitted to the UN Secretary-General<sup>15</sup> who used it to prepare a description of conditions in Somalia for the Security Council.<sup>16</sup>

Included in the Secretary-General's report were options for action and other recommendations for consideration by the Security Council.<sup>17</sup> Both reports were reviewed by the senior planning staff at NDHQ and helped

shape opinions there about the needs of the mission. As Col Bremner confirmed, the reports were “very useful [planning] documents because they represent current information from the area of potential operations.”<sup>18</sup>

The UN technical team reconnaissance was conducted on the understanding that a small UN force of fewer than 600 personnel would be deployed. Generally, the team was asked to develop a plan to establish mechanisms to ensure that the recently signed cease-fire agreement was respected and to ensure unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia. The team report recommended that the UN objective could be accomplished through the deployment of “observers” and “security escorts”, the latter drawn from a “security battalion”. It noted also that several factors would impede the UN mission, whatever form it eventually took. These factors included the absence of a host government authority, antagonism among the parties, meagre infrastructure, complete lack of a reliable communications network, and high rates of serious crime.<sup>19</sup>

It is in this UN report that we first encounter the term ‘security battalion’. It is used by UN planners as a generic description of a military force capable of providing armed security in a region or to a UN mission. However, the term has no precise meaning in Canadian Forces doctrine or organization. Nevertheless, as we will see, the terms ‘security battalion’ and ‘security unit’ were accepted at NDHQ without question and repeated in CF estimates and plans. The use of terms that held no meaning for commanders and commanding officers outside NDHQ simply added to general confusion about the aim and operational concept of the mission.

The Secretary-General’s report of April 21, 1992 clearly describes a “humanitarian assistance” mission.<sup>20</sup> The report reviews the situation in Somalia and emphasizes the serious threat facing relief workers. The Secretary-General anticipates a short deployment period of about 90 days, but emphasizes that future conditions would dictate the terms of the UN effort. There is no mention of specific security measures or any concern about Chapter VII operations.

The reconnaissance and drafting of the technical team report and the Secretary-General’s report were UN activities. Although Col Houghton assisted in the reconnaissance and prepared sections of the technical team report, he did so as a UN official. At no time during the reconnaissance were any assessments made of CF needs in the theatre, and no reports or recommendations concerning potential CF operations in Somalia were prepared by Col Houghton.<sup>21</sup> Both reports were studied at NDHQ, and on May 1, 1992, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and the Deputy Minister (DM) recommended against CF participation.<sup>22</sup>

The CF had been conducting UN-sponsored air transport operations into Somalia as part of Operation Relief, and during this time the air crews had



made reconnaissance visits to several airfields. They looked at the airfield near Belet Huen to assess whether CC-130 aircraft could safely go in and out of the site to deliver humanitarian aid.<sup>23</sup> These reconnaissances may have provided technical data useful for planning air operations in the region, but the aircrews were not technically competent to assess land operations factors. Besides, they were never asked to investigate the area in anticipation of CF land operations there.

## Operation Cordon

Operation Cordon, the Chief of the Defence Staff's plan for deployment and operation of the Canadian Forces in or near Bossasso, Somalia, was prepared for the most part according to CF planning doctrine and procedures. Commanders and staff officers working on the plan had the benefit of time, because the Security Council was typically cautious in reaching consensus on the mandate for the UN force they hoped to send to Somalia. However, the history of the plan for Operation Cordon reveals serious weaknesses in the Canadian planning process and the willingness of senior leaders to plan on the basis of untested assumptions. Although Operation Cordon was not carried out, it became the basis for Operation Deliverance, and that plan carried the deficiencies of the Operation Cordon plan to Somalia.

On July 28, 1992, at a J3 Plans (Land) staff meeting, Cmdre Cogdon, chief of staff for J3, stated that the Chief of the Defence Staff wished to respond to an "informal request" from the Privy Council Office to determine whether "something significant" could be done by the CF to support UN humanitarian assistance operations in Somalia. The CDS directed his NDHQ staff to look at a possible CF mission based on providing a "battalion-size security force" for UN operations. Capt (N) McMillan, J3 Plans, instructed his staff to prepare a "staff check" (a quick, preliminary estimate) for such an operation subject to several limitations: the battalion would be employed for a one-time six-month period under the auspices of a UN umbrella; MINURSO (the proposed Western Sahara mission) would be used as a starting point for planning; and the options analysis was to be ready by July 30, 1992. The staff was to produce a report addressing risk to the CF, possible tasks, transportation and movement factors (such as airlift and sealift capability), costs, CF available, medical support available, and the possible impact of a deployment on domestic and other operations, including UN tasks already under way. Capt (N) McMillan noted the UN technical team report of April 19, 1992 as containing useful information about humanitarian assistance.<sup>24</sup>

RAdm Murray, Associate ADM (Policy and Communications) at NDHQ, sent an aide-mémoire on the situation in Somalia to the CDS and the Deputy Minister on July 28, 1992. He advised that support could be given for operations in Somalia to provide:

- (a) a *security force* of up to battalion level to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid;
- (b) airlift to deliver adequate relief supplies; or
- (c) a medical-surgical team or a field hospital.

He advised that the CDS and the Deputy Minister should be prepared to structure and finance the operation either as a humanitarian mission under national command or as a peacekeeping operation as part of UNOSOM. He thought that the mission might be financed through assessed contributions, voluntary contributions, or costs borne solely by Canada.<sup>25</sup>

Several critical factors were considered and recommendations were made by other NDHQ staff officers during this time. Specifically, LCol McLaren, J2 Security Operations, advised on July 29, 1992 that because the normal complement of Military Police (MP) attached to a battalion was usually only one sergeant, one master corporal and two corporals, the MP staff for the anticipated operation should be increased by at least three corporals and one senior non-commissioned member MP-qualified inspector.<sup>26</sup>

LCol Johnston, working within the Directorate of Force Structure, analyzed the organizational and command and control implications of a battalion-size commitment to Somalia. He advised Capt (N) McMillan on July 27, 1992 that providing a "security battalion" to Somalia presented several organizational problems involving the terms of reference for the commander of the force and the commander's relationship with NDHQ and the UN command structure.

The most effective organization, according to LCol Johnston, would be a small headquarters in theatre, under a Canadian contingent commander who had "full command" of all CF units or elements in the theatre. If this recommendation were followed, then the contingent commander must be appointed "an officer commanding a formation" of the CF. He recommended further that the contingent commander be directly subordinate to the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS), reporting through the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence, Security and Operations). To avoid ambiguities about disciplinary jurisdiction in the force, he recommended that all personnel and units transferred to the Canadian contingent in Somalia be placed under the "full command" of the Canadian contingent commander. LCol Johnson suggested that the operational commander be given all powers, jurisdiction, and staff necessary to complete the task but that administrative responsibilities unnecessary in remote areas remain with commanders in Canada.<sup>27</sup>

The complexity and detail in the staff recommendations for the structure, command, and administration of the CF contingent indicate clearly that the CF had no standing plans or procedures for command and control of overseas operations. Furthermore, it was obvious that staff officers were concerned primarily with maintaining existing peacetime bureaucratic arrangements of the CF at home, and this concern forced them to propose a tangled web of arrangements for the force that would deploy to Somalia.

## Options, Analyses, and Estimates of the Situation

Between July 29 and July 31, 1992, a number of options, analyses, and estimates of the situation were prepared by staff officers at NDHQ and in FMC. The aim was to provide reasoned options for planning, and the documents were completed generally in the prescribed sequence. However, their worth was diminished by three major flaws. First, they lacked rigour and completeness. Second, they were compromised by unverified assumptions, especially as they concerned the CAR. Finally, the estimates, and therefore their conclusions, were seriously impaired by the lack of a precise definition of the aim or mission for the force to be deployed.

On July 29, 1992, the G3 Plans and Exercises staff at FMC Headquarters prepared an estimate of the situation for security operations in Somalia. Officers there seem not to have followed normal staff procedures and considered only three main topics in their estimate, which dealt only with circumstances in and near Mogadishu. They reviewed the general situation in the area, emphasizing information and ideas from the UN technical mission report, completed in April 1992, and the general security threat to the delivery of humanitarian assistance at Mogadishu. The estimate included an "Operations Concept for Security", stating that the UN force would consist of a 50-member group of military observers, deployed throughout the Central Sector (Mogadishu) and reporting to a small force headquarters, and a "security battalion". The estimate notes that the "security battalion" would be the only significant combat unit but could be the "basis of any wider plan if needed."<sup>28</sup>

The estimate drew heavily on deductions made by the UN technical team, adding that the mission of the security battalion was to secure UN humanitarian aid operations in the Mogadishu region. Its tasks might include providing site security to the seaport and the unit camp; escorts for aid convoys moving between the seaport/airports and distribution points; and security for the UN area of operations at Mogadishu-area airports. The FMC estimate summarized the contribution as "initially fixed at a 500 man [security unit], with 5 companies." It concluded that "any infantry, armoured or artillery unit with second line augmentation and some engineer capacity could form an adequate organizational basis."<sup>29</sup>



Although FMC was already contributing to two major international operations, staff officers suggested that FMC could support a third major unit commitment for peacekeeping operations for a short period, but not for more than 12 months. The estimate also noted that the CAR was nominated as the UN standby unit and that it was on standby for domestic operations at 14 days' notice. While suggesting that the CAR could be the basis of the Canadian response, officers observed that finding qualified drivers for armoured vehicles within the Regiment was one of the main problems with this choice. They identified other available units, including the Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD) and the 12<sup>e</sup> Régiment Blindé du Canada (12RBC). The estimate concluded that a response to the requirement for a "security battalion" was supportable by FMC.<sup>30</sup>

This estimate did not discuss the proposed mission or analyze the concept of operations drawn from UN documents, nor did it clarify the meaning of "security battalion" in operational terms. There were suggestions that some operational doctrine on area security operations could be adapted to meet the assumed mission in Somalia, but no officer mentioned the lack of tactics or training in this role as a problem to be considered.

At that time, no CF infantry unit was organized as "a 500 man security unit, with 5 companies." The staff officers may have accepted too easily the notion that such a unit did exist, or that one could be organized quickly and effectively. They seem to have skimmed through standard staff procedures and planning practices instead of waiting for an "assessment of tasks" to be completed before assigning units to the mission. On whose estimate and authority did the staff assume that a "500-man security unit" as described by the UN, was adequate for the tasks envisioned? On the other hand, if using a unit of this size was a limiting factor placed on planners, they should have identified the limitation and the commander who set it. Furthermore, they ought to have identified the serious organizational and training implications that would follow from this change in standard CF organization and practice.

The FMC estimate was forwarded to NDHQ the same day for the use of central planning staff, who were also preparing an estimate for the CDS. On July 29, 1992, Maj Whiting, a member of the J3 Plans staff at NDHQ, prepared an "options analysis" of probable tasks and forces for a CF security battalion in support of UN humanitarian assistance in Somalia. His analysis referred to UN Resolution 751, approving in principle the sending of an armed security force to Mogadishu, and the UN Secretary-General's report of July 24, 1992, calling for Somalia to be divided into four operational zones, including the north-east, for purposes of UN operations. He identified several "probable tasks" for the force, including assisting "in the demobilization of the SNM [Somali National Movement] Army", using security forces to provide escort and protection for humanitarian aid, possibly helping to

re-establish local police forces, monitoring cease-fire arrangements in parts of the country other than Mogadishu, and aiding in the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid.<sup>31</sup> Maj Whiting summarized his estimate by stating that "Force Mobile Command concludes that the provision of a [security battalion] in Somalia is supportable."<sup>32</sup>

On July 30, 1992 another estimate was sent by LCol Kennedy, G3 Plans at FMC Headquarters, to LCol Froh, Acting J3, at NDHQ, apparently to help NDHQ staffs develop more options as requested by Gen de Chastelain on July 28, 1992. It set out three options for the type of unit that could be deployed:

*Option One:* A deployment after seven days' notice that would be lightly equipped but with high strategic [international] mobility. This force would include 500 people, light vehicles, and dismounted weapons only.

Only the CAR was listed as being available within this time frame. The estimate warned that the CAR would be capable only of "static defence/security operations"; that "up to 20%" of the unit might not be ready for immediate deployment; that the operation would be "air dependent" and thus costly to sustain; and finally, and of great significance for desert operations, the CAR would have "limited tactical mobility".

*Option Two:* A deployment after 30 days' notice that would be a "medium force".

This force would include 500 people, some armoured personnel carriers with mounted weapons, and increased first and some second line support. Three units were available for this deployment: the CAR, the 12RBC and the RCD. This option would provide a "self contained unit with some tactical mobility" that could be transported to the theatre of operations by air but it required heavy reliance on air sustainment and a high cost for deployment.

*Option Three:* A deployment after 60 days' notice of a "self-reliant force" of 500 people with wheeled vehicles with a "tailored task organization self-contained for most lines of support."

More units were available for deployment under this option, including the CAR, 12RBC, the RCD, and the 5<sup>e</sup> Régiment d'Artillerie Légère du Canada (5RALC). This option provided at "lower cost, [a more] deliberate response with a more capable [general] purpose...task-tailored unit".<sup>33</sup>

Thus, at the end of July 1992, LGen Gervais informed the Chief of the Defence Staff that his command had several units that could be prepared for the mission. Two main factors appeared to divide the options: time and "tailored task organization". If the CF was to move with little notice and little time to prepare for the mission, the CAR seemed the appropriate unit.

However, the penalty for moving quickly was deployment of a unit that might not be appropriate to the mission, as it was understood at the time. The more prudent course required a clear statement and analysis of the mission, the organization of a force appropriate to the mission, and time to allow unit commanders and troops to prepare themselves for the operation. The obvious penalty in this case would be a slower but “more deliberate response”.

Here, then, was a clear instance of the need for a deliberate command decision. Commanders had to choose either to go quickly, with the risks that entailed, or to allow time for adequate planning and preparation and perhaps suffer criticism for a slower response. No intelligible and professional advice, framed around the question of time versus preparation, seems to have been offered by the chain of command. However, the critical question seems not to have been asked at NDHQ either.

Early — perhaps too early — in the planning process, commanders and staff officers accepted the assumption that a quick response to the Government’s request for a force for Somalia was the overriding consideration in all their deliberations, despite warning signs that the CF, and certainly the CAR, might not be able to meet this challenge.<sup>34</sup>

LCol Froh, at NDHQ, used the July 30th FMC analysis of options to prepare for the CDS an NDHQ staff options analysis “to assess the capability of the CF to provide a [battalion-sized] security force for UN humanitarian assistance operations.”<sup>35</sup> LCol Froh’s estimate reviewed the political situation in Somalia and the UN Secretary-General’s second report on Somalia of July 27, 1992. He observed that a second UN technical team would be sent to Somalia in August to develop a concept of operations for a possible expanded UN plan. LCol Froh also made a brief comparison of the proposed Somalia mission with the now defunct Operation Python, hinting that the operation in Somalia would be more demanding, with combat risks close to those being experienced by Canadian Forces deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The estimate was based on several critical assumptions. The force would be employed for a maximum of six months and would not be replaced by Canada. Funding would be made available from the government to supplement the DND budget. The force would be self-sufficient and include third line medical and logistic support. Especially relevant was LCol Froh’s assumption that the estimate dealt only with “the known requirement to provide a [security battalion] to operations in Mogadishu.” He emphasized that an “assessment of security needs for other zones had to await the report of the UN technical team.” He apparently thought this qualification so important that he quoted Col Houghton, who had participated in the UN reconnaissance in Somalia earlier that year, and later remarked “it would be a very serious mistake to attempt to pre-empt the UN in this [deployment] matter. They should be allowed to do their job.”



After a brief review of the risks and tasks, LCol Froh determined that the mission would "require the general purpose combat capability of a major arms unit." Moreover he stated that "if no other nation provides" the needed support resources, the CF contingent would require "a composite engineer troop of 50 personnel and 20 vehicles; a national support element of 100–200 personnel and 50–70 vehicles; a medical element of 70 personnel and 18 vehicles; and a medium capacity satellite communications system...as a rear [communications] link." He concluded that the "CF could provide a [security battalion] to meet the requirements for the Mogadishu operation within 60 days."

Apparently, Gen de Chastelain was not convinced that the estimate met the requirement to do "something significant" quickly. On the text of the July 30th estimate, someone added a handwritten note changing LCol Froh's statement, "three major units (RCD, 12RBC, and CAR) available on 30 to 45 days notice", to read that the CAR was available to move on seven days' notice. This assertion was repeated in handwriting in other sections of the estimate.<sup>36</sup> Later, at the request of the CDS, LCol Froh made inquiries of FMC and was informed by LCol Kennedy that the CAR could be made ready sooner. LCol Kennedy presented (on behalf of LGen Gervais) two new options. Option 1 — "immediately to demonstrate political resolve... the CAR can be light on the ground" six days following a warning to move. Under Option 2, FMC confirmed that a medium force could be ready on "7 to 30 days' " notice to move, and that force "would include a unit other than CAR."<sup>37</sup>

With this new interpretation of the FMC forces available, LCol Froh prepared a "revised" estimate on July 31, 1992. The background detail and the application of the estimate only to Mogadishu were repeated, but the assessment of the readiness of units was changed. The revised estimate stated that four major units (RCD, 12RBC, CAR and 5RALC) were available on 45 days' notice, but only the CAR was available on seven days' notice. This estimate highlighted the fact that the CAR had few qualified armoured vehicle drivers. LCol Froh concluded that sufficient "general purpose combat forces are available [in the CF] to meet the security force requirement for Mogadishu for two rotations."<sup>38</sup>

The revised estimate included a changed, and more positive, conclusion as well:

The details of the situation in Somalia and the operational concept for the expanded UN involvement are unknown and therefore the capabilities needed to accomplish the tasks set out by the [Secretary-General] in his report to the [Security Council] of [July 24, 1992] cannot yet be determined. Nonetheless, the CF can provide and sustain a general purpose, combat capable force to provide security for this UN mission to provide humanitarian assistance in Somalia.<sup>39</sup>

Thus, by the end of July 1992, the Chief of the Defence Staff had concluded that the Canadian Forces could provide a “security battalion” for duty in Somalia. Although no final decision on which unit should go had been made, senior officers obviously favoured selection of the CAR in planning for the mission.

The conclusion of the July 31st estimate reflects, in its illogical summary, the corruption of the planning process that was beginning to mar the development of a reasoned estimate leading to a sound plan for possible CF operations in Somalia. If the “situation in Somalia and the operational concept for the expanded UN involvement are unknown”, then “the capabilities needed to accomplish the tasks...cannot be determined.” The only logical and professionally acceptable conclusion should have been that no one could responsibly determine whether “the CF can provide and sustain a general purpose, combat capable force to provide security for this UN mission to provide humanitarian assistance in Somalia.” Yet this is precisely the determination that was made.

A responsible course of action at this time would have been to wait for the situation to develop and the mission to become clear, or to seek clarification of the mission from the UN. Certainly, the CDS could have, and most likely would have, ordered commanders and staff to continue to prepare for some type of commitment in Somalia. However, in the absence of a definition of that mission, it is difficult to understand how a declaration could be made that the Canadian Forces had the capability to do it.

## Planning for Operation Cordon in a Changing Situation

In CF doctrine and practice, an estimate of the situation should lead at least to a few “courses open” options from which a specific mission or operational aim can be selected by the commander. In this case, the CDS and the NDHQ staff — dragging the Commander FMC and his staff with them — were designing a plan and designating units and capabilities for an operation without a clear, achievable objective. This approach runs counter to the first principle of war and the first principle of operational planning.

The growing demand by political leaders, the public, and the media that something be done to support the United Nations in Somalia may have encouraged Gen de Chastelain and Mr. Fowler to provide a positive response to the Government’s initial queries. However, the failure to establish an aim and concept for CF operations in Somalia soon forced military staffs to fabricate and patch together disconnected operations and support plans that became increasingly incoherent as the situation and apparent requirements

changed. Thus, as we will see, by the time the real nature of the concept of operations was understood, several critical operational and planning decisions had already been taken, making change awkward, and other crucial questions went without answers until after the force left Canada.

Throughout August 1992, the situation in Somalia and the requirement for forces continued to change. On August 25, 1992, LCol Froh informed the CDS of the status of contingency planning within the CF on the provision of land forces to Somalia.<sup>43</sup> He noted that the second UN technical team had recently returned and submitted its report to the Secretary-General. The report identified the need for two self-contained infantry battalions to provide escort and protection for humanitarian aid activities and for forces to be deployed to assist distribution centres in the Bossaso and Mandera regions.

The UN staff recommended that each "security unit" be capable of escorting up to three convoys per day to distribution centres in their region and securing the distribution centres. It was also recommended that the units be capable of providing aid to the distribution centres and securing the humanitarian aid ships entering the port, storage facilities, and protecting aid convoys. Furthermore, the team suggested that these units be organized in five companies: a headquarters and logistic company to provide command, control and administration, and three rifle companies, and that each rifle company include at least one platoon equipped with armoured personnel carriers (preferably wheeled) with "standard armament". The remainder of the unit should be armed according to UN traditions.<sup>41</sup>

LCol Froh reported that Col Fraser, Canada's permanent military representative at the United Nations, suggested that Canada would be asked to provide communications, logistic and medical units for this expanded operation. "Other nations might be requested to provide infantry forces."<sup>42</sup>

Col Fraser also reported that the U.S. delegate to the UN was concerned about delays in the deployment of the Pakistani battalion into Mogadishu. Col Fraser warned NDHQ that as a result there might be pressure on the UN to ask another member state to provide the "security battalion" for Mogadishu. The mission was obviously growing beyond the simpler parameters used to plan Operation Python and beyond the capabilities of an airborne regiment not equipped or trained for mobile operations.<sup>43</sup>

LCol Froh informed the CDS that the resources of the combat arms units of the CF were being stretched. Although he suggested that existing missions and commitments of the CF in Canada and Yugoslavia could continue and that a new Somalia mission was possible for six months, "the UN standby battalion and the Canada-based brigade group to NATO commitments could not be met." He also advised the CDS that "a message is being written [in NDHQ] tasking [Force Mobile Command headquarters] to prepare a draft



contingency [operations plan] for the provision of a self-sustained battalion-sized force for security tasks in Somalia. Further, J6 [Communications] will be tasked to prepare an initial staff check for the provision of a communications unit to the expanded UNOSOM [United Nations Operation Somalia]."<sup>44</sup> Here again, there was an opportunity to influence the request Canada would subsequently receive from the UN and to steer Canada's commitment away from providing a scarce combat arms unit and toward a more available logistics, medical, or communications unit. But nothing was done.

On the evening of August 25, 1992, Col Fraser reported to NDHQ that the UN Secretariat had made an "informal request for Canadian participation in the United Nations operation in Somalia." Contrary to earlier information, this request was "for an infantry battalion of up to 750 personnel." The UN thinking, he said, was that Canada would be assigned the mission in Bossasso, "the quote most difficult area unquote", where it would be responsible for security at ports of entry, escort of convoys to distribution centres, and security of the centres during distribution. Col Fraser emphasized that the battalion would have to be "self-sustained and deploy with 60 days sustainment." The mission required a unit of "three rifle companies", two of which would be mounted in armoured personnel carriers equipped with "heavy machine guns".<sup>45</sup>

The next day, the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Deputy Minister made a joint recommendation to the Minister of National Defence. They suggested that in accepting the request, the Minister

note that in light of our major UN commitments to the Middle East, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Cambodia and Kuwait, the potential requirement for a further 1200 man task force for Yugoslavia and a potential requirement in Mozambique should the UN decide to send in a force in support of an eventual cease fire, Canada will find it hard to maintain its NATO and domestic contingency responsibilities. In particular, we would have difficulty in simultaneously meeting: our contingency brigade group commitment; and our contingency immediate reaction capability (as currently defined) to meet both domestic and NATO requirements.<sup>46</sup>

Nevertheless, Gen de Chastelain and Mr. Fowler recommended that the Minister also "express DND's willingness to provide a battalion of about 750 personnel to an expanded UNOSOM. We would make this acceptance conditional on the deployment's being for a maximum of one year from October 92, and on Canada's being formally released from any residual commitment to MINURSO [Western Sahara]."<sup>47</sup>

On August 27, 1992, NDHQ instructed various commanders to prepare a draft contingency plan, Operation Cordon, for the Somalia deployment. The CDS's mission was that the "CF will prepare draft contingency plans to support possible relief operations in North-Eastern Somalia." Commanders and staff officers were instructed to plan on the assumption that there would

be no requirement to maintain an earmarked unit for MINURSO or a UN standby force; that the tour of duty of the battalion was based on a one-year deployment with a six-month rotation; and that the Canadian battalion would be deployed in the north-east sector (Bossasso area) of Somalia. The CDS stated that the “probable concept of operations” would entail the CF operating as part of UN mission. He stated also that “the DCDS ISO [MGen Addy] will likely exercise control of the operation on behalf of the CDS [and that the] DCDS ISO will likely have [operational command] of the [Canadian] element. He will transfer [operational control] to the applicable UNOSOM force commander once [the] in-theatre commander has declared himself operationally ready.”<sup>48</sup>

The Commander of FMC was instructed specifically to

be prepared to assemble and provide a battalion group [for] tasks in Bossasso [to provide] security at port of entry, escort of convoy to distribution centres and security of the centres during distribution. Force to include engineer troop plus second line [maintenance], NSE [national support element] and some third line medical support.

The CDS directed that the battalion be composed of “rifle companies [with] a mix of wheeled AVGP [armoured vehicle general purpose] and soft-skinned vehicles [armed with small arms only].”<sup>49</sup>

It is instructive to note that whereas the United Nations had asked for a 750-member “security battalion”, the CDS interpreted this to mean that “the stated 750 person strength includes NSE and NRL [national rear link (communications)] personnel [and] second and limited third line medical support”.<sup>50</sup> In effect, the order of the CDS pre-empted the normal planning process, changed the standing composition of a field unit, and limited the actual strength of the combat arms unit by superimposing second and third line support requirements on the unit.

The CDS’s directive and the corruption of the planning process brought an immediate response from the Commander of FMC. On August 31, 1992, BGen Vernon advised Cmdre Cogdon at NDHQ that LGen Gervais was producing his own detailed estimate of the situation. In it he warned the CDS that “it would be inappropriate to rely overly on the initial UN staff check...as it is too narrow in scope and appears to be driven by financial rather than operational considerations.” Specifically, he criticized the unbalanced mix of mechanized and static rifle companies “as professionally unsound.” He rejected the estimate of 10 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) per company, noting that Canada’s minimum was 14 APCs per company; pointed out the lack of a reconnaissance capability; and noted that the proposed force did not “recognize standard [CF] cohesive fighting units.”

He emphasized this concern directly: "the latter point is important for we are developing a penchant to re-organize prior to operations. Our standard building blocks [companies and battalions] may be added or subtracted, but the integral elements must be protected, otherwise leadership, battle discipline and coherence will suffer."<sup>51</sup>

The strong and appropriate message to NDHQ was clear: Tell us what the mission is, then allow the responsible commander to determine what forces will be needed to accomplish the mission according to CF operational planning doctrine and without reorganizing units to meet some NDHQ imperative. This reaction from the commander who was to provide the main force for the mission should have caused the CDS or his principal operations staff officer to rethink the direction issued by the CDS. But it did not have that effect.

## The Contingency Plan

Operational planning for Operation Cordon continued. Under guidelines issued by the CDS, the Commander of FMC prepared Draft Contingency Plan 01, although his protests concerning the CDS's August 27th directive had evidently been ignored or rejected. The FMC draft plan, dated September 3, 1992, was "based on the CAR, 2 Service Battalion, 2 Field Ambulance and with the engineer resources coming from 2 Combat Engineer Regiment but with augmentation from across the [FMC] Command." The draft plan named MGen MacKenzie, Commander of Land Force Central Area, as "responsible to prepare, assemble and train the Battalion Group and to declare it ready for deployment."<sup>52</sup>

Planners at FMC Headquarters worked from several critical assumptions. They assumed that Canada's commitments to various other UN operations would continue; the main deployment would be by ship and air; the tour of duty would be one year, with a six-month rotation; the battalion would be assigned to the north-east sector of Somalia, with Bossaso as the centre of operations; the battalion would deploy with 60 days' sustainment and be self-contained; the rifle companies would be equipped with wheeled armoured personnel carriers; and second and limited third line medical support would be included in the national support element accepting that the total force would remain within the 750-person limit set by the CDS.<sup>53</sup>

The draft operation plan prepared by FMC Headquarters in August 1992 was unusual, in that the mission and concept of operations were still not clear or defined and the essential elements of the Commander's estimate had been situated before he made his assessment of the operation. For instance, the draft plan contained more than 20 annexes addressing such things as organization, command relationships, intelligence, operations and training,



and rules of engagement. Nevertheless, planners at FMC (and presumably the Commander) had continuing reservations about the integrity of the operation.

In a marginal note written on the document someone asks "how could we commit before knowing concept?"<sup>54</sup> Other questions are asked more formally in the body of the plan. For example, planners were concerned about "the lack of knowledge on the concept of operations for the [security battalion]. Who will it work for, the number of convoys it will escort, the location and number of distribution centres that will be operating and the boundaries of the area of the operations." They noted "equipment deficiencies such as the need for a suspension upgrade and a turret upgrade for the AVGP's, and air-conditioning for them."

The NDHQ direction to reconfigure the CAR's commandos by adding general purpose armoured vehicles had a serious effect on other units. The order caused disruptions to two units and seriously degraded the operational readiness and training potential of the donating unit, The Royal Canadian Regiment, without ensuring that the CAR would ever have time to retrain for mobile operations. The concern was that this disruption, along with the possibility that the 1993 force reduction plan might have to be deferred or cancelled, would have had severe effects in terms of rank stagnation, reduced recruiting, an aging military population, and deterioration of morale.

These concerns and others were conveyed to the CDS by the Commander of FMC, LGen Gervais, during a briefing for Gen de Chastelain by LCol Kennedy on September 4, 1992. While the mood of the briefing was positive and exemplified by a 'can do' attitude, the warnings and uncertainties were also obvious. LCol Kennedy reviewed the organization proposed by FMC, based on the CAR. He qualified the proposal by saying it was "lightly vehicled" and "austere". Although he stated that the unit could meet the commitment (he was, of course, acting on instructions from LGen Gervais), LCol Kennedy warned that "the battalion group will be capable of deploying and sustaining three companies and a small reserve as well as protecting its base. This must be considered as only adequate in light of the unknowns, that is, in light of the operational risks."<sup>55</sup> Any optimism at NDHQ should have been tempered by the early staff assessment made at FMC Headquarters, which found the UN request "to be lean."<sup>56</sup>

During this briefing, LCol Kennedy exposed the wider impact of the Somalia mission on the CF, particularly the army. He reported on the major effects on the army of executing Operation Dagger (a possible commitment of additional combat units to the former Yugoslavia), Operation Cordon or both:

...we must be clear that they will have a significant impact, but only in the wider context of total army commitments. The numbers...are telling. Even using only a modest percentage for non-effectives, you can see that FMC's commitments add up, in the cumulative percentage column, to

more than 40% of our effective strength actively involved in operations or on operational standby...Over a one year period, two thirds of our field strength would be committed to UN operations [that is] about 8600 soldiers. If we took out our essential command, base, training and reserve infrastructure personnel, accounted for the [CF personnel still in Europe] and the...population on career courses, then you can see why FMC has consistently said it cannot maintain [after 1993] more than three major contingents on [peacekeeping] at one time. Yes, FMC can mount Operations Cordon and Dagger, but maintaining these forces beyond one year would cause very significant impacts over the long term, including effects on morale and a significant reduction in professional capability because of a reduction in training.<sup>57</sup>

LCol Kennedy continued:

Clearly, with the portion of our land force that is not on peacekeeping or getting off it over the next year, our ability to generate more forces, to meet an operational commitment [in Canada or NATO] is entirely situationally dependent. Clear is the fact that we are close to the limit of force availability, and that is of course why [LGen Gervais] has dealt in these cases in the detail of unit selection. While these operations are underway, there will be no full brigade group exercises and few battalion ones not directed at a specific mission. General purpose combat capability will take a back seat in the next year to task specific [capability], which is in the long run, a dangerous situation for the army. Of course this is complicated by the force reduction process and our restructuring activities.<sup>58</sup>

Several other unresolved issues of continuing concern about the operation were introduced by LCol Kennedy:

the logistics risks to our battalion group are substantial and just as great as the security risks and we have stressed that we need an all out effort to get our essential sustainment materiel amassed in [CFB] Petawawa and in the [ports] and then into theatre early. Otherwise we could have a contingent stranded without fuel, dry of water and not able to do its job.<sup>59</sup>

Finally, he emphasized the continuing strain on people:

we are going to have to tighten our belts in regards to how we task the soldiers of FMC. We must, over the next year, safeguard our few and heavily committed army personnel and will need to review ways and means of doing so...[W]ith more Canadian soldiers outside of Canada on operational duty than since Korea even with the smallest army since Korea, FMC does maintain that we can execute Operation Cordon and Operation Dagger. And in doing so, we await the challenge.<sup>60</sup>

Despite the can-do bravado of these closing remarks, the weight of the unknowns should have tipped the balance in the direction of caution and prudence. Planners were already cutting doctrinal corners to meet the limit of 750 people imposed by the CDS, rather than adding reserves to ensure a

capacity to deal with surprises. Indeed, corners were being cut at all levels to meet this new commitment. The broad uncertainties about fundamental operational questions and the strain that was already showing in CF combat units ought to have resulted in a decision to decline the invitation to join a difficult, ill-defined operation in a faraway country about which Canadian officers knew little.

## Orders for Operation Cordon

By the end of August, several defining decisions had been taken by the CDS that would shape his orders to commanders and troops. Specifically, he had decided that the CF could provide and sustain a combat capable battalion level force in Somalia for at least six months and probably one year. The force, including all support elements, would be no larger than 750 people and would be equipped with a "light scale" of vehicle and equipment. The commander of FMC would be the principal providing formation, and the CAR would form the base for the CF contribution. The area of operations would be Bossasso, and it would be the "firm base" for operations and logistical support to the CF in Somalia. Finally, the CF contribution would be under the national command of the CDS at NDHQ.

What was not sure was what exactly the CAR was to do in Somalia, how a "security battalion" should function, the situation in the intended area of operations, and when the deployment would take place.

There was enough information, however, to issue warning orders for Operation Cordon to subordinate commands to allow concurrent planning, training, and internal deployments of people and equipments to begin. Therefore, when the Minister of National Defence announced, on August 28, 1992, the Government's offer of 750 Canadian Forces personnel for a UN multi-lateral force, "battle procedure" commenced in the CF, beginning with the issuing of Warning Order — Operation Cordon by the CDS on September 4th.<sup>61</sup> The Commander of FMC issued his warning order the same day, and the commanders of Land Force Central Area and the Special Service Force followed suit September 5th. Other commanders, including the commanders of Maritime Command and Air Command, issued appropriate warnings to their units also. When LCol Morneau, Commanding Officer of the CAR, issued his warning order to his officers and through them to his soldiers on September 6th, the first stage of the operational planning sequence was complete.

This standard and speedy dissemination of orders and information essentially repeated, but rarely amplified, the orders issued by Gen de Chastelain. The CDS's warning order briefly outlined the situation in Somalia as it was understood at the time and the Government's decision to contribute to the



UN force. The mission was "to provide a 750 person infantry battalion for UNOSOM", and the concept of operations was stated simply as "employment begins with arrival of first personnel in theatre and ends with termination of [the] Operation Cordon mandate. Probable tasks in theatre include security of ports and airports, protection of humanitarian relief convoys and protection of distribution centres."<sup>62</sup>

The warning order issued by LGen Gervais repeated the essence of the CDS's order but changed the mission statement slightly and added more co-ordinating information. He stated that the mission was to "prepare, assemble and train a 750 man contingent for secure duties in Somalia within 30 days", meaning that the force should have been ready to deploy by about October 5, 1992. LGen Gervais specifically named the Commander of Land Force Central Area "to prepare, assemble, train and declare ready for deployment the 750 man contingent."<sup>63</sup> The subsequent orders issued by the Commander of LFCA and the Commander of the Special Service Force provided considerable detail, which LCol Morneau used to begin preparing his unit for overseas operations.<sup>64</sup>

The formal operation order from Gen de Chastelain was not issued until November 11, 1992, but in the meantime considerable additional planning and preparations had been accomplished. Throughout the period leading to the November orders, commanders and staff officers issued training directives, planning guidance, and preliminary movement orders for ships, aircraft, and people. In the Canadian Airborne Regiment, supplementary training, indoctrination, logistical preparations, and other critical activities were begun and in some cases completed.

Continuing uncertainty about the objective and considerable dislocation in units resulting from reorganizations needed to mount the operation prevented the Commander of the SSF from declaring the unit ready even late in October 1992. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the Canadian Forces process for operational planning and the doctrine behind it were proved, at least insofar as the planning steps needed for orderly preparation for deployment were concerned. Given reasonable time, the doctrine and staff system could have worked well enough.

Although Operation Cordon was never activated, the evidence suggests that had it gone forward as planned, officers and soldiers would have begun the operation with the confidence born of completed staff work. This is not to say that the many problems that plagued Operation Deliverance would not have occurred in Bossaso, because despite efforts to launch the operation from a strong platform, several critical issues remained unresolved, and they might have crippled Operation Cordon as they later did Operation Deliverance.

## Early Indications of Problems in Planning Operation Cordon

As with Operation Python, there was considerable confusion and inefficiency in the chain of command and in the flow of information between headquarters and field units. For example, the Commander of FMC issued a draft contingency plan for Operation Cordon early in September 1992 to provide detailed guidance on the preparation of the force for Operation Cordon. Two problems or complaints ensued. First, the document, or at least its main ideas, was not passed to every level of command and second, there was confusion in the chain of command, evident in testimony before the Inquiry, about what use was to be made of the document.

A copy of the draft plan was sent to LFCA and the SSF but not initially to the CAR. LCol Turner testified that SSF Headquarters received a copy of the contingency plan for Operation Cordon on the Labour Day weekend. However, he did not send a copy to LCol Morneault at that time because he thought the CAR already had a copy, or because it was not necessary for its work.<sup>65</sup> LCol Morneault testified that he received only part of the contingency plan (the part on guidance for training and rules of engagement) on September 8th.<sup>66</sup> On the other hand, LCol Turner believed that sufficient information had been given to the CAR in the warning order issued by the SSF on September 5th.<sup>67</sup> Whatever LCol Turner's belief may have been, we have no doubt that LCol Morneault would surely have benefited from reading the entire plan early in the preparation stage.

LGen Gervais assumed that the document would go to Land Force Central Area, other agencies with responsibilities for the plan, and NDHQ, but not directly to units. In his opinion, it was not intended to go to LCol Morneault. He expected the Commander of LFCA to adapt the document, eliminating the information about the other commands involved in the mission but still giving as complete a picture as possible to the Commander of the SSF. However, he did not reject the idea that in this case the contingency plan could have been passed on to the CO of the CAR. He stated in testimony that the plan "could have gone from the Special Service Force right to the unit without being reordered."<sup>68</sup>

LGen Reay, Deputy Commander of Force Mobile Command at the time, explained that the document provided a general concept of operations for the battalion. The draft contingency plan was, he said, "roughly speaking, exactly what the title implies...we certainly [were] well aware that a mission is evolving here, and we wanted to try to provide as much detail to the subordinate headquarters as possible to allow them to get on with proper battle

procedure and planning." He stated that MGen MacKenzie "should then have [had] a good look at the thing from the Central Area perspective and produced a similar order that would then go to the SSF."

LGen Reay also stated that he would be very surprised if a battalion commander received a copy of a contingency order originating at army headquarters. But, "on the other hand, again, you're dealing only with one unit [the CAR] and I would expect that significant amounts of this document would simply be reproduced [and passed to the unit and] that there wouldn't be a great need to redefine." According to usual practice, LGen Reay expected "that each level will put its own stamp on the contingency plan to reflect its priorities, its grouping and tasks, where it sees the bits and pieces that are going to pull together this puzzle come from."<sup>69</sup>

In fact, neither MGen MacKenzie nor BGen Beno, the Commander of the Special Service Force, made any substantial amendments or modifications to the plan as LGen Reay expected. Superior commanders' missions were simply repeated in subordinate orders, for example, resulting in the unusual situation of the unit mission for the CAR being essentially the same as the mission statement for LFC. Thus, we can conclude, no detailed analysis of the mission was made by commanders between LGen Gervais and LCol Morneault. This might be excused if LCol Morneault was aware of the thinking behind LGen Gervais's concept of operations and plan, but as we have seen, he was given only the training and rules of engagement annexes to the draft plan.

More serious is the observation that the mission statement at all levels, from NDHQ to the CAR, is devoid of an operational context. In other words, the mission statement in the draft plan and in the warning orders is "to mount a battalion group for security operations in Somalia within 30 days", but nowhere is there any indication of what those operations would be. At some level of command it would be usual to see a statement that the mission of the CAR was, for instance, to conduct tactical operations aimed at securing such and such an area, or words to that effect. This more precise aim would have provided the kind of direction that would in turn have allowed the CO to prepare his unit precisely for a unit-sized mission within a recognizable doctrine or concept of operations. But his superiors seemed content merely to tell LCol Morneault where he would be going, but not what he was expected to do when he got there.

The second main criticism of the draft contingency plan was that it was too detailed in scope, causing "no end of heartache" as organization and training requirements changed.<sup>70</sup> LGen Gervais attributed the amount of detail in the document to an "overzealous staff" used to the "old way of giving information". Staff was doing some of the work that would normally have



been done at the LFCA level. LGen Gervais agreed that the plan probably had more detail than necessary.<sup>71</sup> It is not clear from LGen Gervais' testimony whether he discovered this significant problem during or after the operation or whether he took action to correct the problem then or later.

LGen Reay noted that in the army, officers are taught "in accordance with routine battle procedure, [to] think two [command] levels down and issue orders one level down".<sup>72</sup> In his view the purpose of the draft plan "was to convey to...[LFCA] and...the SSF and the [CAR] the broad parameters of an emerging mission to Somalia."<sup>73</sup> He explained national operations planning as beginning with a "document emerging from National Defence Headquarters, then we put a kind of Army level stamp on it as best we can without trying to get into too much detail and tying the hands of the commanders below us and then so on down the line." LGen Reay then admitted that "it is interesting in that here is Army Headquarters writing quite a detailed order for a single unit, but that is often the nature of UN missions when you only have a single unit deployed."<sup>74</sup> In conclusion he asserted, contradictorily, that because planners at FMC Headquarters "haven't got all the information yet...we wanted to try to provide as much detail to the subordinate headquarters as possible to allow them to get on with proper battle procedure and planning."<sup>75</sup> He expected that a follow-on document, based on the draft plan but containing new information, would be issued eventually and then the draft plan would become the operative document.

From the evidence it is obvious that either the army's doctrine of not directing orders too far down into the command system is faulty or that, in this case, it was not followed. If the doctrine is faulty, and commanders at very senior levels can embroil themselves in unit planning, then we must question the need for the various levels of command through which orders are passing, apparently for no reason. If, on the other hand, the doctrine is essentially sound, based on the assumption that in serious situations senior commanders would not have time to be involved in detailed planning at lower levels of command, then it follows that commanders violated the doctrine in this instance and confused preparations for the mission. Alternatively, it follows that if commanders and staff officers had the time to prepare numerous paper orders, they could also have spent their time with the units, supervising and assisting commanding officers preparing for a complex, unusual mission. In the end, the detailed orders, intended presumably to help field officers, did not reach the unit, and few senior officers took the time to assist LCol Morneault, an inexperienced CO, who was about to carry the full weight of Operation Cordon and the reputation of the Canadian Forces on his shoulders.

## Planning in the Special Service Force and the CAR

From September until early November 1992, the Commander of the SSF and the Commanding Officer of the CAR worked together with their officers to prepare the CAR for deployment. Generally, operational and logistical planning progressed steadily (if to an uncertain mission) in the circumstances and according to normal battle procedure.

During this period troops were undergoing mission training, usually at the commando level, to hone their individual and small-unit skills. Equipment was arriving at CFB Petawawa, and logistical staff completed loading arrangements for the transport of the force by air and sea. Routine departure assistance procedures were begun to check, among other things, the health, medical files, pay arrangements, and family situations of soldiers who would go to Somalia. Given time, the unit would have been "good to go" (ready for deployment) even if it was not trained and fit to go. However, the process was hampered by serious and fundamental problems.

Examples of the types of problems facing field level officers in planning for the deployment were suggested by LCol Turner, BGen Beno's principal operations staff officer at SSF Headquarters. During briefings held at CFB Petawawa on November 10 and again on November 13, 1992, he described several difficulties. The SSF and the unit lacked adequate information about the theatre of operations, mainly because the reconnaissance was not authorized early enough to affect planning and training.<sup>76</sup> Continuing confusion about deployment dates and the availability of transport ships caused considerable inefficiencies and frustrated planners and the troops. LCol Turner stated in his briefing that "deployment details are critical to accurate and efficient staff planning; i.e., it is very difficult to forecast requirements, pack stores, submit movement tables and plan training, when you don't know how you're to get there, when you're leaving, or how long the operation will be maintained".<sup>77</sup> In his view, training could have been "planned more efficiently had the [CAR] known exactly when [it was] going to deploy".<sup>78</sup>

LCol Turner maintained that the chain of command was corrupted by staff officers at several headquarters. Specifically, he discovered that officers from technical branches were acting without the prior approval of the operational chain of command. For instance, although much of the information "coming down on the engineer chain of command...was useful, necessary information...in some cases, because of the speed with which [the engineers in superior headquarters] were initially staffing matters, the operational chain of command may not have had all of the information that was being made available to the engineers in the Airborne Battle Group". Planning was therefore needlessly complicated.<sup>79</sup> Moreover, he said, senior officers were breaking

the “think two down, order one down rule” and issuing orders and assigning tasks directly to the unit commanding officer.<sup>80</sup>

Finally, and inexplicably, units in the SSF and even the CAR — in the midst of planning for a dangerous mission — were being hounded by staff officers at NDHQ and elsewhere, looking for troops to perform ceremonial duties. “There were a number of ceremonial duties. That is one of the disadvantages of living in Petawawa. It is extremely close to Ottawa and when national tasks come up, the SSF tends to be the first choice to provide guards of honour.”<sup>81</sup> During the preparatory period, for example, the SSF was assigned to provide troops for high-ranking foreign visitors and a 50-member guard of honour for another visit. On September 30, 1992, the SSF received an order to send a mortar group to CFB Gagetown, in New Brunswick, for a three-month employment commencing October 5, 1992.<sup>82</sup> Even though not all of these tasks involved the CAR and some were subsequently cancelled, the effect was to distract from and interfere with the staff’s central task of getting the CAR ready for its mission.

## Standing Operating Procedures

Commanding officers usually attempt to simplify routine activities by issuing standing operating procedures (SOPs) for their units. SOPs cover tasks repeated routinely and can be issued by the CO in peacetime garrisons, for training, or in war. SOPs are very much the directions of the commanding officer, although they comply generally with directions and SOPs received from superior commanders. Such procedures are normally reviewed periodically, after a change of command and before deployment on a new operation. If they are to be of any use, however, they must be explained, demonstrated, and practised by the troops and officers to whom they apply. An SOP posted without follow-on training and practice is merely a bureaucratic encumbrance.

A review of unit SOPs and the development of SOPs specific to Operation Cordon were therefore a normal part of battle procedure and operational planning. LCol Morneault, reacting to BGen Beno’s explicit direction, ordered Capt Kyle, Operations Officer for the CAR, to prepare unit SOPs for Operation Cordon. However, preparation and development of the procedures did not progress well.<sup>83</sup>

LCol Morneault’s intention, apparently, was to build unit SOPs from the commandos upward and to consolidate them at the unit level. On September 14th, Capt Kyle instructed that the sub-units submit draft SOPs for Operation Cordon to CAR Headquarters by September 16th. These mission-specific SOPs were to cover the use of force and rules of engagement; arrest and detention procedures; methods for protecting distribution centres and the base camp; convoy escorts; the burial of deceased refugees; crowd control; and



mine protection procedures, among other things.<sup>84</sup> Designated officers were given two days to draft the SOPs, but as Capt Koch, the officer assigned to consolidate the drafts, testified, he did not receive the drafts until late in September, and many of them were incomplete or inadequate.<sup>85</sup>

Inexplicably, the CAR had no SOPs suitable for use as a basis for the drafting process, even though it was Canada's UN standby battalion and had been so for several years. Certainly, new SOPs specific to the Somalia deployment were needed, but Capt Koch and Maj Kyle testified that they had to develop SOPs from scratch. Capt Koch said that the SOP relating to food distribution centres was one they developed on their own. They could not find any documentation on the issue anywhere in the CF. When asked specifically about the preparation of the SOPs, Capt Koch said that there was no guidance or direction from SSF HQ about what was to go into the SOPs.<sup>86</sup>

Capt Koch had hoped that there would be a data bank of SOPs for UN duty compiled by the CF, perhaps extracted from after-action reports of other UN missions, but he could find none.<sup>87</sup> With regard to setting up food distribution centres and creating refugee grave sites, Capt Koch thought the lack of information might be attributed to the fact that, to his knowledge, the CF had never participated in these types of activities before.<sup>88</sup> In the absence of useful models, then, some of the CAR's existing SOPs were used as guidance for the development of SOPs for Operation Cordon. Capt Koch requested materials from the headquarters of the Special Service Force, Land Force Central Area, and Land Force Command. However, when asked if any material was provided by these superior headquarters, Capt Koch replied, "No, not really. No."<sup>89</sup> In fact, for the most part, the base for developing the SOPs was "the Nordic SOPs", made available by the UN and brought back to the Regiment by LCol Morneau after his visit to UN headquarters.

With the deployment date drawing near, many officers, including Capt Kyle, were concerned that the SOPs for Operation Cordon had not been standardized and that the commandos did not have the information required to practise their procedures for general peacekeeping tasks.<sup>90</sup> In fact, some SOPs were ready for practice and confirmed during the training exercise, Stalwart Providence, in mid-October 1992. Although the final written SOPs were issued on November 19th, LCol Turner stated that in his view, it would have been useful to have the SOPs before Stalwart Providence, early enough so that commandos could have used the SOPs in their training, raised concerns about them where necessary, then adjusted them before confirming the SOPs during Stalwart Providence.<sup>91</sup>

It is not certain which SOPs, if any, were ready for Stalwart Providence. LCol Macdonald, exercise director, stated that he did not see any standing operating procedures for the CAR before or during Stalwart Providence, although he assumed that they might have been in draft form at this time.<sup>92</sup>

The unit SOPs for Operation Cordon, such as they were, remained in effect for Operation Deliverance. Maj Kyle testified that he thought that most of the SOPs were still applicable and that “because of the lack of clarity of the situation, the lack of clarity of our mission and operations,...these SOPs could be...adjusted according to the situation in-theatre, which they were.”<sup>93</sup> He also testified that “the SOPs...dealing with larger issues, such as the Rules of Engagement and use of force...we really had to leave those deliberately somewhat vague because we did not have the direction and we were hoping for more clarity [from superior headquarters] of those issues prior to deployment.”<sup>94</sup>

Capt Koch testified that the Operation Cordon SOPs remained in effect for Operation Deliverance partly because all their time was taken up preparing to send the troops to Somalia, but also because “we didn’t want to make a lot of changes to the SOPs in that we wouldn’t have had time to do any training with them.” That decision would have caused confusion. “We knew from the onset,” he stated, “from when we started [drafting] the SOPs that there was going to be some stuff that was obviously not going to be able to be within the SOPs because it would not...make itself clear until we actually arrived on the ground.” Capt Koch hoped and expected that once the forces arrived in theatre, there would be time to develop new SOPs and train on them.<sup>95</sup> Unfortunately, there is little evidence that unit SOPs were ever properly prepared, and certainly little if anything was done to bring the operating procedures of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG) together. Once begun on shifting ground in September 1992, planning for the Somalia deployment never found a solid base, especially as the operation evolved into an ad hoc scramble bound for Africa.

## The CF Reconnaissance to Bossasso

The only reconnaissance made in specific support of the pending CAR deployment to Somalia left Canada on October 12, 1992.<sup>96</sup> The reconnaissance party, led by Col Houghton, included J4 (Logistics), J4 (Movements), representatives from Maritime Command, Air Command, and Force Mobile Command, and the Commanding Officer of the CAR, among others. The party gathered information for the deployment of the CAR to Bossasso in north-eastern Somalia. The reconnaissance party visited various sites, concentrating its efforts on the environs of Bossasso.<sup>97</sup> This information provided the essence of the briefing given to the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) and the Deputy Minister at NDHQ on October 21, 1992 and for plans and orders prepared later at NDHQ and in the supporting headquarters.<sup>98</sup>

The composition of the reconnaissance team was important, because it was intended to include officers who would have primary responsibility for planning and conducting the operation. The reconnaissance, therefore, was

meant not only to gather information but also to make the officers familiar with the ground and facilities they would have to work with after deployment.<sup>99</sup>

Col Houghton considered the reconnaissance effective and that LCol Morneault had done “an excellent reconnaissance.”<sup>100</sup> Col Houghton maintained later that the reconnaissance was not a waste of effort, even though the units went to an entirely different part of the country. “I thought, first of all, the people that were on the reconnaissance would understand the terrain very well because that kind of terrain was literally everywhere.” He also noted that the visit introduced the officers to the type of people and conditions they would have to deal with when the operation began.<sup>101</sup>

LCol Morneault also valued the reconnaissance. In his post-reconnaissance report he stated that “all parties achieved their aims...[and] we acquired enough information to be able to complete the Operational Estimates. The formulation of detailed plans, orders and SOPs can now be completed and/or confirmed at least for the operational phase.”<sup>102</sup> LCol Morneault’s enthusiasm for the reconnaissance is reflected in the body of his report, which sets out in detail critical decisions about the location of the CAR camp, the siting of the camp’s defences, and administrative requirements, among other things.

Two important results followed from the reconnaissance. First, LCol Morneault was able to begin the important task of building relations with the UNOSOM Commander, Gen Shaheen, and with officers, elders, and officials in the Bossasso area. These contacts not only gave LCol Morneault a sense of the problems he would face, but also served as the basis for the approach he intended to convey to his subordinate commanders and troops.<sup>103</sup> It is reasonable to suggest that if LCol Morneault had led the CAR to Bossasso, he would have had some channels to the local leadership that might have facilitated the building of good relations between the Canadian Forces and the local population.

Second, the entire support plan was predicated on the use of HMCS *Preserver* as the provider of fresh water, rations, and other essential commodities. Planners in the reconnaissance party and at NDHQ were depending on HMCS *Preserver*. The concept of support for the Canadian contingent was based on the idea that HMCS *Preserver* would be “along-side in Bossasso” and therefore close to the CAR. The central role of HMCS *Preserver* was confirmed to the VCDS and the Deputy Minister at the post-reconnaissance briefing on October 21st.<sup>104</sup>

Unfortunately, the value of the reconnaissance was greatly diminished by subsequent events. Among other important changes, the deployment area in Somalia was changed, LCol Morneault was relieved of command and his replacement, LCol Mathieu, had no opportunity to conduct his own reconnaissance of the new area. Col Labbé was placed in command of Canadian Joint Force Somalia and had no time to conduct a reconnaissance, and the



composition of the field force was changed to the CARBG — and none of the new sub-unit commanders had been on the reconnaissance. This change in strategy negated the detailed plans for the base camp and especially for the concept of logistical support centred on HMCS *Preserver*. In effect, the CARBG travelled into an unknown situation under the command of leaders without local contacts, with little understanding of the local situation, and with little information on which to base operational and support decisions.

## Operation Orders — Operation Cordon

By early November 1992, the detailed framework for Canada's military commitment to UN operations in Somalia had been confirmed. As we have seen, estimates of the capability of the CF to provide a "security battalion" for the Somalia operation had been completed in late July 1992. From that point on, a type of battle procedure was set in motion based on CF and command warning orders. A reconnaissance of the Bossasso area had been completed. A Forces Mobile Command draft contingency plan, based on the assumption that the security battalion would be going to the northeastern area of Somalia, had been prepared. The results of the reconnaissance had been reported to the VCDS and the Deputy Minister. Finally, the Operation Cordon plan was approved by Gen de Chastelain on October 26, 1992.

On November 13th, Gen de Chastelain issued operation orders for Operation Cordon to the commanders of commands and to NDHQ staffs.<sup>125</sup> Force Mobile Command officially became Land Force Command on November 15, 1992. Soon afterward, November 19th, LGen Gervais issued LFC Operation Order 01, essentially repeating the CDS's orders. Operation Order 01 outlined the situation and gave the LFC mission as being "to mount a 750 man battalion group for security of humanitarian relief operations in Somalia within assigned sector." LGen Gervais' concept of operations was described as mounting "a balanced battalion group to include infantry, engineers, signals and sufficient [combat service support] to provide sustainment in a very inhospitable environment. The battalion group will operate out of the port city of Bossasso and could be involved in the following tasks: port security, airhead security, convoy escort duties, security of distribution centres/UN facilities, base camp security, and general security tasks."<sup>126</sup>

The command arrangements for the CF contingent under the Operation Cordon plan were convoluted. The CDS's orders read:

**Command and Signals:** Operational control of CCUNOSOM is exercised by the Force Commander UNOSOM. National command is exercised by Commander CCUNOSOM. Functional administrative control of CCUNOSOM is exercised by J3 [NDHQ] through chief of staff J3 on behalf of the VCDS. Disciplinary matters beyond the authority

of Commander CCUNOSOM shall be referred to the VCDS through J3. Col J. Cox is appointed Commander CCUNOSOM effective 14 October 1992. CFCC has technical/functional control of the national [communications system]. Commander Maritime Command [will] retain operational command of HMCS *Preserver*. In theatre support to the infantry battalion group to be coordinated between Commanding Officer CAR, and Commanding Officer HMCS *Preserver*. Coordination conflicts to be resolved between J3 [at NDHQ] and Commander Maritime Command [in Halifax] as necessary.<sup>107</sup>

LGen Gervais described the command arrangements differently. In his operation orders he stated that the CAR would remain under his command until it was “deployed in theatre...approximately 29 December”, that LCol Mathieu would be the “deputy Canadian contingent commander”, and that the Canadian contingent would be “under the operational command of the” Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence, Security and Operations), MGen Paul Addy and the operational control of the UN force Commander.<sup>108</sup>

Written orders for Operation Cordon were subsequently issued by MGen MacKenzie to LFCA on November 26th,<sup>109</sup> by BGen Beno to SSF on the same day,<sup>110</sup> and by LCol Morneau to the CAR immediately thereafter. Thus the penultimate step in battle procedure was completed on or about November 30, 1992. The final step, deployment, was expected to commence in early December, with the main body of the CF contingent arriving in theatre about December 30th.

What is striking about all these plans and orders is their lack of operational detail. They are, in effect, administrative orders concerned with assembling and transporting the force to Somalia and sustaining the units once there. LGen Gervais’ order, for instance, is 11 pages long and includes 23 annexes, for about 85 pages in all. In all, orders from NDHQ to the CAR through the army chain of command totalled some 147 pages of instructions. The LFC order goes into great detail on such topics as what to do with military drivers whose licences are under suspension (lift the suspension), financial functions in the field (eight pages), employment of females (“in accordance with policy”), rights of release during the operation (“no change in policy”), passports (“required for all personnel”), messes, sports equipment, and other issues, but there is no description of how the mission will be carried out and only seven words about the rules of engagement. The essence of the operation is absent from these orders.<sup>111</sup>

Certainly, the CF contingent needed administrative orders and directions. It is also obvious that many of the instructions given to the CAR would have suited a larger or a smaller force. What is puzzling, however, is that the CAR — which was Canada’s UN standby force and purportedly maintained continuously on seven days’ notice to depart Canada — needed scores of pages of new instructions to move after months of preparation.

This suggests that the unit had never been ready to deploy overseas, as declared by the CDS, or that its readiness standards were unreasonably low and seriously neglected.

Planning for Operation Cordon was hampered by inexperience at the command and staff levels, a ponderous public service and military bureaucracy, confusion in responsibilities within the chain of command, and, most seriously, by the lack of a clear operational aim. Despite these obstacles, however, planning for Operation Cordon followed battle procedure and military doctrine, which at least provided for an orderly development of information and the production of deployment orders. Although the reconnaissance was late and the mission did not become clear until after planning started, by good luck enough time became available between the reconnaissance and the anticipated deployment to adjust some aspects of contingency plans.

Perhaps more than any other factor, hard work by skilled, mostly middle-ranking and junior staff officers and soldiers at all levels of the Canadian Forces rescued the leaders' plan to the point that it just might have worked. However, inefficiencies in the military bureaucracy and the ineffectiveness of the chain of command could not be overcome, even by dedicated subordinates, when the system was placed under unreasonable time constraints. That very situation confronted the leaders of the Canadian Forces when, in early December 1992, the political underpinnings of the UN-directed mission to Somalia collapsed.

## Operation Deliverance

On December 2, 1992, Gen de Chastelain "suspended for 48 hours" all planning and activities related to Operation Cordon, pending the Government's consideration of new UN resolutions on Somalia.<sup>112</sup> On December 3, 1992, LGen Gervais issued a "contingency planning guidance warning order" to allow for further planning "for a commitment of current Operation Cordon organization with limited changes, possibly to the evolving coalition force." Planning in LFC was simply "to augment [the] Canadian contingent for participation in the unified command".<sup>113</sup> The CDS cancelled Operation Cordon "in its entirety" on December 5, 1992, thus setting in train planning for an entirely new mission, under the title Operation Deliverance.

Gen de Chastelain knew from experience and from conversations with U.S. military leaders that the new peace enforcement mission under U.S. leadership would be more difficult and dangerous for the CF than Operation Cordon would have been. He acknowledged this explicitly when he asked LGen Gervais to suggest how to increase the combat capabilities of the CAR for duties in Somalia in these changed circumstances. The combination of the different



political objective and the implicit decision to change the terms of reference and organization of the Canadian contingent bound for Somalia ought to have restarted the CF battle procedure automatically from a new point. The change from Operation Cordon to Operation Deliverance was not simply a case of sending a prepared unit from one location to another to perform the same duties. Rather, the CDS was about to decide to send a different contingent, under different command arrangements, to work with a different international command, in a different concept of operations, in a different part of Somalia. The leaders in the chain of command ought not to have trusted that plans made for one set of circumstances would suffice in another, especially in a situation so altered that the risk to the lives of CF members had increased substantially.

However, there was no insistence on a new plan. The planners were constrained even before comprehensive consideration had been given to the consequences of critical changes in the Somalia operation. It was also agreed the CF should join the evolving coalition and dispatch the Canadian contingent to Somalia very quickly. The Government was advised that it was possible for a reorganized and enlarged CF contingent to meet this new timetable. These two decisions dislocated the military planning process and imposed unrealistic demands on unit officers, who now had to assemble their troops rapidly for deployment overseas. The result was that many officers and soldiers were sent into a dangerous operation without fully understanding their mission and without time to train and prepare themselves for this new task.

Regrettably, no senior officer in the chain of command challenged these decisions. Regrettably, greater leadership was needed but was not shown.

Operation Deliverance was concocted in haste on the bones of Operation Cordon. Battle procedure and planning doctrine were cast aside. No estimate of the new situation was made by any commander. LGen Gervais did prepare recommendations on improving the combat capability of the CAR, but with only limited changes in the organization. His staff concluded that "the current organization of the Operation Cordon battalion group is an excellent basis on which to build an increased capability" for Operation Deliverance. This base would require an increase in capability to include a direct fire weapon (AVGP), additional mortars, possibly armoured engineer vehicles, and ammunition for offensive operations.<sup>114</sup>

Staff officers at Land Force Command recognized the risks in the new mission. They cautioned both LGen Gervais and MGen Reay that in a worst case scenario of 30 days of operations at minor conflict levels, 96 wounded in action and 42 killed in action could be expected in a force of 850. They also noted that the more troops and units added to the contingent, the more time would be needed to prepare and train, either in Canada or in Somalia, before they were committed to action. For example, if the CF committed with

significant change (a battle group capable of full-scale operations that would include a squadron of Cougars), the elements of the contingent would need up to 40 days to prepare and train in Canada or, if existing elements were deployed immediately, and follow-on elements after 30 days, they would need at least 14 days of concentrated training in theatre before they could be employed safely. If the CF committed with limited change (a battalion group capable of limited self-sustainment in mobile operations, including a squadron minus nine Cougars), deployment could begin on schedule.<sup>115</sup>

LFC staff concluded, "after discussion and evaluation by Commander LFC", that his

preferred option for force composition and employment would be to commit with limited change to a direct role in the U.S. [Area of Operations]. This would provide a significant role in the main effort for the CAR, even if this role was necessarily part of the U.S. Phase 2 or 3. The CAR is not dissimilar in structure and composition to possible elements of the U.S. components of the coalition and interoperability should not be a problem. Commitment to a supporting role is possible but not at all preferred. Command and control will have to be addressed in detail.<sup>116</sup>

There is no evidence that any consideration was given at any level of command to changing the CAR as the basic unit of the CF contingent. LGen Gervais testified that "the staff [had] made the analysis for me, [and] we had a trained and ready battalion group, at that time of 750. The staff...said: 'Sir, why should we look at other units.' Based on the threat assessment we knew...but it didn't make sense in terms of the readiness requirements [to find another unit]...we had a bird in the hand, we had to add something to it. That's the way we were looking at that particular situation at the time."<sup>117</sup>

Gen de Chastelain could not recall any reassessment of the fitness of the CAR for the new mission. He stated before us that if the matter was discussed at all, "it was considered *en passant* because it seemed to make a great deal of sense to go with the unit that one already had that was declared operationally ready and that, indeed, had a lot of equipment being loaded or about to be loaded.... I think it would be extraordinary to change the unit at such a late date for an operation that was going to have a fairly short fuse."<sup>118</sup>

Thus the essential elements of the plan were determined early and, as with Operation Cordon, before the objective of the mission and the circumstances in which it would be conducted were known. In effect, staff officers at NDHQ and elsewhere along the chain of command became so hurried and harried that they abandoned common practice. Capt (N) McMillan, J3 Plans at NDHQ, agreed in testimony that there was insufficient time to do the appropriate estimates, planning and reconnaissance for Operation Deliverance, because "in the time period that was unfolding, the regular process would not have unfolded in exactly the same manner if you had the time."<sup>119</sup> He noted also that NDHQ was building a new operational planning staff at the time

and that documents needed for planning did not exist to give planning staff the necessary guidance through this operation. "So basically we were starting this operation without any direction, without any guidance with respect to drafting the [rules of engagement] or, indeed, the planning process."<sup>120</sup>

Cmdre Cogdon, chief of staff, J3, at NDHQ, testified at the de Faye board of inquiry that the change from Operation Cordon to Operation Deliverance occurred

so quickly that...we in the CF, were not given the appropriate time to do the appropriate estimate, [reconnaissance], really look at the force required, the levels that were there. *We were reacting to a political imperative to make this happen as quickly as we can, to jump on the band wagon and to get in there.* And by the way, I think part of it might have been to get in there almost at the same time as the Americans could.... I think in future, clearly, we have to allow the organization, if we're going to change the mission or the mandate, to go back, do a new estimate, look at what it means, what is it going to cost and all the other issues, like, can we sustain it.... That clearly has to be done.<sup>121</sup>

In his testimony before us, Cmdre Cogdon confirmed that "the shift from Chapter VI from Cordon to Deliverance was done in a very compressed time period. There is no question about that." As a result, "we did not have the time to do the types of things that we would do under normal circumstances, such as an actual reconnaissance on the ground of the area in which we anticipated our troops to go because the area had actually changed." Cmdre Cogdon explained that no estimates were done by the CDS or any other commander to consider other possible options, because "we saw it as a continuation in essence of the activity for the Airborne Regiment, recognizing that the mission had changed."<sup>122</sup>

In Cmdre Cogdon's view, because the United States would lead the peace enforcement operation, NDHQ planners were left with "some unanswered questions in terms of the exact final location, should we get into this operation and things like that, that sort of activity."<sup>123</sup> He added:

if we were going to get into the enforcement operation, we were in the situation of dealing with the Americans as they were developing their plans to ensure that we got, first of all, into the types of areas and operations that we specifically wanted to get involved in, which would require us to get involved early on...[T]hat made a lot of sense to all of us in the sense that the Airborne Regiment was already operationally ready and that all of the movement and training aspects had been in play and working through up to this time. So we were ready to move quickly should the government decide to go that way.... So in a sense there was not the requirement...we did not go through the process...[of]doing a full estimate, [because] looking at all brand new factors and options to deal with it...would prevent us from getting involved in at the front end of the enforcement operation.<sup>124</sup>



Col O'Brien, J3 Operations at NDHQ, confirmed that CF planning was being led in most respects by U.S. operational planners. He testified, "we weren't clear exactly what the tasks were and, therefore, the organization that was built was built on a general capability."<sup>125</sup> In his view, "[Operation] Deliverance happened very quickly and it was being led not by the UN but essentially by the U.S. coalition commander and he had done his staff contingency planning in the U.S. and as he got to Somalia and found out what other nations were going to participate...he adjusted his operational plan. And as that plan changed, so did the task for the Canadian battalion group." Col O'Brien said that this was not unusual in this situation; the U.S. military "started their contingency planning ahead of us for this operation because they obviously thought of it, so we were catching up, we were catching up to their time lines."<sup>126</sup>

On December 5, 1992 a group of senior officers went to the United States as part of the CDS's effort to 'catch up' with the U.S. time lines. Gen de Chastelain sent RAdm Murray, Associate ADM (Policy and Communications), as his personal representative to lead a high-level team to the U.S. Central Command, where he was to make Canada's troop availability, capabilities, and wishes known to U.S. planners. RAdm Murray arranged for a Canadian mission to guard the airport at Baledogle, just north of Mogadishu, after it was secured by the U.S. Marines. The CAR would initially be under the operational control of the U.S. 10th Mountain Division and subsequently a brigade of that division.<sup>127</sup> Thus, by December 7th, Canada had successfully plugged into the U.S. plans and had been assigned a tentative mission at Baledogle, but it was not the type of mission the CAR had planned for under Operation Cordon.

NDHQ and command staffs wrestled with the uncertainty of just where, when, and for what purpose the Canadian contingent would go to Somalia, in the midst of a confusion of orders and counter-orders for Operation Deliverance. As a result, they were forced by Gen de Chastelain's timetable and the U.S. plan to issue orders for Operation Deliverance before they had answers to many basic questions. The CDS's warning order was issued on December 5th. The mission was somewhat imprecise, stating that the CF would "provide a Canadian joint force consisting of HQ battalion group based on the Canadian Airborne Regiment and HMCS *Preserver* to participate in enforcement operations in Somalia under Auspices of UNSCR 794." The order increased the size of the contingent to about 900 persons and created a joint force headquarters under the command of Col Labbé. NDHQ assumed even greater control of the operation, conducting or controlling all contacts with U.S. commanders and through the new, yet to be formed, force headquarters.<sup>128</sup>

The subsequent warning order issued by LGen Gervais from LFC created a battle group made up of the CAR and the other units now attached to it

to bolster its combat capability. This organizational change introduced a significant new planning factor and further dislocated the existing plans based on Operation Cordon. In other words, the CARBG was bigger and included more vehicles, some of different capabilities; it joined units that had never trained together, under a headquarters and a commander that had no earlier relationship to the force; and its organization suggested that the tactics to be used in theatre were not those especially suited to an airborne battalion. Nevertheless, officers and soldiers tried valiantly to respond to the burden their Commander and senior staffs had placed on them. Few officers in the chain of command paid much attention to the operational implications of the change in mission; they were simply too busy trying to get the force overseas.

The CDS issued one operational mission to the force on December 9th and a second on December 11th. The first mission was “to provide a Canadian joint force consisting of a HQ, an infantry battle group based on the CAR and HMCS *Preserver* to participate in enforcement operations in Somalia under the auspices of that UN security [council] resolution” in the area of Baledogle, approximately 80 kilometres north of Mogadishu.<sup>129</sup> The second mission was “to assist in establishing, as soon as possible, a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia under the auspices of UNSCR 794.”<sup>130</sup> These orders provided the substance of the direction to the Canadian Forces and Col Labbé on the eve of the deployment to Somalia.

## Operational Planning by CJFS During Pre-Deployment

Col Labbé, who was in the United Kingdom at the time, was told by telephone late on the evening of December 4th, that he was to be the Commander of Canadian Joint Force Somalia. He was also instructed to return to Canada immediately to begin preparations and to join the planning process from the headquarters of 1st Canadian Division at CFB Kingston.<sup>131</sup> The selection of Col Labbé to command CJFS and to build a headquarters around segments of the divisional headquarters seems odd in the circumstances. Neither the Commander, 1st Canadian Division, nor his staff were usually responsible directly for troops; they merely provided training assistance to brigades and developed exercises and tests for officers and staffs.<sup>132</sup> No one in any estimate or staff paper recommended Col Labbé or an ad hoc headquarters for the mission.

There were many questions about Col Labbé’s qualifications to command this force in this situation. Col Labbé had previously commanded only at the battalion level and had no experience with command of a joint force.<sup>133</sup> He had no hands-on experience in command of a UN peacekeeping force and, in fact, no experience on such missions more recent than his tour in

Cyprus as a junior officer in the 1970s.<sup>134</sup> However, Col Labbé believed that he was well qualified as a result of staff training and seminars he had attended on peacekeeping and peace support operations. He was confident also because, in his view, general purpose combat training and general purpose leadership training at the individual level are appropriate and adequate training for commanding large peacekeeping or UN missions at the unit and larger level.<sup>135</sup>

Neither Col Labbé nor members of his staff at 1st Canadian Division Headquarters had any involvement in the planning or preparations for Operation Cordon or any other UN mission before December 1992. In the autumn of 1992, 1st Canadian Division Headquarters was, according to Col Labbé, very much Yugoslavia-oriented, and Somalia "rarely figured into our thoughts, if at all".<sup>136</sup> He believed, however, that the divisional headquarters was chosen to lead Operation Deliverance because it was the most appropriate headquarters to choose. Furthermore, it made sense to Col Labbé that he was chosen to command the CJFS, as he was the chief of staff of the headquarters and he knew the staff and how they worked.<sup>137</sup>

Like Col Labbé, the headquarters staff were surprised to be placed on standby on December 3rd. When warned for the mission, the staff did not even have a map of Somalia, and they received a contingency planning document (late) that gave them just enough information to do minimal preparations.<sup>138</sup> Col Labbé concluded from the CDS's Operation Deliverance warning order of December 5th that everything was being arranged in a great deal of haste and under pressure to be ready to deploy by December 10th. He speculated that the reason for the haste was that the United States wanted to get as many flags on the ground as quickly as possible and that the CDS wanted to be there with Canada's flag up.<sup>139</sup>

Upon returning to Canada on the evening of December 5th, Col Labbé was led to believe that deployment would be in early January and that the pressure was off to deploy quickly. However, following meetings between RAdm Murray and his counterparts at U.S. Central Command, the timetable changed dramatically.<sup>140</sup> On the morning of December 6th RAdm Murray told Col Labbé that he had from December 6th to December 10th to determine the mission, make a plan, and constitute a force headquarters. RAdm Murray instructed Col Labbé to get to Camp Pendleton as quickly as possible to meet his new boss.<sup>141</sup>

Between December 5th and 7th, Col Labbé travelled to Camp Pendleton, California and received his operational guidelines from the U.S. Commander, LGen Johnston.<sup>142</sup> The mission was still uncertain, and LGen Johnston did not have a location for the Canadian contingent when it reached Somalia. Furthermore, neither Col Labbé, nor LCol Mathieu, also at Camp Pendleton, had any confirmed information about the aim of the Canadian mission or the state of planning at NDHQ.<sup>143</sup>



Col Labbé and LCol Mathieu left Camp Pendleton on the evening of December 8th to continue gathering information and to try to put together a coherent plan. Still, the only mission statement they had was the one in the December 5th warning order from Land Force Command Headquarters.<sup>144</sup> From instructions given to him by RAdm Murray and in NDHQ warning orders, Col Labbé understood that the mission involved the deployment of an infantry battle group of 845 persons, based on the CAR, and a Canadian Joint Force Headquarters of 55 persons. Col Labbé knew for sure only that he and the CF contingent were going to Mogadishu and that they might have to work 200 kilometres from that base.<sup>145</sup> Yet Col Labbé agreed in testimony “that only with a good understanding of the situation that you are going in to deal with can one craft a useful helpful mission statement”.<sup>146</sup>

Operation Deliverance began, in effect, on December 9th when U.S. Marines went ashore in Somalia. At the time, Col Labbé and his staff officers were busy trying to prepare plans, arrange for transportation, and complete their personal affairs.<sup>147</sup> The headquarters and the Commander were ready to go on December 10th, but their departure was delayed until December 12th. In less than two weeks, Col Labbé and his ad hoc staff, drawn from 1st Canadian Division Headquarters were on their way to Somalia. The efforts they made to meet the departure deadline set by the CDS were commendable. But what were the implications of this rush to deploy?

The fact is that Col Labbé was placed in a dangerous and vulnerable position. He was not aware of the state of training, discipline, or morale of the troops under his command. Although LCol Mathieu had told Col Labbé that the “boys are good to go”, Col Labbé ought to have been informed about the considerable problems in the unit.<sup>148</sup> Col Labbé testified that he did not hear until after the deployment that BGen Beno had recommended to LCol Mathieu that 25 CAR members’ assignments should be changed or that they should not be sent to Somalia.<sup>149</sup> There was no formal or informal briefing of Col Labbé that gave him a picture of the CAR’s recent history.<sup>150</sup> He did not know the majors commanding the commandos, except for Maj Pommet, who was from his own regiment.<sup>151</sup> Col Labbé thought it was CAR’s turn to go on a peace support operation and that, from Ottawa’s perspective, it was possibly a choice of sending the CAR or not participating at all.<sup>152</sup>

Col Labbé was also confident and accepted the quick deployment timetable based on his belief that planning for Operation Cordon had been completed satisfactorily and that the CAR had been checked and declared operationally ready by officers senior to him. As he testified, “I knew the other players, General Beno, General MacKenzie and General Reay, and my confidence in them was complete as well. Therefore, any commitment to the Airborne Regiment Battle Group with their endorsement further

enhanced my confidence.”<sup>153</sup> Col Labbé was not required, nor did he ask, to make an additional formal declaration of readiness.<sup>154</sup>

Col Labbé was about to go on an unusual Chapter VII mission with a unit he did not know and without an aim for the mission having been defined. Yet no senior officer took the time to outline to Col Labbé the national and CF objectives, and restrictions or constraints on the mission, or even his terms of reference. Col Labbé had no direct discussions with Gen de Chastelain or Cmdre Cogdon, the senior J3 planner at NDHQ. Nor does Col Labbé recall any discussions with MGen Addy, LGen Gervais, LGen Reay, or BGen Beno.<sup>155</sup>

He testified before us that Operation Deliverance “was very unique” in that he did not have a national operational mission before going and had to make plans without the benefit of a useful reconnaissance. Col Labbé stated that CJFS had only “a mission statement that allowed us to be able to get to [the] theatre.”<sup>156</sup> Nevertheless he saw no doctrinal or practical fault with this situation and made no complaint or even comment about the situation to his superiors:

My point is that NDHQ issued a warning order with a mission statement...which was really a force generation...type of mission statement...to provide these forces to the combined Joint Task Force in Somalia. And that, in my estimation, although it was not a mission statement from an operational perspective telling me what I was going to do in Somalia, because clearly NDHQ had no idea what it was exactly I was going to do once I was in Somalia...the force package was developed [on the basis of certain] tasks that we anticipated possibly doing.... The mission statement which guided our operations in Somalia overall from the start was the UNITAF mission statement that General Johnston had and that translated down to the various levels of command in Somalia.<sup>157</sup>

In fact, neither Col Labbé nor his staff contributed directly to the operational planning process before they arrived in Somalia. They simply gathered information, made contacts with commanders, and put liaison officers in place. In Canada, Col Labbé had little discretion or influence on the mission, training, force composition, logistical support, equipment selection, or deployment timings. The CDS was the principal commander who took every critical decision concerning the mission, and his staff at NDHQ acted on his behalf to implement those directions as best they could.

When Col Labbé arrived in Mogadishu with an advance party of 12 Canadians on December 14th, he had no idea where his troops would go or what they were expected to do. Canada had simply lent CF troops to the U.S. force Commander to do with as he liked. The CDS expected Col Labbé to make up a plan on the ground in Somalia to facilitate Gen Johnston's plan. As far as the commanders and principal staff officers were concerned, getting to Somalia was the plan.

## CF Criticisms of Planning for Operation Deliverance

Not surprisingly, CF officers were not entirely satisfied with the planning for Operation Deliverance and noted their criticisms freely in staff reports and after-action reports. For example, in his report following a staff visit to Somalia in March 1993, Col O'Brien, J3 (Operations) at NDHQ, noted that the manning ceiling

became immutable and the force had to be constructed within [it]. This is seen as a major error in operational planning. This decision resulted in inadequate capability within the HQ CJFS, no security force for HQ CJFS, no national support element to support a force at the end of an 8000 mile line of communications with combat personnel deployed 360 km away at the end of a narrow difficult main supply route; and inadequate [numbers of] second line and administrative and logistics personnel to support mobile operations.

...the end of UNOSOM 1 [Operation Cordon] and beginning of Operation Deliverance precluded a reconnaissance in-theatre, [so there was] uncertainty regarding operational and logistical equipments needed.

Although Operation CORDON was planned originally as an administrative move, Operation Deliverance demanded a tactical deployment. This error resulted in some troops arriving without weapons, vehicles were not combat-loaded, and combat supplies were not available. In future operations the operational concept must be clearly defined before deployment begins.

Some shipments of essential supplies arrived in-theatre by commercial air and sea in a haphazard fashion, often without shipping advice. In some cases long delays were encountered without clear knowledge as to where a given shipment was at any given time.<sup>158</sup>

Many criticisms of the planning process for Operation Deliverance were recorded in the document "Operation Deliverance: Final Report of Lessons Learned". The following small sample of criticisms illustrates the types of problems officers identified in hindsight that should have been addressed properly with foresight.

...there was insufficient time to thoroughly revisit and make all the necessary adjustments to the plan prior to deployment.... An administrative move had already been planned for Operation Cordon, but Operation Deliverance required a tactical move, [and] it was too late to pre-position all the required stores and equipment at a staging area to allow for a full tactical move.

The hasty preparation for Operation Deliverance resulted in inadequate reconnaissance and advance party representation. This aspect of the mission was even more important in the case of Somalia as the country was devoid of infrastructure and very little was known about the area of operations.



...the artificially imposed manpower ceiling...created difficulties from the outset. Attempts to stay within this limit resulted in reduced personnel and logistic support, which consequently hampered operations.

...the number of headquarters involved was excessive. The plethora of concerned parties, 'helpful' suggestions, confusing and conflicting direction from various sources and demands for information from all quarters artificially increased the difficulty of the mounting and deployment process.

...the entire process of mounting the operation was rushed. Chains of command, lines of communication, delineation of responsibilities, and most standard means established for doing business were perverted to get the mission accomplished in the limited time available. This was particularly unfortunate in light of the dangerous nature of the mission being undertaken. ...it is not proper to dispense with tried and true procedures in the interests of meeting politically expedient goals.<sup>159</sup>

Some senior staff officers at NDHQ were candid in their criticism of planning for Operation Deliverance after it was completed. In after-action reports they cited several critical shortcomings, including the following:

- the failure by senior management to provide planners and commanders with an agreed mission statement;
- the tendency for staff officers to develop plans, rather than the commander who was going to execute the plan or order (the staff officers saw the CDS as responsible to develop the strategic level plan and provide strategic level guidance and direction);
- the failure of leaders to make the political aim clear to working-level planners;
- the overall failure of the planning process attributed in part to confusion in documents and instructions at NDHQ;
- the overlapping and confused relationship between J3 Operations, J3 Peacekeeping, and J3 Plans, which led to delays or duplicated responses;
- the uncritical acceptance by Canadian officers of foreign military opinions; and in future,
- insufficient examination of the consequences of changing the mission, resulting in inadequate attention to logistics and incurred risks without a full assessment of the long-term impact.<sup>160</sup>

Officers from the field were as critical of the planning. Col Kennedy, Chief of Staff of 1st Canadian Division Headquarters stated (in relation to the ceiling on personnel) "any force should be based on an estimate of the situation, be it a tactical or strategic one. In the case of Operation Deliverance

the speed at which the overall concept of operations evolved throughout the deployment phase precluded a detailed mission analysis and estimate. This makes the imposition of a manpower ceiling prior to launching the operation even more enigmatic."<sup>161</sup>

The after-action report prepared by the Commander of Land Force Command contained several observations about the disjointedness of the planning process, the lack of adequate battle procedure, and reconnaissance. The Commander was particularly critical of the ceiling on personnel imposed by NDHQ:

The whole system is wrapped around the personnel ceiling...to the point where a Command HQ is wasting...effort over the position of one soldier.... NDHQ should be cautioned in hanging any number figure to the operation until all the staffing is complete or else we will continually see ourselves in the Operation Deliverance situation where we are constantly sending in more troops in a piecemeal fashion that clearly does not work and is much more expensive in terms of resources. The solution is for NDHQ to give the mission and task to LFC...[and then] LFCHQ will... determine the structure based on previously agreed upon building block design.... If the mission changes such as it did for Operations CORDON/DELIVERANCE then the process must be started again and time given to professionally complete the estimate.... We have learned that incrementalism is very expensive.<sup>162</sup>

The Commander of LFC and his staff were also criticized by their subordinate commanders. The Commander of Land Force Central Area commented that the detailed contingency plan issued by LFC "created no end of heartache as the organization and training changed. The contingency plan was in too much detail and [gave direction] three/four levels down from army headquarters."<sup>163</sup>

The operations order produced by the Commander of LFC for Operation Cordon "while well done and comprehensive, was of limited value/use by the time it was received as the unit had already been declared operationally ready." Planners "immediately assumed that once the US was involved they would solve all the [CF] 'engineer' problems."<sup>164</sup> This may have been an overly optimistic description. If the mission changed, as it did for Operation Deliverance, then planners should have taken the time necessary to do another estimate to determine whether the initial assumptions were still valid.

## FINDINGS

- There is no evidence that CF doctrine and procedures for planning, mounting, and deploying operational forces are invalid or weak, so long as a reasonable amount of time is available for their use. The army's staff procedures in particular seem entirely appropriate, and the technical staff training of officers appears to be adequate.
- When battle procedure — reconnaissance, estimates, plans, orders, and deployment — is followed, the evidence suggests that the right force, appropriately equipped, will be deployed in the right place with adequate support. At least, the procedure provides for an orderly method of arriving at completed staff work and recommendations for commanders.
- In this instance, however, senior commanders and senior staff officers were more concerned about the political, governmental, and departmental factors affecting the operation than about the assessment of military factors, which is their obvious responsibility.
- Senior officers of the CF tended to focus their assessment of operations on the deployment of forces, not the employment of forces. This frame of mind had (and has) several negative effects on operational planning:
  - Planning for CF operations under UN mandates relies too heavily on UN and other nations' assumptions, estimates, reconnaissance, and criteria, even though in many instances these factors were in contradiction of CF doctrine, policy and plans.
  - Commanders and staff officers at all levels confused the idea of "ready to go" with the more complex question of whether a unit was ready for employment on the intended operation.
  - Senior commanders were content to pass to allied or foreign commanders responsibility for critical national command decisions affecting the CF in such matters as the aim of the operation, rules of engagement, and the conduct of CF operations. It is clear from the orders issued that, in effect, senior CF officers accepted the idea that Canada could lend troops to other nations and organizations with little regard for how those troops would be employed. This was a regrettable abdication of national command.
- The plans for Operation Cordon and Operation Deliverance, which emphasized their administrative, transportation, and deployment aspects but neglected the operational aspects, reflected an obvious confusion about national command responsibilities.



- Senior commanders did not adequately address fundamental military factors requiring their personal attention. They did not provide a clear statement of the operational mission; analyze the steps necessary to accomplish that mission; complete an adequate estimate of the situation and an assessment of tasks to determine systematically the force size, composition, and organization needed; assess the rules of engagement from a Canadian perspective; or properly estimate the time the CF and, especially, unit commanders, needed to respond to their orders. Nor did they allow sufficient time for thorough assessments of the readiness of units and to correct deficiencies discovered in assessments. These failings were particularly evident in the period between the cancellation of Operation Cordon and the deployment of the CJFS on Operation Deliverance.
- The rush at the higher level of command to deploy the CJFS obliterated battle procedure and planning at the lower levels of command, forcing commanding officers to take unnecessary and potentially dangerous risks.
- At no level in the Canadian Forces were there standing operational procedures for UN duty, or standing plans for the deployment of the CAR on UN duty, despite the fact that the CAR was the Canadian Forces standby unit for UN operations and had been such for several years.
- Some staff officers at Land Force Command Headquarters and at NDHQ warned their superiors that the mission was not well understood, that the deployment was rushed, and that the mission would stretch the resources of the CF, particularly the army. Their advice and warnings were largely ignored.
- Officers commanding Land Force Command and Land Force Central Area were particularly passive during the planning process and in framing and issuing orders to the Special Service Force and the Canadian Airborne Regiment. Although senior officers at LFC Headquarters had serious reservations about the mission, organization, and operational concept for Operation Cordon and then Operation Deliverance, their reservations were not brought to the attention of their superiors, and no serious objection was taken to these poorly conceived and prepared plans.
- Estimates of the situation prepared by commanders or prepared for them by senior staff officers were universally incomplete, overly dependent on untested assumptions, and lacking in basic information and professional rigour. They were undependable sources for senior decision makers but were accepted by these officers without comment.
- Staff officers informed the CDS that the situation in Somalia was "unknown and therefore the capabilities needed to accomplish the mission...cannot yet be determined." Yet a recommendation that the Canadian Forces could provide a unit for this unknown mission was accepted.<sup>165</sup>

- Commanders and senior staff officers settled on the CAR, early in the planning process and uncritically, as the base unit for deployment to Somalia. No reviews or inspections were conducted to confirm the suitability or readiness of the unit after July 1992 until Exercise Stalwart Providence was conducted in October 1992. By then, officers thought it too late to change the designated unit, even though BGen Beno told MGen MacKenzie in mid-October that the unit had serious problems caused by indiscipline, poor training, and weak leaders, among other things.
- The chain of command was repeatedly found wanting during planning for Operation Python, Operation Cordon, and Operation Deliverance.
- Operational planning was confused and unco-ordinated at Special Service Force Headquarters and in the CAR because they had no reliable operational information on which to base decisions.
- The reconnaissance conducted by LCol Morneau and other officers occurred too late and after the principal decisions concerning force composition, organization, equipment, support, deployment area, and command and control had already been made at NDHQ.
- Planning doctrine and norms were corrupted entirely in the rush to implement Operation Deliverance. The mission was not well understood or analyzed by commanders. No reconnaissance was conducted nor was this failure redressed by the early dispatch of an advance party to collect information with which to adjust the plan or force organization.
- No estimates of the situation were prepared for Operation Deliverance. The military planning process was unreasonably and dangerously compromised by 'political' considerations when there was no good reason for this to occur. There was no national operational plan for Operation Deliverance, although NDHQ did prepare deployment and administrative plans.
- No commander or staff conducted a pre-deployment review or rehearsal of the plans for the CF contingent before it deployed to Somalia. Even a modest staff exercise on the basic elements of the plan might have alerted senior officers to its fundamental flaws.
- National command and control arrangements for Operation Deliverance between the CJFS and NDHQ were confused and ad hoc. The CF did not have standing orders or arrangements for the national command of Canadian Forces on active service on international operations, despite many years of experience with peace operations.

- The Commander, Col Labbé, had no knowledge of the pre-deployment planning, problems, or training of the Canadian contingent. He had no national orders beyond those to deploy to Somalia. His staff, drawn from the 1st Canadian Division Headquarters, were untrained for peace operations and had never worked together with the troops that would be under command. Moreover, CJFS Headquarters was not trained as a unit and had never exercised as a headquarters unit in the configuration used in Somalia.
- At this point there was no reasonable chance to assess the situation and mission or to influence the operational plan for Operation Deliverance before they went to Somalia. Even after the situation became known, no objections were raised to these conditions, nor were requests made to adjust the plans.
- The CARBG was formed for Operation Deliverance in December 1992, and commanders did not allow time for battle group training or readiness evaluations in Canada or in Somalia. Indeed, officers commanding units and their subordinates in the newly formed CARBG were not given a reasonable amount of time to plan and prepare for Operation Deliverance. This was especially the case for units such as A Squadron, Royal Canadian Dragoons, which was warned for the deployment and given only days to prepare to go to Somalia. In that brief period, officers were required to change units' organizations, load and prepare equipment, and ensure their soldiers were personally prepared for deployment. They conducted no battle group training whatsoever before they left Canada.
- Poor operational planning caused significant dislocations during the deployment. Wrong equipment was sent to the theatre of operations. Much of the equipment that did arrive came in the wrong order and was unfit for use. Units were ordered into operations in Somalia with insufficient ammunition, defence stores, weapons, and supplies. Much of the communications equipment issued to components of the CJFS, intended to allow commanders to control operations, was incompatible.
- The CJFS arrived in Somalia to conduct operations in a dangerous theatre in a low state of readiness, without proper orders, training, and logistical support, and with ad hoc command arrangements and under the command of an inexperienced officer.



## FORCE STRUCTURE

The force structure for a military operation flows from the mission assigned and the estimate prepared to assess what is needed to complete the mission. A comprehensive and complete estimate allows the commander not only to develop a plan, but to verify that the mission can be accomplished with the resources assigned.

For Operation Deliverance this pattern was not followed. No military estimate was completed, and no specific mission and tasks were assigned. Instead, a general task was assigned and a limit was placed on the number of personnel (referred to as the 'manning ceiling') before any significant planning was completed. Developing the force structure became a guessing game, since it was impossible to determine exactly what combination or mix of combat and logistics resources would be required. In this section we examine two major issues related to mission planning: the circumstances that led to imposition of the manning ceiling, and the impact of the manning ceiling on the composition of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group.

### Manning Ceiling

Many of the difficulties encountered in Somalia were attributable to the imposition of an arbitrary 'manning ceiling' before the needs of the contingent had been properly assessed. CF operational planning doctrine contains no such concept. First, the process of determining what is required to complete a mission is not normally limited at the outset by preconditions or restrictions on resources. Second, conclusions concerning force levels and organization are usually stated in terms of unit types, not numbers of personnel. For example, after an estimate is completed a commander might conclude that one infantry battalion is needed for the mission; a commander would rarely state that 831 people are needed for a mission.

The introduction of an arbitrary limit on personnel before completion of an estimate by the commander responsible for the mission distorts doctrine, planning, tactical concepts, standing operating procedures, and, most important, unit cohesion and organization. These effects are exaggerated when they cause reorganization and retraining under stress.

We are convinced from the evidence that the establishment and enforcement of a 900-person manning ceiling was unrealistic and unfortunate, and resulted in a chain reaction of negative consequences. Unfortunately, the evidence does not show how the restriction was arrived at and by whom. In testimony, however, Gen de Chastelain and Mr. Fowler suggested that they took the decision together to impose a ceiling on planners and commanders.

We believe that the decision was influenced by a combination of factors, including poor judgement, hasty and erroneously calculated estimates, poor communications between senior ranks at NDHQ and mission planners at Land Force Command and Land Force Central Area, concern about costs, and political expedience. The evidence also shows that the Deputy Minister was particularly influential in setting the ceiling<sup>166</sup> and that the Chief of the Defence Staff made the decision with the Deputy Minister.<sup>167</sup> There was a reluctance to change the restriction as conditions changed.

Although both the CDS and the Deputy Minister testified that the ceiling was intended only as a “guideline”, it came to be seen as a planning limit, and as such it was conveyed to the senior planning ranks and the chain of command and affected many critical decisions during the pre-deployment period.

Indeed the most troubling aspect of the manning ceiling was that financial considerations in general, and personnel numbers in particular, seem to have been pre-eminent factors in mission planning. It appears that the practice of setting such limits even before a mission is known and tasks are assessed had become standard well before any prospect of a mission to Somalia. This approach may have been in response to UN attempts to balance national peacekeeping commitments. We certainly recognize that resources, including people, will always be scarce, and that using them carefully is routinely required. Nonetheless, planning for military operations cannot be expected to succeed if the size of the force is decided upon before the task is assessed. It is the extent to which departmental or bureaucratic factors outweighed the assessment of military factors that is at the centre of our concern about imposing a manning ceiling on the planning process and ultimately on the Canadian Forces contingent that went to Somalia.

## The Ceiling for Operation Cordon

For Operation Cordon, the United Nations sought a battalion of up to 750 personnel.<sup>168</sup> In early August 1992, Canadian officials were looking closely at events in Somalia and the need for forces in support of an operation there. However, they were concerned — predictably enough, at a time of budgetary restraint — about the costs of the operation.<sup>169</sup> Nevertheless, in a letter to the Minister of National Defence on August 28, 1992, the CDS and the DM sought approval for a 750-member battalion. They recommended that the Minister also approve the assignment of not more than 15 headquarters personnel to UNOSOM and an air traffic control/airlift control element of not more than 60 personnel. Their recommendation was subject to two conditions: the UN must submit a formal request, and acceptable security arrangements were to be in force. Neither the letter nor any other known correspondence of August or September 1992 makes clear the basis for authorizing a battalion of precisely 750 personnel.

Before Operation Cordon evolved into Operation Deliverance, the personnel ceiling had already affected adversely the prospects for Canadian success. In general, Operation Cordon was a peacekeeping mission under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, but it included something more, as its goal was to establish a secure environment for the provision of humanitarian aid.<sup>170</sup> The tasks of the CF were threefold: to provide security at the port of Bossasso as supplies were unloaded and at the base camp; to deliver supplies to the surrounding villages; and to furnish support to the deliveries, especially through reconnaissance and convoy escorts.<sup>171</sup> If Operation Cordon had taken place, several factors might have helped the CARBG in discharging its tasks. A Canadian base camp would have been easier to establish at Bossasso than in the interior of Somalia: at Bossasso, there would have been no need for personnel to transport Canadian vehicles and materiel far inland. Furthermore, a reconnaissance team had visited the Bossasso vicinity, so the projected area of operation would have been somewhat familiar. That reconnaissance had determined that motorized forces, trained to work in small groups, could best discharge the tasks outside Bossasso.<sup>172</sup>

Operation Cordon did not have, but probably required, a mortar platoon. Similarly, armoured vehicles for infantry were desirable for forces operating outside Bossasso, but they were not added. The Signals Platoon was another element that received insufficient attention in the preparations for Operation Cordon. The manning ceiling forced the CO to choose between the need for signals personnel and the need for other headquarters personnel.

## Operation Deliverance

### *Implications of the Change in Mission*

A type of ad hoc and abbreviated planning for Operation Deliverance began in early December 1992. At a meeting at Camp Pendleton Col Labbé obtained a verbal commitment from LGen Johnston, the Commanding General of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), that the Canadians' resources would be complemented by U.S. Marine support in various areas, notably related to military police and logistics.<sup>173</sup> Although LGen Johnston's commitment seemed to compensate for Canadian parsimony, the offer became much more difficult to implement once the CARBG became responsible for the Belet Huen humanitarian relief sector.

The only support route connecting Belet Huen with Mogadishu was an insecure road extending hundreds of kilometres. This area of operation was less familiar than Bossasso, especially as no reconnaissance had taken place. The shift in area of operations exacerbated the consequences of the manning ceiling. Almost immediately, the lack of logistics personnel and resources



became apparent as the CARBG attempted to transport materiel and vehicles into the interior and to establish Canadian facilities at Belet Huen. Since the new area of operations was significantly larger than the old, air transport became a more important means of moving supplies and personnel.<sup>174</sup>

Operation Deliverance, as part of a UN Chapter VII mission, raised the spectre of armed conflict,<sup>175</sup> thus increasing the requirement for the CARBG to be prepared to disarm belligerent factions as necessary.<sup>176</sup> The CARBG's fighting function therefore came to the foreground, and combat support to the rifle commandos grew vitally important. Nevertheless, the rifle commandos were reduced from 120 to 110 members each to meet the ceiling.

Several problems evident during the planning period set the stage for difficulties in calculating the size of the commitment. NDHQ was uncertain about how to prepare the contingent because its tasks and functions were vague. Canada had offered troops but did not know how they were to be used. Moreover, some officers were under the impression that this was to be a quick peace enforcement mission, requiring only a lean battalion with minimal secondary support.<sup>177</sup>

This lack of clarity in the requirement was compounded by the fact that the CDS did not discern any great differences between conducting a peace-keeping mission and conducting a peace enforcement mission.<sup>178</sup> Consequently, a major reassessment of the types of personnel and numbers required was not undertaken. Even after Canada was reassigned to the Belet Huen Sector on December 19th (only 13 days previously Canada had been designated responsibility for security at the Baledogle airport), NDHQ planners did not consider re-evaluating the estimate, despite the rushed changes and alteration in location. By accepting the ceiling of 900 on December 4th, the mission planners acted prematurely. It would have been wiser to wait until after the mission had moved to Belet Huen and a new assessment of conditions could be undertaken before setting limitations on the operation.

### *Restriction or Guideline?*

There was also confusion about whether the manning ceiling was meant to be a rigid cap or a flexible estimate. In testimony, witnesses used a variety of terms to describe the manning ceiling: cap, guideline, planning figure, estimate. No single definition of a 'manning ceiling' was ever given. Mr. Fowler described the 900 figure as a guideline, stating that every deployment has a manning figure attached to it and that it is common practice for that number to be exceeded.<sup>179</sup> According to Gen de Chastelain, the real figure lay between 875 and 900 but was not intended to be "conclusive".<sup>180</sup>

Yet from the testimony before us, officers were under the impression that the number given repeatedly in orders was a ceiling not to be exceeded without considerable effort. In fact, Mr. Fowler stated before us that he expected

planners to live within the restriction. In his view, “there’s no doubt that the force planners would have constructed a unit trying to live within [the ceiling].”<sup>181</sup> Although both the CDS and the Deputy Minister testified that they assumed difficulties caused by the manning ceiling would be brought to their attention, no officer or official at NDHQ or in the chain of command explicitly made that assumption clear to subordinate commanders and staff officers.<sup>182</sup>

### *Dividing up the 900*

Almost as soon as the NDHQ warning order was issued, criticism erupted from Land Force Command that the ceiling was unduly constraining. It was pointed out, for example, that the ceiling did not appear to include staff for a joint force headquarters (JFHQ). Indeed, it was seen as incredible that headquarters staff would consist only of 11 to 24 personnel.<sup>183</sup> However, the priority was to maximize the number of front-end soldiers, to cut “non-military-essential” positions, and to minimize support functions.<sup>184</sup>

There was a call from Special Service Force Headquarters for the figure of 870 CARBG members to be revoked and a final establishment of 921 persons to replace it.<sup>185</sup> On December 5th, Warning Order 01 declared that the split would be 870 CARBG members and 30 JFHQ personnel.<sup>186</sup> There was little monitoring by NDHQ or consultation with the operational level when this composition was conceived.<sup>187</sup> Yet four days later, the second warning order showed a significant change in the configuration, to an 845 CARBG/55 JFHQ split.<sup>188</sup>

Col Labbé gave little attention in his testimony to problems associated with the cap. In fact he believed the cap was realistic and emphasized that operations functioned well in theatre. His perception was that after arriving in Somalia, he would be able to conduct a new requirements assessment. Furthermore, any shortcomings were rectified by the ability of CARBG to borrow, exchange and share resources.<sup>189</sup> This contradicted his earlier testimony that he returned several times to Col O’Brien at J3 Operations asking for an augmentation before deployment. He was told that the ceiling was firm.<sup>190</sup>

Indeed, even before the advance party left for Somalia, Col Labbé expressed concern about staffing for his headquarters. He claimed that he could not operate both a joint force and a joint force headquarters with the allotted 30 positions. His Chief of Staff, LCol Young, stated that even the partial solution of double-hatting eight positions was insufficient.<sup>191</sup> Col Labbé’s priorities were focused squarely on his headquarters needs. Pressing concerns about shortfalls in the CARBG, particularly insufficient logistics and engineering support, were disregarded. The advance party deployed without staff in all of the key areas, so some of the more serious problems did not manifest themselves

until early January.<sup>192</sup> Nonetheless, once these problems became apparent and were noted in the January 19th augmentation request, Col Labbé still believed the most serious personnel deficiency was at JFHQ.<sup>193</sup>

## The 'Can Do' Attitude

As the evidence indicates, Col Labbé was having difficulty managing with a manning ceiling of 900. If he exceeded the cap during the planning phase, LCol Young had to justify the decision to Col O'Brien.<sup>194</sup> LCol Mathieu and his officers struggled to stay within the 845-member limit. Despite these obvious problems, at every level there appeared to be a general reluctance to notify superiors of the unrealistic ceiling. This timidity is questionable, given that it is contrary to doctrine.

A leader who believes that he has insufficient resources...should first attempt to acquire additional resources from his superior commander. Failing this he should attempt to have his task modified or a new task assigned.<sup>195</sup>

In fact, Col Labbé did request additional support on several occasions but was refused. Subsequently, he rationalized the manning cap, and the need for further resources beyond the JFHQ staff was underplayed.

What led commanders to accept without question the rigid ceiling on personnel? Was it adherence to that unwritten but ubiquitous norm — the 'can do' attitude? Whatever the reasons, neither formal nor fundamental concerns were ever expressed by the Operational Commander to the Commander of Land Force Command, LGen Gervais (later LGen Reay) or to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence, Security and Operations), MGen Addy (later RAdm Murray). These officers agreed in testimony that if anyone had presented them with a "showstopper", they would have contacted the CDS to request an increase in the ceiling.<sup>196</sup> LGen Addy did, in fact, have concerns early on about JFHQ staffing and discussed them with the CDS, who encouraged all showstoppers to be brought forward.<sup>197</sup> Mr. Fowler apparently also encouraged questioning of the ceiling if there was good reason.<sup>198</sup> The focus on "showstoppers" and "good reason" had an ominous tone.

Although the term 'showstoppers' was not defined by any of the numerous witnesses who used it, the inference is definitely one of stopping the operation. To encourage staff to bring to the attention of commanders any issue that might stop the operation is certainly not unusual. It is to be expected. What it implied, however, is that staff were cautioned to bring to the attention of the CDS only those issues considered 'showstoppers'. The Deputy Minister's "good reason" can be interpreted as having a similar meaning. Therefore no one took responsibility for bringing forward any of the many minor items — the lack of pay clerks, postal clerks, mechanics, Military Police, logistical resources — that together might have prompted leaders to reassess



the strength of the force. While individually the issues might seem insignificant, if they had been seen together in the context of a coherent plan by experienced military planners, their collective importance might have been recognized as a 'showstopper'.

Was there a mixed message here? Was the open door policy on questioning the cap genuine? In his testimony, Mr. Fowler cited Col Labbé's initiative of January 19th as evidence that requests for additional personnel were filled.<sup>199</sup> On closer inspection it must be noted that the initial request was ignored. A February 10th J1 Operations message indicates that no decision on sending additional personnel had yet been made. The designated personnel arrived in Somalia only in early March. Gen de Chastelain stated that he heard no complaints about the manning cap and thought the requirement to stay within it had been deemed appropriate.<sup>200</sup> The numbers had already been costed and the decision formalized by Cabinet. It appears that planners were free to go through the motions of requesting more personnel during the mission planning phase, but the chances were slim that requests would be granted.

The perception that the policy was "come and ask for more, if you dare" is strengthened by the testimony of the Deputy Minister, who stated that among his responsibilities was the need to keep expenditures down. Clearly passing judgement on the force planning capability of the CF, he stated:

[I]f you let the force planners have everybody that they thought they might need on a deployment, there would be nobody left at home.... I have a concern that requires me to ensure that we don't spend money unnecessarily...<sup>201</sup>

No explanation was given for why military force planners were not trusted to make reasonable professional choices. Even more troubling and perplexing is the lack of a strong rebuttal from commanders and military planners.

Six weeks after the initial deployment, another 185 people were added to Canadian Joint Force Somalia. This shows clearly that the initial ceiling was a result of poor planning on the part of NDHQ and caused undue hardship for more than three months for personnel already in theatre. Mission requirements had not changed; we can only conclude that if 185 people were needed in March 1993, they were also needed in December 1992.

## Serious Consequences

The initial decision to restrict the number of personnel to 900 would have profoundly serious and far-reaching consequences in theatre. In the November 1993 after action-report, the cap was criticized as a "seemingly arbitrary figure" and the "most controversial issue of the deployment", which "caused numerous long reaching effects on the conduct of operations." The arbitrariness of the

number raises questions about whether the 900 figure was an error in judgement or was indeed intended simply as a guideline. The post-mission analysis blames the rapidity with which the mission concept evolved for the poor analysis and estimate. Whatever the cause, it is evident that the decision was ill-thought out and went largely unquestioned at the operational level. As the after-action report states: "Instead of defining which personnel were required for the mission this HQ was told what the final count would be."<sup>202</sup> The result was shortages or the absence of personnel that would be key to the mission.

### ***Lack of Military Police***

When Operation Cordon was in the planning stages, three Military Police (MPs) were to have been attached to the CAR, all at the non-commissioned officer level. This number was reduced to two MPs for Operation Deliverance.<sup>203</sup> This reduction was problematic for several reasons.

- First, MPs were not considered 'essential military personnel' so their reduction could be rationalized. Only combat personnel could be added to the 750.
- Second, the troops were being prepared for the possibility of combat and were in a state of armed readiness. Yet little forethought was given to how detainees would be held, a function normally performed by MPs. Indeed, a minute sheet attached to the December 9th amendments included a warning of the potential risks resulting from that fact that the CARBG would have virtually no capability to handle prisoners of war and detainees.<sup>204</sup>
- Third, in early December, Col Labbé received a promise from BGen Zinni, Deputy Commander of the U.S. Central Command, and LGen Johnston that any resources required could be obtained from the U.S. MP battalion.<sup>205</sup> A memorandum of understanding was to follow setting out the terms for borrowing, among other things, policing support. However, the final details were never negotiated. The change in area of operations also meant that the CARBG was now to be located more than 350 kilometres from the U.S. MP unit in Mogadishu.
- Finally, concerns were voiced about the lack of an MP at the officer level. There was no one to advise Col Labbé. On December 7th it was recommended that either a captain or a major be added to CJFS Headquarters and that a second line MP unit be added as part of the sustainment package.<sup>206</sup> The Land Force Command MP Provost Marshal sent repeated warnings about the insufficiency of the numbers.<sup>207</sup>

### ***Insufficient Engineering Personnel***

The engineering squadron, originally set at 106 soldiers, was reduced to 81 on the assumption that the force must be pared down and lean. Consequently, the CARBG arrived with “extremely limited [engineering] support beyond the provision of basic combat supplies”.<sup>208</sup> Many of the specialized equipment technicians were left in Canada.<sup>209</sup> There were also “critical shortfalls” in the number of engineers available to provide crucial systems such as power generation, water production and storage, storage of petroleum, oils, and lubricants, and refrigeration.<sup>210</sup> The desert climate caused equipment malfunctions, increasing the demands on the engineers. Engineer support from the UNITAF coalition was required to establish CJFS Headquarters and prepare the Belet Huen site.<sup>211</sup> Little time could be devoted to assisting the ‘hearts and minds’ aspect of the mission,<sup>212</sup> and there was only one J3 engineer to advise Col Labbé.<sup>213</sup> As early as January 19th, Col Labbé requested 11 more engineers.

### ***Poor Logistical Support***

A national support element (NSE) had been considered unnecessary. A makeshift NSE, in the form of the Service Commando, was included in the 845-person ceiling set for the CARBG.<sup>214</sup> This was before the change in location. Now there was no nearby harbour for the easy unloading of supplies. Transportation was slow over the only passable road between Mogadishu and Belet Huen. On January 19th, 21 NSE personnel were requested from NDHQ to help support personnel to unload the ships and to control the flow of personnel and materiel in and out of Mogadishu.<sup>215</sup>

### ***Other Personnel Shortages Affecting Operations***

Interpreters are a valuable source of information on local customs and traditions and indispensable to officers who do not know the local language.<sup>216</sup> Yet the CJFS deployed without its own interpreters. The CARBG was dependent on borrowed U.S. military interpreters from Mogadishu.<sup>217</sup> The 350-kilometre distance meant that interpreters were not available immediately on site. Consequently, if anyone was apprehended at night, the Intelligence Officer had no opportunity to question them until the next day.<sup>218</sup>

The Communications Officer required a further 14 members for the CJFS Headquarters signal troop. The radio detachment, in particular, needed more staffing and tradesmen.<sup>219</sup> According to Maj Dawson, CO of the Signals Support Squadron, coherence in the structure of the signals organization was ruined by the manning ceiling.<sup>220</sup>



Mogadishu was a more violent city than anticipated, and Col Labbé soon discovered that CJFS Headquarters needed a defence and security platoon of 44. The Mortar Platoon of the CARBG was employed in these tasks and was dividing its time between CJFS Headquarters and the airport near Mogadishu. It was quickly exhausted.<sup>221</sup> Eventually, the 44 additional security personnel were sent to Somalia.

Initially, no civil affairs (J5) officer was assigned to the mission because, strangely, civilian/military co-operation was not even a point of discussion during the planning phase. Mission planners had not foreseen the extent of daily contact with non-governmental organizations.<sup>222</sup>

Morale was affected adversely by continuing reliance on hard rations. LCol Mathieu had reduced the number of cooks deployed by 12, leaving only a few.<sup>223</sup> Poor hygiene conditions, lack of air conditioning and refrigeration, and insufficient cooks reduced the frequency of fresh meals.<sup>224</sup> LCol Mathieu also left behind one of the CARBG's two postal clerks.<sup>225</sup> CARBG members who went to Somalia in mid-December waited up to six weeks to receive mail. Obviously, the morale of soldiers who were living in a harsh environment and had missed most of the Christmas season with their families would have been bolstered by news from home during the early stages of the mission.<sup>226</sup>

## Organization and Composition of the Canadian Contingent

Canada's soldiers have long had a strong reputation for improvising and adjusting to bad circumstances. Hard work, long hours and stubborn determination have had much to do with their ability to overcome bad planning, careless preparation, and failed leadership. But this comes at a price: reduced confidence in leadership in general and officership in particular. The issue is not whether the force achieved its objective, but rather, what dangers it faced because of poor organization and incomplete composition. It is not simply a question of whether efficiency could have been increased and misery reduced by manning to mission, instead of manning to an artificial ceiling. The question that must also be asked is what hazards Canadian service men and women might have encountered unnecessarily because of inadequate planning, resulting in an imbalanced force driven by an artificial limit on personnel.

The decision to send the CARBG in support of Operation Deliverance cannot be examined in isolation from events leading up to its deployment. As discussed elsewhere in this report, the CAR was prepared, in a variety of configurations, for several operations in 1992 and 1993. As it prepared for its various contingency roles, the CAR evolved into the CARBG; in a sense it became a formation in search of a mission.

## Factors Affecting Organization

Several factors must be considered in designing a military force for use in operations. Consideration normally takes the form of an estimate of the situation, which leads in a logical fashion to deductions indicating how and in what strength the force should be composed.

### *Threat*

Information regarding all potential dangers to the force are essential, enabling the commander to determine with accuracy the threat capabilities and potential and what must be done to guard against them. The commander requires intelligence on potential enemy dispositions, strengths, tactics, habits and morale. Details on topography and weather are also required. This intelligence helps commanders determine whether they have sufficient resources to achieve the mission and take the necessary action if they do not.<sup>227</sup>

### *Mission and Tasks*

Commanders receive the mission and tasks from their immediate superior in the chain of command. These have been determined through the process of the military estimate, in which superior commanders consider their own mission and tasks and, having determined a plan, reach conclusions about what is required from each subordinate. Commanders are taught to think two levels down and issue orders one level down, so when a commander receives a mission and tasks from a superior, it is with the knowledge that, in general terms, the mission is achievable in the eyes of the superior. To assist in planning through concurrent activity, 'probable tasks' are usually mentioned in a warning order and detailed in the operations order.

The CARBG received its first warning order for Operation Deliverance on December 5, 1992. The probable tasks were vague: security of sea and air ports, protection of food convoys, security of food distribution centres, and disarming of factions interfering with humanitarian relief operations.<sup>228</sup> The CARBG received its first operations order on December 10th. It did not contain a mission for the CARBG, nor did it elaborate on the probable tasks.<sup>229</sup> There was no evidence that an estimate had been completed.

### *Grouping*

To conduct operations, forces must be blended into task-oriented, balanced teams with a range of capabilities. This temporary combining of organizations from various combat functions and capabilities is called 'grouping'. Grouping takes a fixed organization (for example, an infantry battalion) and attaches

elements of other units to flesh out the battalion with the personnel and capabilities needed to achieve its mission and tasks. Attachments are determined when orders are received. The attachments provided to the CARBG were indicated in the initial warning order from Land Force Command.

### ***Balance of Force***

Balance is the sense of proportionality in the composition of a force. A military organization designed for operations must be capable of carrying out a wide variety of tasks. The structure must provide sufficient resources to do more than one task at a time, to avoid the need to shift resources each time a new task comes up. A well-balanced force should contain ground holding troops, manoeuvre troops, fire support troops, engineers, air support, and logistics support troops. If there are insufficient troops to do all tasks simultaneously, or when the plan must be implemented in stages, tasks are assigned priorities and the operation is conducted in phases.

### ***Command and Control***

Adequate communications facilities and infrastructure enable the commander to prepare and issue orders, communicate, monitor and supervise the implementation of orders, and advise superiors and adjoining formations of progress.

### ***Self-Sufficiency***

The operations order indicated that the CARBG was to be self-contained for 60 days.<sup>230</sup> This is considerably longer than a unit would normally be required to be self-sufficient, so additional resources would have to be attached to the unit, including personnel to handle supplies, transportation, postal services, maintenance of vehicles, weapons and equipment, military policing, personnel support, pay support, chaplain support, and food support, as well as resources to operate and distribute them.

### ***Reserves***

No matter how thoroughly operations are planned, there is always the unexpected. To cope with the unexpected while completing the assigned mission and tasks, a reserve is required. The composition of the reserve is based on the general composition of the force and is often the equivalent of a sub-unit; for example, in a battle group composed of combat teams, a force the size of a combat team would be an appropriate reserve. The CARBG had no reserve.



## Organization and Composition of the CARBG

### *Operation Cordon: A Battalion Group*

The composition of the CAR battalion group as it prepared for Operation Cordon was outlined by Maj Kyle in his testimony before the de Faye board of inquiry.

Initially, the organization for Operation Cordon was a Battalion Group based on the Canadian Airborne Regiment, as the infantry battalion, as a mechanized infantry battalion...two mounted companies...one dismounted company...Headquarters/Combat Support Company which included the Regimental Headquarters for the Battalion Group Headquarters, Signals Platoon, a Mounted Reconnaissance Platoon...a Direct Fire Support Platoon...an Engineer Squadron ...our Service Commando plus additional transport, medical, maintenance and supply elements.<sup>231</sup>

In summary, the battalion group had a total of 750 military personnel, broken down in a headquarters commando of 132 persons, three infantry commandos of 110 persons each, an engineer squadron of 106 persons, and a service commando of 182 persons.<sup>232</sup>

### *Operation Deliverance: A Battle Group*

Operation Deliverance was not merely Operation Cordon under a new name, it was something significantly different. It was not a UN mission, but a U.S.-led mission. It was not a peacekeeping mission under Chapter VI of the UN Charter but a Chapter VII mission, with the use of force authorized if necessary to carry out its aims. It was not to take place in a peaceful, stable, accessible area but in a war-torn area remote from the capital and from main sources of supply.

One of the few things that remained the same was that the CAR was the unit assigned to the mission.

With the change from Operation Cordon to Operation Deliverance, several alterations and additions were made to the composition and organization of the CAR battalion group, expanding it to a battle group. The main witness called to testify about the composition and organization of the CARBG, LCol Calvin, described a battle group as follows: "a battle group differs from a normal battalion in that it has been structured for a particular operational tasking and it's taken into consideration in its structure, the mission, the threat and the probable tasks that it will be expected to perform once it gets into theatre." He added that what characterizes a battle group is that it always has a mixture of mechanized infantry and armoured troops.<sup>233</sup>

The organizational changes were described by Maj Kyle at the de Faye board of inquiry.

When our mission changed to that for OP DELIVERANCE, organization changed, stayed with basically the Battalion Group, and added on some Engineers, an Armoured Squadron, AVGP Mounted Armoured Squadron, and a Mounted Mortar Platoon from 1RCR, mounted in the Bison.<sup>234</sup>

Maj Kyle's testimony concerning the Engineers is in error. As we will see, the number of engineers in fact had to be reduced to meet the ceiling of 845 service personnel. The de Faye board of inquiry explained that the armoured squadron and the mortar platoon that were added were "required as a result of the potential dangers of the mission."<sup>235</sup>

On the evening of December 8, 1992 LCol Mathieu was forced to reorganize his unit for Operation Deliverance. He was authorized to add only 95 military personnel to his unit, augmenting the number from 750 to 845.<sup>236</sup>

In summary, the CARBG, under the command of LCol Mathieu, had a total of 845 personnel: a headquarters commando of 174, three infantry commandos of 110 each, an engineer squadron of 82, a service commando of 183, and an armoured squadron of 76.<sup>237</sup> The CARBG also included more than 40 reservists<sup>238</sup> (see Figure 25.1).

With these changes, LCol Calvin testified, the CAR "had been restructured into what is really a doctrinal battle group prior to its mission in Somalia". To our surprise, he added that the CARBG appeared to him to be a "well balanced doctrinal organization that has been tailored to the specifics of the mission in Somalia."<sup>239</sup>


### *Headquarters Commando*

Headquarters Commando was responsible for the day-to-day operations of the battle group and provided the necessary direction, communications, and intelligence to the CARBG's units.<sup>240</sup> Headquarters Commando was composed of the battle group headquarters and the combat support platoons and detachments, although this distinction was not made in testimony before us.

### *Battle Group Headquarters*

The battle group headquarters consisted of the command section, the command post, the liaison section, the Signals Platoon, the intelligence section, the personnel section, the MP detachment, and the public affairs cell (see Figure 25.2).


Figure 25.1  
Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group Organization Chart



\*Number of personnel.



**Figure 25.2**  
**Headquarters Commando Organization**



The command section included the Commanding Officer, LCol Mathieu, the Deputy CO, Maj MacKay, the Regimental Sergeant-Major, CWO Jardine, the signallers, and the drivers.<sup>241</sup> The applicable doctrinal volume describes their roles as follows:

The CO is responsible for the organization, fighting efficiency, discipline and administration of the battalion. The DCO assists the CO and commands in his absence. The DCO is usually responsible for all administration within the battalion... The RSM advises the CO on matters of discipline and administration affecting other ranks [non-commissioned members].<sup>242</sup>

The command post was the focal point for the planning, control and co-ordination of unit operations.”<sup>243</sup>

Liaison officers’ tasks included explaining concepts of particular missions up and down the chain of command, co-ordinating “portions of the battle group’s missions by conducting liaison with local authorities over such issues as humanitarian relief”, and other “civil affairs projects”.<sup>244</sup>

The responsibility of the Signals Platoon was to provide communications between the battle group headquarters and the commandos and squadrons, as well as and also between the battle group headquarters and the next higher headquarters in the chain of command.<sup>245</sup>

The Intelligence Officer, Capt Hope, described his duties as essentially assessing “enemy capabilities and intentions”:

The intelligence section basically assembles, collates, analyzes reports from the companies that are out in the field and with the aim really to determine any likely belligerent activities...and their dispositions within the battle group’s area of operation. Now, in peacekeeping we have to call them information sections normally because we’re not supposed to have enemies when we go on peacekeeping...<sup>246</sup>

The personnel section was under the command of the adjutant, “the unit staff officer responsible for personnel administration.... He also fulfils the function of personal staff officer to the CO”.<sup>247</sup>

The MP detachment was “normally responsible for the conduct of internal unit investigations and traffic accidents and things of that nature.”<sup>248</sup> There were two Military Police officers with the CARBG, a sergeant and a master corporal.<sup>249</sup> The MP section “is commanded by a senior NCO/WO and consists of two or three military policemen augmented, as directed by the CO, by infantry regimental policemen”.<sup>250</sup> No regimental police were assigned to the regular MP detachment,<sup>251</sup> a deficiency that was never clearly explained to us.

The public affairs detachment is the “point of contact for the media within the actual unit”.<sup>252</sup>

## **Combat Support Platoons**

The CARBG Headquarters also included three combat support platoons and detachments: Direct Fire Support Platoon (DFS Platoon), Reconnaissance Platoon (Recce Platoon), and Mortar Platoon. Combat support platoons receive their assignments directly from the CO. "It is largely with these platoons that the Commanding Officer is able to reassign forces to concentrate combat power at the main point where it's most needed."<sup>253</sup> Unlike infantry companies, each combat support platoon is composed of "detachments aimed at manning specialized weapons systems".<sup>254</sup>

The Direct Fire Support Platoon consisted of 30 soldiers and was equipped with nine armoured vehicles and four long-range night observation devices.<sup>255</sup> LCol Bastien told the board of inquiry that the DFS Platoon and the Reconnaissance Platoon conducted "both local security and convoy escort operations."<sup>256</sup>

LCol Calvin also noted that a defence and security platoon

...is necessary in some operations to protect the command post complex and the headquarters. You have to remember that due to the nature of the jobs, when you're in a command post you're inside a tent or inside a building. You're focussed on either writing orders or answering a radio, and you don't have fields of view to protect yourself against local incursions. And, in a traditional sort of war time scenario, the command post is a very valuable target and vulnerable target to enemy threats, so they have a defence and security element and they operate outside the building. They put up perimeter wire, they control access through the wire into the command post and they have routine patrols to make sure that people who are not supposed to wander in don't wander in.<sup>257</sup>

The Reconnaissance Platoon, made up of 32 service members, was commanded by Capt Rainville.<sup>258</sup> At Belet Huen, this platoon was located in the headquarters camp and had the following tasks:<sup>259</sup>

...conduct longer range vehicle and foot patrols, establish either overt or clandestine observation post to monitor warring faction activity and if it's necessary, establish an area surveillance plan in support of the battalion area as a whole. Normally the battalion snipers are located within the reconnaissance platoon should they [be] deployed on an operation.<sup>260</sup>

A mortar platoon provides a battalion with organic indirect fire support.<sup>261</sup> LCol Mathieu testified that when he reorganized the CAR battalion group into CARBG in December 1992, he had to reduce the Mortar Platoon from 55 — the usual number — to 44, in order to meet the manning ceiling.<sup>262</sup>



## *Infantry Commandos*

There were 110 military personnel in each of the CARBG's three infantry commandos. This number represented a reduction of nine members from the official establishment figure of 119 authorized during the summer of 1992.<sup>263</sup> All the members of each commando came from one parent regiment.<sup>264</sup> The significance of this practice was pointed out by the military board of inquiry: "The Commanding Officer of the CAR does not have the flexibility his counterparts in other battalions enjoy to move people from one sub-unit to another to obtain a balance of experience and talent".<sup>265</sup> 1 Commando and 3 Commando were mechanized (mounted in armoured vehicles), while 2 Commando was dismounted (walked or were transported in trucks) (see Figure 25.3).<sup>266</sup>

Each commando headquarters consisted of an officer commanding (OC) (a major), the second in command (a captain), the commando sergeant-major (in the rank of master warrant officer), signallers, and "a small transport element".<sup>267</sup> "The OC is responsible for everything within the actual commando, all of the planning all of the actions that happen and for telling the commanding officer what is going on within his area of operation." The second in command handles the administration of the commando and takes over as officer commanding if the OC is on leave or dies. The commando sergeant-major is responsible for several things, among them good order and discipline within the commando and "excellent advice, normally to the commando's commander on soldier affairs, and he is the company commander's link to the soldiers."<sup>268</sup>


A commando is "the first level of command that operates with a degree of autonomy on peacekeeping operations."<sup>269</sup> The roles and functions of the commando are as follows:

Normally, the commando is given an area of operations and it is responsible for the planning and execution of the daily, routine missions within that area in support of the battalion concept of operations as a whole. An example of commando operations could be routine patrol tasks to establish a presence within their area; in other words, to provide confidence to the local population, co-ordinate search operations to confiscate illegal weapons, and protective convoy escorts for humanitarian supplies.<sup>270</sup>

Each commando had three 33-member platoons. Each platoon was commanded by a platoon commander, an officer with the rank of captain or lieutenant, whose second in command was a warrant officer in a small headquarters of six personnel. In addition to their small arms, each platoon had a long range night observation device, two C6 general purpose machine guns, one 84 mm Carl Gustav anti-tank gun, and one 60 mm mortar.

Normally, all members of the platoon work and live together during operations and they share a common bond and for the most part, platoons bear the largest burden of dangerous situations within the unit...it is the quality

Figure 25.3  
Infantry Commando Organization



of performance of the platoons in sections that largely sets the image and reputation of the unit within the theatre of operation. ...Platoons must demonstrate a high level of...proficiency in weapons handling and tactics. They must have a controlled reaction to dangerous situations including live fire, and a superior standard of discipline and reaction to orders.<sup>271</sup>

Each platoon had three sections of 10 persons each, commanded by a section commander, a sergeant whose second in command was a master corporal.<sup>272</sup>

The section is really the smallest organization within a unit that can be given a task. Typical section tasks in a peacekeeping theatre would be the conduct of a dismounted or vehicle patrol, the manning of a checkpoint on a road, or the operation of an observation post on a confrontation line.

...They operate under the harshest and most severe conditions and they bear the brunt of the casualties. It is within this section that a soldier establishes either his or her closest peer bondings as the section literally eats, lives, sleeps and works together as an unit. To a large extent, the soldier feels that it is the section group that can most be relied upon in times of danger.<sup>273</sup>

### ***Service Commando***


The command group of Service Commando included the officer commanding, the second in command, and the company sergeant major.<sup>274</sup> There were 183 personnel in that commando. This represented an augmentation of 63 personnel above the official establishment figure of 120 authorized for the CAR Service Commando in the summer of 1992.<sup>275</sup> The Service Commando's responsibilities include all the specialized support and administrative services needed to maintain the battalion in the field.

Within Service Commando, the Supply Platoon provided all combat supplies, "everything from combat clothing to sandbags."<sup>276</sup> The Transport Platoon moved personnel and equipment, mainly using heavy trucks.<sup>277</sup> The ration section stocked and distributed hard rations. The Medical Platoon looked after the sick and injured. The Medical Platoon Commander was Maj Jewer, and the unit surgeon was Maj Armstrong. The organization could provide various medical and dental services, including a two-bed intensive care unit and a battlefield emergency surgery capability. The unit Vehicle and Weapons Maintenance Platoon maintained and repaired all vehicles, weapons and equipment (see Figure 25.4).

The welfare section's role was "morale building".<sup>278</sup> The welfare program offered access to television, videos, paperbacks, some sports equipment, and, later on, a limited amount of fresh rations, which usually meant weekly unit barbecues.<sup>279</sup>



**Figure 25.4**  
**Service Commando Organization**



Two padres, one Roman Catholic and one Protestant, accompanied the CARBG; they were helped in providing spiritual and moral guidance by UNITAF chaplains.<sup>280</sup> They also provided feedback to the Commanding Officer on “the status of morale within the unit and how people are feeling.”<sup>281</sup>

The pay/finance detachment was composed of one officer and two non-commissioned members.<sup>282</sup> Maj Lelièvre told the military board of inquiry that pay had been “extremely difficult to coordinate during this operation”. Before departure, the pay staff was reduced to three personnel in order to stay within the manning ceiling. Seven more personnel were added in March 1993.<sup>283</sup>

At the military board of inquiry, LCol Mathieu testified that when the CARBG deployed, it had only one postal clerk instead of two, because of the manning ceiling.<sup>284</sup> Maj Lelièvre gave the following information about this detachment:

...the only postal clerk in-theatre on arrival was in Belet Huen. Contrary to what was stated in the administration order put out by NDHQ, the postal detachment consisting of two personnel did not arrive until the 2nd week in January. As a result, very little mail arrived in the theatre until the fourth week in January. ...An additional postal clerk was added in March after the visit of the logistical support administration team.<sup>285</sup>

The mobile laundry and bath unit (MLBU) was attached to the CARBG to provide a local laundry capability for personal and military clothing. It also provided a shower facility. The MLBU was “particularly important in Somalia where there wasn’t a lot of water”. Soldiers were trucked to the MLBU weekly “to get a shower and do their laundry and get their clothes cleaned.”<sup>286</sup>

### *Royal Canadian Dragoons Armoured Squadron*

LCol Mathieu testified that when the CARBG deployed, he had to reduce the number normally found in an armoured squadron from 105 to 76 to meet the manning ceiling.<sup>287</sup> Most of the reductions in this squadron were among support personnel.

The squadron consisted of four troops.<sup>288</sup> While the basic building block in the infantry is the section, in an armoured squadron, it is a fighting vehicle. That vehicle was the Cougar (a general-purpose armoured vehicle), crewed by three persons and equipped with a 76 millimetre cannon and a 7.62 mm machine gun.<sup>289</sup> Each troop had four Cougars, for a total of 16 in the squadron.<sup>290</sup>

Once in theatre, the squadron’s organization was changed, after January 28, 1993, from a tank squadron to an armoured reconnaissance squadron, with a larger squadron headquarters to provide better command and control.<sup>291</sup>

### *Engineers Squadron*

At the military board of inquiry, LCol Mathieu testified that when he reorganized the CARBG in December 1992, he had to reduce the Engineers Squadron from 106 to 81 to meet the manning ceiling.<sup>292</sup>

The squadron's tasks included clearing minefields, approving routes for patrols, preparation of field defences and bunkers, demolition of buildings, disposal of unexploded ordinance, supply of water, maintenance of airfield and roads, and other technical, construction, and electrical tasks.<sup>293</sup>

### *U.S. Army Special Forces*

Accounts of the early phase of the relationship between the Special Forces and the CARBG are sketchy.<sup>294</sup> On January 7, 1993, however, CJFS Headquarters acknowledged that a U.S. Special Forces alpha team would be in place within five days and requested a reconfirmation of the command relationship from UNITAF. According to testimony, the Special Forces specialized in "long-range reconnaissance and...long-range information gathering",<sup>295</sup> including in border areas.<sup>296</sup> The Special Forces, whose members are mostly sergeants,<sup>297</sup> had interpreters<sup>298</sup> with them and direct communications with UNITAF in Mogadishu through satellite telephones.<sup>299</sup>

### **Discussion on Organization and Composition**

The organization and composition of the CARBG were flawed by several fundamental errors, including a poorly developed doctrinal base, an ill-defined mission, an inadequate threat assessment, and an arbitrarily imposed ceiling on the number of personnel.

The CAR might have been prepared for Operation Python, but it was not prepared for Operation Cordon. Not fully appreciated by the chain of command was the fact that a major transition was necessary to downsize the CAR from an independent airborne regiment to a regular sized infantry battalion; then a second major transition was required to change the CAR from a dismounted infantry battalion to a mechanized infantry battalion. These transitions took time.

The result was a battalion group that was untested from an organizational perspective and that failed to conform to any existing doctrine. Armoured vehicles were added to two of the three commandos and trucks were provided for the third. This meant that 1 Commando and 3 Commando were highly mobile, both on and off the roads, with a certain degree of firepower and armoured protection provided by the AVGPs. By contrast, 2 Commando required trucks to move, would be slow to respond, would be forced to stay on the roads,



and had reduced firepower and no armoured protection. This difference in the capabilities of the commandos seriously reduced the flexibility of the CARBG.

The battle group could not have been “tailored to the specifics of the mission” as suggested by one witness, since there were no specifics about the mission at the time it deployed. In fact, there is no evidence that any military estimate was completed for Operation Deliverance, potentially a far more dangerous deployment than Operation Cordon. The warning order and the operations order for Operation Deliverance were essentially deployment rather than employment orders.

At the military board of inquiry, Cmdre Cogdon stated that the change from Operation Cordon to Operation Deliverance was so rapid that

...we, in the Canadian Forces, were not given the appropriate time to do the appropriate estimate, recces, really look at the force required, the levels that were there. We were reacting to a political imperative to make this happen as quickly as we can, to jump on the band wagon and to get in there.<sup>300</sup>

At our hearings, Cmdre Cogdon restated this opinion.<sup>301</sup> Col Labbé stated that on December 10, 1992, NDHQ approved the order of battle.<sup>302</sup> This process moved so rapidly that they “had virtually no input into the overall organizational structure of the Airborne Battle Group, its deployment sequence, or its sustainment planning”.<sup>303</sup> It is also important to note that at midnight on December 15, 1992, Col Labbé placed the CARBG under the operational control of the Commander of UNITAF.<sup>304</sup> The force was being fed piecemeal into operations without any verification of its capabilities.

Creation of the CARBG from the CAR increased the unit from 750 to 845 personnel. The provision for 95 additional personnel is misleading. The two organizations that were added, (the Royal Canadian Dragoons Armoured Squadron and The Royal Canadian Regiment Mortar Platoon) totalled 160 personnel (105 and 55) and were severely cut back (to 75 and 44). To make up the balance of the cuts, the commandos and the Engineers Squadron were also reduced. These cuts were made from their peace establishments, so their fighting capabilities were now considerably less than under their war establishments. The cuts are difficult to comprehend in light of the fact that the two elements were added “as a result of potential dangers of the mission”.<sup>305</sup>

Converting the CAR, a lightly equipped force, to one with armoured vehicles, trucks and enough supplies to make it self-sufficient for 60 days would have required considerably more logistics support than was added. When the mission changed to Operation Deliverance, and the CAR became the CARBG, the organization expanded by 95 personnel and numerous vehicles and weapons, without a proportionate increase in logistics support. No

additions were made to the Service Commando to compensate for the logistics burden created by the addition of the tank squadron and the Mortar Platoon. Service Commando could not supply the CARBG without a serious degradation in the standard of support.

Each commando platoon had a strength of 33 personnel, including a platoon headquarters of at least six. This left a maximum of only nine in each infantry section, as opposed to the normal 10.<sup>306</sup> From this the section commander, the section second in command, and the section vehicle driver accounted for three persons. Duties, sickness, and the rest and relaxation program took away at least two more persons, on average, leaving the platoon to function with only half the established number of working soldiers and a maximum of only three or four riflemen. Considering the extra equipment each section carried (machine guns, anti-tank weapon and mortars), there was clearly more work than there were people to carry it out.

There was no explanation for why the Regiment chose not to designate selected soldiers as regimental police, to assist the two assigned Military Police, as intended by doctrine. It is customary in most units to assign four to eight soldiers to this task. This major oversight may have been a result of the manning ceiling or the incompatibility of the three commandos.

The need for a defence and security platoon was overlooked from the beginning. No such organization was part of either the CARBG or CJFS Headquarters. These personnel were required at both locations, and until additional resources could be obtained from Canada, The Royal Canadian Regiment Mortar Platoon was mis-employed in this role. Twenty members of the Mortar Platoon were used for defence and security work in Mogadishu at the airport and at CJFS Headquarters. At the beginning of March, a 44-person defence and security platoon, from the Royal Canadian Dragoons, arrived from Canada to take over these responsibilities.<sup>307</sup> The absence of a properly constituted defence and security platoon undoubtedly had a negative impact on the security of both CJFS Headquarters and the CARBG perimeter.

The support elements had been truncated to such a degree that the battle group had only a limited self-contained support capability and virtually no one to turn to for assistance. Maj Gillam explained in testimony that until the establishment of a National Support Element on March 19, 1993, there was no Canadian logistics support unit to assist the CARBG.<sup>308</sup> At one point, Service Commando was responsible for 384 sea containers that were kept at Mogadishu airport, 300 kilometres from Belet Huen.<sup>309</sup> As far as Maj Gillam was concerned, the "magnitude of the task was far beyond the capability of the Service Commando to do all aspects properly".<sup>310</sup>

Poor mail service was a major issue affecting morale. Maj Lelièvre testified about the many delays.

The postal when we first arrived, the first month and a half, was in my opinion, pathetic. Soldiers were in-theatre for almost five to six weeks without mail. The mail that we sent back to Canada when we first arrived took, in some cases, almost nine weeks to arrive back home.<sup>311</sup>

All these weaknesses might have not been insurmountable if a larger land formation had been deployed. Adjustments could have been made using other resources. However, since there was going to be little or no opportunity to make adjustments once the CARBG was in Somalia, getting it organized properly in Canada before departure should have been given more importance. This could not be done as long as the force was being organized to fit a numerical ceiling rather than an operational concept. The CARBG was never forced to fight, and its operational weaknesses were never exposed. What did become evident was the strain on the CARBG by the lack of a well thought out support concept. In his briefing to the Chief of the Defence Staff at the daily executive meeting of April 2, 1993, Col Labbé stated:

The 60 day stock initially planned for was deployed in a staggered fashion which proved inadequate. The reality was that we were sometimes down to two or three days of rations in Belet Huen with no guarantee that the commercial ship off shore Mogadishu would be allowed to berth on time to off-load the rations to transship to the Canadian Airborne Regiment BG. We spent the first two and a half months living on the edge and barely making ends meet. Fortunately everything worked in our favour — we were very lucky.

On December 11, 1992, in recommending to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Intelligence, Security and Operations) that a National Support Element be created Col Labbé had stated that the CARBG was “deploying with very limited logistic assets — a combat heavy force with a first line capability and small second line CSS for integral support.”<sup>312</sup> It took months to rectify problems that might have been overcome in days had a proper plan been developed.

In conclusion, the CARBG was deployed to Somalia without the opportunity to train as a battle group. Ordered to organize to a fixed manpower ceiling, it proceeded without complete infantry sections, without a defence and security platoon, without a reserve, without sufficient cooks, pay clerks, military police and postal clerks, without a complete second line logistics capability, and with a tank squadron, an engineers squadron, and a mortar platoon whose effectiveness had been reduced.



## FINDINGS

- The force manning ceiling was set at National Defence Headquarters before there was any clear appreciation of the roles and tasks to be undertaken.
- There was no formal policy analysis regarding the changes in the force estimate necessitated by the shift from Operation Cordon to Operation Deliverance. The mission concept was vague, and the conditions that would be encountered in Somalia were uncertain. This should have alerted mission planners to plan for uncertainty.
- From August through late November 1992, the purposes and objectives of UNOSOM were in constant evolution. Nonetheless, Canada's force manning ceiling was set at 750 in August even before a proper estimate had been made by commanders or a reconnaissance of the northern area of Somalia had been conducted.
- When the mandate covering the deployment changed from Chapter VI to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, commanders and staff officers should have reviewed all aspects of the CF plan for the Somalia deployment. Yet the force estimate was not reviewed for its viability; the existing force was simply added to.
- Efficient and proven military methods of calculating the strength of units needed for Operation Deliverance were sacrificed to ad hoc estimates based on non-military factors and unduly influenced by officials with no experience in military operational planning. The needs of departmental managers apparently triumphed over the needs of soldiers in the field.
- The manning ceiling for Operation Deliverance was set in less than three days.
- It was politically necessary to act quickly and to seek another role once the mission to Bossasso was deemed unnecessary. Within 11 days of the UN announcement suspending the Bossasso mission, Canadian troops were deploying to Somalia. Cabinet had approved Canada's participation regardless of the hastily assembled and erroneous force estimate.
- Decisions were made without seeing the Belet Huen location. The force was deployed with insufficient knowledge of the extent to which heat and dust would damage equipment and cause numerous other logistics problems. The force estimate calculated for Bossasso was simply superimposed on the mission concept for Belet Huen. Key personnel, such as engineers and maintenance technicians, were cut from the numbers, even though their presence would have been more important at Belet Huen than it would have been at Bossasso.

- The Canadian contingent was in Somalia less than a month before it became necessary to reassess the force estimate and request 185 additional support personnel. Some of the personnel were required urgently. Once the CARBG had finally settled in at Belet Huen, significant shortfalls in engineers, support personnel and logisticians became apparent.
- The force estimate reflected a mission requiring little infrastructure. The logistics required for Belet Huen were markedly different, and the new geographic site could not be compared to Bossasso.
- There was clearly an expectation at senior planning levels that serious gaps in personnel would be rectified in theatre. Yet no mechanism was put in place to evaluate whether the force estimate had been accurate. It fell to the initiative of senior officers in the field to analyze and then request troop augmentation.
- Most of the planning for the mission, including calculating the force estimate, occurred within a three-day period. Multiple levels and agencies were involved. Co-ordination and communication were poor. Mistaken assumptions and errors were made in information and assessments. NDHQ gave little feedback and gave the force estimate no more than cursory review.
- There was unspoken reluctance on the part of operational planners to admit the manning ceiling was not viable. The fear of appearing uncooperative or incompetent silenced many officers. Officers responsible for cutting personnel to stay under the 900 figure were hesitant to confront their superiors with the impossibility of the task. This was despite the fact that NDHQ claimed an open door policy for concerns about the manning ceiling. The 'can do' attitude prevailed.
- Land Force Command set out to prepare an estimate on the erroneous assumption that once the mission was better defined, the numbers could be adjusted. There was confusion about whether Canadian Joint Force Somalia Headquarters personnel were to be included in the 900. Only J3 Plans staff actually submitted a written estimate with their options analysis, but with little rationale for the number chosen. Senior leadership did not question the rationale for the estimate. Nor did they look actively for factors or problems that might, individually or collectively, have constituted 'showstoppers'.
- Little or no attention was paid to the level of threat being faced by the force as a factor affecting organization and composition of the force.
- There is no evidence to indicate that a military estimate was completed based on missions and tasks, as a foundation for establishing the organization and composition of the CARBG for Operation Deliverance.

- *Since each part of the organization appears to have been affected adversely by the personnel ceiling, there was a general balance in the force. However, there were several serious omissions from the CARBG: a defence and security platoon and a reserve force. In addition, no personnel were assigned as regimental police, and there were shortages of cooks, pay clerks, postal clerks, and logistics personnel.*
- *Based on the assessment of Col Labbé, self-sufficiency was limited at best. Had the CARBG been assigned a prolonged operation, its self-sufficiency would have quickly collapsed.*

The CARBG had difficulty coping with the expected, let alone the unexpected. Weaknesses in almost every area — from personnel shortages in infantry sections to shortages in regimental police, to shortages in almost every aspect of logistics support — made day-to-day operations precarious. There was no defence and security platoon and no reserve. There were insufficient cooks and pay clerks, and incomplete second line support. The effectiveness of the Tank Squadron, Engineers Squadron, and the Mortar Platoon had been reduced. The CARBG had insufficient resources to secure their unit lines adequately, and no capacity to respond to emergencies without reassigning the entire organization. The lack of a reserve was potentially the greatest failing. If an operational emergency had arisen, it could have had catastrophic consequences for the CARBG.

## MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

In this section we review intelligence planning for the Canadian Forces mission to Somalia. The function and significance of military intelligence in the decision-making process at DND was touched on in the previous chapter, in the context of Canada's decision to join UNITAF. In this section we examine intelligence planning as an essential aspect of mission planning. We summarize the concepts and terminology of military intelligence; review the role of military intelligence in peace operations; examine related military doctrine in the 1992 period; and analyze the application of that doctrine in preparation for Operation Cordon, during the pre-deployment phase for Operation Deliverance, and in theatre.

Our findings relate to deficiencies in the intelligence planning process; the lack of doctrine on intelligence for peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions; the quality of intelligence; and the lack of appropriate direction from the chain of command.



## Concepts and Terminology

**Intelligence** in the military context is the sum of knowledge and understanding of the environment in which military activities are conducted.<sup>313</sup> It is the product of processing information about foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, and areas of actual or potential operations.<sup>314</sup>

**Information** is unevaluated material of every description that could be used to produce intelligence.

**Military intelligence** comprises strategic intelligence, combat intelligence and counter-intelligence.<sup>315</sup> It is essential to the preparation and execution of military policies, plans and operations.

**Intelligence gathering** is the process for collecting intelligence as a component of the decision-making process to participate in a mission and as a key element in operational planning.

**Intelligence cycle** is the sequence of events whereby information is obtained, assembled, evaluated, converted to intelligence, and disseminated.<sup>316</sup>

**Strategic intelligence** is intelligence required to formulate policy and military plans at the national and international levels.<sup>317</sup>

**Combat intelligence** is intelligence about the enemy, terrain and weather required by a commander to plan and conduct combat operations.<sup>318</sup>

## The Role of Intelligence in Peace Support Operations<sup>319</sup>

The UN prefers the term 'information' to 'intelligence' and has refrained from activities that could be interpreted as collecting military intelligence by covert means.<sup>320</sup> The UN considers intelligence collection incompatible with its peacekeeping role, because military-style intelligence gathering can undermine two fundamental conditions for traditional peacekeeping: the impartiality of UN forces, and support to UN forces from the belligerents.<sup>321</sup> Information required by the UN for traditional peacekeeping operations is therefore gained typically through observation and conversation.<sup>322</sup>

This attitude might have been adequate for traditional peacekeeping operations, but in the post-Cold War era there is a need for intelligence capabilities more suited to new kinds of UN intervention.<sup>323</sup> UN peacekeepers can now be involved in multifaceted operations, such as those in Somalia, where the social order has broken down and force may be used against UN troops and installations.<sup>324</sup> To conduct peace operations in such circumstances, both the UN and troop-contributing states need improved intelligence to make rational decisions about all aspects of a mission.

The Somalia operation made clear the need for a full range of military intelligence, to understand the social and political situation in Somalia and, particularly, to assess the potential threats to troops in theatre. At the time, however, the UN was still reluctant to acknowledge the need for intelligence gathering and had no means of co-ordinating the receipt and dissemination of such information.<sup>325</sup> States providing troops thus had to rely heavily on their own sources for intelligence.<sup>326</sup> Although some member states have their own intelligence support (primarily traditional combat intelligence), many of the troop-contributing states' resources for maintaining accurate and current intelligence on different parts of the world are inadequate. Countries that do have their own intelligence support, typically for conventional military operations, do not have appropriate procedures for collecting, processing, and disseminating information for peace support operations.

## CF Intelligence Gathering

At the time of the Somalia mission, the CF had no doctrine for collecting information and preparing intelligence for a peacekeeping operation. Despite all the Canadian experience in peacekeeping operations since 1945, Capt Hope, Intelligence Officer for the Canadian Airborne Regiment, testified that there was no intelligence doctrine to guide him, either for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions operations such as UNOSOM<sup>327</sup> or for low-intensity operations such as UNITAF.

At the time, the absence of doctrine meant that intelligence staffs relied on intelligence doctrine for combat intelligence for conventional warfare, which was mostly unsuited to peace support operations,<sup>328</sup> because this type of intelligence is concerned primarily with operational information about a designated enemy and much less with cultural and social information.

CF doctrine describes the primary objective of combat intelligence as "to provide friendly forces with timely, accurate intelligence about hostile dispositions, capabilities and intentions, geographic conditions, targets and meteorology while also denying friendly force information to an opponent"<sup>329</sup> through tasks that include providing early indications and warnings, preparing battlefield intelligence, and situation development.<sup>330</sup>

## Role and Function of Intelligence Staffs

At each command level in the CF, personnel trained in the combat intelligence function provide information on hostile forces, weather, and terrain to their operational commanders. At Land Force Command Headquarters, the G2 staff is responsible for monitoring current operations and co-ordinating the intelligence organization for the commander and for maintaining liaison

with the intelligence staff of higher, adjacent and lower formations.<sup>331</sup> At the battle group level, intelligence officers perform similar tasks. As the commanding officer's adviser, the battle group intelligence officer is responsible primarily for the battle group combat intelligence system, including collecting and disseminating essential intelligence within the unit.<sup>332</sup>

For conventional combat operations, intelligence staff co-ordinate combat surveillance and intelligence collection, exploit captured enemy personnel and equipment, and provide imagery exploitation and counter-intelligence. In peace support operations, however, many of these tasks are inappropriate. For these operations, intelligence staff must monitor the activities of belligerent forces and other threats to assess the risks, monitor and obtain information on cease-fire and other agreements, and co-ordinate overt intelligence gathering about belligerent forces, economic conditions, history, political developments, and social conditions. This is meant to be a careful and rational system.<sup>333</sup>

## The Intelligence Cycle

The intelligence cycle is the sequence of events for obtaining, assembling, and evaluating information, converting it into intelligence and disseminating it. Intelligence staff and commanders at all levels operate in a sequence of four steps.

1. In the **direction phase**, commanders determine the priority intelligence requirements and communicate them to intelligence staff, who then use existing material or gather further information and request other sources and agencies to collect information.
2. In the **collection phase**, sources and agencies gather and deliver information from reconnaissance and surveillance.
3. In the **processing phase**, the intelligence staff collate, evaluate, analyze, integrate, and assess information gathered.<sup>334</sup>
4. In the **dissemination phase**, intelligence is conveyed in an appropriate form and by suitable means to those who need it, in accordance with the following principles: clarity, conciseness, standardization, urgency, distribution, regularity, and security.<sup>335</sup> Intelligence can be disseminated orally or in written reports, typically either intelligence reports or intelligence summaries.

## The Intelligence-Planning Process

The intelligence staff is responsible for conducting an initial intelligence assessment on the area of operations for the CDS. These assessments are typically completed at the same time as contingency planning begins in



earnest. Planning for peace support operations begins at the intelligence branch at NDHQ, J2, then shifts to either the national or the operational headquarters. Once a force is in theatre, the function shifts to the intelligence element attached to the deployed force. Throughout the process, officers at all levels must be in constant communication with one another.

During the pre-deployment period, intelligence staff assemble and prepare the intelligence organization and staff for the mission. All relevant data bases and material must be reviewed and checked for completeness and accuracy. Usually, area handbooks, describing general conditions in the theatre, are prepared.

In addition to preparing the intelligence organization, intelligence officers at the regimental level support pre-deployment training by briefing the troops and commanders on current intelligence assessments.<sup>336</sup>

### **Intelligence Planning at the Joint Force Level**

During the pre-deployment stage for Operation Deliverance, two distinct, but interrelated, planning processes were in effect. Initially for Operation Cordon, intelligence planning relied on combat intelligence doctrine and focused on northeastern Somalia. When the mission changed to Operation Deliverance and a Joint Force Command was established, the joint and combined operations doctrine was applied.<sup>337</sup> Although joint and combined doctrine now makes specific provision for peace support operations, there was no explicit doctrinal statement to that effect before the CF deployment to Somalia.

### **Intelligence Planning for Operation Cordon**

Much of the initial pre-deployment intelligence planning was for Operation Cordon, Canada's contribution to the UN-sponsored peacekeeping operation UNOSOM. Intelligence planning for Operation Deliverance, the U.S.-led peace enforcement action, took place much more quickly (days instead of months), with different participants, an uncertain mission, and new unconfirmed tasks.

### **Before the Decision to Participate**

Col Houghton, in his capacity as Chief Operations Officer of the UN technical mission to Somalia in March 1992, provided a detailed account of the situation in parts of Somalia. This report was the basis for the proposed concept of operations for the UN mission.<sup>338</sup> On the basis of this report, the Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy and Communications) at NDHQ recommended against participation in the proposed peacekeeping operation, as he believed the risk to the troops was too great.<sup>339</sup>

As the situation changed, more intelligence was requested and received by NDHQ. In July 1992, the CDS directed the joint staff at NDHQ to conduct a feasibility study to determine whether the CF could provide a battalion to the Somalia mission.<sup>340</sup> The threat assessment in this study identified mines and armed factions,<sup>341</sup> described reports of widespread indiscriminate placement of mines in northern Somalia, and concluded that mines were likely in other areas. The threat of attack was assessed as highly likely, despite the fact that factional forces were ill-disciplined and poorly armed.

In the memorandum prepared for the Government outlining options, both External Affairs and National Defence advised a cautious approach, recommending incremental responses to the UN request, because the risks (assessed as medium to high) were still too uncertain, and there was great need for further exploration and assessment. A second UN technical mission went to Somalia in mid-August.<sup>342</sup> By the end of August, NDHQ planning focused on an analysis of the north-east sector, near Bossasso, as a preliminary analysis of the overall situation in Somalia had already been completed. Much of the additional analysis considered only the viability of deploying the security battalion to the north-east sector.<sup>343</sup>

In late August, G2 staff prepared a preliminary intelligence estimate addressing factors concerning relief operations in Somalia for Air Command before it began Operation Relief, a humanitarian airlift operation.<sup>344</sup> The report noted that the threat from armed factions was sufficiently high that personnel should stay within secure zones and that sufficient Military Police would be needed to provide security for aircraft, equipment, foodstuffs, and personnel.<sup>345</sup> The estimate also contained important information about the social and political situation; the climate (e.g., recommending summer clothing); the need for medical staff and a medical evacuation plan; advice on ground, air, and water transport; and identifying the need for communications systems.

During August 1992, reports from the UN confirmed the broad scope of the proposed action in Somalia and warned of an anticipated strong reaction from parts of Somali society, given the degree of intervention recommended.<sup>346</sup> As planning was expedited for CF involvement in the mission, G2 at Land Force Command Headquarters prepared intelligence briefs for the Commander and staff, but provided only basic intelligence, without evaluating the information in detail.<sup>347</sup>

## After the Decision to Participate

Once a decision was made to participate in the mission, planning shifted to the operational staffs, although NDHQ continued to provide national intelligence support to the battalion group and to arrange the necessary linkages.<sup>348</sup> LFC was warned to begin preparing a task force for the mission, and this warning included developing the mission's intelligence support plan.

The plan for the operation's intelligence support was set out in Force Mobile Command's contingency plan.<sup>349</sup> According to the plan, FMC Headquarters would serve as the primary command point of contact with national agencies for intelligence and/or information in support of the operation. The G2 of the Special Service Force Headquarters identified intelligence production and training requirements and co-ordinated intelligence and/or information requirements.<sup>350</sup> The initial general intelligence requirements were outlined as follows:

The complete int[elligence] cycle is operative before and throughout OP CORDON and includes a COMD Int[elligence] Estimate and Collection Synchronization Plan. Basic Intelligence documents/studies have been produced in response to anticipated needs. Current int[elligence] is disseminated through LFCHQ Daily Intelligence Highlights (DIH) and Periodic Intelligence Digests (PID). Additional int[elligence] requirements are mission specific and will be coordinated through LFCHQ with the appropriate agency in response to identified in[telligence] gaps/requirements. This HQ will also coordinate mil geo sp [military geographic support].

The intelligence annex to the contingency plan included an updated threat assessment, assuming that the initial area of operations was Bossasso. It emphasized high threat of attack from rogue elements under no central control; threat of being targeted by armed insurgents in search of food; and threat of other banditry.

We reviewed documents (not filed as evidence for security reasons) indicating that intelligence and/or information was received by Force Mobile Command in the fall of 1992 pertaining to social and political developments in Somalia at the time. We also saw updated assessments of continuing threats to UN personnel throughout the country and within Canada's proposed area of operations.

Our review of the activities of these components of intelligence planning consisted of review of the documents filed at the hearings, those not filed for security reasons, and testimony from witnesses who commented on aspects or consequences of the planning process. For example, Capt Hope indicated that there had been little involvement by the chain of command in the intelligence planning process at the CAR level. We also found that despite the intelligence plan, dissemination of intelligence among the commands was clearly inadequate.<sup>351</sup>

## Intelligence Planning in the CAR

We heard testimony from the regimental Intelligence Officer, Capt Hope, who outlined his involvement in the intelligence planning process, first when the CAR was preparing for Operation Cordon, and later when they prepared



for Operation Deliverance.<sup>352</sup> He pointed out the inadequacies of intelligence planning doctrine at the time for low-intensity operations.<sup>353</sup>

Generally, Capt Hope planned without appropriate doctrinal guidance or adequate direction from the chain of command. He was left alone to develop an intelligence plan based on his own expertise in combat intelligence. Essentially, he was starting from scratch.<sup>354</sup> His plan for the mission gave his CO all the information he could assemble from very limited sources concerning the 'enemy', the weather, and the terrain as a basis for planning and conducting operations.<sup>355</sup>

During the pre-deployment period, Capt Hope's primary function was to serve his CO, but he was also responsible for disseminating information to members of the CAR through regular briefings and developing materials to support cultural training for the mission. He was also involved in producing a phrase book; a Somali/English dictionary; and a soldier's handbook, including basic information on the weather, the terrain and Somali culture. He also arranged for Mr. Hassan, a Somali national, to speak to officers of the CAR about Somali culture.

Capt Hope testified that he searched out public sources of information, including encyclopaedias, articles, books, and television news reports from sources such as the Cable News Network (CNN). He contacted staff officers in the Intelligence Directorate at NDHQ, spoke with people employed by non-governmental organizations working in the area, and talked with a Somali national living in Canada who later came to brief the officers. Finally, he relied on information he obtained while on reconnaissance in Somalia in mid-October 1992.<sup>356</sup> During the reconnaissance, Capt Hope recorded an hour-long video and completed a comprehensive intelligence report, which he later used to brief soldiers preparing for Operation Cordon.<sup>357</sup> In short, this junior officer did the best he could to assemble useful information, acting largely on his own initiative and while under significant stress.

In addition to the background and cultural sources, Capt Hope also relied on the intelligence contained in two threat assessments received from the Director General of Intelligence at NDHQ, one in September 1992 and one in December 1992.<sup>358</sup> These threat assessments were not mission-specific but identified threats in the operational zones of Somalia. According to LCol Morneault, the Regiment also received information from NDHQ in different forms on a daily basis.<sup>359</sup>

In the fall of 1992, Capt Hope briefed soldiers on the conditions in Bossaso, based mainly on the intelligence report following the reconnaissance. According to Capt Hope, the briefings were attended by almost all the soldiers who ultimately went to Somalia. Capt Hope considered the threat in Bossaso was "limited/low",<sup>360</sup> in terms of both armed factions and other threats. One briefing focused on the factional forces in Somalia, their weapons, organization,

and tactics, and the difficulties of distinguishing between them.<sup>361</sup> The north-east was considered the most stable area in Somalia, with the Somalia Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in firm control. The area was reasonably stable during the fall of 1992, although there was a possibility of periods of instability. The Commanding Officer of the CAR assumed it could operate in the area in co-operation with the SSDF as the governing faction.<sup>362</sup>

Although the CAR ultimately deployed to Belet Huen, Capt Hope believed that much of the information in his briefings to soldiers was relevant to that area as well, particularly information about the social and political situation.<sup>363</sup>

In addition to the general intelligence briefings conducted by Capt Hope and his staff, officers and senior NCOs were briefed on conditions in the Bossasso area, the people, their languages, habits, and clan structure by a Somali national, Mr. Hassan. While the briefing was generally considered helpful,<sup>364</sup> it was given only to a small group of officers. Soldiers were not afforded the same opportunity, nor did they receive information from the briefing, because LCol Morneault thought it was better to wait until they had more information specific to the area assigned to the Canadian contingent.<sup>365</sup> While he fully intended to have Mr. Hassan return, LCol Morneault was relieved of his command, and there never was another briefing by Mr. Hassan for the Regiment.

Later, a member of the CF Reserves who had served in a relief organization in Somalia briefed CAR officers and some SSF staff on his experiences.<sup>366</sup> A later report confirmed the reliability of the briefing and included valuable information about the area near Belet Huen.<sup>367</sup> There was no evidence that the information was disseminated to the soldiers in the CAR.

## Intelligence Planning for Operation Deliverance

### First Canadian Division Headquarters

When Operation Deliverance was ordered by the CDS in early December 1992, the CF embarked on a "war footing"<sup>368</sup> as part of a UN Chapter VII operation. A light armoured squadron, a mortar platoon, and anti-tank weapons were added to the CAR. Under a Chapter VII mission, an 'enemy' is usually identified, and according to Capt Hope, the enemy was the United Somalia Congress, led by General Aidid.<sup>369</sup>

First Canadian Division Headquarters was chosen to provide joint force headquarters for the mission, with Col Labbé as the Commander. Neither Col Labbé nor staff at First Canadian Division Headquarters had been involved in any way in planning Operation Cordon. Col Labbé testified that throughout the fall of 1992, the division headquarters had focused on Yugoslavia, as there was a possibility that a Canadian contingent might become involved

there.<sup>370</sup> Headquarters staff thus monitored intelligence reports mainly from Yugoslavia. When they were notified of the deployment to Somalia, they had to try to prepare a significant amount of intelligence in a very short time.

Despite the accelerated planning imperatives, the issue appeared not to be of major concern to Col Labbé, who testified that intelligence gathering was an “ongoing, long-term and short-term operation”.<sup>371</sup> He believed that he could rely on the United States, which was in charge of the operation and had agreed unofficially to share intelligence though to a limited extent.<sup>372</sup> In his opinion, NDHQ did not need detailed intelligence to provide the warning order and specify the mission statement, as the only mission statement was to mount the force — the real mission statement for the in-theatre operation came from the coalition Commander, LGen Johnston.<sup>373</sup> Once Col Labbé accepted the assignment to Belet Huen, he then conducted the intelligence gathering and operational reconnaissance necessary to secure that objective.<sup>374</sup> Weeks later, Col Labbé expressed dissatisfaction with the level of intelligence support received from UNITAF, describing it as uneven and fragmentary.<sup>375</sup> But in the absence of a national source, he was left to depend on this increasingly weak intelligence base.

Before they deployed, designated personnel at First Canadian Division conducted an intelligence battle procedure in preparation for deployment.<sup>376</sup> Intelligence was requested from the Director General of Intelligence at NDHQ, and maps were procured from Canadian and U.S. sources. Materials were obtained from the CAR and on the basis of reports received, a briefing package and a map were prepared for Col Labbé that included a geographic breakdown of the country by political factions; an initial order of battle by political faction and clan; an intelligence estimate of the situation at that time; a synopsis of political and military activities leading to the situation in Somalia at that time; biographical notes on the political and military leaders of the major factions; and an analysis of the area of operations.

On December 11, 1992, First Canadian Division received instructions from NDHQ that intelligence support to Operation Deliverance would be arranged through the National Defence Intelligence Centre (NDIC) and that all command requirements should be co-ordinated through NDIC rather than the deployed headquarters staff. Orders confirmed also that standard intelligence procedures for a deployed force headquarters applied, as opposed to those relative to peacekeeping operations.<sup>377</sup> These guidelines set the tone and outlined the substance of the general intelligence plan for the operation. Essentially, the direction was that:

- All official out-of-theatre contact with allied intelligence organizations would be through NDIC.



- All intelligence requests from CJFS Headquarters were to be addressed to NDIC, and the response would be co-ordinated by the Defence Intelligence directorate.
- CJFS Headquarters would transmit a daily intelligence summary for NDHQ, and intelligence reports would be produced as needed.
- CJFS Headquarters would be responsible for all in-theatre dissemination of intelligence from NDHQ.
- Every attempt would be made to maintain the lowest possible classification level for reports and communications.<sup>378</sup>

Following receipt of the guidelines, First Canadian Division Headquarters issued the operation order for Operation Deliverance, including an intelligence annex that defined the intelligence problem, summarized the threat assessments, and outlined the priority intelligence requirements and the intelligence requirements.<sup>379</sup>

### **Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group**

When the mission was changed from Operation Cordon to Operation Deliverance, Capt Hope became increasingly alarmed by the lack of doctrine, given the complexity and seriousness of the situation confronting the soldiers.<sup>380</sup> In his testimony, he questioned whether the highest echelons of government understood the situation in which they were getting involved and noted problems in the chain of command and with the flow of information. He also noted weaknesses in overall planning and intelligence staffs. In his view, the CF was not well enough prepared to deploy on this type of operation.<sup>381</sup>

Capt Hope testified that the operation order annex dealing with intelligence was a good general summary of the extent of the intelligence available to the CF before deployment.<sup>382</sup> The material contained in the order, together with the recently acquired aerial photos of Baledogle airfield, a sketch map of the Baledogle airfield area prepared by the Americans, and the most recent threat assessment from the Director General of Intelligence made up the general range of intelligence documentation available for the mission before deployment.<sup>383</sup> But that was hardly enough information on which to base planning for a potentially dangerous operation.

### **Threat Assessments before Arrival in Somalia**

Capt Hope testified about what he believed were the major known threats confronting the CARBG when they arrived in Somalia. He relied primarily on threat assessments received from the Director General of Intelligence in September and December 1992,<sup>384</sup> both of which predated Operation

Deliverance and spoke only generally about the situation in Somalia. The assessments contained intelligence on specific areas, such as the north, but there was little information about Belet Huen. When Capt Hope received the intelligence annex as part of the operation order on December 13, 1992, there was no specific information on Belet Huen.<sup>385</sup> Limited intelligence was available on the southern part of Somalia, and more detailed intelligence was available for Mogadishu, where the CJFS Headquarters was to be located.

The general known threats facing the CJFS before deployment as noted by Capt Hope include the following:

### ***1. Threat from Armed Factions, Local Militias and Bandit Gangs***

The most significant threat noted by Capt Hope before deployment was the threat of violence from armed factions.<sup>386</sup> Quoting the annex to the operation orders, he emphasized the unpredictability of the security situation and the fact that, unlike the situation at Bossasso, little was known about how the armed factions would react to the introduction of coalition forces. The major factions in Somalia, the United Somali Congress (USC) and the Somali National Front (SNF), while not positioned in the Belet Huen area, were nonetheless represented there through factional commanders and were actively engaged in fighting each other.<sup>387</sup>

Local militia forces, who were of the same tribe as Gen Aideed's USC forces, were perceived initially as a similar threat to the soldiers. Before deployment, the threat was assessed as high, because militia forces were in control of the area, and the CARBG would essentially be taking control away from them. The militia forces were encouraged to pull back by the local government, as it was believed beneficial to have coalition forces in the area. While in theatre, the threat was accordingly considered low.

Belet Huen turned out to be a key area for bandits, as it was located on the main route to Ethiopia, which was used for the smuggling of drugs, weapons and food from Ethiopia to Somalia. It was also near a group of USC Aideed forces to the north-east, whose lines of communication and supply ran from Mogadishu, past Belet Huen, toward the north. According to local non-governmental organizations, complete lawlessness was associated with these gangs, and it was hoped that the CF presence would bring some order to the area. The threat was considered high and largely unpredictable.<sup>388</sup>

### ***2. Threat from Looters and Thieves***

According to Capt Hope, the primary problem with looters and thieves was that they were expected to try to penetrate the perimeter of the camp and steal materials. There were also concerns that they might attempt to sabotage the force.

### ***3. Threat from Political Agitators***

Initially, concern focused on Islamic fundamentalists throughout Somalia. Information was received that the local groups in the Belet Huen sector were potentially dangerous, although it was later discovered that the group was not a threat.

### ***4. Threat Resulting from Instability***

Fighting among the local forces of the USC and the SNF could have broken out at any time. There was also potential for conflict between the USC and the local Hawaadle clan, or the Hawaadle clan and a coalition of a smaller group of tribes in the area. Finally, there had been threats against non-governmental organization (NGO) workers in the area.

### ***5. Threat from Mines***

Land mines were believed to be a major threat because of indiscriminate mining by the former Barre army.

In summary, the most significant threat noted was the possibility of attack from opposing factions, primarily the USC faction led by General Aideed, who was known to be anti-coalition and who had previously been responsible for attacks on UN forces. Looters and thieves were considered a lesser and endemic problem throughout the country.

## **Change in Mission: Arrival in Belet Huen**

Intelligence personnel from the CAR were not part of the advance party that arrived in Somalia on December 14, 1992. Capt Hope maintains that he had no idea what they were getting into until he arrived, almost two weeks after the elements that had been added to form the CARBG were largely on the ground. He arrived at Belet Huen on December 29th. From mid-December until his arrival at Belet Huen, the overall responsibility of the intelligence function shifted to the intelligence unit attached to CJFS Headquarters. It was the staff's responsibility to provide intelligence support to the CARBG. To a great extent they relied on intelligence supplied by U.S. forces.<sup>389</sup>

During the start-up period, things were extremely fluid. Officers did not know where they would be assigned, under whose command they would operate, or where CJFS Headquarters would be established. When Capt Hope arrived at Belet Huen, he met with the Operations Officer, Capt Kyle, and received his intelligence instructions from LCol Mathieu. After the briefing, he drew up a patrol plan and began the intelligence gathering process for the in-theatre phase.



No officer knew the Regiment was going to Belet Huen until shortly before they were ordered there. According to Capt Hope, they knew very little about the factions and activities in the Belet Huen region before deployment, because they had mainly prepared reports on the factions in the north-east region around Bossasso. Then they prepared for Baledogle, for which they received additional intelligence in the form of an intelligence summary, airfield photos, and maps. Other updates to the intelligence annex in the operation orders were received before Capt Hope's deployment in late December, many of which did not relate to Belet Huen, but related either to the central-south portion of Somalia or to Baledogle.

Reports from NDHQ, in the form of operations notes, indicated that the CAR received detailed information on Belet Huen as of December 23, 1992.<sup>390</sup> Under cross-examination by counsel for the Government of Canada, Capt Hope recalled that there had been some reports from an American who had recently been in Belet Huen, but no further reports to help understand the situation in Belet Huen. A report prepared by CJFS Headquarters on behalf of Col Labbé, describing the proposed insertion of the CAR advance party into Belet Huen on December 28, 1992, concludes that the quality and quantity of intelligence support for the proposed insertion were sufficient, remarking further that the threat was low. This is surprising, given that Col Labbé planned an air mobile assault to get the CAR into the area. In Capt Hope's view, this approach was indicative of a significant threat about which there was insufficient information. In his view, the threat was high at the Belet Huen airfield on December 29, 1992.

## Impact of CF Intelligence Planning on the Conduct of Operations

### Pre-Deployment Problems

#### *Lack of Information from the UN*

At the time of the Somalia mission, little intelligence was received from the UN, even during the early stages of planning. The UN rejected any involvement in intelligence collection at that time and had accumulated very little information about the situation in Somalia before its involvement. According to Dr. Ken Menkhaus, the UN had very little information to disseminate to foreign contingents because

the UN does not have information-gathering agencies...[It] is very dependent on national governments to provide it with information. And this we found was a real weakness...because the UN officials were either beholden to national governments whose information could reflect their

own interests or more generally had no information themselves to work off.... The UN had actually very little to pass on to member states who were going to be contributing troops and usually the flow of information was the other way around.<sup>391</sup>

### *Lack of Appropriate Doctrine*

There was a conspicuous lack of doctrine for low intensity operations, such as peace enforcement, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Combat intelligence doctrine — which is founded on combat situations in the context of war — was all that was available.

Despite the lack of doctrine, Capt Hope provided intelligence support to officers in charge of training the Regiment and to help prepare the soldiers for the situation in Somalia. Nevertheless, serious repercussions, reflecting on the accuracy, adequacy, and verification of intelligence, flowed from the lack of doctrine/guidance.

Although Capt Hope's efforts were commendable given the general lack of direction and guidance, in the light of testimony from many soldiers and officers, the adequacy of intelligence at the briefings was questionable.<sup>392</sup> Few felt that they were sufficiently prepared for the social and political situation, while others had little recollection of the briefings. According to Maj Seward, the briefings were short and focused on concrete information about the climate and terrain, leaving little time for cultural/political issues.<sup>393</sup> Finally, the information was disseminated mostly to officers.

Without doctrine, Capt Hope was required to develop his own plan and strategy for gathering and evaluating information, then disseminating it appropriately. According to Capt Hope, his principal source of information was a desk analyst for the Horn of Africa section at NDHQ. Apart from intelligence documents he received, the desk analyst appeared to be the key contact at NDHQ.<sup>394</sup>

Another consequence of the lack of doctrine identified by Capt Hope was the inadequate number of intelligence staff officers and non-commissioned members in theatre. Although the number assigned to the section was standard for the battle group establishment, it was inadequate to deal with the amount of information that had to be processed in theatre.<sup>395</sup> Had there been more guidance about how to assess the number of personnel required, according to Capt Hope, more would have been included in the CARBG. There was no shortage of intelligence personnel in the CF generally at the time.

Similarly, before deployment, commanders failed to appreciate the need for interpreters. This had a major impact on the conduct of operations both generally and from an intelligence perspective. As is common in these types of operations, much of the information Capt Hope relied on in theatre was gathered from individuals.<sup>396</sup> Apart from the usual limitations of this type of

intelligence, Capt Hope had the additional problem of having to rely on interpreters to obtain information from the local population. Since they had no interpreters initially, they had to use interpreters brought by the U.S. forces. When the CARBG finally hired their own, they hired unwittingly from only one tribe, and this affected both the efficacy of interpretation and the nationals' perception of Canadian Forces personnel. Although they later hired other interpreters, this time from a cross-section of tribes, they encountered other problems. They had to adjust for clan bias in interpreting information gathered by this method, and none of the interpreters would work at night, creating a serious problem during the entire operation.<sup>397</sup>

Thus, for example, Capt Hope was generally unable to question infiltrators detained at night and was therefore unable to gather information about their intent directly from infiltrators, who were generally released the next morning after being held overnight. They were thus unable to get a clear idea of the nature and extent of the thievery problem.<sup>398</sup>

A critical aspect of intelligence work in support of the operation was understanding the nature of the threat confronting the CF in theatre. A major problem facing the troops was the significant number of infiltrations. Capt Hope thought the motive behind the infiltrations was an intelligence problem, although the general feeling among the troops was that the main motive was simply theft. Capt Hope looked at them from a different perspective, trying to assess whether the threat was more significant. He was receiving intelligence reports from Mogadishu and was thus monitoring the situation from a different, more cautious perspective.<sup>399</sup>

According to Capt Hope, some of the problems facing the troops in theatre could have been alleviated by a requirement that intelligence personnel deploy more quickly, in advance of the troops, so that they could assemble intelligence and disseminate it before the deployment commenced.<sup>400</sup> This is the usual CF method, but it was not followed in the Somalia deployment.

According to the testimony of Dr. Menkhaus, the Canadian humanitarian relief sector in Somalia included a very complex set of clan relations and political factors. He knew that it was extremely difficult to get accurate information because the situation was so politicized.<sup>401</sup> This situation made it crucial that the CJFS have appropriate procedures for gathering and evaluating information. It was clear that neither capacity existed.

### *Lack of Adequate Direction*

There was little evidence of direction from the chain of command to guide the Intelligence Officer in his tasks. Capt Hope received priority intelligence requirements from his Commanding Officer, but they were for the most part a general request for information about the factions and clans and their inter-relationships.<sup>402</sup> The operation order intelligence annex set out the priority



intelligence requirements for Col Labbé, but these were essentially issues of concern to headquarters staff in Mogadishu and dealt with the more generalized threats to troops in that area. Lessons learned reports indicate that intelligence requirements were not identified in sufficient time or detail for the G2 branch at Land Force Command Headquarters to respond adequately. (A request for information about the status of infrastructure was not received until mid-November 1992.<sup>403</sup>)

Although the intelligence unit of the Special Service Force was directed to serve as the focal point in support of the operation, by identifying intelligence production and training requirements and by co-ordinating intelligence and/or information requirements,<sup>404</sup> there is no evidence before us to indicate involvement by SSF G2 Intelligence staff in that capacity. Instead, Capt Hope appeared to be almost solely responsible for intelligence support training, and in our view he received inadequate guidance and assistance from NDHQ in developing this support. He was responsible for the instructions for preparing the Somalia handbook, which was based on information he had gleaned from his review of open sources on Somalia and from his consultations with the desk analyst at NDHQ.

### *Lack of Central Co-ordination and Quality Control*

The CF lessons learned report identified weakness in the planning process: information was received by all intelligence branches from a variety of sources when ideally it should have been assessed by a single organization — the G2 branch.<sup>405</sup> The lack of co-ordination was also evident in redundant handbooks prepared by NDHQ, Land Force Central Area Headquarters, and the SSF, when one agency should have been responsible for a single, comprehensive handbook.<sup>406</sup> And despite numerous handbooks, the soldiers complained about lack of information on Somalia.

It is not clear whether the information provided in briefings by Capt Hope, Mr. Hassan, and the former reservist were subjected to the appropriate scrutiny by senior officers and, if so, by what process. Other briefing sessions were conducted after the October reconnaissance and ought to have been considered relatively reliable. However, as Dr. Menkhaus pointed out, information received from human intelligence in Somalia varied according to the clan an individual belonged to and therefore varied in accuracy.<sup>407</sup> Ultimately, much of this information was of little value, as it pertained only to the Bossasso area.

The eclectic mix of information as a source for intelligence on Somalia led to an unhealthy reliance on media reports, particularly from CNN. Both Capt Walsh and Capt Hope used news footage to describe events in Somalia.<sup>408</sup> Many witnesses indicated that they received all or most their information from CNN reports,<sup>409</sup> since before the training exercises, very little other information was available. According to Col MacDonald, much of their information

was coming from the networks.<sup>410</sup> Maj Kampman, who commanded the CARBG's armoured squadron, held a similar view.<sup>411</sup> The relevance of information from media accounts was questionable, as much of the footage was believed to be from Mogadishu, where conditions were notably different from conditions in Bossasso.<sup>412</sup>

While media reports had a major impact on the troops, according to Maj Pommet, Officer Commanding 1 Commando, the impact should have been mitigated by relating media reports to actual conditions in the area of operation. Although officials at NDHQ did nothing to allay the impact of media images, Maj Pommet took it upon himself to correct erroneous perceptions.<sup>413</sup> His efforts, however, were directed only to troops under his command, who accounted for less than a fifth of the force.

In our view, reports from the news media — untempered by information about actual conditions in the area where they were to be deployed — might have led some soldiers to believe that when they arrived in Somalia they would find an 'enemy' ready for battle. Commanders should have been conscious of this possibility and taken steps to counter it.

### *Lack of Adequate Intelligence Dissemination*

One of the more compelling observations from several witnesses was the statement that the soldiers did not know what they were getting into. Few believed that they had an adequate understanding of Somalia, its culture and background. Moreover, they were confused about the nature of their duties because of the change in mission.<sup>414</sup>

## **In-Theatre Problems**

### *Lack of Clear Mandate*

The vague nature of the UN mandate and CF orders, coupled with the lack of authority, led to enormous uncertainty about what types of actions were expected of the soldiers. For example, if a crime was committed, it was not clear under whose law perpetrators were to be held, and to whom perpetrators were to be turned over.<sup>415</sup>

### *Unreliable Threat Assessment*

The pre-deployment threat analysis proved unreliable. Although intelligence sources identified attack by armed factions as the "key threat" facing the soldiers, once in theatre, it became clear that this threat had been overstated. Instead, the most prevalent threat was from thieves. Although thievery should have been anticipated, soldiers were not sufficiently alerted to this threat by intelligence assessments or their commanders.<sup>416</sup>

Only a small part of the operation required conventional combat skills. Soldiers expecting a military operation found themselves doing social work, policing, riot control, and endless negotiations in a context of intricate clan tensions. They had little training for or information on this type of work.<sup>417</sup> Many of the troops were inadequately briefed on Somali culture, leading to inappropriate behaviour on their part.<sup>418</sup> The CF Somalia handbook contained only three paragraphs on Somali culture, which were short, simplistic and so defensive that the effect would have been to poison rather than foster relations with the local population.<sup>419</sup>

Canadian soldiers in Mogadishu believed that they had to treat every clan member as a potential threat, because they were unable to identify who was hostile to them. After incidents of rock throwing directed at CJFS Headquarters in early February, feelings of isolationism and frustration intensified. According to Maj Moreau, in charge of security for CJFS Headquarters, soldiers became increasingly removed and potentially more aggressive toward the local population.<sup>420</sup>

### *Consequences of Inadequate Planning for the Change in Mission*

When the soldiers first became aware of the change in mission on December 5, 1992, they still had no idea where they were going or what exactly they would be doing. Capt Hope maintained that he continued to rely on the original threat assessment of December 2, 1992, along with updates received in the days that followed. All clearly identified that the Aideed forces were hostile and were to be considered a threat upon landing. There were no intelligence documents specific to Belet Huen.

With the change from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, many soldiers became even more confused about what to expect in theatre. Although many were aware that they were no longer going to Bossaso, most did not know that they were assigned to the Belet Huen sector until they arrived in Mogadishu. Even before the change to Belet Huen, they were confused about what threat existed. They were aware that everyone was armed, but they did not understand clearly what that meant in terms of their security.<sup>421</sup>

Sgt MacAuley, a section commander for 2 Commando, testified that he was told to expect anything and as a result didn't know what to expect. Although he acknowledged that there was not a great deal of time to gather intelligence on Belet Huen, more information on the town and better maps would have been extremely beneficial.<sup>422</sup>

Describing his reaction to a patrol at night, Sgt MacAuley maintained that their early concerns were about mines and booby traps. He described a nighttime patrol as being, "like walking into the twilight zone; it was nothing we had ever seen before."<sup>423</sup>



Although Sgt Godfrey testified that he felt prepared for the mission, much of his testimony indicated otherwise. He maintained that there were no specific briefings on Belet Huen and that the maps they were given were poorly drawn.<sup>424</sup> He confirmed that instructions given before they left for Somalia were unclear, and that the troops were uncertain about what to expect when they landed. They had been told that there might be hostile forces when they got off the plane, and the original plan was to fan out once they landed at Belet Huen airport, with guns in full view.

According to Maj Pomet, the 2 Commando members loaded their rifles a few minutes before landing,<sup>425</sup> but by the time they arrived, the airport had been secured by U.S. forces.<sup>426</sup> The temperature was 45°C, and on the march from the airport, many were carrying more than 100 pounds of equipment for the six-hour walk. There were cases of dehydration, owing to the fact that the soldiers were not sure of the length of the march, so were unable to gauge how long their water supplies would have to last.<sup>427</sup> Careful intelligence assessments beforehand might have prevented these types of command errors and oversights.

## FINDINGS

We heard testimony questioning the adequacy of intelligence planning for Operation Cordon and the circumstances under which the mission changed in December 1992. The testimony of the CAR Intelligence Officer, Capt Hope, spoke of his frustration about the lack of doctrine on the topic of peace support operations. We heard from Maj Kampman, Officer Commanding the armoured squadron of the CARBG, who testified that the entire mission constituted a failure of military intelligence.<sup>428</sup> Col Labbé and his Chief of Staff disagreed. Col Labbé praised the intelligence planning process, particularly at the regimental level in theatre; but in support of his assertion, he cited only the approval of LGen Johnston for briefings produced by the regimental Intelligence Officer, Capt Hope.<sup>429</sup> LCol Moffat, who was posted at CJFS Headquarters in Mogadishu, testified that the intelligence received before deployment, though not perfect, was adequate.<sup>430</sup>

We agree with the view of Maj Kampman and the strong criticisms expressed by the soldiers who testified before us. The entire intelligence process was flawed by serious deficiencies in direction, doctrine, co-ordination, and quality control. The consequences were far-reaching as the mission changed in nature: troops in the field did not know where they were going or what to expect when they got there, and especially how to relate to members of the local population with whom they came into contact. We find

that the low value placed by officers and officials at senior levels on intelligence before, during, and after deployment was a contributing factor to the serious incidents that occurred.

### More specifically we find that:

- In 1992, there was no specific doctrine for intelligence planning for peace enforcement operations, nor was there specific doctrine for peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. Available doctrine in the area of combat intelligence, founded on combat situations in the context of war and presuming the existence of an identifiable enemy, was grossly inadequate.
- In 1992, there was almost no acknowledgement of the need for military intelligence for United Nations operations. It was thus the responsibility of troop-contributing countries to use their own intelligence organizations and to refrain from using covert methods to obtain intelligence.
- At the time of the Somalia mission, there was little information from the UN even during the early stages of the planning process. The UN had rejected any involvement in intelligence collection at that time and had accumulated very little information on the situation in Somalia before its involvement.
- Several consequences flowed from the lack of specific doctrine for peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian operations:
  - (a) Capt Hope, the CAR Intelligence Officer, was compelled to develop an intelligence plan for the mission based on combat intelligence doctrine. No guidance was readily available to assist him in planning intelligence support for the regiment or to assist in regimental training.
  - (b) Commanders and senior staff officers failed to recognize the need for additional intelligence staff in theatre.
  - (c) Commanders and senior staff officers failed to appreciate the need for interpreters. This affected the intelligence organization in theatre and the conduct of operations generally. Although they were able to hire Somali nationals for the job, intelligence staff encountered problems with this arrangement. First, they had difficulties adjusting for clan bias in interpreting the information. Second, none of the interpreters would work at night, which created a serious gap in intelligence operations.
  - (d) As a result of the problem with interpreters, intelligence staff were unable to question infiltrators detained at night and were unable to gather information about the purpose of infiltrations directly from infiltrators. They were thus unable to get a clear idea of the nature and extent of the problem of thievery.

- (e) Commanders and senior staff officers failed to require that intelligence staff be sent with the advance party, a step that could have alleviated some of the problems in theatre. They could have gathered information and formulated intelligence for the force before deployment commenced.
- (f) The humanitarian relief sector assigned to Canadian forces was characterized by a very complex set of clan relations and political factors, and it was extremely difficult to get accurate information because the situation was heavily politicized. This situation made it crucial to have appropriate procedures for gathering and evaluating information. Neither capacity existed.
- Information disseminated to soldiers was totally inadequate, as evidenced by the testimony of many soldiers who felt that they received inadequate preparation for the military, social and political situation confronting them on arrival in Somalia. Although the briefings contained some information on political structures and historical background, they were too short and included erroneous information on cultural issues.
- Canadian officials placed too great a reliance on U.S. intelligence. Despite the accelerated planning imperatives with the change in mission, Col Labbé expressed little concern about the fact that his headquarters staff had no previous involvement in or knowledge of Somalia, and he believed that considerable reliance could be placed on the Americans, who had agreed to share intelligence. Once in theatre, it became apparent to Col Labbé that U.S. intelligence was not necessarily a reliable source, as he encountered difficulties obtaining information from them in a timely and responsive manner.
- Although intelligence sources relied on by the intelligence staff identified the threat from attack by armed factions as the key threat facing the soldiers in Somalia, once in theatre, it became clear that this threat was overstated. The threat that was most evident in theatre related to the risks associated with endemic thievery.
- From a planning perspective, there was little evidence regarding adherence to the various stages of the intelligence cycle, most significantly the direction stage. Although the intelligence unit of the Special Service Force was directed to serve as the focal point in support of the operation, by identifying intelligence production and training requirements and by co-ordinating intelligence and/or information requirements, there is no evidence before us to indicate involvement by SSF G2 Intelligence staff in that capacity. Instead, Capt Hope appeared to be almost solely responsible for intelligence support for regimental training.



- *We find that Capt Hope received inadequate guidance and assistance from NDHQ in developing intelligence support for training. He was responsible for developing instructions on preparation of the Somalia handbook, and this was based on information gleaned from a review of public sources of information on Somalia and from consultations with a desk analyst at NDHQ.*
- *Centralized control and co-ordination of intelligence were lacking. The lessons learned report identified a weakness in the planning process, noting that information was received by all intelligence branches from a variety of sources, when ideally information should be assessed by a single organization, the G2 branch.*
- *The eclectic mix of information sources led to an unhealthy reliance on media reports, particularly CNN. Both regimental and intelligence officers used news footage to convey events in Somalia. Many soldiers testified that they received all or most of their information from CNN news coverage.*
- *Before the training exercises, very little other information was available for soldiers. The accuracy of information from media accounts was questionable, as much of the news footage was believed to be from Mogadishu, where conditions were far different from Bossaso, where the force was originally to deploy. This led to confusion about what they could expect on arrival in theatre.*

## LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL PLANNING

A successful operation begins with solid and reliable logistics and materiel support to the mission.<sup>431</sup> This did not happen in the case of Operation Deliverance. Usually, the first task is to establish a firm base of operations in theatre, then to bring in sufficient logistical support for troops who have just arrived on site and for those still to follow. In Operation Deliverance, a National Support Element should have been built into the manning ceiling of 900, but there was no space because of the number of positions required for combat personnel.<sup>432</sup> Only a small service support commando was attached to the CARBG and could not sustain massive arrivals of troops, equipment and supplies by sea and air.

Logistical problems adversely affected the conduct of Canadian Forces operations in Somalia. The shift from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, a troop augmentation from 750 to 900, and two changes in area of operations should have been sufficient reason to delay the deployment until these changes could be assimilated. Instead, little thought was given to the implications of the fact that Operation Deliverance was a totally different kind

of mission from Operation Cordon. Initially envisioned as a 'lean and mean' operation, requiring a bare minimum of supplies and equipment, it was not until Operation Deliverance personnel had begun to arrive in theatre that a decision was made to establish a base camp of a similar standard to that planned for Bossasso.<sup>433</sup> However, neither logistical support nor materiel was available to achieve this goal.

Even so, the mission was not postponed. Transporting troops and the necessary supplies to Belet Huen, 350 kilometres away from HMCS *Preserver* created confusion and expense. The higher levels of leadership forgot or sacrificed a fundamental principle of logistics: send in the first line units with a three-day supply of the essentials (hard rations, ammunition, and fuel), but build up reserves of supplies and equipment on site before the operation becomes actively engaged.<sup>434</sup> Political expediency and a desire to be visible on the world stage overrode all practical logistical concerns.

## Lessons Learned from Operation Python

Before NDHQ issued the warning order for Operation Cordon on September 4, 1992, Operation Python (for the Western Sahara) was the Canadian Airborne Regiment's most recent planning exercise for such a deployment.<sup>435</sup> In an after-action report of July 17, 1992, Maj Desnoyers described Operation Python as "a costly and confused non-event. Much of the logistic costs could have been avoided if a more systematic approach was taken."<sup>436</sup> He added that NDHQ had before it "the opportunity now to produce a workable and improved system." This opportunity was squandered when it came time to make the hasty transition between Operation Cordon and Operation Deliverance. The potentially valuable lessons learned from Operation Python were forgotten in the chaotic planning for the rushed mission to Belet Huen. The after-action reports for Operation Python revealed what was to be a recurring theme: logistics planning suffered because information about the operation, available to the planners, contained gaps or did not reach all relevant personnel. In an after-action report of June 16, 1992, LCol Prosser noted that only the CAR's Commanding Officer, Col Holmes, visited UN headquarters for a briefing about Operation Python, and that planning, preparing, and mounting operations would have proved easier if representatives of Land Force Command Headquarters, Land Force Central Area Headquarters, and Special Service Force Headquarters had accompanied Col Holmes.<sup>437</sup>

LCol Prosser also pointed to the lack of a Canadian reconnaissance of the Western Sahara. Normally, a detailed reconnaissance of a proposed area of operation should precede a deployment, and key participants from each headquarters level in the planning process should join the reconnaissance

party, along with experts with specialized knowledge in the use of local resources. He also identified a lack of logistics intelligence on possible areas of operation.

Inadequate logistics intelligence on areas of operation typified a broader failure to make full use of intelligence staff. LCol Prosser urged that G2 (Intelligence) staff participate in planning any operation from the warning order on.<sup>438</sup>

Co-operation is a fundamental tenet of logistical planning; however, the J3 Peacekeeping staff and the G4 Operations staff were not involved early in the planning process for either Operation Python or Operation Deliverance. Consequently, uninformed planning personnel led to costly mistakes and confusion. Similarly, they were unable to prepare proper estimates of supplies that would be needed, such as parts and types of petroleum, oils and lubricants.<sup>439</sup> A situation report of November 12, 1992 confirmed that some equipment stocks from Operation Python helped to fill Operation Cordon's requirements.<sup>440</sup>

## Information from UN Technical Team

The Canadian member of the UN technical team visiting Somalia between March 21 and April 3, 1992 was Col Houghton, Director of Peacekeeping Operations, J3 Peacekeeping. He found a situation in which the Canadian contingent of the UN mission would have to be completely self-sufficient. There was very little host support, virtually no infrastructure left in parts of Somalia, shortages of the basic commodities, and few commercial establishments providing supplies in a lawless and sometimes hostile environment. Despite this analysis, plans demonstrated naïvety. Although few businesses were operational, for example, the reconnaissance concluded that only light vehicles needed to be brought from Canada. Plans anticipated that vehicles could be rented, but the vehicles initially rented locally were in poor condition. Plans foresaw that more than 40 vehicles would be required,<sup>441</sup> but a situation report of November 6, 1992 called for up to 150.<sup>442</sup>

Despite rampant infectious diseases, planners expected the contingent to procure local fish and vegetables. They grossly underestimated water provisions at only three litres per day for drinking and cooking, when each member of the contingent actually required a minimum of eight litres per day.

The port at Mogadishu was intact but had no services and required security precautions because of the presence of two rival clans. The airport was in need of repairs. Supply vehicles had to be guarded because of extensive thievery. Diesel fuel had to be obtained from suppliers in Mombasa or Nairobi.<sup>443</sup> Diesel-powered vehicles reduced the variety and volume of fuel, oils, and lubricants needed,<sup>444</sup> but such products purchased locally were costly



and often dirty or contaminated. Plans anticipated that only small arms would be required and that no ammunition would be used for training. Obviously, the changeover from peacekeeping to peace enforcement mission would greatly change the quantity and type of ammunition needed.

A second UN technical mission visited Somalia between August 4 and 17, 1992, but no CF members were included, even though the logistics and communications group visited 11 locations in Somalia, including Bossasso and Belet Huen. The key findings communicated to Canada confirmed the findings of the March–April reconnaissance.<sup>445</sup>

NDHQ's message of November 16, 1992 marked CFB Petawawa and CFB Halifax as supply bases for Operation Cordon. The major supply ship was to be HMCS *Preserver*.<sup>446</sup> CFB Lahr, in Germany, was no longer an option. NDHQ correspondence in the autumn of 1992 suggests a clear intent to create a National Support Element.<sup>447</sup> The intention was for the NSE to forward equipment and supplies to Canadian units upon receipt in Somalia. This second and third line support would offset CAR's loss of logistics capability from the previous summer.

## Logistics Planning for Operation Cordon

The UN guidelines issued on September 11, 1992 required each contingent to carry a 60-day supply of composite rations and other goods. A UN resupply would then follow by sea and air transport.<sup>448</sup> Some of the expectations created by these guidelines never materialized. For example, tents were to house the troops initially, with the expectation that prefabricated accommodations would follow.<sup>449</sup> These accommodations never arrived, and most troops lived in tents throughout the mission. These tents, intended only as an interim measure, were unsuited to the desert climate and initially contained no floors or interior lighting.

There were opportunities to obtain information. From September 23 to 25, 1992, Col Houghton, LCol Morneau, and Col Cox went to UN headquarters, where, they and representatives of other troop-contributing countries, were briefed, especially about the evolving situation in Somalia.<sup>450</sup> From October 12 to 18, Col Houghton led a reconnaissance party of 17 to assess Somalia and Djibouti for Operation Cordon. Among the party were representatives from J3 Peacekeeping, J4 Logistics, Maritime Command Headquarters, and Air Command Headquarters, and LCol Morneau of the CAR.<sup>451</sup>

On October 28, 1992, LCol Mathieu, the CAR's new Commanding Officer, submitted a report concerning the reconnaissance visit to Somalia of October 12 to 18, suggesting that Canadian logistics planners had spotted and addressed potential logistics problems.<sup>452</sup> Canada's national mission in

Operation Cordon was to maintain security in the northeastern zone of Somalia, centred on Bossasso. Under Operation Cordon, HMCS *Preserver*, anchored off the port of Bossasso, would furnish in-theatre supply because of the meagre infrastructure in Somalia<sup>453</sup> and the lack of a suitable airfield at Bossasso for delivering supplies.<sup>454</sup> According to LCol Mathieu's report, Maritime Command representatives had verified that the port of Bossasso was too small to accept a ship the size of HMCS *Preserver*; nonetheless, the port could perhaps take a roll-on-roll-off ship.<sup>455</sup>

Foreshadowings of problems with sustainment by the UN were also apparent in the report.

The concern is day 61. In discussions with the UN adm reps there was a great lack in detail on sustainment. While broad brush concepts were given there were no concrete details on rat [rations] resupply, CASEVAC [casualty evacuation] and POL [petroleum, oils, and lubricants].<sup>456</sup>

The report also stipulated that while the Canadian base camp was being built, HMCS *Preserver* would provide petroleum, oil and lubricants, water, equipment storage, and rear link communications. Ways of transporting CF members to Somalia were being contemplated: about 10 days were needed to deploy the advance party; HMCS *Preserver* could bring 50 persons as part of the advance party; and the main body would have to arrive by air and crossload onto CC-130s.<sup>457</sup> HMCS *Preserver* would provide all the services and facilities necessary, but could provide fresh fruit and vegetables for only the first seven days of operation.<sup>458</sup> This raised health and morale concerns.

The operation order for Operation Cordon was issued on November 13, 1992. The main area of operations was Bossasso, with headquarters in Mogadishu, and Air Command was to provide sustainment airlift support twice a month from Canada. HMCS *Preserver* would sail on November 16th carrying fuel, fresh rations, water, medical supplies, and other services for the base camp at Bossasso as agreed upon by Force Mobile Command Headquarters and Maritime Command (MARCOM), and, co-ordinated by NDHQ and J3 Peacekeeping staff.<sup>459</sup> The advance party and equipment would depart by air, to arrive in Bossasso at the same time as HMCS *Preserver*. The main equipment would be sent on a UN-chartered ship, while troops were flown over on UN-chartered aircraft. CARBG would deploy with equipment and sufficient first and second line supplies and resources to satisfy their immediate requirements. Commencing in January, a CC-137 would make twice monthly trips from Trenton, Ontario to bring supplies. Commercial air freight was considered another option.<sup>460</sup> An initial 30 days of individual meal packs were required and 15 days' supply of bottled water. It was expected that fresh rations would be procured locally once reliable sources were established.<sup>461</sup>

Three days later, the declaration of operational readiness would be made, despite outstanding equipment issues.<sup>462</sup> There had already been pressure to move quickly. On October 26, 1992, the UN had requested that Canada's advance party and infantry battalion deploy when possible.<sup>463</sup> A maritime logistics detachment was added to co-ordinate logistics and engineering support from Nairobi or Mombassa and to provide and co-ordinate in-theatre sustainment by HMCS *Preserver*.<sup>464</sup> The battalion's main body was deployable by December 20, 1992 on two conditions: the UN was to provide a roll-on-roll-off ship in the port of Montreal on November 16, 1992; and the UN was to furnish the needed strategic and tactical airlift to complete the move to Bossaso.<sup>465</sup>

HMCS *Preserver* arrived off the port of Mogadishu on December 12, 1992, two days before the advance party arrived by air.

### Supplies and Equipment Preparation for Operation Cordon

The urgency associated with preparations led to the deployment being marred by miscommunication, insufficient planning, poor organization, and inadequate supply accounting. For example, the weekend after the warning order for Operation Cordon, the Commanding Officer of CAR prepared a comprehensive table of organization and equipment (TO&E). Yet when Operation Deliverance began, no new TO&E appeared. Another example: a situation report dated October 2, 1992 noted that at the time, 30 armoured vehicles, 41 trucks (medium logistic vehicles wheeled), and 31 commercial utility combat vehicles had undergone departure assistance group procedures. Forces Mobile Command's warning order had limited the number of vehicles being sent to Somalia to 150.<sup>466</sup> Since the CAR had lacked a sizeable motorized fleet, other units had to furnish the vehicles for Somalia. BGen Beno's after-action report of February 2, 1993 for Operation Cordon and Operation Deliverance indicated that the First Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment had given up their armoured vehicles to outfit the CAR, with adverse effects on morale.<sup>467</sup> The vehicle fleet did not reach its final composition quickly, because higher headquarters added specialized vehicles. Although the task force movement table should have been completed, it continued to undergo amendment: a 60-ton crane and other items, rejected earlier as unnecessary by the CAR, were to be added.<sup>468</sup>

### Change to Operation Deliverance and the Deployment

With numbers increased from 750 to 900, supplies planned for earlier became inadequate. When the mission shifted from Baledogle to Belet Huen, the main body began deploying there on December 28, 1992, deployment continued until January 4, 1993. The problem now became how to unload materiel



from HMCS *Preserver* and transport it to the new site. On December 19th it became apparent that CARBG would most likely assume longer-term responsibility for the humanitarian relief sector centred on Belet Huen.<sup>469</sup> A situation report of the following day affirmed that the CARBG, apart from its vehicles, would deploy to Belet Huen by January 2, 1993.<sup>470</sup>

In both Operation Cordon and Operation Deliverance, HMCS *Preserver* was to rest a few miles from the ports of Bossasso and Mogadishu respectively.<sup>471</sup> Various crucial items that were too large to fit into a CC-130 had to be transported by HMCS *Preserver*. Once HMCS *Preserver* reached Mogadishu, its three Sea King helicopters and two small craft moved supplies ashore.<sup>472</sup> Under Operation Cordon, the site of the Canadian base camp would have been only three kilometres inland;<sup>473</sup> nonetheless, under Operation Deliverance logistics planners initially had to contemplate transporting supplies from HMCS *Preserver* to Baledogle, closer to 100 kilometres inland. When the location changed to Belet Huen, the only available supply route was an insecure road extending 350 kilometres from Mogadishu. Problems were compounded because no reconnaissance had been done of the proposed site.

On December 8th, three days after NDHQ's warning order, Canada concluded a memorandum of understanding with the United States on mutual support, agreeing to exert their best efforts, compatible with national priorities, in peacetime, emergency and active hostilities, to fulfil the other participant's requests for logistics support, supplies, and services.<sup>474</sup> It remained unclear, however, precisely what logistics support the United States would provide. Canadian and U.S. officers gathered at Camp Pendleton, California, on December 14th and 15th to seek agreement on what the United States would furnish.<sup>475</sup> According to Maj N.C. Heward's report, the Canadian battle group was to deploy self-sufficient for 60 days of operations; full echelon support would flow from in-theatre Canadian and U.S. resources as available.<sup>476</sup> By December 18th it seemed likely that when the cargo ship reached Mogadishu, the U.S. Marine Force Service Support Group would help the CARBG move the sea containers to Baledogle.<sup>477</sup>

Operation Cordon's task force movement table was to specify how to load the ships; only small common sense changes were in consideration. The additional personnel and supplies required by Operation Deliverance would move entirely on a third ship or in combination with air transport.<sup>478</sup> The logistics plan for Baledogle was to have in-theatre CC-130 aircraft, operating from Nairobi, ferry supplies from Mogadishu to Baledogle; after the Canadian vehicles arrived by ship, they would journey to Baledogle as well.<sup>479</sup> By January 1, 1993, the U.S. Army force, including 10 Mountain Division Support Command and 13 Corps Support Command, would begin to arrive.

After mid-January, U.S. transport could and would handle Canadian requirements.<sup>480</sup> A military resupply flight would continue delivering materiel unique to Canadian needs to Nairobi every two weeks, and commercial shipping, by sea or air, would supplement these deliveries.<sup>481</sup>

By December 27th, Canada had tentatively arranged for a transit area for storing sea containers at the Mogadishu airfield; co-ordination with the U.S. Navy Seabees to prepare the transit area for storage had already taken place. The transit area was to be ready by January 5, 1993.<sup>482</sup> Between December 28 and January 4, 1993, the CARBG's main body deployed to Belet Huen. Fifty-one CC-130 flights carrying personnel, equipment and supplies from Mogadishu and Baledogle arrived in Belet Huen during this interval. A sizeable airlift control element from Nairobi sent teams to all three airfields to support aircraft loading and unloading. Information on arrival times was imprecise, and the contents of many loads were a surprise.<sup>483</sup> The ships were approaching Somalia and were expected to offload in the port of Mogadishu from January 5th to 7th. The third ship was to reach Mogadishu between January 19th and 26th.<sup>484</sup>

### Consequences of Inadequate Logistical Planning

The logistics planners and personnel did the best they could under the circumstances. It is a credit to them that supplies and equipment reached the troops to the extent they did and that staged logistic support was provided as much as humanly possible. The problems that ensued were caused largely by the hasty change in mission and area of operation, without time to assimilate changes and reconsider plans, the lack of communication among various and numerous headquarters, and the over-involvement of higher level headquarters, which failed to understand the need for a clear and simple concept of what was required. All these factors forced logistics personnel to assume a constantly reactive position.

The most serious flaws in planning logistical support resulted from pressure to launch the operation with just two weeks' notice. This left no lead time for planners to be briefed on operational intentions. No new logistical plan was conceived for Operation Deliverance; the Operation Cordon plan was simply adapted. To a certain degree, adapting the procedures, concepts, and infrastructure of Operation Cordon made sense, but superimposing one mission plan on another, without major policy analysis or revisions, did not. Good logistical planning should be pro-active. Planning for Operation Deliverance occurred over two weeks, while three months' preparation time was allotted for Operation Cordon.

Adding to the complexity caused by changes in the mission and location was the length of the communications and supply line from Canada to Belet Huen — the longest line since the Korean War, 40 years earlier.<sup>485</sup>

The CARBG camp site was to be located over 350 kilometres from headquarters in Mogadishu. The connecting road was dangerous and the terrain hazardous. HMCS *Preserver*, the major supplier for CARBG was too far away for a quick transfer of supplies. Operation Cordon had been planned as an administrative mission, whereas Operation Deliverance was tactical. It was too late to reposition the stores and equipment for a tactical move.<sup>486</sup>

Execution of the mission was also complex because there was never a clear concept of what was required. Nothing was straightforward in communications down the chain of command. CARBG logistics planners were ignored when they suggested what equipment they would need and how it should be packed. J4 logistics staff for Operation Deliverance were not consulted or asked to formulate a logistical deployment plan. Numerous levels of headquarters overrode each other in giving orders, leading to poor supply accounting procedures, faulty equipment sent, and damaged equipment received without an adequate supply of technicians to carry out repairs. There was little co-operation among the various planning staffs. It was difficult to know who was to set priorities. There were too many micro-managers and too little use of logistics liaison officers.

Self-sufficiency was a concern right from the outset. For UNOSOM, 60 days of essential resources had to be available. However, there was always a worry about who would provide supplies on day 61. When the mission changed to a U.S.-led operation, there had been no forecasting of what resources and supplies were needed. There was no system of continuous replenishment. Supplies and equipment had been budgeted for 750 persons, not 900. The National Support Element had been dropped from the mission because of the tight personnel ceiling. CARBG deployed without distinct second or third line logistic support; it was assumed, mistakenly, that the CAR's Service Commando could fulfil the role adequately. This later proved impossible when Service Commando was overwhelmed by the 384 sea containers sitting off the port in Mogadishu. This error in strategic planning was not corrected until the National Support Element reached Somalia in March 1993.

### ***Rations and Water***

Rations were grossly underestimated. Once Operation Deliverance replaced Op Cordon as part of the U.S.-led mission, three problems developed. First, logistics planners had made no contingency plan for day 61, expecting the UN to replenish supplies. Second, there were hard rations for 750, not 900 persons. Third, there was an understanding that shortly after deployment the troops would begin receiving fresh rations.



Resolving the problems meant creating a dependency on the U.S. force, who had brought a large reserve of hard rations. Maj Gillam purchased some of this supply to feed Canadian troops and to function as a reserve until the supply ship arrived at the end of January. The promise of fresh rations within three weeks of landing never materialized; this was to be the longest CF deployment ever on hard rations, and it clearly affected morale. A combination of factors was cited as an explanation: the configuration of the camp did not allow for daily preparation of fresh rations, there were insufficient cooks to handle the volume, there was only one cooking and feeding facility, and there was no air conditioning or adequate refrigeration to reduce food spoilage.<sup>487</sup> Sea containers were later discovered in Mogadishu with fresh rations that had never been distributed.<sup>488</sup> Although some meats, cheeses and fruits began arriving from Nairobi in February,<sup>489</sup> 2 Commando did not receive its first hot meal until March 29th.<sup>490</sup> There was some resentment among the troops concerning the lack of fresh-cooked food. In his testimony, MWO Amaral noted that CARBG members compared their situation to that of the Italian contingent, who had regular fresh food and a working kitchen.<sup>491</sup>

Hard rations provided only 14 days of menus, yielding inadequate variety for a six-month tour. Some of the food was intended to meet dietary requirements in arctic conditions (the coffee was not thirst-quenching, the jerky was too salty, and chocolate bars turned to mush in the heat). The troops had to ask their families to mail more appropriate items, such as pasta supplements and dehydrated soups.<sup>492</sup> Storage conditions were poor, and some individual meal packets spoiled from being left on pallets in the sun. Almost 6,000 breakfast and supper packets were withdrawn after soldiers became ill from eating the spoiled contents.<sup>493</sup> Of the 20 refrigeration units shipped to Somalia, 18 were in disrepair before leaving Canada, all arrived in poor condition, and only 10 could be made operational.<sup>494</sup>

Estimates of water requirements were inaccurate. There were significant water shortages at the beginning, and water consumption was restricted because of fears of a shortage.<sup>495</sup> On arrival at Belet Huen, uncertain about how much water they were permitted to drink and how much to save, some soldiers became dehydrated and fainted on the six-hour march to the camp site during the hot daylight hours.<sup>496</sup> It was not until 10 days after arrival that there was sufficient water for washing.<sup>497</sup>

Again, the force depended on the U.S. force to produce clean water. Reverse osmosis water production units did not arrive from Canada until mid-January,<sup>498</sup> and the quality of the drinking water was tasteless and difficult to swallow.<sup>499</sup> Initially there was no way to cool the water, so soldiers drank it without refrigeration — the warm air heating the water to a temperature of approximately 45°C.<sup>500</sup>

### *Miscellaneous Supplies and Equipment*

The absence of a clear concept for the mission was perhaps best exemplified by the inadequate amount of equipment sent to Somalia. Some items were geared to arctic conditions. The tents were too dark in colour and absorbed solar heat; they had no screens or roll-up sides for fresh air;<sup>501</sup> leaving the flaps open for ventilation allowed dust to blow through the tents. There were only arctic candles for light, which were soft and therefore burned too quickly. The arctic stoves could not be used because there was no naphtha gas.<sup>502</sup> Three reconnaissance missions had identified desert conditions, so summer-weight clothing and desert equipment should have been ordered much earlier, given the long lead time required for special order items. In his testimony, Maj Mansfield described his plans for bringing in further supplies to make the troops more comfortable, but NDHQ opposed the plan. Planners thought more in terms of immediate needs rather than developing a comprehensive six-month plan.<sup>503</sup>

Security was compromised by the lack of trip flares, tent lighting, and perimeter wire. Trip flares were used as a security warning signal around the camp perimeter, but once tripped they could not be used again, and replacements became a continuous problem. The stock aboard HMCS *Preserver* was rapidly depleted, necessitating constant reordering.<sup>504</sup> During the pre-deployment phase, Maj Seward instructed MWO Amaral to order spotlights for perimeter lighting. In theatre, MWO Amaral continued to ask for perimeter lighting, but 2 Commando never received any.<sup>505</sup> An important security miscalculation was the lack of sufficient perimeter wire, which had been ordered on the basis of measurements for the Bossasso camp site, where the assessed threat was lower.<sup>506</sup>

The CJFS deployed with 30 days' supply of ammunition, based on the NATO low-intensity scale, as modified by Land Force Command Headquarters and approved by NDHQ,<sup>507</sup> but it was sent separately from the troops, who arrived ahead of their ammunition to a potentially hostile environment.<sup>508</sup> Maj Pommet noted in a report of April 17, 1993 that when the troops arrived in Mogadishu without their ammunition, transport personnel wanted to send them on to Belet Huen empty-handed. The situation was rectified by a platoon commander.<sup>509</sup>

Numerous other supplies were lacking for a variety of reasons. The troops were initially given steel helmets, which proved too hot for desert use and were not bulletproof.<sup>510</sup> When the Kevlar helmets arrived there were not enough for everyone. Poor advance intelligence meant there were few maps, and those given to the early patrols were poorly drawn and inaccurate.<sup>511</sup> Patrols soon learned to navigate by memory.<sup>512</sup>

## Vehicles

When the Operation Cordon declaration of readiness was issued, it was noted that there were still outstanding equipment issues. This was a grave understatement. Planning for vehicles illustrates the disorganization and confusion in the transition from one mission to the other. Because the CAR had been downsized, total re-equipping of it with armoured vehicles and some restructuring of vehicles were necessary.

In his testimony, Maj Kampman described the preparations for his squadron as “controlled chaos”. He expressed concern about “going bare bones” and noted that he had to guess at the quantities for ammunition, fuel, weapons, and ancillary equipment to send along with the Cougars. The Cougars had not been expected to go on operations, so staff had not designed a field equipment table for a Cougar squadron on operations.<sup>513</sup> Maj Kampman stated that only 30 to 40 per cent of the vehicles were completely operational before deployment. Adding to this confusion, the squadron was given only hours to identify and collate their list of equipment and supplies, which then had to be rushed to the quartermaster.<sup>514</sup> Other equipment was added late to the list. Even after the task force movement tables were submitted, higher-level headquarters insisted on adding specialized equipment at the last minute, such as the 60-ton crane that the CARBG had already decided it did not need.<sup>515</sup> This forced the CARBG to reduce its fleet to stay within the 150-vehicle limit that had been imposed. It also meant that the movement tables became inaccurate and ceased to be useful. With so many levels of headquarters involved, Special Service Force Headquarters was not kept informed of these changes.<sup>516</sup>

Transport of the vehicles was not co-ordinated with deployment of the main body of troops. The vehicles arrived between January 10th and 15th, which meant that CARBG’s early security patrols had to be on foot.<sup>517</sup> Because there were insufficient vehicles to transport Canadian supplies from Belet Huen airport to the camp site, trucks had to be rented locally.<sup>518</sup> When the vehicles did arrive, some had problems requiring immediate repairs, and some were unusable because of damage resulting from storms during the Atlantic crossing.<sup>519</sup>

One problem exacerbated another. Constant additions to and deletions from the vehicle fleet, even after movement tables were supposed to have been finalized, meant that appropriate numbers and types of parts were not sent.<sup>520</sup> This caused particular havoc for the Grizzlies, which were not suited to the dusty and uneven desert terrain and required repairs. But the wrong spare parts had been sent. Repairs that could have been completed before deployment were not done, because the regimental armourer’s tool kit had



been packed, and no action was taken to borrow tools from another unit. As Maj Pommet noted, "We see the peacetime mentality — that is, carry out repairs once you reach the scene."<sup>521</sup>

Some of the vehicles required immediate repairs after unloading. Sgt Hobbs (maintenance supervisor, Royal Canadian Dragoons) testified that when the warning order was given on December 4th, all vehicles were assessed as "battle worthy", even though many repairs were required and could not be completed before the vehicles had to be loaded on December 18th.<sup>522</sup> In fact, the armoured vehicle fleet was in such a poor state of maintenance before the warning order, that two squadrons had to be stripped to assemble one completely operational squadron for deployment.<sup>523</sup>

Lack of spare parts and poor vehicle condition naturally affected maintenance. Heat, dust and poor road conditions caused frequent breakdowns. Over the course of the mission, 120 tires had to be replaced because of punctures caused by large thorns from local plants.<sup>524</sup> Vehicles required daily repairs, but because of downsizing, the maintenance platoon was too small to handle both the continual repairs and the daily patrol missions.<sup>525</sup>

### ***Logistical Disorganization and Haste***

Disorganization and haste characterized preparations for Operation Deliverance. As a result, several key planning steps were ignored. The lessons learned from preparations for Operation Python were not reviewed: insufficient flow of information to the logistics planners, lack of reconnaissance of the proposed camp site, lack of logistics intelligence on the areas of operation, logistics staffs not involved in planning for deployment, and inadequate estimates for supplies. There was little communication with transportation specialists to evaluate the Mogadishu and Belet Huen airfields or inland transportation systems. Instead, the logistics flow priorities should have been established early and then updated regularly as the operation progressed.

One of the major consequences of deploying in haste was poorly documented movement tables and tables of organization and equipment. Determining the number of sea containers required was critical in determining how much shipping capacity would have to be chartered and what equipment would be packed and loaded in what order. However, the constant addition of large numbers of new items and the haste to stuff them into sea containers made it difficult to make an accurate count and ensure that loading took place in the right order.<sup>526</sup> The after-action report of March 21, 1995 was critical of this approach. Although the CARBG was briefed on the importance of itemizing container contents, apparently whole containers were "stuffed with 20,000 lbs simply labelled 'military stores'"; determining the contents of containers therefore cost time and effort and

resulted in delays in receipt of supplies. The Operation Cordon materiel list was never checked to remove supplies no longer needed once the mission moved to Belet Huen. No NDHQ staff check was carried out to assess changing requirements from Bossasso to Baledogle to Belet Huen.<sup>527</sup>

The issue is a lack of communication between Canadian Forces foreign traffic unit personnel and the CARBG. An after-action report of February 2, 1993 adds another dimension: when CAR members attempted to advise on how to load the ship, they were ignored by foreign traffic unit personnel.<sup>528</sup>

To alleviate some of the confusion caused by poor inventory, a manual locator system was initiated by the CARBG quartermaster. This proved somewhat ineffective because of time constraints in loading. Some materiel was shipped direct to Somalia without passing through the quartermaster's office and was therefore not added to the inventory. Even when these items reached their destination, there were too few supply technicians to manage supply accounting, due to the lack of a second and third line organization.<sup>529</sup>

Many difficulties caused by poor logistical planning could have been avoided had there been more integration and co-operation among the movement and supply staffs during the warning phase. Supplies and equipment were lost not only because manifests were inaccurate and not updated frequently, but also because of a lack of interconnecting communication at all points from loading through unloading, a loss of visibility of the materiel once it was turned over to a commercial carrier, and improperly addressed documents.<sup>530</sup> This latter problem meant an extra burden of unloading and repacking for CARBG staff, who sometimes received materiel from Nairobi addressed to CJFS Headquarters in Mogadishu because these supplies had been mixed on the same pallet with items intended for the CARBG.<sup>531</sup> The pallets themselves were the wrong size, causing difficulties in loading from HMCS *Preserver* onto the CC-130s. Even unloading was slowed by the lack of traffic technicians or air movement personnel — casualties of the manning ceiling. Unloading was done by hand by HMCS *Preserver* personnel.<sup>532</sup>

The lack of combat service support marred the initial arrivals of both troops and supplies in Somalia. There was no one to track movements of stores and equipment or to deliver either to mission sites. The landing of the troops was so disorganized that no one had thought ahead about feeding them on arrival and before they began their first march, unacclimatized, in the hot sun. It was only through the ad hoc intervention of Maj Gillam's staff that the troops were given food and water before moving out.<sup>533</sup>

### ***Lack of Communication and Chain of Command Confusion***

Good planning necessitates early and close co-operation between operational and logistics personnel, who must understand the initial operational concept and be involved in its evolution. This fundamental principle of

logistical planning was not acted upon in Operation Python, nor was it remembered in Operation Deliverance. An after-action report of March 21, 1995 recommended that every activity involving J3 Operations personnel should also include the J4 Logistics staff.<sup>534</sup> There would have been better communication had there been more headquarters liaison officers to co-ordinate efforts among planners at multiple levels and throughout the chain of command. Liaison officers should have been available from the CARBG and NDHQ, J3 Operations, J4 Logistics and J4 Materiel staff during the planning, warning, and deployment phases.<sup>535</sup>

The lack of communication and co-ordination had serious consequences at the operational level. When HMCS *Preserver* sailed, it lacked the necessary army maps. Moreover, the army and navy teletype computers were incompatible, because of poor communication between the ship and planning staffs. There were constant conflicts in decision making between the principal units (HMCS *Preserver* and the CARBG) and the hierarchy of staffs (Land Force Command, Land Force Central Area, and Special Service Force headquarters) involved in planning.<sup>536</sup> Confusion resulted over which set of orders to follow. For example, LFCA and LFC headquarters confirmed early which stores had been identified as marked for loading on HMCS *Preserver*. These stores were to be shipped directly to Halifax, but when SSF Headquarters later discovered that this was not possible, some stores ended up in CFB Petawawa.<sup>537</sup>

At other times, the judgement of the CARBG was questioned regarding its choice of deployment equipment, especially its decision to bring electrical generators.<sup>538</sup> Priorities for loading cargo were constantly changing. There was little co-ordination in determining which items were high priority for HMCS *Preserver* or for air transportation. The CARBG was frequently not consulted in setting the priority list, and usually not notified about what equipment and supplies were to be downgraded.<sup>539</sup> There was no National Support Element to take charge, monitor, and evaluate the tracking and loading of goods.

During the frenetic days after the warning order and before the loading of the final items, there were criticisms of confused orders, misdirection and micro-management. The vehicle maintenance unit, for example, had only seven days to repair the many poorly maintained vehicles for A Squadron, and the unit resented taking time from this urgent task to fill out detailed daily situation reports on its progress.<sup>540</sup>

### ***Errors in Leadership***

Three significant leadership shortcomings can be identified in the area of logistical planning. First, logistics planners were not sent to establish liaison with the U.S. force before deployment. Second, little logistical forethought was given to the decisions to move the area of operations from Bossasso to Baledogle to Belet Huen. Third, the need for a National Support Element



to accompany the CARBG was ignored before the mission began and for three months afterward.

For Operation Cordon it was estimated that sufficient logistics support had been built in, particularly since HMCS *Preserver* could dock at Bossasso. Operation Deliverance altered all this, resulting in a heavy Canadian dependence on the U.S. contingent for supplies and logistical support (including everything from hard rations to vehicles). There was no longer a UN logistics chain to resupply the troops. A Canada-U.S. memorandum of understanding had been signed. Following a meeting between Col Labbé and LGen Johnson, a logistics team was sent to Camp Pendleton from First Canadian Division Headquarters on December 14, 1992 to work out the implementing agreement.<sup>541</sup> Col Furrie testified that there was no senior logistics officer on either of the teams sent to MacDill Air Force Base and Camp Pendleton. This was an oversight.<sup>542</sup>

Throughout the planning and warning phases for Operation Deliverance, there was a sense of urgency to get the mission off the ground, regardless of the state of readiness. On November 5th Col Furrie had sent a memo to the senior levels of NDHQ stating that the mission should be delayed because of numerous equipment shortfalls. Canadian stockpiles were geared to a European theatre rather than desert climate and terrain, so more time was required to compile items needed for Somalia.<sup>543</sup> This warning went largely unheeded as the 'can do' attitude set in. The mission was to go on as planned unless a "showstopper" was identified. Among senior logistics officers, there was the feeling that the deployment could be slowed down only if some element that would have affected the safety and welfare of troops was entirely absent. This would have been difficult for the J4 to evaluate, since that office became aware of the change in mission only on December 4th.<sup>544</sup> Maj Gillam detected serious problems with the mission, but he remained silent because he believed that LFCA Headquarters or NDHQ would have anticipated these problems as he had and rectified them.<sup>545</sup>

When the CARBG was scheduled to deploy to Baledogle, it was planned that they would receive logistical support from U.S. 10th Mountain Division. However, when the location shifted to Belet Huen, the logistical estimate was made at the operational level in Somalia, and NDHQ was not informed. Col Furrie testified that he found out only after the decision had been made. He believed that Col Labbé's decision to go to Belet Huen was never scrutinized by NDHQ.<sup>546</sup> Otherwise, an alarm would have been raised over CARBG moving out of the logistical reach of 10th Mountain Division. Maj Gillam worried less about the actual physical move to Belet Huen and more about the lack of continuing second line support once in camp.<sup>547</sup> Nonetheless, he could not provide Col Labbé with "showstoppers". Col Labbé testified that he reviewed the options and assessed Belet Huen as a viable option even

without a National Support Element. He was concerned by the 350 kilometres between Mogadishu and Belet Huen, but he ensured that CARBG received “first class service” and always had adequate combat supplies.<sup>548</sup>

If it is general practice to send a single unit overseas with built-in second and third line support, why was the logistical unit severed from the CARBG? If a combat unit requires extra logistical help to make it self-sufficient, why did it take more than three months for a National Support Element to be sent to Somalia? The likely answer is that the rigid personnel ceiling of 900 meant there was little room to manoeuvre once the numbers in the combat unit and its supporting squadrons and platoons were added up.

A second flaw in the planning led to the mistaken assumption that the small Service Commando unit could assume all logistical responsibilities. Maj Gillam had suggested a National Support Element early in the planning for Operation Deliverance, but Col Labbé informed him that LCol Mathieu had assured him that Service Commando could provide adequate support.<sup>549</sup> No one at NDHQ took the time to assess the consequences of this decision or to consider making the National Support Element a completely separate unit from the CARBG.<sup>550</sup> When the Logistics Staff Assistance Team arrived in Somalia on February 19, 1993, LCol Carveth assessed logistics support as being in dire need of a 60 per cent augmentation in size and declared the mission in jeopardy if proper support was not sent.<sup>551</sup> Although Col Labbé had requested a national support element on January 19th, and several further requests were made in February, the unit did not arrive until March.

## FINDINGS

- *We find that no policy analysis or evaluation was undertaken to assess the logistical changes required for the change of mission from Operation Cordon to Operation Deliverance.*

Deployment should have been delayed until logistically, at least, everything was in a state of preparedness, including all equipment (especially vehicles) and supplies (especially those adapted for desert use). Supplies and equipment had been packed for 750 personnel, not the 900 personnel required for Operation Deliverance. There was no logistical reconnaissance of the Belet Huen camp site, and there was no host infrastructure on which to rely. NDHQ saw Operation Deliverance as a pared-down mission requiring a minimum of logistical support. When the decision was made to build the Belet Huen camp site, there were insufficient supplies. Senior J4 planners were not consulted in the initial planning process.

- Significant negative logistical effects flowed from moving the mission from Bossasso to Belet Huen. A 'can do' attitude prevailed. Senior J4 officers at NDHQ were not included in the logistical evaluation of the new site. The senior J4 officer in Somalia worried about providing sufficient second line support to Belet Huen, but Col Labbé was confident that there would be no significant problems.

At the Bossasso site, HMCS *Preserver* would have docked at the port and been able to meet all major supply needs. Unloading would have been from ship to shore. Belet Huen proved more challenging, because land transportation was over 350 kilometres of rough and unsafe road between Mogadishu and Belet Huen. Consequently, most materiel had to be flown by CC-130s to the Belet Huen airfield. To complicate matters, haste in packing the sea containers in Canada resulted in poor supply accounting procedures and difficulty locating needed supplies.

- Essential items (such as hard rations) for 60 days were prepared and packed. It was expected that from Day 61 on UN suppliers would be responsible for all future replenishments. When the mission became the U.S.-led UNITAF, the Canadian Forces scrambled to provide needed supplies. Dependence on the U.S. contingent (who were well equipped) ensued for some essential items.
- A national support element was not included in the 900-person ceiling imposed on Operation Deliverance. This caused a serious void in second and third line support capabilities.

Serious concerns were voiced before deployment about not sending a national support element to accompany the CARBG. They were repeated on January 19th by Col Labbé and reiterated by senior logistics planners in Ottawa in February. However, the NSE did not arrive in Somalia until March. The CARBG's Service Commando was assigned all logistical responsibilities in theatre, even though it was drastically understaffed and overwhelmed by the scope of such tasks as unloading the 384 sea containers. The Service Commando could not meet the second and third line support requirements of the CARBG. Morale was undermined and unnecessary hardships were created by poor planning and supply choices, such as the lack of cold water, fresh food, and equipment and supplies suited to desert conditions. Fresh rations were promised to begin three weeks after deployment, but did not actually materialize until March, almost three months later.



## CAMP LAYOUT

The location and layout of a military camp are critical to the success of a mission and the security of personnel. Senior officers must decide, based on well established doctrine, how and where to build a camp, using the technical means and human resources available. While the location of the Belet Huen camp did not emerge as a significant issue at our hearings, the layout of the camp was clearly of major concern to many of the soldiers who testified. During training for Operation Cordon, the soldiers had been trained for a triangular camp layout (considered by some to be a defensive posture),<sup>552</sup> which was considered a standard layout for CF operations. On arrival in Belet Huen, they confronted a large, elongated camp, spread out over a mile-long area on either side of a local public highway (see Figure 25.5). Many soldiers voiced concern about the negative impact of the camp layout on the general conduct of operations. Very few expressed confidence in the arrangement.

Our review of the evidence led us to conclude that the decentralized camp configuration had a serious impact on the conduct of operations in theatre. The layout negatively influenced security, basic operating procedures, and troop cohesiveness; it left areas open to infiltration, contributed to materiel shortages, and increased the chances of casualties from friendly fire.

In the review that follows we first consider the manner in which decisions about camp location and layout were made, then review the impact of the layout decision on key aspects of the operation, including security risks and troop safety, materiel shortages, and morale. We end with a brief summary of findings.

## Selection of Camp Location


When the troops arrived at Belet Huen on December 28, 1992, the initial plans were for a camp in the vicinity of the airport. The decision to locate the compound at the Belet Huen site instead of near the airport was based on several factors. First, the airport field was difficult to defend from military attack. Second, heavy supply trucks from Mogadishu would have to pass through the village to bring goods and equipment to a compound located at the airport site, exposing themselves to theft and violence. Third, there was evidence that the Belet Huen airfield was in a flood-exposed area. Finally, the CARBG was able to secure an alternative location with some structures already in place.<sup>553</sup>

According to the testimony of Maj Mansfield, no formal decision-making process was followed by the CO of the CARBG to select the camp location. There was merely an informal discussion between the Commander and his



Figure 25.5: The CARBG camp at Belet Huen depicting the various compounds on either side of the Imperial Highway, a public road running through the camp. The original photograph was Exhibit "E" at the General Court Martial of Captain Rainville.

Figure 25.6: Computer-generated scale diagram of the Belet Huen relative to the surrounding area. Note the city of Belet Huen to the left of the camp.





staff advisers, who generally accepted the site as suitable for the mission.<sup>554</sup> The decision about location was supposedly based on tactical positioning rather than security. A factor that allegedly influenced the position was that the location allowed Canadian troops to control important routes and block access to General Aidid in Mogadishu.<sup>555</sup> Despite the lack of process, the decision about location does appear somewhat defensible (particularly if the road cutting through the centre of the camp is disregarded as a location issue). But even if the location decision was defensible, the rationale does not extend to justify the decision about the layout of the camp.

## Selection of Camp Layout

According to accepted military custom, five factors are key to determining appropriate layout.

- The length of the deployment — whether days or months — determines whether the configuration should be temporary or permanent.
- The purpose of the camp — whether it was necessary to assume a defensive position, to build a home base, or an administrative site.
- Available resources — whether sufficient supplies (such as perimeter lighting and wire) were available to build a more decentralized camp than the one envisaged for Bossasso.
- The security situation — whether the camp could be protected from sabotage, thieves, and curious passers-by.
- The need for cohesiveness — whether cohesiveness and communications between the commandos would be jeopardized if the units were physically isolated from each other.

The layout ultimately chosen consisted of small separate sections spread out over a distance of 1.5 kilometres, a layout that left the commandos widely dispersed. (Figure 25.6 shows the length and size of the camp relative to the Belet Huen area.) A triangular layout, the one used in training, would have concentrated all of the CARBG in one secured area, with only one perimeter to defend. What factors were considered in laying out the camp in the decentralized manner, given that the troops had trained for a triangular layout?

First it was believed that the camp at Belet Huen would not be permanent, and this was critical to initial plans for the layout.

Another thing was that at the beginning — when we were establishing the camps, I knew, or I anticipated, that the camps would not be permanent. We were not all that permanent in fact.<sup>556</sup>

The fact that there were existing structures in certain areas was another factor. The locations of the engineers and service compounds were predetermined, because an infrastructure was already available,<sup>557</sup> and the balance of the camps were set up around these two.

Finally, initial plans contemplated setting up islands of defence, sufficiently spread out to minimize the risk of indirect fire attacks.<sup>558</sup> The theory was that if one camp was hit, the others would still be protected, unlike a single camp, which was considered far more vulnerable to indirect fire.

A triangular layout was dismissed by LCol Mathieu (at least for the size of the battalion in Somalia) as being too big. LCol Mathieu was of the opinion that a triangular compound would not be adequate for the materiel, vehicles and 900-person contingent. Moreover, he had read documentation to the effect that the exercises in Petawawa were not conclusive, so he dismissed the idea.<sup>559</sup>

Apart from these factors, it was not clear from the evidence whether other factors were considered, such as resource availability or cohesiveness.

Once the concept of the layout had been approved, decisions about which locations fell to which Commando took place while the troops were marching down the road leading to the Strada Imperiala. Each Commando selected its own spot; it was every Commando for itself. No instructions or directions were given by the Commanding Officer.<sup>560</sup> At first, 2 Commando was supposed to share a compound with 3 Commando, but because a locally owned piece of land intervened, they had to move west, past the engineer compound, the fuel bladders, and the helicopters.<sup>561</sup>

The reasons cited for the layout of the camp may have some merit, but they fail to satisfy us that the appropriate factors were given due consideration in the decision to lay it out in the manner chosen. We believe that some critical factors, such as cohesiveness of the unit and availability of resources, were neglected or ignored and that other factors such as the security situation were not afforded the appropriate weight or were misapplied, for example, the purpose of the camp.

Numerous officers and soldiers who testified at the hearings expressed pointed criticisms of the layout from many perspectives. Most expressed concern about security, because of the much enlarged perimeter area that would have to be defended and the vulnerability inherent in having an uncontrolled public road running through the centre of the camp and beside vital installations.<sup>562</sup> Some were of the view that the layout should have been restricted to the plan that they came prepared to execute, specifically the plan for "one large camp".<sup>563</sup>

Maj Mansfield found the layout unsuitable, even though he supported the choice of location. He was under the impression, following discussions with his superior, that the camp would be a single box-shaped or rectangular unit.<sup>564</sup> He confirmed that either a triangular or a rectangular camp would have had advantages over the dispersed layout.

A single geometric camp would have been all of those things [simplicity, security, economy of effort, cohesiveness] be it triangular or square.<sup>565</sup>

Although LCol Moffat, Col Labbé's Chief of Operations, was reluctant to offer an opinion on the issue, under questioning he declared that the layout of the camp was simply "a layout of bivouac areas along a road, but not a defended position in the definition."<sup>566</sup>

Others were more openly disdainful. MWO Amaral stated, "it's a stupid set up and it doesn't make any sense."<sup>567</sup> Sgt Little maintained that he lost respect for the Commanding Officer primarily because of the layout of the camp, which he believed to be "just foolish. There was no military value to it. It was dangerous, in my opinion, the way he had the camp set up."<sup>568</sup>

Maj Pommet expressed criticism in his after-action report on the operation, written in April 1993. He expressed his preference for a triangular layout, as it emphasized basic principles: simplicity, security, economy of effort, cohesiveness of the regiment and perimeter defence. He questioned the reasoning behind the decision, stating that it appeared to be attributable only to the priority that certain organizations gave to comfort.<sup>569</sup>

## Conclusions

For reasons set out below, which illustrate the extent to which the layout adversely affected the conduct of operations, we conclude that the camp layout was unacceptable given the alleged and anticipated threat from factions in the region and from endemic thievery. The layout failed to address security concerns, failed to support a more cohesive unit, and considerably aggravated the problems posed by limitations in available materiel and resources.

### Effects on Security Operations

Not surprisingly, many of the soldiers saw the layout as insecure. Not only was the camp spread out, with individual encampments for the units, on either side of a public road, but Somali nationals and refugees lived in close proximity to many of the individual encampments. As a result of the elongated set-up, the perimeter of the camp was much longer than it would have been with a single camp, requiring considerably more wire to secure the areas and considerably more manpower to patrol. Objectively, it is difficult to imagine any other conclusion being drawn.



According to LCol Mathieu, decentralizing the compound increased security against indirect military attacks because of what he referred to as mutual support by soldiers from all sections of the compound in the event of a siege.<sup>570</sup> He believed that a dispersed layout increased security because it covered more territory and more approach access to the camp. He stated that once a single camp is attacked and breached, the enemy is inside, whereas the way this camp was laid out, if one section went down, the whole camp would not necessarily be defeated.<sup>571</sup>

This view might have been reasonable if the perceived threat was only the risk of indirect fire, but it was clearly limited given the information available about the type of activities and threats facing the troops at Belet Huen. Although there were serious problems in the intelligence received before deployment, commanders and senior officers were nonetheless aware of endemic thievery and the use of small arms. The risk of drive-by shootings on the road running through the compound should have been considered high. Maj Pommet voiced this concern and added that the road passing through the Service Commando and Engineers camp left the site vulnerable to grenades tossed from the road. For thieves or others who intended harm to the camp, a quick escape route was available through the refugee village nearby.<sup>572</sup>

Moreover, the fact that each Commando was responsible for the defence of its own perimeter led to redundant defence systems and inefficient use of manpower in the circumstances. On this matter, Maj Vanderveer (the Officer Commanding Service Commando) wrote in his after-action report.

Having separate [commando] lines has increased security manpower [requirement] and also creates engagement problems. A single [regiment] camp would have reduced this problem. Because of [temporary depot for munitions] and in/out route and size of [Service Commando] six [personnel] are on security at any one time [each] night. This reduces numbers of [personnel available] to fulfill [support] functions to rifle [commandos].<sup>573</sup>

Maj Mansfield cited similar problems. On March 4th, he had to request assistance with security at the Engineers compound. According to him, standing guard interfered with the unit's work as engineers.<sup>574</sup>

The issue is best described by Maj Pommet in his after-action report.

The Regiment is currently spread over a distance of 1.5 km in various small camps, causing communications, supply and transport problems.... Several small camps pose additional security problems, such as guard duty and the need for redundant defence systems.... This point stems directly from the question of security. Because there are several camps, the [commandos] must provide their own perimeter security. They therefore have to use considerable manpower just for guard duty. Further, under the triangular formation, the riflemen were responsible for sentry duty, thereby ensuring that the specialists — [medical assistants, vehicle technicians] and so on — had the time needed to perform their primary duties, rather than standing guard duty.<sup>575</sup>

Security for the enlarged perimeter area was also affected indirectly by the shortage of wire. According to Maj Mansfield, the decentralized compound was far less secure because of a shortage of barbed wire, and soldiers were concerned about attack because they knew materiel shortages were weakening their defences. Moreover, the decision about layout was taken knowing that the threat was greater than in Bossasso.<sup>576</sup>

Col Labbé supported the layout decision, speculating that it had been made by balancing the risk of a conventional military attack against the need to deal with infiltration by looters or saboteurs.<sup>577</sup> We found his testimony self-serving and unconvincing, his suggested rationale for the decision merely echoing the reasons expressed by LCol Mathieu.

## Effects on Cohesiveness and Morale

Comraderie and cohesiveness were not fostered by the layout. The three commandos were far apart, separating the Francophones in 1 Commando from the other units. Maj Pommet testified that having the three commandos “under the same roof” would have fostered interaction.<sup>578</sup> In his after-action report, he noted further that with a triangular layout, they could have had an officers’ mess and an NCOs’ mess to serve as social centres for the camp — places to relax with peers and alleviate stress.<sup>579</sup>

None of this was available under the decentralized arrangement. According to LCol Mathieu, the decentralized layout allowed the commandos to come and go, minimizing disruption to others and enabling them to develop and live by their own schedules.<sup>580</sup> But this was hardly conducive to promoting the interaction that fosters unit cohesiveness.

After ensuring the safety of the troops, a foremost concern should be their quality of life. Camp improvements should be made to enhance the conditions under which troops live and work. Maj Mansfield testified that he could have provided more facilities for the comfort of the troops, but that he encountered resistance to such suggestions from officers at headquarters, who maintained that this was not a long-term mission. His perception was that there was a general feeling that the Airborne soldiers were tough and did not require extra comforts.

The troops were living mainly on hard rations “to...minimize risk...from preparing food in the open.”<sup>581</sup> Maj Gillam testified that the camp layout was one reason why the soldiers could get fresh-cooked meals only on a rotational basis. Fresh meals were prepared in a single insulated, air-conditioned tent to reduce the risk of food spoilage. Consequently, each group had fresh rations only once a week.

Guard duty affected both morale and effectiveness. Because more guards were needed to secure the spread-out camp, fewer soldiers were available to patrol in Belet Huen or perform other tasks. As Maj Pommet pointed out in

his after action report, specialists in the Service Commando and the Medical Platoon also had guard duty, which gave them less time for their primary duties.<sup>582</sup> More duties meant fatigue.<sup>583</sup>

## The Eventuality of Friendly Fire

The configuration of the camp posed a risk of friendly fire — that is, that soldiers in one part of the camp, perhaps in the process of defending a compound from outside attack, would have to shoot toward another part of the camp, running the risk of shooting a member of their own unit or damaging facilities and materiel. As Maj Pommet stated at the time:

No orders were given relating to defence — such as arcs of fire or arcs of responsibility — or coordination in the event of a ground attack. Currently, the [Commandos] are defending themselves individually, with no coordinated mutual support and without even knowing what action to take if the need arises to help the [Service Commando], 3 [Commando] or the engineers.<sup>584</sup>

Although Maj Pommet had serious concerns about many aspects of the layout from the start, he never discussed them with LCol Mathieu until an incident in early March, when bullets fired from the Service Commando entered the 1 Commando area.<sup>585</sup> That incident spurred Maj Pommet to action.<sup>586</sup> The response was simply an instruction to the troops the following day to use their judgement before using their rifles.

To reduce the danger of friendly fire, LCol Mathieu's headquarters asked CJFS HQ for more shotguns to deal with the problem.<sup>587</sup> The lack of shotguns became an important issue in the March 4th incident, when one Somali national was killed and another injured (see Volume 5, Chapter 38).

LCol Mathieu did not disagree that the chance of friendly fire was greater with a decentralized camp, but he nonetheless maintained that greater weight was given to other factors, such as proximity to the road, because supply trucks could not be driven on unsound ground.<sup>588</sup> To deal with the risk of friendly fire, LCol Mathieu said that the soldiers could always hide in the trenches to defend themselves.<sup>589</sup>

We find the response and approach to the possibility of friendly fire both simplistic and elementary. The potential for friendly fire is of major significance to the safety of troops. A simple admonishment to watch where you are firing is insufficient to address safety concerns. The fact that a decentralized layout was more vulnerable to the risk of friendly fire than a triangular layout is apparent and ought to have been a factor in the decision about camp layout.



## Effects on Materiel Shortages

The dispersed layout required far more barbed wire for perimeter security and more wire for lighting and communications than a smaller compound would have demanded. There were problems getting wire to the camp, and shortages limited the extent and effectiveness of wire defences.<sup>590</sup> Engineers complained about the lack of barbed wire, and electrical wire caused by the increased size of the perimeter of the camp layout.

In response to these complaints, LCol Mathieu countered that they only received the materiel that had been allotted for Operation Cordon, which was to have had a non-tactical permanent compound. In his view, even with a less decentralized camp, there would not have been sufficient materiel to meet all the security needs identified.<sup>591</sup>

After realizing that the new camp layout was larger than anticipated, Maj Mansfield raised a concern about the shortage in barbed wire in informal discussions with LCol Mathieu. The answer was that Canadian Forces were tapped into the U.S. contingent's supply system, and because of that, there was the potential to obtain additional wire.<sup>592</sup> However, no extra wire was ever obtained from this source.

The dispersed camp layout also created problems in getting electrical power to every unit. Again, when the supplies were packed in Canada, everything was measured for the dimensions of the Bossasso camp.<sup>593</sup> Maj Mansfield was not sure he would have enough cable to bring power to everyone. He had to use point generation systems, meaning that each Commando had a small generator, an arrangement that was maintenance-intensive and generated fluctuating power after a few weeks.<sup>594</sup> Although some supplies were eventually received, 2 Commando never did receive any perimeter lighting.<sup>595</sup>

Given the supplies that were available to the Engineers and their relative isolation from the other commandos, Maj Mansfield stated, the dispersed layout put a strain on his men. The problem did not appear sufficiently serious for him to tell his Commanding Officer that he was unable to perform his duties.<sup>596</sup> The attitude was to "Do the best that you can with the resources that you have."<sup>597</sup>

Once again we find that the problem of materiel shortages was met with indifference. The significance of the issue for troops who were confronting risk in insecure conditions was not seriously acknowledged.

## Loss of Confidence

Many of the soldiers and officers who testified indicated, with varying degrees of criticism, dissatisfaction with the camp layout, which they blamed for the lack of security, the need for more patrols, the shortages of barbed wire and electrical equipment, the scarcity of fresh rations, and other annoyances. This was the subject of conversation among many of the troops and had the effect of undermining the confidence of the soldiers in their leaders.

## FINDINGS

- Although the deployment of Canadian troops to Somalia was a tactical deployment under anticipated threat, the camp was configured more along the lines of an administrative site, rather than a defended position.
- Appropriate factors were not given due consideration in the decision to lay out the camp in the manner chosen. Some critical factors, such as cohesiveness of the unit and the availability of resources, were neglected or ignored, while other factors were not afforded the appropriate weight (the security situation) or were misapplied (the purpose of the camp).
- A camp layout emphasizing basic principles of simplicity, security, economy of effort, the homogeneity of the Regiment, and perimeter defence would have been a more appropriate layout for this operation.
- The decentralized layout required increased security resources and personnel. This left the troops exhausted because of extra duties. It also left the camp more vulnerable to infiltration and terrorist attacks.
- The camp was so configured as to be susceptible to friendly fire. Such an incident occurred in early March 1993, when bullets from Service Commando entered the First Commando site.
- Supplies of barbed wire and perimeter lighting were insufficient for the decentralized layout. Materials had been calculated for the Bossasso site where the threat assessment had been lower.
- The decentralized layout provided inadequate facilities to cook and prepare fresh rations. As a result, fresh meals were served centrally, on a rotational basis, only once a week for each group. This affected morale.
- The dispersed layout of the camp isolated the commandos, particularly 2 Commando, and discouraged unit bonding and cohesiveness.
- The dispersed layout of the camp undermined the confidence of the soldiers in their leaders.

## Recommendations

We recommend that:

- 25.1 To redress the planning problems earmarked by the Somalia mission, the Chief of the Defence Staff reinforce the importance of battle procedure (the process commanders use to select, warn, organize, and deploy troops for missions) as the proper foundation for operational planning at all levels of the Canadian Forces, and that the importance of systematic planning based on battle procedure be emphasized in staff training courses.
- 25.2 Contrary to recent experience, the Chief of the Defence Staff enunciate the principles that apply to planning, commanding, and conducting operations by the Canadian Forces in each international operation where these differ from national principles of planning, commanding, and conducting operations.
- 25.3 The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that all states of command, such as national command, full command, and operational command are defined on the basis of Canadian military standards and criteria.
- 25.4 For each international operation, the Chief of the Defence Staff issue clear and concrete orders and terms of reference to guide commanders of Canadian Forces units and elements deployed on those operations. These should address, among other things: the mission statement, terms of employment, command relationships, and support relationships.
- 25.5 The Chief of the Defence Staff clarify the duties and responsibilities of the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff and, in particular, identify precisely when the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff is or is not in the chain of command.
- 25.6 In light of the Somalia experience, the Chief of the Defence Staff assert the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff under the *National Defence Act*, to establish better "control and administration" of the Canadian Forces, taking appropriate steps to ensure that the Chief of the Defence Staff has adequate staff assistance to carry out this duty.



- 25.7 The Chief of the Defence Staff provide commanders deployed on operations with precise orders and unambiguous reporting requirements and lines to ensure that Canadian laws and norms are respected.
- 25.8 The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that all plans for the employment of the Canadian Forces be subject to operational evaluations at all levels before operational deployment.
- 25.9 The Chief of the Defence Staff establish standing operating procedures for:
  - (a) planning, testing, and deploying Canadian Forces in domestic or international operations; and
  - (b) the conduct of operations by the Canadian Forces in domestic or international operations.
- 25.10 The Chief of the Defence Staff establish principles, criteria, and policies governing the selection, employment and terms of reference for commanders appointed to command Canadian Forces units or elements in domestic or international operations.
- 25.11 The Chief of the Defence Staff conduct training and evaluation exercises to prepare and test staff procedures, doctrine, planning, and staff officers in National Defence Headquarters and in the chain of command.
- 25.12 The Chief of the Defence Staff establish a uniform system for recording decisions taken by senior officers during all stages of planning for operations. The records maintained under this system should include a summary of the actions and decisions of officers and identify them by rank and position. The records should include important documents related to the history of the operation, including such things as estimates, reconnaissance reports, central discussions, orders, and casualty and incident reports.
- 25.13 The Chief of the Defence Staff or the Chief of the Defence Staff's designated commander identify and clarify the mission goals and objectives before commencing calculation of the force estimate.

- 25.14 The Chief of the Defence Staff base the force estimate for a given mission on the capacity of the Canadian Forces to fulfil the demands of the operation, as determined after a mission analysis has been completed and before recommending that Canadian Forces be committed for deployment.
- 25.15 The Chief of the Defence Staff develop a formal process to review force requirements once any Canadian Forces unit or element arrives in an operational theatre.
- 25.16 To remedy deficiencies in existing practices, before committing forces to an international operation, commanders should:
- (a) clearly establish the military mission as well as the tasks necessary to achieve the mission;
  - (b) return to the practice of preparing military estimates before developing the organization and composition of forces to be employed in operational theatres;
  - (c) be required to undertake a thorough reconnaissance of the specific area where the forces are to deploy; and
  - (d) accept that in the interests of deploying a force that is appropriate, well balanced and durable, proper estimates of the requirements be completed before forces are committed and personnel ceilings are imposed.
- 25.17 The Chief of the Defence Staff develop specific doctrine outlining the intelligence-gathering process for all peace support operations, to be separate and distinct from the doctrine covering intelligence gathering for combat. This doctrine should include:
- (a) a statement confirming the purpose and principles of intelligence gathering for all peace support operations, from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement. Where required, a differentiation would be made between the strategic stage, the decision-making stage, and the operational planning stage of the operation;
  - (b) a statement confirming the sources of information appropriate for use in the intelligence-gathering process;
  - (c) a section outlining anticipated use of intelligence in peace support operations, during both the decision-making stage and the operational planning stage;

- (d) a section outlining the intelligence planning process during the various stages of planning, establishing what needs to be done and by whom, including any procedures required to develop an intelligence plan for the mission or intelligence support for the training of troops; and
- (e) a section describing the dissemination process for all stages, including the manner of dissemination and the personnel involved.

- 25.18 The Government of Canada urge the United Nations to expand its peacekeeping planning division to include an intelligence organization within the secretariat that would serve to co-ordinate the intelligence required for peace support operations, including maintenance of an information base on unstable regions available for use by troop-contributing countries.
- 25.19 The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that planning doctrine includes appropriate assessment methodology to determine sufficient numbers of intelligence personnel and intelligence support personnel (interpreters) for the operation. In accordance with existing doctrine, the presence of intelligence personnel in the advance party should be ensured.
- 25.20 The Chief of the Defence Staff develop guidelines and procedures for ensuring that cultural training programs are appropriately supported by the intelligence staff by providing adequate and appropriate resources for the intelligence staff well in advance of the operation.
- 25.21 The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that sufficient resources are available and adequate guidelines are in place for intelligence staff to foster self-sufficiency in the area of intelligence planning and to discourage over-reliance on other intelligence sources.
- 25.22 The Chief of the Defence Staff review the organization and process for intelligence planning to ensure maximum communication and efficiency in the intelligence-gathering and dissemination processes.



- 25.23** To remedy deficiencies in existing practices, the Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that logistical planning is finalized only after the mission concept is developed, the size and composition of the Canadian contingent is estimated, and a full reconnaissance of the area of operations has been undertaken.
- 25.24** The Chief of the Defence Staff provide guidelines stipulating that sufficient time be taken to assess any changes in areas of operation. Such guidelines should include the stipulation that military considerations are paramount in decisions to change the proposed mission site after materiel has been packed and logistics planning completed for the original site.
- 25.25** When a change in mission is contemplated, the Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that new logistical contingency plans are completed before the new mission is undertaken.
- 25.26** The Chief of the Defence Staff ensure that a National Support Element (that is, an integrated logistics support unit) is included as a separate unit at the commencement of every mission undertaken by the Canadian Forces.

## NOTES

1. Canadian Forces, *Land Formations In Battle* (DLCD, 1987), pp. 3-3-1 to 3-3-10. See also Col. Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32724.
2. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 33774.
3. Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College (CLFCSC), "Course Brief" (November 1995), p. 4-3/11.
4. *Land Formations in Battle*, p. 3-3-2, paragraph 5.
5. CLFCSC, "Course Brief", p. 4-1/11.
6. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 166, p. 33980.
7. CLFCSC, "Course Brief", p. 4-8/11.
8. *Operational Staff Procedures*, vol. 2, *Staff Duties in the Field* (June 1993), B-GL-303-002/FP-002, pp. 9-13 and 9-14. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32728-32734.
9. FMC OPO 01, "Operation PYTHON CCMINURSO", July 29, 1991, Document book 123, tab 4.
10. Document book MOR2, tab 12, p. 1/2.
11. Document book MOR2, tab 12.

12. Operation PYTHON After Action Report, LCol Prosser for Commander, Land Force Central Area Headquarters, June 16, 1992, Document book 9, tab 15.
13. Maj J.M.P. Desnoyers (A G1/G4 Ops), Memorandum: Operation PYTHON After Action Report, July 17, 1992, Document book 9, tab 16.
14. Testimony of Col Bremner, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1483.
15. Technical mission report (March–April).
16. UN Security Council, *The Situation in Somalia, Report of the Secretary-General*, S/23829/Add. 1, April 21, 1992, Document book 9, tab 12.
17. Testimony of Col Bremner, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1484.
18. Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1486.
19. Technical mission report (March–April).
20. *The Situation in Somalia*, Document book 9, tab 12, p. DND 004985.
21. For details of Col Houghton's views on the technical team and its report, see Transcripts vol. 44, pp. 8661–8678.
22. Document book 9, tab 14. See also Testimony of Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 44, pp. 8678–8679.
23. Transcripts vol. 44, p. 8703.
24. Document book 9, tab 20.
25. Document book 9, tab 19.
26. Document book 9, tab 23.
27. Document book 9, tab 18.
28. *Estimate of the Situation: FMC Forces Available for Security Operations in Somalia*, Version no. 2, July 29, 1992, p. 2/7.
29. *Estimate of the Situation*, p. 5/7.
30. *Estimate of the Situation*, p. 6/7.
31. Memorandum, Option Analysis Somalia: Probable Tasks and Forces Available, July 29, 1992, Document book 9, tab 22, p. 2/5.
32. Option Analysis Somalia, p. 2/5.
33. *Estimate of the Situation*, Document book 9, tab 25.
34. This attitude is borne out by evidence presented later in this section.
35. Document book 9, tab 27.
36. Document book 9, tab 27, paragraph 17.
37. Document book 27, tab 18.
38. Document book 9, tab 28.
39. Document book 9, tab 28, p. 6/6.
40. Confidential: Briefing Note for the CDS on Provision of Land Forces to Somalia, August 25, 1992, Document book 11, tab 14.
41. See Technical Team Report, August 4–17, 1992, Document book 11, tab 6.
42. Confidential: Briefing Note for the CDS on Provision of Land Forces to Somalia, p. 2.
43. Referred to in Confidential: Briefing Note for the CDS on Provision of Land Forces to Somalia.
44. Confidential: Briefing Note for the CDS on Provision of Land Forces to Somalia.
45. Document book 10, tab 5.
46. Document book 10, tab 21.
47. Document book 10, tab 21.
48. Document book 10, tab 12.
49. Document book 10, tab 12.
50. Document book 10, tab 12.

51. Document book 10, tab 19.
52. FMC Draft Contingency Plan Operation Cordon, Document book 12, tab 16.
53. FMC Contingency Plan: Operation Cordon Plan Summary, and FMC Draft Contingency Plan 01: OP CORDON.
54. FMC Draft Contingency Plan 01: OP CORDON, p. 1/8.
55. Document book 27, tab 6, paragraph 16.
56. Document book 27, tab 6.
57. Document book 27, tab 6, paragraph 25.
58. Document book 27, tab 6, paragraph 28.
59. Document book 27, tab 6, paragraph 33.
60. Document book 27, tab 6, paragraphs 34 and 36.
61. Document book 28, tab 12.
62. Document book 28, tab 12.
63. Document book 28, tab 13.
64. WNGO 01—Operation Cordon, September 6, 1992, Document book 110B, tab 6.
65. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3617.
66. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7046. On September 8, 1995, the annexes from the draft plan, Document book 10, tab 28, giving guidance on training and the rules of engagement, were sent to LCol Morneault from SSF Headquarters.
67. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3714.
68. Testimony of LGen Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, p. 9415.
69. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, pp. 8988–8989.
70. Land Force Command, After Action Review: Operation HARMONY, Operation CAVALIER, Operation DELIVERANCE, Document book 61A, tab N, p. C-5/11.
71. Testimony of LGen Gervais, Transcripts vol. 47, pp. 9415–9417.
72. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, p. 8986.
73. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, p. 8989.
74. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, p. 8990.
75. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 45, p. 8988.
76. Document book 32B, tab 5.
77. Document book 32B, tab 4.
78. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3541.
79. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, pp. 3541–3542.
80. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3543; Document book 32B, tab 5.
81. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, p. 3542.
82. Document book 32B, tab 5.
83. Testimony of BGen Beno, Transcripts vol. 40, pp. 7752–7753 and 7810.
84. Document book 36, tab 2.
85. Testimony of Capt Koch, Transcripts vol. 22, pp. 4147–4148.
86. Testimony of Capt Koch, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4184–4185.
87. Testimony of Capt Koch, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4206–4207.
88. Testimony of Capt Koch, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4225–4226.
89. Testimony of Capt Koch, Transcripts vol. 22, pp. 4144–4145.
90. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 21, pp. 3841–3842.
91. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, pp. 3528–3530.
92. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, pp. 4960–4962.
93. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 22, p. 3990.



94. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 22, p. 3991.
95. Testimony of Capt Koch, Transcripts vol. 23, pp. 4199–4200.
96. See testimony of Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 44, pp. 8719–8773.
97. Document book 16, tab 12.
98. Document book 29, tabs 1, 5, and 10. The CDS was absent from NDHQ on duty at the time.
99. Testimony of Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 44, p. 8718.
100. Testimony of Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 44, p. 8723.
101. Testimony of Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 44, p. 8732.
102. *Reconnaissance Report*, October 27, 1992, Document book 16, tab 12, p. DND 005851.
103. *Reconnaissance Report*, Notes on Meeting with Gen Shaheen, pp. DND 005865–005866.
104. Briefing to VCDS/DEPUTY MINISTER—21 October 1992, Document book 16, tab 12, pp. DND 005879–005881.
105. Document book 17, tab 7.
106. Document book 59, tab 9.
107. Document book 17, tab 7.
108. Document book 59, tab 9.
109. LFCA, Operation Cordon, Operations Order 01, November 26, 1992.
110. Document book 59A, tab 2.
111. LFC, Operation Order 01, November 19, 1992, Document book 59, tab 9.
112. Document book 19, tab 13.
113. Document book 110A, tab 6.
114. Document book 19, tab 6.
115. Document book 19, tab 7.
116. Document book 19, tab 6. See also Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, pp. 9080–9087.
117. Testimony of LGen Gervais, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9638.
118. Testimony of Gen de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10043.
119. Testimony of Capt (N) McMillan, Transcripts vol. 10, pp. 1975–1976.
120. Testimony of Capt (N) McMillan, Transcripts vol. 10, p. 1995.
121. Testimony of Cmdre Cogdon, Transcripts vol. 4, pp. 947–948 (emphasis added).
122. Testimony of Cmdre Cogdon, Transcripts vol. 9, pp. 1706–1707.
123. Testimony of Cmdre Cogdon, Transcripts vol. 9, pp. 1706–1707.
124. Testimony of Cmdre Cogdon, Transcripts vol. 9, pp. 1737–1738.
125. Testimony of Col O'Brien, Transcripts vol. 10, pp. 1930–1931.
126. Testimony of Col O'Brien, Transcripts vol. 10, pp. 1934–1935.
127. Document book 32.1, tab 31.
128. Document book 20, tab 5.
129. Document book 20, tab 29.
130. Document book 59A, tab 18.
131. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32743.
132. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32749–32751.
133. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32752.
134. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32753.
135. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32753–32754.
136. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32744–32745.
137. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32749–32751.

138. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32763.
139. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32764–32766.
140. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32759, 32780.
141. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32780.
142. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32784.
143. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32790–32791.
144. Document book 110, tab 7; testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32805.
145. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32809–32810.
146. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32818.
147. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32770.
148. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, p. 32901.
149. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, p. 32907.
150. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, p. 32915.
151. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, p. 32916.
152. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, pp. 32943–32944.
153. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32904.
154. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, pp. 32952–32953.
155. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32849–32850.
156. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32841.
157. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32835–32836.
158. Memorandum, Col O'Brien to Distribution, J-Staff Trip Report OP Deliverance/ UNOSOM I & II 1–7 Mar 93, March 16, 1993, pp. 2/16, 7/16 and 8/16.
159. "Operation Deliverance: Final Report of Lessons Learned", Document book 62E, tab 18.
160. "Operation Deliverance: Final Report of Lessons Learned".
161. "After Action Report — Operation DELIVERANCE", Document book 61C, tab 1, p. 2/7.
162. "Land Force Command After Action Review: OP HARMONY, OP CAVALIER, OP CORDON, the After Action Review Summary: Operations HARMONY, DELIVERANCE AND CAVALIER", Document book 24, tab 8, p. 3/8.
163. Testimony of LGen (ret) Reay, Transcripts vol. 46, pp. 9211–9212.
164. LFC, After-Action Report: Operation Deliverance, p. C7/11.
165. Document book 9, tab 28, p. 6/6.
166. Testimony of Mr. Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, pp. 10192–10198.
167. Testimony of Gen de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10073.
168. Document book 10, tab 5, p. 1.
169. Document book 11, tab 3.
170. Testimony of Cmdre Cogdon, Transcripts vol. 9, p. 1770.
171. Testimony of Cmdre Cogdon, Transcripts vol. 9, p. 1694.
172. Testimony of Col O'Brien, Transcripts vol. 10, p. 1927.
173. Testimony of LCol Young, Transcripts vol. 29, pp. 5593, 5634.
174. Document book 31A, tab 34, p. DND 002526.
175. Testimony of Maj Wilson, Transcripts vol. 28, p. 5355.
176. Testimony of Maj Turner, Board of Inquiry, vol. 11, p. 220.
177. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20351.
178. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10045.
179. Testimony of Mr. Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, pp. 10193, 10198.
180. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10073.
181. Testimony of Mr. Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10198.

182. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, pp. 10080–10081; and Mr. Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10198.
183. Notes for consideration, Col Caron, December 5, 1992, Document book 30, tab 23, p. 1.
184. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 20, pp. 3647–3648; and Col Joly, Transcripts vol. 16, p. 2916.
185. Operation Deliverance Organization and Establishment, December 5, 1992 (not filed, DND 079067).
186. Document book 30, tab 22, pp. DND 099157–099158.
187. When LGen Gervais established the 870/30, split he had not yet met with Col Labbé. Testimony of LGen Gervais, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9645. NDHQ took little notice of how the CARBG/CJFS HQ numbers were apportioned: testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10079.
188. Document book 30, tab 44, p. 1.
189. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32874.
190. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32859–32860.
191. Testimony of LCol Young, Transcripts vol. 29, p. 5580.
192. First Canadian Division, Operation Deliverance After-Action Report, Document book 61A, tab O, p. D2–5.
193. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, p. 33094.
194. Testimony of LCol Young, Transcripts vol. 29, pp. 5646, 5591.
195. CFP 300, The Army, B-GL-300-000/FP-000, April 1984, pp. 3–10, 3–11.
196. Testimony of LGen Addy, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9555; and LGen (ret) Gervais, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9648.
197. Testimony of LGen Addy, Transcripts vol. 48, p. 9553–9554.
198. Testimony of Mr. Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10198.
199. Testimony of Mr. Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10198.
200. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10080.
201. Testimony of Mr. Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, pp. 10193–10194.
202. After-Action Report, Operation Deliverance, Document book 61C, tab 1, pp. 2/7, B1–2.
203. Testimony of CWO (ret) Jardine, Transcripts vol. 24, p. 4535.
204. Document book 30, tab 43, p. DND 008385.
205. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32884–32887.
206. Document book 20, tab 20, p. 1–2.
207. Testimony of Maj Wilson, Transcripts vol. 28, p. 5326.
208. Document book 31A, tab 33, p. D-1.
209. Document book 31A, tab 33, pp. D-2, D-3; testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20353.
210. Document book 31A, tab 33, p. 3–4.
211. Document book 61, tab 2, p. DND 030754.
212. Document book 31A, tab 33, p. D-6.
213. Document book 61, tab 1, Serial D, p. DND 003363.
214. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 3208–3209.
215. Document book 31A, tab 33, p. DND 002746, point 10, p. DND 002757, point 2.
216. Document book 61C, tab 1, p. B2-1.
217. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19923.
218. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 20022–20028.
219. Document book 31A, tab 33, p. 3.
220. Document book 61D, tab 1B, p. DND 348699; Document book 109, tab 1, pp. 2–3.



221. Document book 31A, tab 33, p. 4.
222. Document book 61C, tab 1, p. B1-1; testimony of LCol Young, Transcripts vol. 29, pp. 5581–5582.
223. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169; Document book 30, tab 43, p. DND 123749.
224. Testimony of Maj Gillam, Transcripts vol. 100, pp. 19594–19609.
225. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169.
226. Document book 61C, tab 1, Serial 22, p. DND 190471.
227. Canadian Forces, *Infantry, volume 1, The Infantry Battalion in Battle*, March 31, 1992, p. 3-2-1.
228. SSF Headquarters, Operation Deliverance Warning Order 01, December 5, 1992, p. 2.
229. SSF Headquarters, Operation Deliverance Operation Order 01 (Op O 01), December 10, 1992, p. 1.
230. Op O 01, SSF 3/6, DND 038056.
231. Board of Inquiry, Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group, vol. III, pp. 525–526 (Exhibit P-20.3).
232. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. VI, p. 2094, chart: CDN AB REGT BN GP–OP CORDON.
233. See Transcripts vol. 1, pp. 111–113. However, LCol Calvin never served with the CAR; see p. 113 and Transcripts vol. 8, pp. 1420–1421.
234. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. III, p. 525. For an overview of the CARBG, see also the testimony of LCdr Bastien (National Defence Operations Centre), Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. II, pp. 206–207; and Col Ross, *Transcript of Policy Hearing*, June 19, 1995, pp. 273–274. See also Ron Pupetz, ed., *The Canadian Joint Forces in Somalia 1992–1993 Journal*, “In the Line of Duty” (1994), pp. 15–16.
235. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. XI, p. 3337 (Exhibit P-20.11).
236. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V, pp. 1187–1188 (Exhibit P-20.5).
237. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. VI, p. 2096 (Exhibit P-20.6).
238. DND, “Backgrounder — Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group Operation Deliverance” (December 1992), p. 1.
239. Testimony of LCol Calvin, Transcripts vol. 8, pp. 1420–1421.
240. Testimony of LCol Calvin, Transcripts vol. 8, pp. 1422–1423; see also p. 1425.
241. See testimony of LCol Calvin, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1422; and DND, *Infantry, vol. 1, The Infantry Battalion in Battle* (1992), p. 2-2-1.
242. DND, *The Infantry Battalion in Battle*, p. 2-2-1.
243. DND, *The Infantry Battalion in Battle*, p. 2-2-1.
244. Transcripts, vol. 8, p. 1426.
245. Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1427.
246. Transcripts, vol. 8, p. 1428. See also Pupetz, *In the Line of Duty*, p. 221.
247. DND, *Operational Training, vol. 2, Unit Administration* (1987), p. 2-2-4.
248. Transcripts, vol. 8, p. 1429.
249. Exhibit P-85.5, chart of Headquarters Commando; and Exhibit P-20.6, Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. VI, p. 2096.
250. DND, *The Infantry Battalion in Battle*, p. 2-2-2.
251. See “Operation Deliverance After Action Report — Military Police Operations”, pp. 4/19–5/19, Exhibit P-205.5, Document book 61E, tab 5; and testimony of MCpl Godin at Board of Inquiry, vol. 3, p. 710.
252. Testimony of LCol Calvin, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1432.
253. Transcripts, vol. 1, p. 122.

254. Transcripts, vol. 1, pp. 122–123.
255. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. VI, p. 2096.
256. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. II, p. 207.
257. Transcripts vol. 8, pp. 1430–1431.
258. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. VI, p. 2096.
259. Testimony of Capt Rainville, *Transcript of the General Court Martial of Capt Rainville*, vol. 6, p. 1042, Exhibit P-31.6.
260. Transcripts, vol. 8, p. 1431; see also vol. 1, p. 125.
261. DND, *Infantry*, vol. 3, *Section and Platoon in Battle* (1976), p. 3–4.
262. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V, p. 1188.
263. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. XI, p. 3335.
264. Transcripts vol. 1, p. 121.
265. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. XI, p. 3335.
266. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. VI, p. 2096.
267. Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1436; and Exhibit P-85.6, “1, 2, and 3 Commandos” (chart).
268. Transcripts vol. 8, pp. 1438–1439.
269. Transcripts vol. 1, p. 120.
270. Transcripts vol. 1, p. 120.
271. Transcripts vol. 1, pp. 115–117.
272. Transcripts vol. 1, p. 114.
273. Transcripts vol. 1, p. 115.
274. Exhibit P-85.7, “Service Commando” (chart). LCol Calvin explained at the hearings that the company quarter master “parallels the regimental quarter master responsible for the provision of beans and bullets to this particular commando”: Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1442.
275. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. XI, p. 3335.
276. Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1442. See also Pupetz, *In the Line of Duty*, p. 214.
277. Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1442. See also Pupetz, *In the Line of Duty*, p. 229.
278. Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1444.
279. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. II, pp. 402–403.
280. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. II, p. 402.
281. Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1445.
282. Testimony of Maj Lelievre at Board of Inquiry, vol. 2, p. 400; *Board of Inquiry*, vol. 6, p. 2096.
283. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. II, pp. 399–400.
284. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V, p. 1188.
285. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. II, p. 400. On the two postal clerks, see Document book 41, tab 9, p. DND 007642.
286. Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1445.
287. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V, pp. 1187–1188.
288. Exhibit P-85.8, “A SQN RCD—1 AB FD SQN” (chart).
289. Transcripts vol. 8, pp. 1448, 1449; DND, “Backgrounder — Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group Operation Deliverance”, p. 2.
290. Board of Inquiry, vol. VI, p. 2096.
291. Transcript of General Court Martial LCol (ret) Mathieu, 2nd trial, vol. 3, p. 459 (Exhibit P-243.2).
292. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. V, p. 1188.
293. Transcripts vol. 8, pp. 1450–1451.

294. Pre-Deployment Daily Executive Meetings, Document book 32.1, tab 32. See also message from LCol Arbuckle (liaison officer at U.S. Central Command), Document book 32, tab 21; HQ CJFS SITREP 009, December 23, 1992, Document book 32, tab 21; Dan Alvis, "The Other Side of Somalia — an American View", *Defence Policy Review* 14/18 (October 4, 1996), p. 2; and Document book 51, tab 2, p. DND 309549.
295. Testimony of Maj Moffat, Transcripts vol. 97, p. 19043.
296. Testimony of Capt Hope at Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. II, p. 518.
297. Testimony of Capt Yuzichuk at Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. III, p. 683.
298. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5260. On the importance of the interpreters, see Document book 63C, tab 2.
299. Testimony of Maj Moffat, Transcripts vol. 97, pp. 19043 and 19045.
300. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. IV, pp. 947–948.
301. Testimony of Cmdre Cogdon, Transcripts vol. 9, pp. 1711–1714.
302. See Col Labbé, "Overview of Comd CJFS Pre Deployment Activities for Op Deliverance", p. DND 383074.
303. Maj L.W. Gillam, "Logistics Overview of Operation Deliverance", Document book 63F, tab 13, p. 2.
304. Sitrep 002, Document book 41, tab 2.
305. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. XI, p. 3337.
306. Testimony of LCol Calvin, Transcripts vol. 1, p. 114.
307. Testimony of Maj Kyle at Board of Inquiry, vol. 3, p. 526. See also Pupetz, *In the Line of Duty*, pp. 89, 222 and 224.
308. Gillam, "Logistics Overview of Operation Deliverance", p. 1.
309. Gillam, "Logistics Overview of Operation Deliverance", p. 4.
310. Gillam, "Logistics Overview of Operation Deliverance", p. 8.
311. Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. II, p. 404; see also pp. 408–409.
312. See Col. Labbé, "Third Line Support — Canadian Joint Force Somalia", December 11, 1992, p. 1/2.
313. DND, *Intelligence*, vol. 2, *Combat Intelligence*, second draft, p. 1-1, B-GL-315-002/FT- 001.
314. *Combat Intelligence*, p. 1-1.
315. For a full description of combat intelligence doctrine, see *Combat Intelligence*, p. 1-2.
316. An in-depth description of the intelligence cycle as it relates to combat intelligence is found in *Combat Intelligence*, Chapter 5. Although this manual reflects current doctrine in the area, according to the director general (Intelligence), it also applied to the period of the CF deployment to Somalia. The manual goes into considerable detail about the intelligence cycle and combat intelligence as it pertains to conventional warfare and the responsibilities of the various levels of army organization. The application of these processes to peace support operations would be difficult (Briefing for Inquiry staff, January 15, 1997).
317. *Combat Intelligence*, p. 1-3.
318. *Combat Intelligence*, p. 1-3.
319. Peace support operation is the generic term for activities in international crises and conflict resolution and management in which the CF may be involved. They include activities conducted in support of preventive diplomacy, peace making, peacekeeping, post-conflict peace building, and peace enforcement operations when limited in scope, local in nature, and in support of a peacekeeping or peace-making mission (Joint Doctrine for CF Joint and Combined Operations, April 6, 1995, B-GG-005-004/AF-000).



320. Mats R. Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping?* Adelphi Paper 281 (London: Brassy's, 1993), p. 43.
321. Robert E. Rehbein, *Informing the Blue Helmets: The United States, UN Peacekeeping Operations and the Role of Intelligence* (Kingston, Ontario: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1996), p. 69.
322. *Peacekeeper's Handbook* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), p. 39. According to the testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 20117, before the Somalia deployment, intelligence officers were not allowed to refer to themselves or be identified as such, for fear of compromising the neutrality of the UN force.
323. New forms of civil unrest and upheaval have surfaced since the end of the Cold War, stemming in part from assertions of nationalism and ethnic or religious strife. The UN has thus been called to intervene in new and varied ways. For a detailed account of the characteristics of the new peacekeeping missions, see Volume 1, Chapter 10 of this report.
324. Hugh Smith, "Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping", *Survival* 36/3 (Autumn 1994), p. 174.
325. Since then, the UN has established the 24-hour Situation Centre in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, consisting in part of the Information and Research Unit, set up to co-ordinate requests for information from their data base from field commanders or to other member state missions for assistance. See Rehbein, *Informing the Blue Helmets*, p. 30.
326. According to Dr. Menkhaus, Transcripts vol. 7, pp. 1332-1333, the UN had very little information on Somalia to disseminate to foreign contingents because the UN does not have information-gathering agencies [and] it...is very dependent on national governments to provide it with information. And this we found was a real weakness...because the UN officials were either beholden to national governments whose information could reflect their own interests or more generally had no information themselves to work off. The UN had actually very little to pass on to member states who were going to be contributing troops and usually the flow of information was the other way around.
327. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 19928-19929.
328. Doctrine pertaining to combat intelligence at the time of the Somalia operation is found in CFP 315(2) Supplement 1 — Combat Intelligence Operations and Training. The current manual on combat intelligence doctrine, which is the source for most of the material in this section, is *Intelligence*, vol. 2, *Combat Intelligence*, second draft, p. 1-1, B-GL-315- 002/FT-001.
329. *Combat Intelligence*, p. 2-1.
330. For a complete list of the tasks and a more detailed description of the six tasks, see *Combat Intelligence*, p. 2-1.
331. For a detailed list of G2 staff responsibilities, see *Combat Intelligence*, Annex C, Chapter 3.
332. For a detailed list of the responsibilities of the battle group intelligence officer, see *Combat Intelligence*, Annex D, Chapter 3.
333. Current doctrine sets out the responsibilities of intelligence staff and the procedures to be followed to a certain extent. See *Combat Intelligence*, pp. 20-2 to 20-6.
334. *Combat Intelligence*, pp. 5-14 to 5-18.
335. *Combat Intelligence*, pp. 5-18 to 5-19.
336. *Combat Intelligence*, p. 20-9.

337. In 1992, doctrine for joint and combined operations was found in CFP(J) 5(4), Canadian Forces Joint and Combined Operations Doctrine (Interim). Current doctrine for joint and combined operations is found in B-GG-005-004/AF-000, effective April 6, 1995, and is essentially a codification of previous conventional doctrine.
338. Col Houghton, director of peacekeeping at National Defence Headquarters at the time, testified about the situation in Somalia during the period of the UN technical mission. Col Houghton confirmed reports of no government infrastructure or central authority, Testimony of Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 44, p. 8676. See also the technical mission report (March–April), Document book 9, tab 11.
339. When UNOSOM was first established, only the military observers were agreed to by the ruling factions in Mogadishu. The security force was referred to only in principle. It was generally acknowledged that such an arrangement would place the observers at greater risk. See briefing note, ADM (Pol & Comm) to CDS and DM, April 28, 1992, Document book 60, tabs 16 and 17.
340. Testimony of Gen (ret) de Chastelain, Transcripts vol. 49, p. 9920
341. Somalia Threat Assessment, July 29, 1992, Document book 9, tab 24, p. 4.
342. Note on Options for a Canadian Response to the Crisis in Somalia, August 5, 1992. Document book 27, tab 21, pp. 5–6. The report noted that with anarchy prevailing, the UN forces could encounter small-arms fire from groups attempting to raid or otherwise interfere with relief supplies. Compliance by armed factions with UN humanitarian plans was seen as unlikely at that time, yet important in determining the level of risk to which the UN troops might be exposed.
343. Testimony of Col Bremner, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1504.
344. Preliminary Intelligence Estimate, prepared by G2, August 5, 1992, Document book 65A, tab 1.
345. Preliminary Intelligence Estimate, p. 16.
346. Telex, Col Fraser, PRMNY, to EXTOTT, August 23, 1992, Document book 27, tab 33. Gen Aideed had recently agreed to the deployment of the Pakistani battalion, and only after protracted negotiations. There was legitimate concern that once he heard of the additional troops assigned to headquarters in Mogadishu, a strong reaction would follow.
347. Minutes, DEM, August 25, 1992, Document book 32.1, tab 4. See also Somalia Area Brief, August 21, 1992, prepared by G2, Document book 11, tab 13, which provided basic intelligence on Somalia, including sections on political, social, geographic and military intelligence, and information on the state of the economy and infrastructure.
348. FMC Draft Contingency Plan Op Cordon, Document book 12, tab 16, annex C, p. C-1/2.
349. FMC Draft Contingency Plan, annex C, p. C-1/2.
350. FMC Draft Contingency Plan, annex C, p. C-1/2.
351. DCDS, Operation Deliverance, Final Report of Lessons Learned, March 21, 1995, Document book 62E, tab 18G, pp. 17, 18, 27.
352. As Intelligence Officer with the CAR, Capt Hope testified at great length about doctrine, intelligence gathering, intelligence dissemination, and the resulting problems. His testimony with respect to intelligence can be found in Transcripts vols. 102 and 103.

353. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 20113. At various points in his testimony, Capt Hope raised this issue and indicated serious concerns about the inadequacy of the doctrine, noting that he had yet to see the recently prepared doctrine on intelligence for low-intensity operations.
354. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 20120. When he first received notification that the CAR would be deployed to Bossasso, he spoke to someone in the intelligence corps who specialized in plans and doctrine and was advised that no doctrine was available at the time. He received some advice, however, regarding the basics of operation.
355. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19967.
356. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19916.
357. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19916.
358. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 19935–19936.
359. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7084.
360. See the intelligence report annex to the reconnaissance report, Document book 16, tab 12, annex D, p. 4.
361. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19940.
362. Intelligence report annex, pp. 3–4.
363. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 19917–19919.
364. Several officers found the briefing useful. See the testimony of Maj Mackay, Transcripts vol. 33, pp. 6397–6399. LCol Morneault found the briefing excellent and indicated that his intelligence officer was able to get a complete map of the country broken down by clan; testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7078.
365. Testimony of LCol Morneault, Transcripts vol. 36, p. 7080.
366. Testimony of Maj Kyle, Transcripts vol. 22, p. 4001.
367. Document book, LCol Morneault 2, tab 4.
368. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19938.
369. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 19938–19939.
370. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32744–32745.
371. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32796.
372. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32796.
373. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32820.
374. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, p. 32801.
375. As expressed in the CJFS headquarters war diary, February 18, 1993, Document book 51, tab 3, p. 10/19. The entry noted:

Reporting of the area to the northeast of Belet Huen has not been forthcoming and all efforts to obtain coverage have met with little success. As the region flanks the CDN HRS and contains the bulk of hostile combatant forces in the area it is vital to have a detailed understanding of the daily situation. We have indications that this information is available at UNITAF but not being disseminated to CJFS.
376. Much of the information concerning the intelligence activities of the First Canadian Division was drawn from the Operation Deliverance After Action Report on Intelligence prepared by First Canadian Division, 3350-52-27 (J2), December 1993, but not filed with the Inquiry because of the classified nature of some of the information in it. The portions referred to in this part are non-controversial and non-classified.



377. Intelligence Support Direction and Guidelines, BGen Doshen, Director General Intelligence, Document book 65, tab 1.
378. Document book 65, tab 1, annex A.
379. Document book 21, tab 14, annex B. But note that the direction given by Col Labbé was primarily for CJFS Headquarters intelligence personnel, as the information requested focused on the Mogadishu area, not Belet Huen.
380. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 20114–20115.
381. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 20116.
382. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19942.
383. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 19946–19949.
384. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 19935–19936. Note however that the threat assessments were not filed in evidence at the Inquiry because of the classified nature of the information in them.
385. Document book 20, tab 14, p. B-1-6.
386. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 19955–19957.
387. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 20173 and following.
388. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 20176–20177.
389. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19950.
390. “Ops Notes, 23 Dec, CDS Briefing Book, Op Deliverance”, Document book 23, tab 1, p. 1382. See also the exchange between Capt Hope and counsel for the government of Canada on this issue in Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 20160–20162.
391. Testimony of Dr. Menkhaus, Transcripts vol. 7, p. 1333.
392. Many of the witnesses testified about the inadequacy of pre-deployment training on the situation in Somalia.
393. Testimony of Maj Seward, Transcripts vol. 32, pp. 6093–6095.
394. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 19930–19931.
395. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19927.
396. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19959.
397. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19923.
398. See generally the discussion about this point in the testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, pp. 20024–20032.
399. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 20030.
400. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 20115.
401. See, generally, testimony of Dr. Menkhaus, Transcripts vol. 7, pp. 1287–1382, especially pp. 1380–1382.
402. Testimony of Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 20147.
403. DCDS, Operation Deliverance, Final Report of Lessons Learned, March 21, 1995, Document book 62E, tab 18G, pp. 17, 18, 27.
404. FMC Draft Contingency Plan, Document book 12, tab 16, annex C, pp. C-1/2 to C-2/2.
405. Final Report of Lessons Learned, p. 18.
406. SSF, Operation Cordon/Deliverance After Action Report, February 2, 1993, Document book 61, tab 13H, p. A-11/17.
407. See, generally, testimony of Dr. Menkhaus, Transcripts vol. 7, pp. 1287–1382.
408. See the testimony of Capt Walsh, Transcripts vol. 13, p. 2377–2378, regarding the use of taped newscasts for training; and Capt Hope, Transcripts vol. 102, p. 19940, regarding intelligence briefings.
409. MWO Mills testified that the soldiers kept their “eyes glued to CNN”, Transcripts vol. 23, p. 4345.
410. Testimony of Col MacDonald, Transcripts vol. 26, p. 4952.

411. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, p. 5153.
412. According to Maj Pommet, the reports revealed mainly violence and looting in Mogadishu, where the threat was far more serious. In Bossaso, things were calm and stable: Transcripts vol. 182, p. 37522.
413. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, pp. 21309–21312.
414. Cpl Purnelle testified that the reality of what they faced in Somalia was a shock to them all: Transcripts vol. 35, pp. 6839–6840.
415. Testimony of Dr. Menkhaus, Transcripts vol. 7, pp. 1346–1347.
416. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5163–5164.
417. Testimony of Dr. Menkhaus, Transcripts vol. 7, pp. 1345–1346.
418. Testimony of Dr. Menkhaus, Transcripts vol. 7, pp. 1351–13522.
419. Dr. Menkhaus cited by way of example the warning in the handbook that locals with weapons must be considered dangerous. According to Dr. Menkhaus, however, almost all Somalis were carrying weapons at the time to protect their herds: Transcripts vol. 7, p. 1362.
420. Testimony of Maj Moreau, Transcripts vol. 52, pp. 10351–10353 and 10385–10387.
421. Testimony of WO Labrie, Transcripts vol. 53, pp. 10609–10612.
422. Testimony of Sgt MacAuley, Transcripts vol. 54, pp. 10744–10745.
423. Testimony of Sgt MacAuley, Transcripts vol. 54, p. 10675.
424. Testimony of Sgt Godfrey, Transcripts vol. 54, pp. 10787–10812.
425. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, pp. 21366–21368.
426. This was confirmed by most of the soldiers, many of whom were advised just hours before they left that there could be trouble upon their arrival in Belet Huen. They landed in combat gear, fully armed, and took position. See testimony of Capt Poitras, Transcripts vol. 52, pp. 10411–10412.
427. Testimony of Sgt Godfrey, Transcripts vol. 54, pp. 10788–10793.
428. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 28, pp. 5302–5303. Maj Kampman's concerns are explored later in this chapter.
429. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, pp. 33038–33039.
430. Testimony of LCol Moffat, Transcripts vol. 97, p. 18923. Note, however, that LCol Moffat did not substantiate this assertion.
431. A glossary issued by Force Mobile Command (November 1, 1991) defines logistics as follows:

The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with:

- a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel;
- b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel;
- c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and
- d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (AAP-6(S))

(ADTB Note: In Canadian operations, the movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel are not logistics functions). Land Force Command, *Operational Staff Procedures*, vol. 2, *Staff Duties in the Field*, Supplement 3, *Army Glossary* (B-GL-303-002/JX-Z03), p. L-12. Under this definition, logistics is related to but distinct from the materiel provisionment of forces.

The Materiel Assets Lexicon (Supply and Services Canada, 1992) defines **materiel** as

Movable property and all assets, including equipment and stores, other than money and real property. It comprises: raw materials and manufactured products, short-term consumable items, small durable items such as cameras, medium-sized items such as office equipment and furniture, and large items such as vehicles and aircraft.

432. National support element is a generic term identifying personnel who, for the duration of an operation, link Canada to the support of whatever force is being supported, independent of that force's own resources: Testimony of Col Furrie, Transcripts vol. 99, p. 19472.
433. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20352.
434. Gillam, "Logistics Overview", Document book 63F, tab 13, p. 9.
435. Testimony of LCol Turner, Transcripts vol. 18, p. 3407; and Mr. Fowler, Transcripts vol. 50, p. 10172.
436. Document book 9, tab 16, point 3d.
437. Document book 9, tab 15.
438. Document book 9, tab 15, p. 3.
439. Document book 9, tab 15, p. 6.
440. Document book 17, tab 3, p. 4.
441. Technical mission report (March–April), paragraph 5.
442. Document book 16, tab 18, p. 3/6.
443. Technical mission report (March–April), paragraph 9.
444. Report of the Technical Mission to Somalia, August 4–17, 1992, Annex 8, Logistic Evaluation for Peacekeeping Forces, Document book 11, tab 6, pp. 51–62.
445. Technical mission report (August), Annex 5, Activities of the Technical Team, pp. 32–37; Annex 8, Logistic Evaluation for Peacekeeping Forces, pp. 48–51; and Annex 9, Logistics: Accommodation, pp. 51, 55–56.
446. Document book 17, tab 8, p. DND 006857–006858.
447. Document book 28, tab 12, p. DND 111436; Document book 20, tab 16, p. DND 006856.
448. Document book 15, tab 2, p. 8.
449. Document book 15, tab 2, p. 9.
450. Testimony of Col Houghton, Transcripts vol. 44, pp. 8702–8703.
451. Document book 29, tab 10, Annex A, p. DND 123602.
452. "Op Cordon ADM Recce Report", Document book 15, tab 21, p. 3.
453. Testimony of Col Bremner, Transcripts vol. 8, p. 1505.
454. Document book 16, tab 10, p. DND 001519, point 2.
455. "Op Cordon ADM Recce Report", p. 3.
456. "Op Cordon ADM Recce Report", p. 4.
457. "Op Cordon ADM Recce Report", pp. 4–5.
458. "Recce Report Somalia, 12–18 October 1992", Maritime Section, Annex C, Logistics, Document book 29, tab 1, p. C-4.
459. Document book 17, tab 7, pp. 4, 7.
460. Document book 17, tab 8, pp. 5, 6.
461. Document book 17, tab 8, p. 8.
462. "Op Cordon–Op Ready Declaration", Document book 17, tab 9.
463. Document book 16, tab 5, p. DND 002210, point 2.



464. "MARLANT OPORD 23/92", Appendix 2 to Annex N, DND 086440, p. N2-1.
465. Document book 16, tab 5, pp. DND 002210-002212.
466. Document book 14, tab 14, p. 3.
467. Document book 24, tab 1, Annex A, p. A-1.
468. Document book 24, tab 1, Annex A, p. A-14.
469. Document book 22, tab 14, pp. DND 007691, 007697.
470. Document book 22, tab 17, p. DND 007685.
471. Document book 15, tab 21; Document book 62E, tab 18.
472. Document book 22, tab 6, p. DND 006727.
473. Document book 31A, tab 30, p. DND 108339.
474. Document book 20, tab 22, p. 5, section III, paragraph 1.
475. Document book 31A, tab 25, p. DND 082643, point 1.
476. Document book 31A, tab 25, p. 1.
477. Document book 22, tab 6, pp. DND 006727-006728.
478. Document book 30, tab 22, p. DND 099155.
479. Document book 22, tab 6, p. DND 006727.
480. Document book 22, tab 6, p. DND 006728.
481. Document book 22, tab 6, p. DND 006729.
482. Document book 23, tab 19, p. DND 007543, point 3A(1).
483. Testimony of Maj Gillam at Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. II, p. 414.
484. Summary of Operation Deliverance Situation Reports, Document book 23, tab 25, p. 2.
485. Gillam, "Logistics Overview", Document book 63F, tab 13, p. 1.
486. Operation Deliverance, Final Report of Lessons Learned, March 21, 1995, Document book 62E, tab 18, p. 3.
487. Testimony of Maj Gillam, Transcripts vol. 100, pp. 19595-19604.
488. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, pp. 21471-21472.
489. Testimony of MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, p. 20599.
490. Testimony of Sgt MacAuley, Transcripts vol. 54, p. 10700.
491. Testimony of MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, pp. 20600-20601.
492. Col Joly, "Director Infantry Post Visit Report", April 19, 1993, Document book 63F, tab 11F, p. 15-17.
493. Message, date unknown, but sometime after March 23, 1993, Document book 63E, tab 14.
494. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, pp. 20353-20354, 20366, 20371.
495. Testimony of WO Labrie, Transcripts vol. 53, p. 10611.
496. Testimony of Sgt Godfrey, Transcripts vol. 54, pp. 10790-10793.
497. Testimony of Capt Poitras, Transcripts vol. 52, p. 10425.
498. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, pp. 20374-20375.
499. Joly, "Director Infantry Post Visit Report", p. 16.
500. Testimony of Capt Poitras, Transcripts vol. 52, p. 10427.
501. Report by Maj Pommet, April 17, 1993, Document book 61A, tab 1, p. DND 013011.
502. Testimony of Sgt MacAuley, Transcripts vol. 54, pp. 10696-10697.
503. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20329.
504. Testimony at General Court Martial of LCol Mathieu (First Trial), Transcripts vol. 3, p. 484.
505. Testimony of MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, pp. 20578-20581.
506. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, pp. 20318-20319.

507. "Adm O Admt 3 — Op Deliverance", February 10, 1993, Document book 63D, tab 13, p. 14.
508. Operation Deliverance Final Report of Lessons Learned, March 21, 1995, Document book 62E, tab 18G, p. C-29.
509. Maj Pommet, "Report, Operation Deliverance, Part 1", Document book 61A, tab 1, p. DND 013002.
510. Testimony of Sgt MacAuley, Transcripts vol. 54, pp. 10685–10686, 10717–10718.
511. Testimony of Sgt MacAuley, Transcripts vol. 54, pp. 10676–10687.
512. Testimony of Sgt Godfrey, Transcripts vol. 54, pp. 10811–10812.
513. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5221, 5240.
514. Testimony of Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5222, 5241.
515. SSE, After Action Report Operation Cordon/Deliverance, February 2, 1993, Annex A, Document book 61, tab H, p. A-14.
516. SSE, After Action Report, p. A-15.
517. Testimony of WO Labrie, Transcripts vol. 53, p. 10618.
518. Testimony of Capt Powell, Transcripts vol. 101, p. 19884.
519. Testimony of Capt Poitras, Transcripts vol. 52, p. 10447.
520. BGen Beno, Op Cordon/Deliverance After Action Report, February 2, 1993, Document book 24, tab 1, p. A-17.
521. Maj Pommet, "Report, Operation Deliverance, Part 1", pp. DND 013008–013009.
522. Testimony of Sgt Hobbs, Transcripts vol. 55, pp. 10902.
523. LCol MacDonald, "Op Deliverance Prep, Lessons Learned", December 18, 1992, Document book 22, tab 8, p. 2.
524. Testimony of Sgt Hobbs, Transcripts vol. 55, pp. 10940–10941, 10943.
525. Maj Pommet, "Report, Operation Deliverance, Part 1", p. DND 013009.
526. Operation Deliverance, Final Report of Lessons Learned, March 21, 1995, Document book 62E, tab 18F, Annex B, pp. B-8 and B-9.
527. Operation Deliverance, Final Report of Lessons Learned, pp. C-75, C-80.
528. BGen Beno, Op Cordon/Deliverance After Action Report, February 2, 1993, Document book 24, tab 1, Annex A, p. A-16.
529. Op Deliverance After Action Report, November 4, 1993, Document book 61D, tab 1B, Appendix 4 to Annex B, p. B4-4.
530. Op Deliverance After Action Report, p. B4-4.
531. Airflow Cargo Message, February 2, 1993, Document book 63D, tab 3, p. 1.
532. Maj Gillam, "Logistics Overview", Document book 63F, tab 13, p. 2.
533. Testimony of Maj Gillam, Transcripts vol. 100, pp. 19565–19566.
534. Operation Deliverance, Final Report of Lessons Learned, March 21, 1995, p. C-67.
535. Operation Deliverance, Final Report of Lessons Learned, p. C-67.
536. Marland Headquarters, Halifax, Operation Deliverance Lessons Learned, February 19, 1993, Document book 31A, tab 42, pp. DND 087610, 087692.
537. BGen Beno, Operation Cordon/Deliverance After Action Report, February 2, 1993, Annex A, p. A-12.
538. Maj Weicker, Operation Deliverance After Action Report, February 11, 1993, Document book 61, tab K, p. A-3.
539. Maj Vanderveer, Service Commando After Action Report — Deployment, February 25, 1993, Document book 61, tab 21, p. 2-3.
540. LCol Macdonald, Operation Deliverance Prep, Lessons Learned, December 18, 1992, Document book 22, tab 8, p. 1.

541. Testimony of LCol Young, Transcripts vol. 29, p. 5634.
542. Testimony of Col Furrie, Transcripts vol. 99, p. 19449.
543. Testimony of Col Furrie, Transcripts vol. 99, pp. 19424–19425.
544. Testimony of Col Furrie, Transcripts vol. 99, p. 19428.
545. Testimony of Maj Gillam, Transcripts vol. 100, p. 19584.
546. Testimony of Col Furrie, Transcripts vol. 99, pp. 19463–19465.
547. Testimony of Maj Gillam, Transcripts vol. 100, pp. 19586–19587.
548. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 161, pp. 32968–32969.
549. Testimony of Maj Gillam, Transcripts vol. 100, p. 19544.
550. Testimony of Col Furrie, Transcripts vol. 99, p. 19475.
551. Maj Gillam, “Logistics Overview”, Document book 63F, tab 13, p. 7; and telex, LCol Carveth to LCol Furrie, February 1993, Document book 63F, tab 8, p. 4.
552. Testimony of MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, p. 20568.
553. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, pp. 34876, 34878.
554. See testimony of CWO Jardine, Transcripts vol. 105, p. 20890, who believed that the ground was dictating how they would set up camp; and Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, pp. 20308, 20309, who was also supportive of the location, though critical of the final plans for the camp layout.
555. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, pp. 34884, 34885.
556. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, p. 34875 (translation).
557. Testimony of MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, pp. 20558–20559.
558. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, p. 34878.
559. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, p. 34864. Col Labbé testified that he discussed the outcome of the training with LCol Mathieu because he wanted to know whether the triangular compound could be used in Bossasso, but since the outcome of Stalwart Providence training was not conclusive, the idea of using this type of compound was abandoned: Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, p. 33053.
560. Testimony of MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, pp. 20561, 20564.
561. Testimony of MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, pp. 20560–20562.
562. See, for example, testimony of MWO O'Connor, Transcripts vol. 109, pp. 21781–21783; and Maj Kampman, Transcripts vol. 27, pp. 5163–5165.
563. Testimony of MWO O'Connor, Transcripts vol. 109, p. 21783.
564. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, pp. 20315, 20316.
565. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20333.
566. Testimony of LCol Moffat, Transcripts vol. 99, p. 19390.
567. Testimony of MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, p. 20563.
568. Testimony of Sgt Little, Transcripts vol. 110, p. 22097.
569. Maj Pommet, “Report — Operation Deliverance — Part I”, April 17, 1993, Document book 61A, tab 1A.
570. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, pp. 34847–34848.
571. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, pp. 34862–34863.
572. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, p. 21408.
573. Document book 61, tab 24, paragraph b.
574. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, pp. 20333–20334.
575. Document book 61A, Tab 1A.
576. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20319.
577. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, p. 33044.



- 578. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, pp. 21398–21399.
- 579. Document Book 61A, Tab 1.
- 580. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, p. 34849.
- 581. Testimony of Maj Gillam, Transcripts vol. 100, pp. 19601–19603.
- 582. Document book 61A, tab 1.
- 583. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, p. 21400.
- 584. Document book 61A, tab 1.
- 585. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, pp. 21405–21408.
- 586. Testimony of Maj Pommet, Transcripts vol. 107, p. 21406.
- 587. Testimony of Col Labbé, Transcripts vol. 162, p. 33044.
- 588. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, p. 34859.
- 589. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, pp. 34880–34881.
- 590. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20322.
- 591. Testimony of LCol Mathieu, Transcripts vol. 169, pp. 34854–34855.
- 592. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20322.
- 593. Testimony of CWO Jardine, Transcripts vol. 105, p. 20902.
- 594. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, pp. 20327–20328.
- 595. Testimony of MWO Amaral, Transcripts vol. 104, p. 20578.
- 596. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20336.
- 597. Testimony of Maj Mansfield, Transcripts vol. 103, p. 20322.

















Commission of Inquiry  
into the Deployment of  
Canadian Forces to Somalia



CANADA

Commission d'enquête  
sur le déploiement des  
Forces canadiennes en Somalie





